
STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: STUDY ON THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF REFORM (2002-2012)

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Abstract; This study aims to look at how the strategy for handling terrorism is implemented in this phase by using three analysis variables: strengthening legal infrastructure, strengthening institutional capacity, and implementing policies for handling terrorism. The analysis of these three variables is related to the similarities between the labels used by terrorist groups and the majority religion in Indonesia, namely Islam; and the ongoing democratization in the second ten years of the phase of handling terrorism in Indonesia. By using a qualitative approach and literature studies as well as limited observations from researchers who lived in Indonesia during the research period, the following findings were produced: the Indonesian government's strategy of counterattack against the threat of JI's malignancy experienced a "model disconnection" with previous Indonesian experiences (discontinuity model), which was caused there is a change in the threat of violence which is completely different from the previous threat even though it has a historical connection with past violent groups. Political changes since the enactment of the 1998 Reform so that the ongoing democratization process at that time has slowed the strengthening of legislation and hampered the development of institutional retaliation efforts. There are ideological/religious similarities i.e. Islam, which is held by the majority of the Indonesian population and JI, has created a dilemma for the government in its implementation.

Keywords: terrorism, counterterrorism strategy, Indonesia, Islam, democratization

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INTRODUCTION

The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Counter-terrorism strategy with involving international regime, known as scheme of strategy of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which put forward by the George Bush after the events of 9/11. This policy is a Counter-Terrorism policy that aims to eradicate terrorists and extremist Islamic groups, especially Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups based in the Middle East (Jordan, Bagus Ibrahim 2019:3) The new phase of the threat of international terrorism characterize

indicate that the ideology of terrorism is now influenced more by religion (Andrew Tan, 2007: 5)

One year after the declaration of GWOT, the countries of Southeast Asia were surprised by the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. Tragedy that has killed 204 people from various countries (POLRI 2006), have confirmed that the Southeast Asian region as the second front the GWOT (Andrew Tan, 2007: 5). It was reinforced by the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) passed Resolution No. 1267 dated October 24, 2002 which mentions the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a terrorist group which responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing event. JI is also regarded as an “ally of Al-Qaeda” in Southeast Asia. The declaration has given confidence to countries in Southeast Asia that the source of security threats are no longer only from within the country but also from abroad.

Indonesia is a country where the majority of the population is Muslim (Means 2009). Having the same ideology/religion i.e. Islam between the majority of the country's population and JI is an interesting issue to study. What's more, the country must face JI while undergoing the democratization process (Zaini Othman 2006: 178). In the first ten years, the emergence of the issue of terrorism labeled Islam came at a time when the issue of democratization was gaining strength in Indonesia. Therefore, the issue of terrorism tends to be rejected by Muslims and supporters of democratization. For Muslims, the issue of international terrorism involving Al Qaeda is considered a way for the US to create a new enemy, namely Islam. The US has lost a major enemy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The issue of international terrorism labeled Islam has become a justification for Indonesia's half-hearted response. Supporting the US global campaign against terrorism or even acknowledging the bombings carried out by JI, is considered the same as fighting Islam.

In addition, the issue of terrorism has worried groups supporting democratization. The existence of the issue of terrorism seems to have become a reason for the government to re-strengthen the use of regressive policies and policies. For supporters of democratization, it is a threat to the survival of democratization. Therefore, the government's measures to use or strengthen repressive laws against terrorists are considered as the government's efforts to constrain the strength of the opposition, or return political life to be more constraining.

This study looks at the extent to which the democratization process taking place in Indonesia affects the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies? In addition, to what extent is the factor of ideological/religious similarity i.e. The Islam that JI and the majority of the Indonesian population follow affects the implementation of its counter-terrorism strategy?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Counter-Terrorism and Indonesia's Strategic Model

The definition and concept of counter-terrorism is defined by experts according to their perspective and experience. Segal (1987: 5) for example, defines counter-terrorism as a strategy to defend and protect society from acts of terrorism because it is an important part of national security. Whereas Morris and Hoe (1987: 14) defined counter-terrorism as including the act of identifying terrorists, preventing the occurrence of acts of terrorism and providing protection to public safety. Those activities, according to the scholars, should be supported by law. Moris and Hoe's definition provides an affirmation that a government should carry out acts of terrorism with a legalistic approach. Another view is presented by Mockaitis and Rich (2003) who see counter-terrorism as a comprehensive strategy in countering the threat of terrorism. His actions are not only limited to the time of violence but also how to prevent the occurrence of violence. While Martin (2003: 230) defines counter-terrorism as an act of responding to violence that combines a repressive response (hard-line response) and a persuasive response (soft-line response).

As a country that is the main site of JI's acts of terrorism, Indonesia performs a response strategy that Martin (2003: 230) mentions includes hard-line response and soft-line response. Hard-line response means that the response is done by using the military and paramilitary forces to destroy terrorists without any tolerance, while soft-line response means the response by using diplomacy, tolerance and improving the social situation as well as various options of possible actions. The various options that will be taken depend on the actual situation. Therefore, Martin (2003: 342) defines terrorism response as any action taken by a targeted interest in response to a terrorist incident or terrorist environment. The response action is very passive, but there are also very active ones. It can even be very intensive, which includes military attacks against terrorists and their supporters, until an anti-terrorism campaign that can reduce the ability of terrorists to act.

Theoretically, the strategy of dealing with terrorism in Indonesia can be seen from the four steps Martin (2003: 346-348) found. First, use of force options. These options include a hardline response in which policymakers use armed force to deal with terrorists and their supporters. The use of military forces or non-military forces can be aimed at providing symbolic punitive attacks or destroying the strength of terrorists and all their capabilities.

The use of force response consists of three main policies: a). coercive covert operation. These actions include murder, sabotage, kidnapping and the use of "extralegal methods". This action aims to suppress the terrorist to the lowest level of capability and conduct a covert war against the terrorist movement; b). suppression campaigns. These actions are campaigns that suppress terrorists and groups associated with them. This action is meant to disable the terrorist's psychological strength; c). punitive strikes and pre-emptive strikes (punitive strikes and early strikes). The actions taken are aimed at punishing terrorists through attacks on members of terrorist groups and all their capabilities.

Second, repressive options. These options include responses that utilize the force of military units such as the army, navy, air force, and specialized anti-terrorism units. These options consist of three main policies: a) covert operations. This involves secret actions such as infiltration, information deception, and technological warfare (cyberwar). Secret actions require creativity and adaptive abilities to deal with the varying environments of terrorist groups; b) intelligence. This involves gathering data to

effectively understand terrorists and their threats; c) economic sanctions. This involves weakening a country or group by imposing economic restrictions, whether in trade or the cessation of economic cooperation.

Third, conciliatory options. These options include persuasive responses where policymakers develop non-violent alternatives. The goals of these non-repressive responses depend on the characteristics of the terrorists or the terrorist environment. Martin (2003: 364) states that conciliatory responses are "soft-line" options that allow policymakers to develop a range of options that do not involve force or other repressive methods. The objectives of non-repressive responses depend on the characteristics of the terrorist environment. Conciliatory options consist of three main policies: a) diplomacy. This involves seeking a resolution through negotiation when terrorists are willing to engage in discussions. The aim is to minimize violence and resolve conflicts more comprehensively; b) social reform. This includes social projects or government policy improvements that address the social conditions that contribute to terrorism. The objective is to understand the root causes of terrorism and the environments that support its occurrence; c) concessionary approaches. This involves making compromises or granting certain rights to terrorists in emergencies or when urgent needs arise. The aim is to mitigate specific crises and meet the legitimate demands of terrorists.

Fourth, legalistic responses. These options emphasize addressing terrorism through the development and application of laws. Law development can be achieved by enacting international laws and protocols or creating and amendment existing laws for more effective use. Legalistic responses can be carried out through: a) law enforcement. This refers to using law enforcement agencies and enhanced investigative methods to bring terrorists to justice; b) domestic laws. This involves the creation or amendment of anti-terrorism laws from various perspectives, treating acts of terrorism as criminal acts. Additionally, this policy attempts to increase the impact of anti-terrorism laws by enhancing punishment for terrorists; c) international laws. This refers to efforts to strengthen international anti-terrorism laws by ratifying conventions and protocols. It also involves cooperation with other countries to reach agreements in addressing transnational terrorism. This can include using international courts to prosecute terrorists, extradition agreements, or mutual legal assistance.

The concept of counter-terrorism in Indonesia also adopts Collins' (2002: 47-48) model, which considers the political regime and its relationship with community involvement in counter-terrorism processes. There are three models: First, the dictator regime model, which emphasizes military involvement, controlled civil military units, and secret police. The Soviet Union used this model. Second, the democratic governance model, which emphasizes law enforcement functions in counter-terrorism. The involvement of armed civilians as part of a tightly controlled domestic security apparatus is intended to strengthen national security. This was seen in the involvement of the Coast Guard under Operation Just Cause in the United States in 1990. Third is the orchestra team model, which involves various agencies performing their functions. This model has been used in the United States, where domestic counter-terrorism tasks are divided between the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), while counter-terrorism functions abroad are entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Department of State. The success of such a handling model depends on the ability of top-level leaders to coordinate this "orchestra."

The orchestra team model has been implemented in managing counter-terrorism in the Indonesian context. The involvement of counter-terrorism agencies plays their respective roles according to their tasks. This signifies that the government has effectively managed counter-terrorism.

METHOD

To answer these questions, a qualitative approach is used. Data related to official Indonesian government documents related to counter-terrorism were carried out using literature studies at relevant government agencies and special committees at the UN Security Council. In addition, interviews were conducted with terror perpetrators who had been caught, and related officials and experts.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia's Counter-terrorism Strategy (2002-2012)

The Indonesian government's counter-terrorism strategy in dealing with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) underwent several changes. First, the government adopted a multi-faceted approach, which differed from previous strategies. During the Soekarno era, the government primarily emphasized a military approach in dealing with Darul Islam. Similarly, during the Soeharto era, a military approach was employed in handling GAM in Aceh and separatist groups like the OPM in Irian Jaya and the RMS in Maluku. Soeharto's strategy in dealing with these groups also involved international diplomacy to prevent foreign support for the separatist movements. Soeharto also utilized security approaches to address political acts of terrorism by opposition groups. Second, the government placed greater emphasis on international cooperation rather than building internal support. This was evident in the early stages of addressing the Bali bombings from 2002 to 2005.

The change in counter-terrorism strategy was influenced by the unique threat posed by JI, which differed from previous terrorist threats. JI successfully gained support from international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. For Indonesia, the change in counter-terrorism strategy was necessary not only because of the evolving terrorist threats but also due to the internal political changes following the 1998 Reformasi. This new political regime opened the path for extensive democratization. The democratization factor not only changed the concept of counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia but also affected the implementation process of that strategy. The influence of democratization on the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies became more evident when combined with the factor of shared ideology/religion, i.e., Islam, which is followed by the majority of the Indonesian population. This factor, combined with JI's use of the label of Islam, successfully confused some segments of the Muslim community, leading them to support JI's agendas. The government faced a dilemma in combating JI as it did not want to be perceived as suppressing Islam.

Both factors influenced the implementation of the counter-terrorism strategy, including strengthening legal systems, institutional development and capacity building, and the enforcement of counter-terrorism policies. These factors do not solely determine the success of a country's counter-terrorism strategy. However, in the context of this

study, the influence of these two factors on the effectiveness of Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy will be examined.

Strengthening the Legal System

Strengthening the legal system refers to the government's efforts to strengthen laws applicable in counter-terrorism measures. These efforts can include enacting new laws, amending existing laws to make them more effective, or ratifying international conventions. As stated by Makmur Widodo, the Indonesian Ambassador to the UN, the Indonesian government considers strengthening the legal infrastructure as "a vital component in the fight against terrorism. Efforts to strengthen the legal system were underway before the Bali bombings in 2002. This is evident from Indonesia's report to the Chairman of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee on December 21, 2001, which mentioned that the Indonesian government was in the final stages of ratifying the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Additionally, the government had prepared a draft Anti-Terrorism Act. Before the enactment of these two laws, the government would utilize the Drug Law to address terrorism-related crimes and cross-border offenses.

The government did not have a specific legal system that could be used to confront the threat of terrorism, nor did it initially perceive the threat posed by JI as significant. The report prepared to comply with UN Resolution 1373 in 2001 emphasized that the initial planning to strengthen the anti-terrorism legal system was in response to September 11, 2001, or to play a role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

The Bali bombings in 2002 provided a boost to the government's position. Firstly, the bombings generated strong domestic and international support for the Indonesian government to issue an Anti-Terrorism Act promptly. The government gained political support to enhance its power in the security field. This support also allowed the government to expand its powers through legislation. The strong support weakened movements that hindered or criticized the issuance of the act. At that time, opposition movements were not only considered unsympathetic to the victims of terrorism but could also be accused of sympathizing with terrorist groups. The need for opposition groups to balance the potential infringement of human rights was overshadowed by psychological pressure from groups sympathetic to the Bali bombing victims. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the ratification by the People's Consultative Assembly (DPR) of Emergency Laws No. 1 and 2 of 2002 on counter-terrorism, which became Laws No. 15 and No. 16 of 2003, only two opposition groups rejected them (Riza Sihbudi 2005: 41-42).

The strength of the government's position during the Bali bombings was due to the legal system in Indonesia that allowed the government to issue Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu) without prior approval from the DPR (People's Consultative Assembly), in the event of extraordinary circumstances like the Bali bombings in 2002. With such a legal system, the approval of the Perpu by the DPR would take place in the subsequent session specifically held for that purpose (Fourth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution: Article 22 paragraph 1).

Perpu No. 1 of 2002 was a special act addressing terrorism in Indonesia. Compared to general provisions under the Criminal Code, this Perpu was considered exceptional as it contained new provisions not present in existing legislation. The specificity of the Perpu

strengthened two social claims against the Indonesian government. First, Perpu No. 1 of 2002 was seen as a political tool to increase security power, aiming to restore "civil order" as previously implemented during the Soeharto regime in the New Order era. This can be observed from the political language used in Law No. 15 of 2003 in the "Consideration" section point "d," which states: "to restore orderly and safe community life and to provide a strong legal foundation...". Second, Perpu No. 1 of 2002 was claimed to be part of the government's "political subservience" to international pressure, particularly from the US as the proponent of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This claim stemmed from the fact that in the "General Explanation" section of the Perpu, the tenth paragraph stated:

"...these special provisions do not constitute discriminatory treatment but rather reflect the government's commitment to implement the provisions of the Convention Against Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the Convention on the Suppression of Financing Terrorism (1999)."

The claim was not only related to the content of the two conventions, which were creations of the US, but also because these conventions were part of the US's cordon sanitaire strategy. The reference to various conventions in Perpu No. 1 of 2002 gave rise to allegations of the government's involvement in supporting a Western conspiracy to corner the Islamic world.

The Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia faces dilemmas and is subject to criticism. For instance, Mc. Jebhy (2009) criticizes the implementation of retroactive principles, warrantless detention for up to seven days, and the use of intelligence reports as legal evidence. Furthermore, Mc. Jebhy notes that proposed amendments to the act include several offenses that potentially violate human rights, such as Article 9a, which states: a. Any person who intentionally and unlawfully trades potential explosive materials shall be sentenced to a maximum of 12 years' imprisonment; b. If the aforementioned materials are proven to have been used in acts of terrorism, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to a maximum of 15 years' imprisonment.

The strategic planning and its relation to the enhancement of security powers through strengthening the legal system can be understood in the context of the diminishing government's power in security due to the reform era in Indonesia. Simultaneously, democratization has reinforced the freedom of political participation in society through the issues of democracy and human rights. This has posed challenges for the government in controlling societal forces, while also limiting the actions of security and military forces. Therefore, strengthening counter-terrorism police is crucial. The decrease in power is not only determined by political pressures from political parties and civil society forces but is also supported by the absence of preventive laws that the government can effectively utilize to address various security issues in Indonesia. The Emergency Law No. 11/Pnps/1963 on the Suppression of Subversive Activities, for example, which was used by the Soeharto regime to arrest individuals without warrants, was abolished in 1999. The absence of such laws that the government can employ to confront terrorism threats is acknowledged in the "Considerations" section of the Anti-Terrorism Act (Perpu No. 1 of 2002): "Existing legislation is not yet comprehensive and sufficient to combat terrorist offenses." The statement in point e of the Perpu emphasizes the decline in security powers.

The strengthening of the legal system through the enactment of laws was also carried out with the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Law on April 7, 2002. The law played a

role in preventing the flow of financial support to terrorist groups. The passage of this draft law faced no significant opposition. However, this law did not play a major role in addressing the terrorism threat because terrorists generally employ traditional methods to provide financial support to their groups.

The strengthening of the counter-terrorism legal system was also achieved through the ratification of several conventions, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) (Government of Indonesia 2002: 3; 2003: 9). The ratification of these conventions did not face any significant debates from the parliament or pro-democracy supporters. Even the Islamic community did not show any rejection in the form of demonstrations or newspaper reports. Apart from the content of these conventions, which were deemed to be in line with democratic values and Islam, the strategic aspect of strengthening the legal system through ratifying conventions is interesting. This may also explain why the government has engaged in numerous international collaborations.

Institutional Development and Capacity Strengthening

The development and strengthening of counter-terrorism institutions refer to the government's efforts to establish previously non-existent institutions and enhance the effectiveness of existing institutions in dealing with terrorism. These efforts can involve proposals from the government itself, suggestions from foreign countries, and cooperation between the Indonesian government and the international community. As Makmur Widodo, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations (Government of Indonesia 2001: 4), stated, "*...another vital component in the fight against terrorism is institution capacity building.*" Therefore, the government has focused on strengthening law enforcement agencies. The initial response to enhancing counter-terrorism institutions involved bilateral, regional, and international cooperation through meetings, information exchanges, and other technical collaborations. Indonesia has utilized various international organizations that have connections with the country.

Specifically, in response to international terrorism threats, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the Indonesian government (2001: 3) established an interdepartmental group under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The members of this group include the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Indonesian National Police, the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI), the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transportation, Bank Indonesia, the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), and the Strategic Intelligence Agency of the Indonesian National Defence Forces (BAIS).

In developing counter-terrorism institutions, the government also held the Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crime from 26 to 28 February 2002. The conference aimed to explore how Southeast Asian countries could collaborate in safeguarding their nations against the inflow of financial support to terrorists within their respective countries. Following this, on 30 December 2002, the government took the initiative to establish the National Coordination Committee on Money Laundering to coordinate anti-money laundering

institutions in participating countries (Government of Indonesia 2002: 3). The government also held various meetings with ASEAN member countries to exchange intelligence information, border security measures, and other related matters.

In regional cooperation, Indonesia and Australia jointly organized the Regional Conference on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Bali in December 2002. The meeting aimed to explore how Southeast Asian countries could collaborate in preventing the flow of financial support to terrorists within their respective countries. As a follow-up to this, the government took the initiative on 30 December 2002 to establish the National Coordination Committee on Money Laundering to coordinate anti-money laundering institutions in participating countries (Government of Indonesia 2002: 3). The government also engaged in numerous meetings with ASEAN member countries to exchange intelligence information, security border measures, and more.

The strengthening of counter-terrorism institutions was also carried out during the handling the Bali bombings in 2002. The Indonesian National Police (POLRI) had close and intensive cooperation with several police forces from Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This cooperation significantly helped in the swift capture of suspects. It also aided in uncovering the JI network and apprehending key JI members involved in bombings in Indonesia from 1999 to 2002, such as bombings in Jakarta, Batam, Medan, Bandung, and East Java.

The democratization process also eliminated the position of the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (BAKIN). During the New Order era, this institution played a role in coordinating all intelligence agencies in Indonesia. The abolition of this institution weakened the coordination of intelligence agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Strategic Intelligence Agency of TNI (BAIS), and various intelligence agencies in POLRI, the Attorney General's Office, and other government institutions. The weakened coordination function failed to detect various bombing incidents by terrorist groups. As a response, the government quickly realized the influence of democratization on this political structure change and issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 4 of 2002, which coordinated all intelligence agencies under BIN. However, the democratization process slowed the establishment of anti-terrorism units, such as the Indonesian National Police's Densus 88 Anti-Terror and the National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT).

To implement Government Regulation No. 1 of 2002 on counter-terrorism measures, President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued Presidential Instruction No. 4 of 2002, instructing the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia to take three steps. First, formulate comprehensive policies for counter-terrorism, including the October 12, 2002 incident in Bali. The formulation of policies was coordinated with relevant ministries based on their functions. Second, develop operational measures to address terrorism threats. Third, establish a task force under the Ministry of Political and Security Affairs to support the implementation of the first and second points (Ansyad Mbai, Interview, December 27, 2005). This instruction was a political will of the Indonesian government to build a specialized anti-terrorism institution that was expected to be more effective. The issuance of this instruction was also an effort by the government to ensure the existence of a responsible entity in

handling terrorism in Indonesia, formally under the Ministry of Political and Security Affairs.

The efforts to build the anti-terrorism institution conducted by the Indonesian government began with the development of its legal basis, such as issuing Government Regulation and establishing a task force responsible for its system. The anti-terrorism task force also included the establishment of an Anti-Terrorism Coordinating Desk, the coordination of existing intelligence agencies, and the creation of counter-terrorism task forces within relevant ministries that could support counter-terrorism efforts (Ansyad Mbai, Interview, December 27, 2005). In 2010, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2010 regarding establishing the National Counter-terrorism Agency (BNPT), which directly reports to the president. The BNPT is responsible for implementing the government's tasks in counter-terrorism. The BNPT is led by a chief who reports to the president through the coordination of the Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. The period between the hope and the realization of almost five years was not without reason. As mentioned above, Presidential Instruction No. 4 of 2002 to the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs was followed by establishing the Desk for Coordination of Eradicating Terrorism (DCET) on November 27, 2002. This desk was established to assist the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in formulating policies for countering terrorism and providing operational support for counter-terrorism measures. The Indonesian government (2003: 3). The DCET faced challenges regarding its position and function. In terms of its position, the DCET was a task force under the Secretary of the Ministry of Security, which complicated its coordination function because it had to coordinate ministries and government agencies that should be coordinated. This challenge occurred because the DCET's position was under the Secretary of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, but its work involved coordinating the activities of other ministries in counter-terrorism efforts. With the establishment of BNPT, politically, the organization's position and authority as a counter-terrorism coordinator in Indonesia has been strengthened. Establishing and upgrading agencies dealing with terrorism have provided the government with increased capabilities in counter-terrorism. The existence of BNPT challenges the government to improve the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism strategies in Indonesia. However, when large-scale bombings continued to occur, as in the years 2002 to 2005, the increase in security power through BNPT may be criticized as the government merely enhancing its power in the security sector for political rather than public service purposes (Interview, Mohammad Baharun, 2011).

During its first launch, BNPT actively collaborated with Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). BNPT launched a deradicalization campaign targeting the misconceptions about jihad (DetikNews, August 11, 2011). The government's efforts to engage Islamic organizations have not been a one-time occurrence. Since 2005, the government has organized anti-misinterpretation of jihad campaigns with Islamic organizations. This step is seen as the government's way of addressing its dilemma in dealing with JI, which also carries the label of Islam by offering suicide bombing jihad.

In addition to establishing counter-terrorism units, President Megawati Soekarnoputri also issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 5 of 2002 to the Head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN). This instruction assigned the then-Chief of BIN, Lieutenant

General (B) Hendropriyono, to coordinate all intelligence activities in various ministries and state agencies. In Indonesia, 13 intelligence units are operating at the central level. With Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 2002 issuance, BIN gained the authority to coordinate them and enable joint operations. The coordination of intelligence units was only formalized through this instruction, which was done to address the terrorism threat. The step in building the capacity of counter-terrorism institutions is the establishment of Densus 88 Anti-Terror. This operational unit operates under the Indonesian National Police (POLRI). Its establishment was motivated by the absence of technical units that could directly deal with terrorist bombers. At that time, POLRI only had a bomb disposal team (Gegana Team) under the Mobile Brigade (Brimob). This team was always relied upon whenever there was a bomb threat in Indonesia.

The establishment began during the international counter-terrorism campaign when the US Department of State evaluated POLRI's capabilities in handling the increasing number of bombings in Indonesia. Through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, in October 2003, the US trained 30 Indonesian police officers led by Brigadier General Gorys Mere. From this program, a team known as Crisis Response Teams (CRT) and bomb disposal technicians were formed, which later became the main team in the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror. Afterward, the special detachment was officially established in March 2004 (Awani Irewati (ed), 2005: 102). From October 1, 2004, to September 30, 2005, the US-trained two CRT teams and conducted CRT instructor courses. The CRT teams were assigned to handle terrorist activities in Central Java and Central Sulawesi, especially in Poso. This team successfully neutralized Dr. Azhari M. Husein, the most wanted JI terrorist by the Indonesian government.

The existence of Densus 88 has had a significant impact on counter-terrorism in Indonesia. The team is considered as the official spokesperson of the government in addressing the public's curiosity regarding counter-terrorism efforts. Densus 88 has successfully conducted arrests, raids, and other effective operations. However, its establishment and financial support from the United States have also raised suspicion among Muslims who are uncomfortable with the involvement of the US.

Another institution established to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts is the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK). As mentioned earlier, this institution was established based on the Anti-Money Laundering Law.

Essentially, the issue of terrorism that gained momentum after the 2002 Bali bombings provided an opportunity for the Indonesian government to reassert its security powers, similar to what happened in the US after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The US model of enhancing security powers was based on the assumption of vulnerability within the country. Thus, the US established the Department of Homeland Security on June 6, 2002, to coordinate more than 40 government agencies involved in security matters. Following a similar pattern, the Indonesian government entrusted the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to play the role of Indonesia's "Department of Homeland Security" by coordinating all intelligence agencies within ministries and other state institutions, including POLRI, the Attorney General's Office (Kejaksaan Agung RI), and other agencies. To strengthen security powers, the Indonesian government enacted Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002, approved by the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia on March 6, 2003, becoming the Anti-Terrorism Act.

In practical terms, the Indonesian government actively participated in various international collaborations through the Indonesian National Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS-TNI). In 2001, BAIS-TNI organized seminars for intelligence exchange with three countries: Thailand in Jakarta on January 23, 2001, Malaysia in Jakarta on August 24, 2001, and the Philippines in Jakarta on September 25, 2001. BAIS-TNI participated in the Counter-Terrorism Conference held in Kuala Lumpur from January 29 to February 1, 2001.

In other forums, Indonesia actively signed the Security Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) declaration on October 27, 2002, in Mexico. Regardless of US involvement, the declaration provided important support for Indonesia in the global campaign against terrorism. Subsequently, Indonesia actively responded to international issues by involving various international actions to address the terrorism threat. The Indonesian government demonstrated efforts to strengthen counter-terrorism legislation by garnering support from foreign countries through enhanced relations with the US under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.

Enforcement of Counter-terrorism Policy

During the Bali Bombings in 2002, the government was seen as weak in ensuring public safety. Therefore, the government's first step was to exert political pressure on terrorists to demonstrate the government's handling capabilities and create psychological fear among them. According to the Indonesian government, this step was important because every bombing incident represented a psychological victory for the terrorists. This pressure was exerted by arresting perpetrators such as Imam Samudera, Muklas, Amrozi, and their associates, serving as a legal measure to put psychological pressure on terrorists.

After the JW Marriott Hotel Bombing on August 5, 2003, the government began to intensify this strategy. The government started to "attack" terrorists politically. Some of the measures taken included: First, POLRI announced Dr. Azhari and Nordin M. Top as the most wanted terrorists and offered a reward of IDR 1 billion (RM 350,000) for their capture. Second, the government turned counter-terrorism efforts into a political agenda that received support from various political parties. Third, the government involved the public in campaigns that targeted the Jemaah Islamiyah network. Fourth, POLRI regularly announced its successes in apprehending terrorists to the public.

Applying political pressure to terrorists was considered an appropriate step because some segments of Indonesian society did not view groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a threat but as representatives of Islamic interests opposing the US and its allies. The government aimed to emphasize that terrorists were enemies of the state, creating a social impact that discouraged support for them. The government sought to make the public realize that if they supported terrorists, they were essentially opposing their community.

Another enforcement measure the government took was to regulate the curriculum of Islamic boarding schools. The terrorism involving individuals from Islamic boarding schools has changed public and government perceptions of these institutions. The strategy assumed that the militancy of terrorists was influenced by their understanding of jihad acquired from the curriculum of these schools. Therefore, changing the perception of jihad, which was considered violent, needed to start with modifying the

curriculum to a more simplified version. However, this strategy failed as terrorism continued to occur.

In 2005, the Indonesian government established a special desk under the Ministry of Religious Affairs called the Counter-terrorism Team (TPT). This team was responsible for controlling the curriculum of Islamic boarding schools. Implementing the strategy of controlling the curriculum of Islamic boarding schools faced many challenges. Most traditional Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia never relinquished their authority to be controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The curriculum in these schools is generally determined by the kiai (religious leaders) themselves. Moreover, these schools do not issue certificates, especially those considered militant. As a result, there is no instrument for the Indonesian government to exert control. This control over the curriculum is not appropriate in addressing terrorism rooted in Islam because Islam does not teach violence without legitimate religious grounds (based on religious rules).

Another strategy the government employs is conducting campaigns involving the Muslim community. This approach is taken because the government faced allegations that fighting JI is equivalent to fighting Islam. This perception arises due to the religious/ideological similarities between Islam, the religion/ideology followed by JI terrorists, and most of the Indonesian population.

The religious similarity has prompted a meeting between US President George W. Bush and Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri with Indonesian Muslim figures in Bali on October 22, 2003. Some of the Muslim figures present were Kiai Haji Hasyim Muzadi (Nahdlatul Ulama), Syafii Maarif (Muhammadiyah), Azzyumardi Azzra (Rector of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta), and other Muslim figures. One of the agreed-upon matters in the meeting was the rejection of any association between religion and terrorism. The significant meaning of the meeting lies in the importance of Muslim support in combating terrorists who claim their acts of terrorism are based on Islamic teachings. The need for community support led the Indonesian government to recommend that any group within society launch anti-terrorism campaigns. This government initiative received positive responses in 2005. Various community groups, including Islamic organizations such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), spread messages and displayed statements opposing bombings as acts of jihad. The same was done by civil society organizations such as Kosgoro, Pemuda Panca Marga, and Non-Governmental Organizations in Jakarta. They rejected acts of terrorism from a humanitarian perspective.

Furthermore, MUI issued a fatwa specifically addressing terrorism. Fatwa MUI No. 3 of 2004 presented arguments from the Qur'an, such as Surah Al-Ma'idah: 33, Surah Al-Hajj: 39-40, Surah Al-Anfal: 60, and other verses, to refute the verses used by terrorists to justify their actions. According to MUI, terrorism fulfills the elements of crime and is therefore forbidden (haram) under Islamic law. MUI also differentiates between terrorism and jihad. MUI considers jihad to be *islah* (doing good) while terrorism is considered *ifsad* (corruption) and *faudha* (violence). Specifically, regarding suicide bombings, MUI believes that such actions are akin to *al-ya'su* (despair) and *ihlak an-nafs* (self-destruction). Therefore, MUI deems suicide bombings to be forbidden (haram).

The ideological/religious similarities have hindered the government's efforts to gain Muslim support in the success of anti-terrorism campaigns or the involvement of Muslims in counter-terrorism actions. The government, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs,

officially gained support from MUI, NU, and Muhammadiyah to establish a counter-terrorism team in 2006 (Government of Indonesia 2006: 16). The ideological/religious similarity between JI and the majority of the Indonesian population has made it difficult for the political structures involved in addressing the threat of terrorism to be effective. These structures often face rejection from the Muslim community while carrying out their roles. However, this ideological/religious similarity has led to a new structure within counter-terrorism, involving the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the establishment of the Counter-terrorism Team in 2006, which involved Islamic organizations under the coordination of MUI. This additional structure aims to modify the curriculum of Islamic boarding schools, break Muslim support for JI, and correct the concept of jihad among Muslims.

Civil society involvement was not limited to the national level but also extended to the village level, such as the neighborhood association (Rukun Tetangga or RT). An RT is a smaller administrative unit within a village, and above the RT is the Rukun Warga (RW) or Dusun, which is one level below the village. The village or sub-district (Kelurahan) is at the same level as the village in Malaysia. In mid-2005, for example, in Klender Sub-district, East Jakarta, the community supported the Lurah (village chief) to ensure that no elements of terrorism were present in their residential areas, as desired by the Indonesian government. The community's support at the RT level was facilitated by a circular letter from the Lurah addressed to the community. This circular letter was known to the general public as it was posted on bulletin boards, public places, and mosques. Such counter-terrorism measures were appropriate, although, for the first time during the reform era, the circular letter raised unanswered questions among residents due to the need for a centralized system for them to seek clarification. The circular letter also raised suspicions about stricter control over non-Jakarta residents. This approach was unusual as it was carried out by the village-level government rather than the police at the closest level to the village, such as the Police Sector (Polsek).

Indonesia still faces challenges in involving civil society in addressing terrorism issues. Besides being sporadic and limited to certain cities, some segments of civil society even oppose the government's initiatives. Such a situation hampers the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies. The involvement of government personnel at the village level is a viable option, although it should ideally be the responsibility of the police at the level closest to the village, such as the Polsek.

Enforcement measures are constrained by the ideological similarity between JI and the majority of the Indonesian population, which poses a political dilemma for the elites. The efforts to fight JI are seen as desperate attempts to eradicate local Islam for the benefit of the West. At the same time, the political elites need Muslim support amid their weakened political position due to democratization. The support of Indonesian Vice President Hamzah Haz for Abu Bakar Baasyir exemplifies this political dilemma.

As a predominantly Muslim country, it is unsurprising that most political elites in parliament and the government are Muslims. Therefore, when the government declares Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a terrorist group, it is rejected by most Muslim political elites. The ideological/religious similarity between JI and most of the Indonesian population has caused political elites to face dilemmas in supporting campaigns against terrorism. The political elites are concerned that supporting such campaigns will be perceived as endorsing eliminating Islam's existence in Indonesia. Political elites fear this perception

as it would erode or eliminate popular support for them. The dynamics of the relationship between political elites, the government, and the people have hindered the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies. Therefore, since the development phase of counter-terrorism strategies, the government has involved Islamic elites from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah in implementing counter-terrorism measures.

The change in the influence of democratization on political elites about strengthening counter-terrorism strategies after the Bali bombings in 2002 was influenced by two factors. First, there was international involvement in the Bali bombings. This involvement was evident when the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution No. 1438 on October 15, 2002. The resolution, fully approved by the 15 members of the Security Council, considered the Bali bombings as an international event and called on all UN member states to assist Indonesia in combating international terrorism. Indonesia took this international involvement as an opportunity to gain political support from the international community. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2010: 3), this support was needed to prevent foreign support for terrorists within the country.

Second, there was a tangible terrorism threat from 2002 to 2005. JI succeeded in carrying out bombings that had a significant impact on society, such as the Bali bombings (I) on October 12, 2002, in Bali; the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta on August 5, 2003; the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta on September 9, 2004; and the Bali bombings (II) on October 1, 2005. At the same time, the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), particularly the Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) Anti-Terror Unit, successfully proved the existence of terrorist groups. Densus 88 also captured and neutralized the most wanted terrorists, such as Dr. Azhari and Noordin M. Top.

After 2005, terrorism continued to be a topic of discussion in the news as Densus 88 successfully captured terrorists. The achievements of Densus 88 had a significant impact on building public trust in POLRI. This achievement was important because in the early days of democratization, POLRI was disliked by the people as it was seen as an instrument of power during the New Order regime. Democratization made POLRI respect human rights in its actions. The positive response of the public to the counter-terrorism efforts carried out by POLRI was as follows:

Table 1
Public Satisfaction with Counterterrorism Handling
in Indonesia (2007-2011)

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Percentage (%)	54,5	47,9	57,6	79,0	62,8

Source: Compiled from KOMPAS Research Survey conducted on June 22-23, 2011, in 57 cities across Indonesia (Kompas Daily, June 27, 2011)

People's satisfaction since 2007 has changed political elites' perception regarding counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia. A number of Islamic political figures and scholars formed an Anti-Terrorism Team. The establishment of this team came after Vice President Jusuf Kalla aired a recording of Noordin M. Top proposing acts of terrorism by

distorting the understanding of jihad (GATRA Magazine, November 26, 2005). KH Ma'ruf Amin, as the Chairman of MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), also served as the Chairman of the Anti-Terrorism Team and stated that:

"Terrorists cause destruction, while jihad promotes goodness. Therefore, it must be fought against. Indonesia is not a darul harb (war zone). So why fight against fellow Indonesians? And that is not jihad. It's terrorism. So we need to correct the distorted perception of jihad." (Interview, June 5, 2010)

Support for counter-terrorism efforts also came from Azyumardi Azra, the Rector of the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah. He stated, "we cannot instantly combat terrorism in the name of jihad." To be effective, he suggested that religious scholars must acknowledge that some Muslims engage in terrorism, and not always assume that various bombings are a foreign conspiracy (GATRA Magazine, November 26, 2005).

From a democratic perspective, terrorism issues can hinder the pace of democratization as they require political attention and strengthening of security legislation, which may psychologically impact political freedoms. However, from a strategic perspective, terrorism issues provide an opportunity to build international support, as Indonesia faced similar problems to the US after being targeted by JI bombings in Bali in 2002. International support is crucial for the success of counter-terrorism programs and to prevent external support for JI in Indonesia. Various actions from this strategy were demonstrated through official visits by the Indonesian government to ASEAN member countries from August 21-28, 2001. Even before the September 11, 2001 tragedy, President Megawati Soekarnoputri began discussing security issues, including cross-border terrorism and small arms smuggling. As a result of these visits, a proposal was put forward by the Indonesian government to establish extensive regional cooperation (Government of Indonesia, 2001: 3).

CONCLUSION

Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy in the face of JI terrorism has experienced a "discontinuity model" compared to Indonesia's previous experiences. This phenomenon occurred due to several factors. Firstly, there has been a change like terrorism threats, which differ significantly from previous threats, although they have historical connections to past extremist groups. Secondly, there has been a political change since the Reform era in 1998, which led to the ongoing democratization process and transformed the structure and position of political elites in Indonesia. These changes have slowed down legislative strengthening and hindered the development of counter-terrorism institutional capacities. Thirdly, the existence of shared ideology/religion, i.e., Islam, between the majority of the Indonesian population and JI, has made the government face a dilemma in developing a counter-terrorism strategy and its implementation.

The presence of these factors has complicated the development of counter-terrorism strategies. Consequently, the government has been limited to reactive counter-terrorism measures focused on responding to past terrorist acts, and even then, only when there

are legislative references. Such a counter-terrorism strategy can be referred to as a curative-legalistic strategy.

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