

POLITICAL CONSTELLATION AND DECISION-MAKING – CASE STUDY: TWO LEADERS IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO



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Abstract

In representative democracy, citizens with free vote, mainly political parties, elect their representatives to legislate, supervise, protect and make decisions that are in their interest. Given this, political leaders express the thoughts, wishes and will of the voters and act as their representatives when defending interest and making decisions that are related to the quality and the fate of their lives. Supporting their decisions can often be decisive for success and failure in their political career. Thus, in this paper work, it will be given views on how their decision-making is influenced by: leadership position and support from the coming party, constellation of political forces in parliament, achievement of a common platform and political consensus among political actors, constitutional norms, and broad civic support.

The methodology used will be in harmony with the purpose of the study. Here will be an analysis of the behavior and actions of the two leaders within the constellation built in their country. In the course of this, this study will be oriented to the analysis of the political circumstances prevailing in the respective countries, the position of leadership within the party, the position and constitutional functions that favor one or the other, the distribution of political forces in the respective parliaments and many other moments. For this purpose, the interviews of the two leaders, the statements of the opposition leaders in the respective countries, the statements of prominent politicians, the other political and legal documents will be analyzed with which they will provide sufficient evidence on how they can be influenced in the process of the decision-making process during the Serbia-Kosovo Normalization negotiations.

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, the number of wars between sovereign states has decreased, but the same cannot be said of wars within states, the number of which has increased and today they are the largest number of armed conflicts in the world.

Nowadays, for international peace and security, the threat to peace and world security are sub state conflicts. These are armed conflicts within the borders of the state where certain ethnic groups under the umbrella of the principle of self-determination aim at secession and the creation of their state.

From the start of 1990 to the end of 1999 there were 118 armed conflicts worldwide, involving 80 states and two para-state regions and resulting in the death of approximately six million people (Smith, 2004).

Holst has defined conflict as “a situation involving incompatible collective objectives and the possibility of armed conflict between two or more governments” (Holst, 1995).

Unlike Holst, Goldstein has defined the conflict with the following words: “Conflict may be defined as a difference in preferred outcomes in a bargaining situation” (Joshua, 1994).

From the abovementioned definitions, we note that conflicts are the result of disagreement and opposition of the parties on certain issues, whereas the negotiations imply the process of approximating the opposite positions by favoring the solution by peaceful means.

In international relations, the attempt to resolve conflicts peacefully represents one of the most acceptable settlement processes between the parties. During this process, the parties are oriented towards finding a solution by creating a relaxing climate followed by the reduction of tensions by favoring the solution by peaceful means.

This assertion is contained in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that “any dispute that endangers international peace and security would at first be tried to be resolved through negotiations, arbitration, judicial remedy and several other such means” (UN Charter, art, 33).

Nowadays, negotiations are the simplest and most up-to-date way of solving post-conflict situations.

According to Pillutla, negotiations are “The process through which two or more parties who are in conflict over outcomes attempt to reach an agreement. It is a constructive, positive alternative to haggling or arguing; it is aimed at building an agreement rather than winning a battle” (Pillutla, 2004).

Meanwhile, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger defined the negotiation as “a process of combining conflicting

positions in a common position under a decision rule of unanimity” (Kissinger, 1969).

Odel et al, conceptualize negotiation “as a process in which actors take steps to agree on an outcome, and every actor seeks to make that outcome as good as possible from their own perspective” (Maldonato, 2010).

From the above definitions of negotiating by different authors, we conclude that negotiating involves the efforts of contradictory parties that have substantial differences between them to reach final solutions acceptable to both parties.

Aristotle in his work *Nicomachean Ethics* defines the decision making process as a *Deliberate Appetition*, “which is a logical and psychological sequence that starts with desire, continues with violation and concludes with the act of choice” (Maldonato, 2010). Seckler-Hudson, emphasize that “Decision making in a government is a plural activity. One individual may pronounce the decision, but may contribute to the process of reaching the decision. It is part of the political system” (Laxmikanth, 2011).

Roth and Mullen the decision-making process considers as “a technique that is designed to help arrive at the best possible choice that satisfies that higher order values and goals that have been selected” (Byron, Myllen, 2002).

During the negotiation process, leaders are in a situation where they need to make difficult decisions. Not always their decisions are welcome and sometimes even outdated. “There are on occasion leaders whose rationality may be questioned, but there are far fewer such individuals than those who are commonly labeled irrational. Hence, when seeking to explain foreign policy decisions, it is more fruitful to start with the assumption that the leaders who made these puzzling decisions were rational human beings trying their best to make “good” foreign policy decisions for their countries” (Tetlock, 2004).

Of course, when we carefully analyze the above statement, we will get an answer (though perhaps incomplete) of what motivates these leaders, what is the impact of the circumstances and which factors are determinants that have driven them to take these decisions.

During the negotiating process, the main goal of decision-making is to get the best out of this process, to reduce the losses to a minimum, and finally, the most important issue to solve the problem.

Often decision-making means choosing the right options but, "Skeptics of good judgment in foreign policy decision making argue that the world is very complex and that, as a result, decisions often have many unintended consequences" (Tetlock, 1992).

According to Jensen, "the impact of personality on decision-making is perhaps the most contentious (Jensen, 1982). The role of personality in foreign policy encompasses cognitive processes, background, personal characteristics, motives, and beliefs, and assumes that decision making is the result of individual 'human agency'; that is, that ultimately, it is individuals who make decisions, not states" (Jensen, 1982).

"Foreign policy decision making (FPDM) refers to the choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation's actions on the international stage. Foreign policy decisions are typically characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk" (Jonantan, Renshon, 2008).

From the definitions made above, we can conclude that decision-making is a process of choosing the best option, among the possible solutions taking into account the costs and consequences.

So decision-making is a very important moment for every politician's political career and for the country's destiny. According to Lin, decision-making is a common behavior that is present in economic, political life and is a form of practice that often occurs in management activities whose ultimate purpose is to attain a specific goal (Lin, 2016). Therefore, the solution for which leaders are determined must be endorsed by individuals, institutions, political parties, even the citizens themselves, so when they are determined for a solution, they certainly consider this fact. It can be said that from political psychology researchers, a general consensus has been reached that politicians' decision-making relies on their personality as "their individual pattern of integration of processes of perception, memory, judgment, goal-seeking, and emotional expression and regulation" (Winter, 2009), but what this paper seeks to offer is that the political constellation in which they operate is also of great importance as

it has a decisive significance in the behavior and decision-making of political leaders during the negotiations.

The political decision-making process has to do with decisions on important political issues or social issues that affect both internally and internationally, so the decision-making subjects that are leaders of a political party, state or government leaders, or even military leaders, should have a strong support when making their own decisions.

Leadership, studies of its role and importance in negotiations are numerous and theories have been raised. Our goal in this seminar paper is to show that the negotiation process is very complex, does not depend solely on the attitudes and behavior of the leader, but they are influenced by both; domestic and international circumstances and factors.

In his work "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", Marx wrote, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx, 1852).

Meanwhile, Spencer argued, "[We] must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears and the social state into which that race has slowly grown... Before he can remake his society, his society must make him" (Herbert, Spencer, 1986).

During the negotiations, Putnam points out that the leaders, "[At] the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments" (Putnam, 1984).

The purpose of this paper work is to show that in the Serbia-Kosovo negotiation process, the behavior and actions of the two leaders are influenced by the political constellation built in their countries. As such, this study will be oriented to the analysis of the political circumstances that reign in the respective countries, the position of leadership within the party, the position and

constitutional functions that favor one or the other, the distribution of political forces in respective parliaments and many other moments. With the sole purpose of contributing to filling the gap in knowledge about the influence of political constellation in leadership behavior and decision making, I expect this paper to provide sufficient evidence of how both leaders are influenced in their decision-making process during the process Normalization of Serbia-Kosovo Relations.

The subject of the study is two presidents; Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo President, Hashim Thaçi. The study will analyze their path of promotion in the political career, the position of the two leaders they had in their parties before being elected president, the role and constitutional functions, the report of the political forces in the perspective parliaments, and the broad civic support. It will also analyze the political statements and interviews of party leaders and state institutions, relevant to the topic.

In this paper work, with the notion of political constellation, we understand the political circumstances in which the two leaders act during the negotiation process for normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations, the political power of the leaders within the party, which they have the main support, the support of political forces in parliament, support from citizens, as well as the constitutional function and norms that influence the process of political negotiation and final decision-making. Acting under these circumstances, they must make decisions that respond to their claims, arguments, proposals, and expectations, in order to reach a final and legally binding agreement on the parties.

Also, achieving a domestic political consensus is necessary considering the many difficulties faced by both leaders during bilateral negotiations. The importance of this process, for both sides, highlights the need for broad co-operation within the local political spectrum, co-operation between political actors, interest groups and citizens, for the creation of a common political platform that will overcome the partial differences and harmonize positions on a negotiated political agreement.

With the Serbia-Kosovo Relations Normalization Agreement, this paper implies an agreement that is viable, sustainable and that does not create instability in both countries, but also in the region. Through this legal agreement, binding on the parties, Serbia would accept Kosovo's international subjectivity, would not prevent it in the integration processes, would not hinder Kosovo's membership in international institutions and mechanisms, and

would pave the way for membership in the EU, while the Serbian minority in Kosovo, through the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, will be enabled to represent the collective interests of ethnic Serbs, in particular in the fields of education, health, urban and rural planning and economy.

1. Internal party support for the leader

Of course, one of the most important moments, during the political career of the leaders, is the taking and enforcement of decisions. When they make their own decisions "they do so in different ways, such as seeking followers' thoughts and making decisions together" (Yukl, 2010).

The political decision-making of the leader is largely influenced by the role and support within the political party. Much more, that a party is dominated by its leadership, towards other members, its decisions become more acceptable. The political decision-making of the leader is largely influenced by the role and support within the political party. How much is voted and the more a party is dominated by its leadership, towards other members, its decisions become more acceptable.

The Democratic Party of Kosovo is a political party formed after the end of the war in 1999 by KLA leaders, most of whom until then were activists and leaders of the People's Movement of Kosovo. From the foundation until the resignation of him, Hashim Thaçi was in charge of it. After resigning from the post of president, Kadri Veseli, a close associate of Thaçi, was led by PDK after the election of President of Kosovo.

Table 1. Number of votes of PDK and its leader Thaçi

Year	Nr. of voters	PDK votes	% votes	Seats	Thaçi's votes
2004	699519	119 112	28,85	30	
2007	628630	196 207	34,3	37	105378
2010	698751	224 339	32,11	34	160850
2014	734055	222 181	30,39	37	166422
2017	727986	245 627	33.74	23	

Source: Central Election Commission of Kosovo

From the analysis of these statistics, we can see that Hashim Thaçi was an indisputable leader in PDK and his political career had a constant up until his election as President of Kosovo. What is apparent to PDK is that in the last elections it entered a large pre-election coalition with the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo and the Initiative for Kosovo with the sole aim of getting out in the elections. So there was a coalition of war parties with the sole aim of gaining power. This proved to be successful for the coalition, but not for PDK. From these elections she won only 23 seats in parliament, which could be a little support for President Thaçi's decision-making. Even more difficult is the fact that within this brisk coalition there are many differences and disagreements.

Table 2. Number of SRS votes

Year	Nr. of voters	SRS votes	% votes	Seats
2008	4 141 176	1 219 436 453	29,36	78
2012	3 739 317	180 558	4.61	0
2014	3 592 375	1 736 920	48.35	158
2016	3 667 915	1 823 147	48.25	131

Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the National Assembly of Serbia

Table 3. Number of votes for Nikolić and Tadić

Year	Candidate	Proposer	Nr. of votes	% votes
January 2008	T. Nikolić	SRS	1 646 172	39,99
	B. Tadić	DS	1 681 528	53,24

Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the National Assembly of Serbia

Table 4. Votes of Serbian presidents until Vučić is elected president of Serbia

February 2008	T. Nikolić	SRS	2 197 155 47 9	48,81
	B. Tadić	DS	2.304.467 50,31	51.19
May 06 2012	T. Nikolić	SNS	979 216	25,05
	B.Tadić	DS	989 454	25,31
May 20 2012	T. Nikolić	SNS	1 552 063	49,54

	B. Tadić	DS	1 481 952	47,31
April 2017	A. Vučić	Coalition SNS...	2 012 788	55,08
	Sasa Jankovic	Citizens' Group For Serbia Without Strain	597 728	16,36

Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the National Assembly of Serbia

For change, Aleksandar Vučić was not the leader of the party. He entered the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in 1993 and after the election he was a member of the National Assembly. In 1995 he was elected secretary general of the SRS. In March 1998, Vučić was appointed Minister of Information in the Government of Mirko Marjanović (Narod koji ima najkraće pamćenje na svetu <http://www.prekoramena.com/t.item.459/Vučić-o-cenzuri-medija.html>).

Following the dismissal of Tomislav Nikolić from the Serbian Radical Party, on September 12, 2008, Vučić, one of the most popular figures among SRS supporters, resigned from Radical Party on 14 September 2008. Vučić briefly served as Minister of Defense and First Deputy Prime Minister from July 2012 to August 2013, when he stepped down from his position as Defense Minister in a cabinet reshuffle. Although the Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, held formal power as head-of-government, many analysts thought that Vučić had the most influence in government as head of the largest party in the ruling coalition and parliament.

Before his tenure as his country's president Vučić served as prime minister of Serbia in two terms from 2014-2016 and from 2016 to 2017, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister from 2012 to 2014.

2. Political consensus and the establishment of unity for talks

Political consensus among the parties plays an important role in decision-making of leaders in the negotiation process. It plays an extremely important role in the quality of decision-making of presidents, especially in countries with parliamentary democracy such as Serbia and Kosovo. In a post-conflict society and a lack of democracy environment, they can be crucial to political stability as "the parties are objects of civic loyalty, voter mobilizers, and key actors in democratic politics"(Montero,

Rashmond, 200). They represent different segments of society and their interests. For the parties and citizens of both states, this is the first time that negotiations on vital issues are negotiated in this format. Also, parties are a key element in decision-making, as any agreement should be ratified in the respective parliaments, so without their vote in parliament, the agreement would have no value. To achieve progress in negotiations, the constituency between political parties can be very useful. Under these conditions, consensus is indispensable to the fact that actors within political parties are the same people who fight each other for political power.

Certainly, such support within the party is necessary for the leader when making important decisions for the country and signing international agreements when it is known that they are the most common and acceptable form of finding a solution after each dispute, conflict or war.

Negotiations are laborious and lengthy processes in which the participating parties seek to produce a more favorable outcome, namely, making a decision and signing an agreement that should be fully acceptable to the community to which it is intended.

One of the main problems in the negotiation process is that the expectations from the conclusion of these negotiations for the main actors within the community are different. So, leaders, participants in the negotiations, think not only of what they are going to do in a negotiation but also of the likelihood that such an agreement will be accepted by the community and respected in the future. An unacceptable community agreement will certainly not be accepted, and in this case, it will not be ratified by the Kosovo Parliament or will not go to a referendum in Serbia. Moreover, it can cause political problems in the career of the leader. In order to amputate the dissatisfaction and eventual concerns that may arise as a result of decision-making, leaders in the negotiation process try to involve as many institutional, political and social actors as possible, that the decision is welcomed and gained support. Involvement of a greater number of political and social actors in the negotiation and decision-making process can be understood as their assessment by the political leader and as part of decision-making.

Creating a political platform, from the respective assemblies, where would lay down principles, negotiating leaders, issues to be negotiated, and defining red lines for which to negotiate and for what no, would be a relief in decision-making for two leaders. Some of the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia persistently refuse to discuss issues that they consider to be internal, a stance that the development of negotiations for normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations makes it even harder for leaders in the talks. These negotiations, in one of the largest opposition parties in

Kosovo, 'Vetevendosje', are a betrayal of the country. Since the beginning they were considered technical, but turned out to be political, and very sensitive issues are being discussed, dealing with the status of Kosovo and its territory.

President Thaçi's frequent recent public appearances, where he is revealing some of his confusing, unstable, improvised and uncertain ideas, have stirred confusion, dissatisfaction and tension in public opinion and the political scene. This confusion, this instability, this improvisation is a clear and complete expression that Thaçi is unprepared for decision-making, and there is no clear idea and strategy for completing these negotiations. At this moment, Thaçi is alone, without constitutional basis and without institutional, political and public support, national and international (Bashkurti, 2018). Given this data, it is imperative to create a political platform with inter-party cooperation and the creation of a unity group. This would enable representation of all political parties and interest groups, and consensus could be reached more easily on difficult issues.

Having been in such a situation since the opposition categorically opposes the talks to be chaired by President Hashim Thaçi, and knowing that a comprehensive Kosovo-Serbia agreement is a condition for the two countries to integrate into the EU, he has given such a proposal, but have not found support for political actors and other interest groups.

In support of this idea, it was proposed to hold an extraordinary session by the Kosovo Parliament, proposed by the government, to discuss the negotiating team that will participate in the dialogue with Serbia in Brussels. Failures came about because of the lack of quorum for holding this session. Efforts to continue the session failed several more times. On the other hand, an extraordinary session was called for by the opposition, which required the adoption of a resolution that would be forbidden to President Hashim Thaçi to take part in the dialogue with Serbia, which also failed to be held.

The refusal to negotiate the establishment of this group was justified by the fact that Thaçi has continued the talks independently without the approval of the Kosovo Parliament. In these talks, he has no clear idea of what should be negotiated with this deal. In his frequent public appearances, he is becoming confused, unstable, improvised and uncertain, which means that he has no doctrine or strategy before himself. Once it declares 'border correction', another time 'border change', continuing with 'territorial exchange', times 'exception of Kosovo division', sometimes 'joining the Presevo Valley with Kosovo'. This confusion, this instability, has raised dissatisfaction with public opinion and the Kosovar political spectrum.

The unity group, in mutual co-operation with the president, would create an agenda; where through conferences, declarations, negotiating tables, etc., would clarify and make the political platform acceptable to the interest groups, political parties and the public opinion, which the parliament would vote later.

Regarding the clarity of the final settlement with Kosovo, it seems that it lacks President Vučić. In his statements, he says, "I will do my best, but it is a long road full of thorns and problems ahead" (Serbia's Vučić says long road ahead in talks with Kosovo <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbias-vucic-says-long-road-ahead-in-talks-with-kosovo/>) since in his plan for the final solution there are many unknowns, for the public and political opinion as well as for itself.

He stresses that a solution must be found and an agreement reached. During these days, he had mentioned the possibility of an agreement in which a land swap would be possible. Serbia would be enabled to take the northern part of Kosovo, which is predominantly populated by Serbs. In return, Belgrade would hand over southern municipalities mostly populated by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, an idea which later did not stand in its vocabulary and in media spaces.

In favor of idea of unity, the Government of the Republic of Serbia has adopted a decision to create a Working Group for the development of a strategic document for the development of the public information system in the Republic of Serbia.

In support of Serbia-Kosovo negotiations and in support of President Vučić, the Serbian government has stated that it will soon choose a working group that will be responsible for Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić's logistical support during the Kosovo's internal dialogue.

While support for Serbian President Vučić is not lacking, the same cannot be said of Kosovo's President Thaçi.

The extraordinary session of the Kosovo Parliament, summoned by the ruling parties, in support of President Thaçi and aimed at ratifying the negotiating team proposed by the Kosovo government failed twice.

A day later, after some attempts to make the necessary quorum, the session called by opposition parties that attempted to ban the president to talk about Kosovo's borders was also fired by a resolution failed.

Such sensitive situations in the Kosovo Parliament, where the parties in the coalition are not giving the support to President

Thaçi for these talks, put him in a more unfavorable position compared to the Serbian President Vučić and have a profound influence on his decision-making.

3. The lack of transparency

In addition, in the talks on normalization of Serbia-Kosovo Relations, as from political parties, interest groups and public opinion, the most frequent remarks were for lack of transparency. Kosovo and Serbia have started talks on normalizing relations between them since 2011. Initially, mediated by the European Union, these talks began as talks on technical issues, and are now continuing in another format, beyond technical issues.

"Transparency includes making it clear who is taking the decisions, what the measures are, who is gaining from them, and who is paying for them. This is contrasted with opaque policy measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decisions, what they are, and who gains and who loses" (Hood, 2006).

Nowadays transparency is understood as a concept that involves the process of accountability, impartiality and the rule of law. By Christopher Hood, the concept of transparency is defined "broadest doctrine of openness" or "... the doctrine that the general conduct of executive government should be predictable and operate according to published (and as far as possible non-discretionary) rules rather than arbitrarily" (Hood, 2006).

Both presidents, such as Thaçi and Vučić, point out that they are in the final stages of the dialogue, which is aimed at completing this process by a legally binding agreement on both sides by which a final solution would be reached and reconciliation would be made between the two states, emphasized remains the lack of transparency made these talks. "The lack of transparency, the failure to publish the treaties, the different treatment the parties have made to the agreements, calling them as a consensus, sometimes as a conclusion, the constructive ambiguity as a concept for the accommodation of the parties, their non-signing or not their ratification in the Assembly, has made the process unclear and has left the parties discretion in interpreting in the first place and their unwillingness to implement them" (<http://kdi-kosova.org/aktivitetet/sondazhi-i-kdi-kuvendi-te-fuqizohet-marreshjet-e-dialogut-te-zbatohen/>).

The same situation is happening with the information of public opinion and political parties in Serbia. Such a non-transparent process, not only to citizens, political parties but also to the respective assemblies, questions the legitimacy of the parties in the talks and makes it difficult to accept such an agreement. "The process itself is not transparent, which raises a question about its legitimacy" (Serbia Not Transparent over Kosovo Deals, Report

Says, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/brussels-agreement-implementation-slow-and-not-transparent-report-says/1589/77>).

4. Constitutional Framework

The position of the two presidents in the negotiating process is closely related to the constitutional legal basis and the functions of the presidents established under these constitutions.

Both countries, like Serbia, as well as Kosovo, are the parliamentary republic. Despite the similarities that exist in the exercise of presidential functions, to the two presidents. The constitutional statuses of the presidents of the two countries vary. The president of Serbia is directly elected by the people. As such, he is a direct representative of the sovereign as well as the Serbian Parliament. The president of Serbia, as a representative of the sovereign, has a broader and stronger legitimacy of Serbia's representation in international relations as well. Though, like in any such political system, the principle of 'check and balance' forces even the president of Serbia to find joint decision-making with the Serbian Parliament, where all the international negotiations negotiated and signed by the Serbian president are ultimately ratified (Bashkurti, 2018).

Meanwhile, the President of Kosovo is elected by parliament, "by two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of all deputies of the Assembly" and "If no candidate receives a two-thirds majority (2/3) in the first two ballots, is the third ballot between the two candidates who have received the highest number of votes in the second ballot and the candidate who receives the majority of the votes of all deputies " (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo), is elected president of Kosovo. That's what happened. Such a president is not a direct representative of the people, so the sovereignty of Kosovo lies in the Kosovo Parliament. This makes Kosovo a parliamentary republic and the powers of the President of Kosovo, limited to the international representation of Kosovo. Making foreign policy and decision-making in the Republic of Kosovo are inter-institutional and depend on the Parliament and the Foreign Policy Committee, the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President and the Constitutional Court. All of these in their entirety are included in the policy-making and decision-making of Kosovo's foreign policy. So the President of Kosovo or anyone else, who would sign an international agreement, in this case with Serbia, should take into account all the aforementioned institutions.

Certainly, an agreement that would not be welcomed by these institutions would not be ratified in parliament, it would be a matter for the Constitutional Court of Kosovo and would put

Kosovo into a deep political crisis and in particular would have a negative for the fate of President Thaçi himself.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to explain the impact of political constellation on the decision-making of leaders, participants in Serbia-Kosovo relations normalization talks, presidents Vučić and Thaçi. In an attempt to better reflect influencing factors, numerous studies have been conducted on the decision-making and leadership process, the position of two leaders in their political parties and career advancement, the relationship between political parties and their representatives has been analyzed are their supporters, analyzed their institutional and constitutional position, and the support they can enjoy in the respective parliaments.

Decision-making as a process, which itself includes a range of actions and activities that identify the problem, the ways of solving it, and the consequences that may result from the solution. The political decision-making process is about making decisions on important political issues that have implications both domestically and internationally. Finding in such situations, political decision-makers must have a strong support when making their own decisions.

Political decision-making is not just a definition for a better solution than many other alternatives, but is also influenced by many factors related to the political constellation in which leaders find and carry out their activities. It is a dynamic political process regarding the taking and enforcement of major decisions regarding the fate of the two states. The solution is not just for them and does not depend solely on their will; it is crucial to nations, political parties, interest groups and as such includes many aspects.

Based on the arguments provided above, we may conclude that; in these talks, the position of Serbian President Vučić is more favorable than that of Kosovo's President, Thaçi.

For President Thaçi, political support, from the coming party and ruling coalition is different from what was at the beginning of his rise to political career. Decision-making in Kosovo's foreign policy is done by a range of institutions as; The Parliament, the Foreign Policy Committee, the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Constitutional Court, which is also involved in the matter, and the President is elected by the Parliament of Kosovo. By contrast, the political support that Vučić enjoys in Serbia is great; he had a rise in the political career that is now in the zenith, his support from the political subject

from where he comes is not lacking, also the support of the Government and the Parliament is complete, and the greatest support can come from the people, when it is known that he has become president of direct elections.

All these arguments point out that the position of the two leaders in these negotiations varies. But that does not mean that; Negotiators in the negotiating strategy should not compile their negotiating form, create a unity group or any other group in support of their negotiations, and consider this whole set of policy-making and decision-making institutions at the time of signing an agreement. Without considering these factors, their agreement would be unacceptable, illegitimate and impracticable. As such, instead of generating improvement of inter-neighborly relations across the Balkans and beyond, it could put both countries in the internal political crisis with consequences beyond their borders.

Decision-making is a very important process, both for its object, as well as for the fate itself of the leader. In this case, the most important thing for the two leaders at this moment is their ability to create a supportive climate from key actors in the political and social life of the country.

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