
THE PROBLEM OF PRESENTIAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE ILLUMINATION PHILOSOPHY OF SUHRAWARDI

Sayed Payam Aldin Sajjad and John Giordano
Assumption University of Thailand

ABSTRACT:

In Islamic philosophy the relationship between God and the Human subject has been an interesting and difficult problem. While mystics claim a direct connection with God, philosophers and other theologians find that the use of reason creates a distance between God and the Human subject. This is reflected in the way Islamic philosophy attempts to ground itself through the concept of self-evidence. Avicenna, who was a follower of Aristotle, believed that existence is self-evident, and the reason for the existence of all beings is God. But this approach maintains a gap between God and the human being. Suhrawardi was interested in Avicenna's problem and the importance of the concept of self-evidence. But he considers form, essence or quiddity as self-evident. He uses a philosophy of Illumination to demonstrate the unity of quiddity with God. This allows him to posit a direct connection between human thinking and the Divine. The human subject or the "I" does not perceive existence directly, but perceives light directly. Light is self-evident and God is the Light of Lights. Based on this insight, he introduced a new kind of knowledge which he called Presential knowledge (*huduri*) or knowledge as presence. This researcher will explain Suhrawardi's approach to Presential knowledge, but will

attempt to demonstrate that neither Avicenna's grounding of self-evidence in existence nor Suhrawardi grounding it in essence or light is completely successful. It will contend that the "I" is prior to both existence and essence, and our knowledge of God as perfection emerges within the "I" through a dialectic of perfection and imperfection.

Keywords: Suhrawardi, Avicenna, Illumination Philosophy, Presential Knowledge

Introduction:

Islamic mystics such as Hallaj and Rumi have always spoken of unity between God and creation. The writings of these mystics represent their inward journey to God, and they claim to have experienced a connection with God beyond the realm of reason. But in Islamic philosophy dependent upon the use of reason, the unity of God and the human connection with God, becomes a problem. In the Peripatetic philosophy of Avicenna, the idea of God is related to Aristotle's idea of an Unmoved Mover. The ground of philosophy is related to the phenomenal world, and self-evidence is focused upon existence. This creates a separation of man from God who remains a distant Unmoved Mover. The Illumination philosophy of Suhrawardi was an effort to solve this problem by creating a metaphysics of light, where all existence is an emanation of Light. Self-evidence here is based upon essence or quiddity. Man is directly a part of God's emanation of this essence, and this provides the possibility of the recognition of unity with God through mystical experience.

The Essence of the First Absolute Light, God, gives constant illumination, whereby it is manifested and it brings all things into existence, giving life to them by its rays. Everything in the world is derived from the Light of His essence and all beauty and perfection are the gift of His bounty, and to attain fully to this illumination is salvation.¹

+

Suhrawardi attempted to provide a direct and rational knowledge of God through Light. And it suggests that to know Light is to know God. Or as Nasr explains “ Suhrawardi sought to replace – or at least supplement – the excessively discursive and deductive (*bahthiyya*) character of Aristotelian thought with a more intuitive, experiential and mystical wisdom (*al-hikma al dhawqiyya*).²

This paper will examine the problems of Suhrawardi’s Illumination Philosophy. Particularly the idea of Light as self-evident. It will suggest that while Suhrawardi’s philosophy was an interesting attempt to account for the possibility of a direct mystical experience of God as perfection, it needs to be modified by an appreciation of the dialectic of perfection and imperfection within the human subject.

The Problem of Self-Evidence in Avicenna

Avicenna presented a philosophy which attempted to reconcile Aristotle with Neo-Platonism and finally Islamic religion. He was attempting what Aquinas would later attempt in the Christian tradition. The point of departure for knowledge is self-evidence. Avicenna believes that:

Existence is known to the knower without definition and without description since it has no genus or difference, nothing is more common than it, and nothing is known better than it.³

Avicenna believed that existence is known by its *quiddity* and quiddity can be knowable directly in the mind of the thinker and immediate awareness of thing as existence indicates existence as self-evidence. Such concepts as *the existent*, *the thing*, and *the necessary* are ideas primordially engraved in the soul in such a way that they need not be acquired through ideas better known than them.⁴ For example, when a person thinks of a horse, he can distinguish in his mind between the idea or form of the horse, or its *quiddity*, which includes the shape, form, color, and everything else that comprises the essence of the horse, and the existence of that horse in the external world.

What is known as quiddity in the mind of the thinker is existence and the thinker directly distinguishes existences from one another. In other words, Avicenna believes that what is known directly as existence with quiddity is one, and there are no divisions between existence and quiddity. It can be said that existence is existence without any distinction between existence and quiddity and the idea of a separation between quiddity and existence is an illusion

This quest for self-certainty has been compared to the project of Descartes. Avicenna posits the idea of a person born mature and suspended in space as having an awareness of their own existence. Yet there are differences. For Avicenna it is existence itself which is self-evident, for Descartes it is the existence of the thinking subject or *res cogitans*. Or as M. E. Marmura explains in the *Iranica Online* article on Avicenna:

Avicenna's metaphysical starting point is not doubt. (The primary intention of the example of a person suspended in space is to show that the human rational soul is immaterial and individual.) As has been noted, the concept of "the existent" for him is a primary concept, intuited immediately. It is indubitable. He begins one version of his proof from contingency for God's existence with the statement: "There is no doubt that there is existence" (*lā šakka anna hāhonā wojūdan*). But existence, as he points out, divides into that which is in itself necessary and that which in itself is only possible. The existents immediately encountered (including ourselves) are in themselves only possible. They can exist or not exist. Yet in fact they do exist. Why is this the case? In his metaphysics, Avicenna, in effect, seeks an answer to this very question, namely, why is it that that which in itself is only possible (and this includes the whole world as distinct from God) exists at all?⁵

According to the religious doctrine of the Quran, Avicenna understands God as the Creator, and the association between God and the world is the correlation between the Creator and the Creature. Following what he had learned from Aristotle, there is a disconnection between the

“Thinker” and “Thing” and there should be a *reason* for the existence of “Thing.” So the ontology of Avicenna is structured based on this Peripatetic approach he received from Aristotle.

It is evident that Avicenna should recognize the Many absolutely in order to know the One, otherwise it is impossible to know the One without full knowledge of the Many. The Many is known as existence and the One is known as *the existence of existence* or God. This restricted his early philosophy to the acceptance that there is a separation between “God” and “What is created by God.” And there is a separation between God, and the “I” who knows God through what is created by God. This was the problem that Suhrawardi attempted to solve.

Suhrawardi wrote that “The truth of existence is well known only when all of their essentials are known, and if there be another essential that we are unaware of, then knowledge of that thing is not certain, it becomes clear that the limits and definitions, as the Peripatetics have accepted will never become possible for man”.⁶ Existence can be defined according to Empirical knowledge based on sense perception or formulas but since we can never know all the constituent elements of a thing, we can never define a thing perfectly and therefore, it cannot be known by definition. Suhrawardi, like Avicenna, believes that the knowledge of metaphysics begins with self-evidence but unlike Avicenna, He believes, that existence cannot be self-evident.

Light as Self-evidence

So while Suhrawardi, like Avicenna, starts from self-evidence, he does not base it on the experience of existence. This is why he turns to light. It the experience or awareness of quiddity or Light meets his criteria for self-evidence. Suhrawardi writes:

If there be anything that needs no definition or explanation, it has to be obvious by nature, and there is nothing more obvious and clear than light. Thus, there is nothing that needs no definition except light.⁷

Suhrawardi's entire metaphysics and ontology begin with the self-evident reality that is light. He defines light as "evident by its own reality and by essence makes another evident and knows itself by itself".⁸ In other words,

Light is that which is manifest to itself and by virtue of which other things are made manifest. Light according to its essence is obvious to itself and whatever is obvious to itself, knows itself by itself and whatever knows itself by itself is self-consciousness and whatever is self-consciousness is self-evident and one".⁹

We now see that light, will be the vehicle which unites God, Creation and the "I". It will be what connects all existence as quiddity.

According to Nasr's interpretation, there is no a distinction between existence and quiddity in Suhrawardi's thought. Rather than quiddity being dependent upon existence and the two having a clear separation as we find in Avicenna, now quiddity is given priority and the knower knows a thing by its quiddities. Nasr writes:

He does not accept the view of Avicenna and other Aristotelians that in each existing thing, the existence is principal and the essence is dependent for its reality upon existence. For Suhrawardi, at least according to the common interpretation of his words, it is the essence of a thing that possesses reality and is principal, existence playing the subordinate role of an accident added to the essence. This viewpoint is called the principality of essence (*isalat al-mahiyah*).¹⁰

Henry Corbin explains that this allows Suhrawardi to return to a kind of intuitive knowledge that reaches back before Aristotle. A kind of *Ishraqi* wisdom. Nasr cites the following quotation of Suhrawardi.

Although before the composition of this book I composed several summary treatises on Aristotelian philosophy, this book differs from them and has a method peculiar to itself. All of its material has not been assembled by thought and reasoning; rather, intellectual intuition, contemplation and ascetic practices have played a large role in it. Since our sayings have not come by means of rational demonstration but by inner vision and contemplation, they cannot be destroyed by the doubts and temptations of the skeptics. Whoever is a traveler on the road to Truth is my companion and aid on this path. The procedure of the master of philosophy and *imam* of wisdom, the Divine Plato, was the same, and the sages who preceded Plato in time like Hermes, the father of philosophy, followed the same path. Since sages of the past, because of the ignorance of the masses, expressed their sayings in secret symbols, the refutations which have been made against them have concerned the exterior of these sayings not their real intentions. And the *Ishriiqi* wisdom, whose foundation and basis are the two principles of light and darkness as established by the Persian sages like Jamasp, Farshadshir and Biizarjumhr, is among these hidden, secret symbols.

The ladder leading up to this knowledge involves three levels:

1. Those who begin to feel the thirst for knowledge and thus embark upon the path of seeking after it.
2. Those who have attained formal knowledge and perfected discursive philosophy but are strangers to gnosis; among these Suhrawardi names al-Farabi and Avicenna.
3. Those who have not considered discursive modes of knowledge at all but have purified their souls until, like Hallaj, Bastami and Tustari, they have attained intellectual intuition and inner illumination.¹²

According to Henry Corbin and most Western philosophers, Suhrawardi's major contribution was the mystical aspect of light stressing instead the influence of Zoroastrian thought of ancient Iranians. And like most Western scholars, Corbin does not pay much attention to the relationship between Avicenna's Aristotelian philosophy and Illumination philosophy. Most Iranian philosophers, on the other hand, who have studied Suhrawardi's philosophy connect him with the Aristotelian approach of Avicenna. They regard Suhrawardi as a follower of Avicenna which shifts attention from the primacy of existence, to the primacy of quiddity.

Perhaps a helpful interpretation of the role of light in Suhrawardi's philosophy is by Walbridge. According to this interpretation, the goal of his Illumination philosophy was to assign "primary reality to concrete entities directly known, rather than to what he called intellectual fictions: existence, unity, "Thing", form, and so on". Light is an appreciation of immediate knowledge prior to reason. It is a kind of Presential knowledge which can be expressed through the primacy of quiddity (Empirical knowledge). Walbridge, writes:

His view came to be known as "the primacy of quiddity", a term which is not, so far as I know, found in his own writings. It might better be called "the primacy of the concrete," for it was an intense awareness of the direct, tangible presence of specific concrete things, whether sensible or spiritual, and disbelief in metaphysical substrates of any sort such as existence, quiddity, substantiality, form, or "Thing".¹⁴

Therefore, we must avoid the more fanciful light interpretations, such as physical light, mystical light, and light in the forms of existence or existent. Light is infinite and infinite is not known by finite. "Suhrawardi held that such concepts as pure existence, pure quiddity, thingness, reality, essence, unity, contingency, necessity, substantiality, and color were mental fictions to which no external reality corresponded".¹⁵ (Walbridge, 1976, p.61). Suhrawardi believes that nothing in existence is less in

need of being made known than the manifest. “Since there is nothing more manifest than light, then there is nothing less in need of being made known”.¹⁶ Whatever is light should be able to manifest and whatever is manifesting should be light. This was not a demonstration, simply an explanation of a concept basic to the science, in this case, the manifest not manifestation. “This did not mean that we should make a distinction between existence and quiddity, and maintain then that this quiddity is what is fundamental, for Suhrawardi held that quiddity in this sense was just as unreal as existence”.¹⁷

But a problem emerges here. According to Suhrawardi, nothing in existence is less in *need* of being made known than the manifest. But if the “I” knows a “Thing” directly then it is necessary for “I” to know light without any intermediaries. But if the “I” *needs* to create a relationship with light, this suggests a distinction between knower and known, between the “I” and light.

Presential knowledge (*huduri*)

Suhrawardi believes “there is a special mode of cognition which attains knowledge directly and without mediation and thereby it goes beyond the subject-object distinction”.¹⁸ For example, the rainbow is known by its spectrum of colors and a man is able to detect differences between these colors because color is directly knowable to man, in other words, man does not need to know anything before knowing white, blue, red and so on. Man has a Presential knowledge of colors.

While empirical knowledge is created by the separation between subject and object, and knowledge is represented as the relationship between the two, Presential knowledge is a knowledge that is immediate and does not represent the relationship between subject and object. There is no intermediary in this kind of knowledge. There is no gap between the knower and the knowable.

Presential knowledge’s existence is necessary as Suhrawardi believes “All definitions inevitably lead to those a priori concepts which themselves are in no need of being defined; if this were not the case

there would result in an infinite succession”.¹⁹ If white is not known through itself, it would be necessary to know white through something else. This process has to end in one point that we call that endpoint self-evident. Otherwise Without self-evidence knowing would be impossible. Suhrawardi believes that “knowledge by definition (Empirical knowledge) is possible if, and only if, there be a first principle that is knowable in Presential state so that everything else is measured against it”.²⁰

Suhrawardi states that the only way to know one thing is either a complete or incomplete state is having Presential knowledge of some aspects of it. He believes that human knowledge is must have an innate component, or it would be impossible. Suhrawardi believes that this innate source of knowing is Presential knowledge and provides a ground for the rest of our knowledge. “Whenever there is known, how do you know that this is what you searched for? Thus, either you remain ignorant (of the object of your search) or before this awareness, there must be a knowledge which one knows because of which the desired end is the same as the unknown end”.²¹

The problem is he cannot answer is what kind of knowledge Presential knowledge is. When we consider knowledge, we consider the ability to make conceptual distinctions or relationships. Light in Suhrawardi’s philosophy, is beyond the conceptual, because it is a unity beyond any distinctions. This would suggest that light is known without definition. Light is self-evident in a way which is beyond any distinctions or limitations. So there seems to be a contradiction here which we will now examine.

Presential Knowledge of the “I” to itself

Self-evidence according to Suhrawardi is a kind of knowledge that knows itself by itself directly and light to know itself, does not need to make any mediations and relations. If the “I” knows itself by itself directly, without any intermediations then it can be concluded that “I” is self-evident. Avicenna believes that “Our awareness of ourselves is our very existence. Self-awareness is natural to the self, for it is its existence

itself, so there is no need for anything external by which we perceive the self. Rather, the self is that by which we perceive the self”.²² “Whenever we know something, there is in our knowledge of our apprehension of it an awareness of ourselves, though we do not know that our selves apprehended it. For we are aware primarily of ourselves”.²³

Otherwise, “when would we know that we had apprehended it if we had not first been aware of ourselves? This is as it were evidence, not a demonstration that the soul is aware of itself”. These words of Avicenna proves that “I” knows itself directly, and that this knowledge comes prior to the knowledge of other things.

My apprehension of myself is something which subsists in me, it does not arise in me from the consideration of something else. For if I say: “I did this,” I express my apprehension of myself even if I am heedless of my awareness of it. But from where could I know that I did this unless I had first considered myself? Therefore I first considered myself, not its activity, nor did I consider anything by which I apprehended myself.²⁵

According to Avicenna’s view of self-knowledge, the “I” knows itself directly and there is no intermediation between the “I” and itself. The researcher believes that Avicenna’s view of the consciousness of the oneness of “I” and itself in Islamic studies has not been sufficiently considered, and this lack of attention has led to the fact that Avicenna is completely known as logical philosopher with no appreciation of mystical knowledge.

Suhrawardi explains how the “I” has Presential knowledge about itself:

A thing that exists in itself and is conscious of itself does not know itself through a representation of itself appearing in itself. This is because if, in knowing one’s self, one was to make a representation of oneself, since this representation

of his “I-ness” could never be the reality of that “I-ness”, it would be then such that that representation is “it” in relation to the “I-ness”, and not “I”. Therefore, the thing apprehended is the representation. It thus follows that the representation apprehension of “I-ness” would be exactly what is the apprehension of “it-ness”, and that the apprehension of the reality of “I-ness” would be exactly the apprehension of what is not “I-ness”. This is an absurdity. On the other hand, this absurdity does not follow in the case of apprehension of external objects, for the representation and that to which that representation belongs are both its.²⁶

Razavi explains this as follows:

In this argument Suhrawardi is saying that if I am to know A, through B, then I must have come to know that B, in some sense, represents A. However, if we say this, then it is necessary for a person to first know A, and then the fact that B represents A. How can I begin to know myself through something other than myself, if I do not already know myself?²⁷

Avicenna believed that “I” knows itself directly and as self-evident, but he began his philosophy with existence and not with the “I”. Like Avicenna, Suhrawardi believed that “I” knows itself directly and without any intermediary and could be self-evident, but he grounded his philosophy in light not “I”. The researcher believes that these two philosophers should have begun their philosophy with the “I” prior to both existence and essence.

The researcher believes that direct consciousness of “I” to itself, what both Suhrawardi and Avicenna both believe in, is a key point that can make Islamic philosophy more mystical, although maintaining its logical structure. The starting point of Avicenna’s metaphysical philosophy was existence, not “I”. And the starting point of Suhrawardi’s philosophy is light, not “I”. The researcher believes that if Avicenna’s Islamic

philosophy started with “I” instead of starting with existence, today the structure of this religious philosophy would be quite different.

Perfection, Imperfection and Presential Knowledge

According to what was said, the reason for the existence of Empirical knowledge is Presential knowledge. For instance, Kant would claim that the “I think” must accompany all of my representations. It is the Presential knowledge of the “I” that precedes all of empirical knowledge. In other words, the reason for the Empirical state of “I” is its Presential state. And Empirical state of the “I”, always knows itself in this duality. The Presential state makes possible the Empirical state, but the empirical state is also the starting point for an awareness of this Presential state.

The “I” according to its self-consciousness essence and its Presential knowledge of Perfection (God), knows that it has to go beyond the conflicts of these empirical relations to reach a higher Presential state. These relations are the starting point for “I” to know itself and these relations show that the “I” begins its journey far from the place it should be, which would be a unity with God.

This change from the Empirical state to Presential state is still based on the empirical “I”. This does not mean that “I” adds something to itself to know itself. The Presential state happens when “I” is able to free itself from reason and relations, and this does not mean to add something to itself. The result is a “Circular movement of Presential and Empirical states.”

We also find this in other traditions. For instance, German Idealism. Fichte in his later versions of the *Wissenschaftslehre* turns to the language of Illumination philosophy to make the same point. There is a ground within the “I” which connects to this unity. And out from this ground through dialectical opposition of the “I” and the “not-I” comes the construction of the empirical world. In his later philosophy he calls this an “I which sees its own seeing”. Seidel explains Fichte’s later approach as follows:

... in the contemplation (*Betrachtung*) of this light, the light reveals itself. We become enlightened; the light is also in us. The externally existent light is as one with the Absolute, eternally equal with it. Thus, the light exists in two modalities (*Weisen*): the inner life of light, which is unseen, and the outer. There is an absolute relation between the copy and its image, and vice versa; the distinction between the inner and the outer lies only in the viewpoint of factual existence. In the light we see the light, both lights. Further, by virtue of the two basic principles of German idealism, these two lights are both the same and not the same. There is the light that appears and the light that does not appear, with the light that does not appear appearing in the light that does.²⁸

This fits with what Fichte describes as the dialectical tension between the “I” and the “not I” leading to the “Absolute I”. But relevant for Suhrawardi is the idea that this self-awareness of light is not simply a mystical connection. The initial recognition of reality is a kind of Presential knowledge, but (at least in Fichte) it involves the presence of a kind of reason.

There thus exists a penetrating seeing, which, as independent, posits an absolute being, the description of a self-contained certitude. It represents a seeing of the seeing of the light. Reason is the ground of its intrinsic (*innerlich*) living and acting existence; reason itself is immediately and simply ground of an existence, its existence, as a pure absolute fact. And we are ourselves reason in that we see this light. This reason appears as the ground or cause of its own existence, of its objectivity, for itself, and herein rests its original life. It is in this sense that Fichte can speak of the theory of reason (*Vernunftlehre*) as the first and most important part of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, for in it, in this penetrating seeing, we see the light through a pure absolute fact. It is in the light that we see the light.²⁹

This suggests that Presential knowledge can never be pure in itself but must always be in tension with empirical knowledge. We cannot know the perfection of God directly. We can only know it illuminated through its dialectical tensions with imperfections within the “I”. We as imperfect beings cannot be one with God, but can only recognize the perfection of God within the imperfect self. Suhrawardi gives us a clue about how this can take place. There is a connection of God within the self through light. But this light only directs us to the fuller apprehension of God.

The attempt of Avicenna and Suhrawardi to ground self-evidence in some ontological structure is a failure. The only Presential self-evident knowledge that is possible is the knowledge of the “I” and this “I” is always in dialectical odds with itself. It is through the “I” that our ideas of perfection and imperfection emerge. In fact, perfection does not create the “I”, nor does it illuminate the “I”, but it is within the “I” that the “I” can discover this perfection as a part of its itself. And this intuition of perfection within the “I” can ultimately point or guide us to God.

ENDNOTES

¹ Suhrawardi, Shahab Aldin. *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. translated by M. Smith, *Readings from the Mystics of Islam*. London, 1950, 79

² Nasr, Sayed Hossein. *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna- Suhrawardi- Ibn ‘Arabi* New York, 1997, 58.

³ Avicenna. *Al-Shifā’, Al-Madkhal*, ed. G. Anawati, M. El-Khodeiri, F. al-Ahwani, Madkour. (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1952), 8-9

⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵ Marmura, “Avicenna iv. Metaphysics”, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/avicenna-iv>.

⁶ Suhrawardi, Shahab Aldin. *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical 2*. ed. with an Introduction by Henry Corbin. (Istanbul, 1954), 36.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹⁰ Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, 67.

¹¹ Suhrawardi, *Opera 2*, 10.

¹² *Ibid.*, 64.

- ¹³ Walbridge, John. Tuthill. *The Philosophy of Qutb al-Din Shirazi*. A Study in the Integration of Islamic Philosophy. (Massachusetts, 1983), 61
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 62.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 61.
- ¹⁶ Walbridge, John. Tuthill and Ziai, Hossein, *The Philosophy of Illumination*. Yahyá ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī, (Brigham Young University Press), 1999,75.
- ¹⁷ Walbridge, “The Philosophy Of Qutb Al-Din Shirazi”, 69.
- ¹⁸ Aminrazavi, Mahdi. *Suhrawardi's (Theory of Knowledge* Temple University, 1989), 220.
- ¹⁹ Suhrawardi, *Opera 2*, 194.
- ²⁰ Aminrazavi, *Suhrawardi's Theory of Knowledge*, 155.
- ²¹ Suhrawardi, *Opera 2*, 142.
- ²² Avicenna. *Al-Taliqat*, ed. A.. R. Badawi. (Cairo, General Egyptian Book Organization, 1973), 160.
- ²³ Ibid., 161.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 161.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 161.
- ²⁶ Suhrawardi, *Opera 2*, 111.
- ²⁷ Aminrazavi, *Suhrawardi's Theory of Knowledge*, 229.
- ²⁸ Seidel, George. “The Light That Lights the Seeing of the Light: The Second Wissenschaftslehre of 1804” in *After Jena: New Essays on Fichte's Later Philosophy*. ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore. (Northwestern University Press Evanston, 2008), 93
- ²⁹ Ibid., 96.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aminrazavi, Mahdi. *Suhrawardi's Theory of Knowledge*. Temple University, 1989.
- Avicenna. *Al-Shifā', Al-Madkhal*,. ed. G. Anawati, M. El-Khodeiri, F. al-Ahwani, Madkour. Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1952.
- Avicenna. *Al-Taliqat*. ed. A. R. Badawi. Cairo, General Egyptian Book Organization, 1973.

- Marmura. “*Avicenna iv. Metaphysics*”, <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/avicenna-iv>. accessed 20, March, 2020
- Nasr, Sayed Hossein. *Three Muslim Sages: Avicenna- Suhrawardi- Ibn ‘Arabi*. New York, 1997.
- Seidel, George. “The Light That Lights the Seeing of the Light: The Second Wissenschaftslehre of 1804” in *After Jena: New Essays on Fichte’s Later Philosophy*. ed. Daniel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore. Northwestern University Press Evanston, 2008.
- Suhrawardi, Shahab Aldin. *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. translated by M. Smith, *Readings from the Mystics of Islam*. London, 1950.
- Suhrawardi, Shahab Aldin. *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical 2. ed. with an Introduction by Henry Corbin*. Istanbul, 1954.
- Walbridge, John. Tuthill. *The Philosophy of Qutb al-Din Shirdazi: A Study in the Integration of Islamic Philosophy*. Massachusetts, 1983.
- Walbridge, John. Tuthill and Ziai, Hossein, *The philosophy of illumination*. Yahya ibn Habash Suhrawardi, Brigham Young University Press, 1999.