

The Practices of Political Patronage and Clientelism of the Democrat Party in the 2014 Legislative Election in Ponorogo Regency

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ABSTRACT

The Democrat Party in Ponorogo Regency still exists despite cases of corruption that ensnared some national political actors. The Ponorogo Regency attracted the attention of many parties and candidates, including that of the Democratic Party, during the legislative elections in 2014. This concern included candidate efforts to transform the party through the provision of patronage material in diverse forms such as a unique distribution process, and a variety of patronage models. This research was conducted to determine the practice of patronage politics of the Democrat Party in the Ponorogo Regency in 2014. The theory used for this research on the practice of patronage is the theory of patronage and clientelism according to the variables offered by James Scott. The qualitative research methods are data collection interviews, and documentation and reports related to the elections in Ponorogo. The results of this study suggest that the practice of patronage in Ponorogo conducted by the Democrat's candidate is very diverse, ranging from the use of money given to voters, the provision of public goods targeting social groups such as farmers and youth organizations on the assumption that they were impressionable on an emotional level, and giving pork barrels in the form of road construction and irrigation disbursed through the BKAD (Inter-agency Cooperation Board). Patronage is certainly distributed through clientelism networks such as successful teams that have been prepared since before the election, a network of social groups that utilize a *warok*, considered a person who has a wise and exalted nature and takes advantage of the village elite. This is a political machine that runs a network to help distribute patronage so that it becomes clientelistic. The interest of this study is the association between patronage and clientelism that is fused with the local culture of the Ponorogo community and was mobilized in the legislative election in 2014.
Keywords: Clientelism, legislative elections 2014, patronage, *warok*

ABSTRAK

Partai Demokrat di Kabupaten Ponorogo masih ada meski terjadi kasus korupsi yang menjerat beberapa pelaku politik nasional. Kabupaten Ponorogo menarik perhatian banyak pihak dan kandidat, termasuk Partai Demokrat, saat pemilihan legislatif pada 2014. Perhatian ini termasuk upaya kandidat untuk mengubah partai melalui penyediaan materi patronase dalam berbagai bentuk seperti proses distribusi yang unik, dan berbagai model patronase. Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui praktik politik patronase Partai Demokrat di Kabupaten Ponorogo pada tahun 2014. Teori yang digunakan untuk penelitian ini mengenai praktik patronase adalah teori patronase dan clientelism sesuai dengan variabel yang ditawarkan oleh James Scott. Metode penelitian kualitatif menggunakan wawancara pendataan, dan dokumentasi dan laporan yang berkaitan dengan pemilihan di Ponorogo. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa praktik patronase di Ponorogo yang dilakukan oleh calon Demokrat sangat beragam, mulai dari penggunaan uang yang diberikan kepada pemilih, penyediaan barang publik yang menargetkan kelompok sosial seperti petani dan organisasi pemuda dengan asumsi bahwa mereka mudah terpengaruh pada tingkat emosional, dan berupa konstruksi jalan dan irigasi yang disalurkan melalui BKAD (Badan Kerjasama Antar-Lembaga). Patronase ini pastinya didistribusikan melalui jaringan clientelism seperti tim sukses yang telah dipersiapkan sejak sebelum pemilihan, jaringan kelompok sosial yang memanfaatkan warok, dianggap sebagai orang yang memiliki sifat bijak dan agung dan memanfaatkan elit desa. Perilaku tersebut adalah mesin politik yang menjalankan jaringan untuk membantu penyebaran patronase sehingga menjadi clientelistic. Ketertarikan dari penelitian ini adalah hubungan antara patronase dan clientelisme yang menyatu dengan budaya lokal masyarakat Ponorogo dan dimobilisasi dalam pemilihan legislatif pada tahun 2014.

Kata kunci: Clientelisme, pemilihan legislative 2014, patronase, *warok*.

INTRODUCTION

This research describes the practice of patronage politics in the Ponorogo Regency, which focuses on the Democrat Party. As a newcomer, the Democrat Party is able to bring more color to Indonesian politics. The party is seen as a newcomer because it was born after the three major parties: Golkar, the PDI, and the PPP. The democratic national vote in 2004 and 2009 increased (kpu.go.id, 2015). The Democrats' achievements over ten years were not repeated in the 2014 election, as their national vote declined. The decline in votes faced by the Democrats was for several reasons, one of which was the influence of the cadres involved in corruption cases (kompas.com, 2015). Of course, that case has no big impact on the achievements of the Democrat Party at the regional level, because the Democrat Party can still maintain their existence following the 2014 election as researchers focused on the Ponorogo Regency.

The results of Democratic votes at the national level cannot

be separated from the acquisition of votes that came at the regional level. East Java province is a contributing area for the party that brought Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency (detiknews.com, 2015). The Pacitan Regency is utilized by the Democrat Party to reap the votes from East Java (kpu.go.id, 2015). Of course other factors give affects to other regencies around the Pacitan Regency such as Ponorogo Regency, Madiun Regency and surrounding areas (rri.co.id, 2015).

The Ponorogo Regency is the basis of the vote of the Democrat Party, because the vote in this district is very stable. A stable vote from every election in Ponorogo makes this research more focused on the Democrats. What strategy is used by legislative candidates and cadres of the Democrat Party to maintain their existence on the political stage of the Ponorogo Regency? There have been a lot of strategies ranging from good strategies to strategies prohibited by law to gain support from the community as voters. The new phenomenon that is rooted in Indonesian politics is a practice of patronage that is increasingly interesting to see, and is even utilized by political actors. The practice of patronage politics is one of the most common political phenomena in Indonesia in legislative elections, presidential elections, and elections of regional leaders.

The patronage politics referred to in this study are various forms of exchange of benefits between candidates and the electorate to gain political support at times of elections, especially in the 2014 legislative election in Ponorogo Regency, which were focused on the local parliament (DPRD) in Ponorogo Regency of the Democrat Party which has managed to sit as a people representative.

The study of patronage politics has actually begun to rise in popularity and is popular in Indonesia with various themes related to money politics or research that discusses the practice of buying votes at democratic elections. Most of these findings look at how the political phenomenon that occurred in Indonesia, especially after the end of the new order and entering the reform

era, reflects more the transactional political process that has the most tangible money politics. The embodiment of that money politics is like the practice of purchasing votes whenever elections are held. The various ways of explaining the benefits of candidates to the electorate involve many forms of relationship between the candidates and the electorate. "This relationship is what is commonly known as "clientelism" ([Hasrul, 2010](#)). The terms "patronage" and "clientelism" are actually still difficult to differentiate; there are some circles that equate both these terms and there are also those that distinguish between the notion and the concept of both.

This study has its own characteristics by distinguishing both. Patronage and clientelism are distinguished by the researchers with a view to clarifying the context of the study. This study is not limited to a close relationship between the two, because it can be said that the practice of patronage is the distribution of materials or certain advantages to supporters or voters that is usually facilitated through mechanisms or relationships that are clientelistic, such as the existence of the *Tim Sukses* (SuccessTeam), political machines from social networks, and the organizations of political parties themselves. Focusing on the main theme or the title of this research about patronage politics in the 2014 legislative elections in the Ponorogo Regency, the researcher presents a discussion that explains the relationship between patronage and clientelism within the Democrat Party in the Regency district.

The concept of patronage in social science is in fact still widely debated. This is related to understanding the relationship between the concept of patronage and clientelism, which still causes differences of opinion among social scientists. Some have equated the notions of these two concepts, and some distinguish between them. In relation to this research alone, the two concepts are distinguished from each other. Where the concept of patronage is primarily used, that of clientelism supports it to provide a good understanding of the political symptoms of patronage discussed

in this study.

Political patronage is the relationship between a patron (a person a particular position) and a client (a person in need of something) who are mutually beneficial to each other; in the political context it is the exchange of suffrage with goods and money given by the cadre to the voters ([Aspinall,2014](#); [Hein,2010](#); [Sadan dan, 2012](#); and [Scherlis, 2013](#)). Such practices are referred to as political practices of kinship that are packaged in political patronage ([Aspinall, 2014](#); [Hilman, 2013](#)). Indonesia because Indonesian people feel they benefit and the candidates also enjoy an advantage in terms of votes in the name of patronage politics and actor philanthropy.

Of course, this situation is not only experienced by new candidates but also by incumbent or old candidates. More patronage politics emerged from the government to exchange policies with the people so the candidates could be elected again ([Hachemaoui, 2013](#); [Kopecky&Scherli, 2008](#); [Arriola, 2009](#); [Waddell, 2015](#); [Wigh, 2015](#)).

This direct exchange on the part of the former government was in the form of a policy of an incumbent strategy to gain the attention of the public ([Alley, 2010](#); [Heperand Keyman,1998](#)). These distributions and trucks are provided directly to the community but others are provided through the network. Patronage conducted directly from patrons to clients without going through an intermediary is called “pure patronage” ([Aspinall, 2014](#)) while gains of patrons and clients through networks or brokers are called “patronage politics” and are clientelistic ([Aspinall, 2014](#); [Hasrul, 2010](#)).

The clientelistic network is very important in distributing profits from candidates to voters ([Aspinall, 2014](#); [Auyero, 2000](#); [Robinson &Verdier, 2013](#)). Of course, this network is needed because the character, culture, and needs in the community that most understand is a network or a successful team ([Aspinall, 2014](#); [Auyero, 2000](#); [Hasrul, 2010](#); [Hilman, 2013](#); [Robinson & Verdier,2013](#))

This political clientelism is repeatable that is uninterrupted after the election, but persists when the candidate is elected ([Aspinall, 2015](#); [Hasrul, 2010](#); [Hilman, 2013](#); [Hrebenar, 2007](#); [Winters, 2016](#)). The practice of political patronage will not be perfect when a network is not formed, so this network of clientelism needs to distribute something to the community to achieve its purpose.

Research on the politics of patronage and clientelism has been carried out but only to see how the practice of political patronage in elections and clientelism can be seen in isolation from the perspective of elections. Such research includes Jovano Deivid Oleyver, titled “The Application of Political Patronage in Victory of Justice and Unity Party Indonesia in the Legislative Election of Bitung City in 2009.” This research was conducted in 2014, with the use of patron-client theory in collaboration with distributive political theory to discuss the victory of the Justice Party and Indonesian unity in the Legislative election in Bitung City in 2009. This is the difference with the research itself, where the concept of patronage is specifically combined with the concept of clientelism. In addition, differences are also found in the patron-client framework itself, where the highlight of the study emphasizes the practice of vote buying, pork-barreling, and constituency service, while this research further systematizes the distribution in a broader classification and refers to the distribution of variations of patronage forms of Aspinall and Sukmajati. While the equation itself is more about the main theme that is discussed specifically to see the symptoms of patronage politics in the event of a legislative election, the type of research used is also the same as qualitative research.

While the research of Nurfaizin on the Kroni Santri Patronage Relationship Collapse in Local Political Space (Study on Regional Election of Pamekasan Regency in 2013) has a similar research theme, i.e. patronage, the scope taken in patronage in the research is more between *santri* and *kiai* with the case study in the Pamekasan Regency. This is in contrast to this study, which

focuses more on patronage in legislative elections in relation to legislative candidates with voters in the Ponorogo Regency, especially for candidates of Regency/City DPRD from the Democrat Party.

From the two previous studies above, in particular this study, the revealing of various forms of patronage politics refers to the distribution of variations of patronage forms expressed by [Aspinall and Sukmajati \(2015\)](#). The distribution of variations of patronage forms expressed by Aspinall and Sukmajati includes five forms, namely vote buying, individual gifts, services and activities, club goods, and pork barrel projects. Of course, the concept of patronage in this study is not patronage alone but rather a look at clientelism in accordance with Aspinall and Sukmajati (2014). The purpose of this research is to the concept of patronage and clientelism because these two things have never been used by other researchers to visualize the political problems in Indonesia.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

POLITICAL PATRONAGE

The notion of the concept of patronage in social science is in fact still widely debated. This is related to understanding the relationship between the concept of patronage and clientelism, which still causes differences of opinion among social scientists. Some have equated the notions of these two concepts, and some distinguish between them. In relation to this research alone, the two concepts are distinguished from each other, with the concept of patronage being primarily used, and the concept of clientelism in support to provide a good understanding of the patronage political symptoms discussed in this study. This section will discuss the concept of patronage, and afterwards the concept of clientelism will be presented in the next section.

In relation to the context of this research, we can see how this patronage relationship becomes a form of profit exchange or dis-

tribution of profits that is expected to provide support or votes from those given to profit-giving politicians. Because the patronage form is done with diverse expectations for the replies of the distribution as described: “Political parties, party factions, individual politicians expect the following rewards from patronage: votes, energy, money, strategy flexibility, and retrieval capacity policy” ([Muller and Vousden, 2014](#)).

Specifically in this study, revealing various forms of patronage politics refers to the distribution of variations of patronage forms expressed by [Aspinall and Sukmajati \(2015\)](#). The distribution of variations of patronage forms revealed by Aspinall and Sukmajati includes five forms, namely vote buying, individual gifts, services and activities, club goods, and pork barrel projects. Variations of this form of patronage will be explained by defining and classifying each one as follows:

Vote buying is the systematic distribution of cash payments from candidates to voters within days of an election accompanied by an implicit expectation that the recipients will respond by voting for the giver ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)). In practice, patronage actions that are classified in terms of vote purchases by these candidates are usually performed systematically using mobilization networks, or can also be regarded as useful ways to record the voters and later to distribute money/goods to voters. Apart from the patronage form of vote buying, there is also patronage in the form of private gifts ([Aspinall, 2014](#)).

Individual gifts are usually patronage practices undertaken to support sound purchasing practices to be more systematic. This is done by giving certain forms of gifts in person. These personal gifts are often described as glossy social relationships, such as giving personal gifts such as souvenirs ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)). The classification of the practice of providing personal items is actually very difficult to distinguish from sound buying practices. Therefore, according to Aspinall and Sukmajati, the practice of giving personal goods can be categorized into several parts, namely giving in the form of small objects (such as calen-

dars and keychains), foodstuffs, and other small objects that have religious significance (such as fabrics, household appliances, *hijabs*, *mukenas* and prayer rugs). Furthermore, in addition to vote purchases and personal grants, this form of patronage can also be in the form of services and activities.

Service and activity is a form of patronage practice by providing or financing various forms of activities and services for voters. In general, the form of activity that is most often performed by candidates or party politicians is campaigning during a celebration of a particular community. Other examples of this include sporting events, chess or dominos tournaments, recitation forums, cooking demonstrations, group singing, parties organized by the community, etc. ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)). In addition to these forms of activities, the forms of service to the community include a variety of free health services such as free ambulances and checkups, as well as garbage collection, and many other forms of service.

In addition to services and activities, another form of patronage is the provision of group items. Club goods are patronage practices aimed at providing benefits to a particular group of people or social groups, not just individual benefits. Club goods in practice in Indonesia can be divided into two categories: donations to community associations and donations to communities living in urban, rural, or other environments ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)).

Usually, most politicians or parties feel that the strategy of providing benefits in the form of group items to a particular community is less effective because of the reciprocal elements that have been discussed earlier. Therefore, the provision of these public goods is usually done with the strong support of community leaders who have an influence on the groups to which these goods are distributed. So the expected reciprocity in the form of support on election day becomes more convincing because of the community leaders who are heard and obeyed by the voters coming from the beneficiary community. In addition to several

forms of distribution of profits in the patronage that has been described above, the last form of patronage expressed by [Aspinall and Sukmajati \(2015\)](#) is in the form of pork barrel projects.

In addition, aspiration funds, which are usually provided to the legislature and are intended as funds to be used by legislators in response to constituent or community aspirations, are usually used by incumbents for this purpose. Where projects are awarded by legislators to the community with the aim of the community choosing the candidate again at the next election. In fact, the community groups in certain geographical areas that have received pork barrel profits are included in campaign teams. Another form of this is where the candidate provides payments to the members of the Success Team and provides other benefits that are more clientelical and more sustainable, such as providing employment or assistance to obtain allocation of government projects ([Aspinall, Davidson and Weiss, 2016](#)). In Aspinall and Sukmajati's research on the 2014 legislative election, they saw that there was a reciprocal relationship between patronage and electoral fraud. Whereas in some studies, election fraud is sometimes regarded as an alternative to patronage, based on the research they conducted, Aspinall and Sukmajati found that election fraud and patronage may be linked.

Several variations of the patronage form described above are referenced from [Aspinall and Sukmajati's \(2015\)](#) exposure guidelines that are used in this study. The concept of clientelism, which will also be used in this study to support the concept of patronage, will be described in the next section.

CLIENTELISM

In relation to this research, the pattern that is used, or the concept of clientelism that is used in this case, refers to the exposure of Aspinall and Sukmajati's patronage concept, referred to above. Aspinall and Sukmajati refer more to the notion that clientelism is a characteristic of the relationship between politicians and voters or supporters ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)).

Aspinall and Sukmajati's exposure referred to research on the last elections of 2014 in Indonesia, where when looking at the context of the research at the time of the election, the concept of clientelism is meant to be both synonymous with the concept of new clientelism and with democratic elections. But the subject of patrons places more emphasis on individual politicians of political parties who are more similar to the pattern of old clientelism, although political party politicians are not entirely autonomous as in the concept of old clientelism, since politicians are people who come from political parties that have been selected through an internal party mechanism. That means that the party is still in control over the individual.

Furthermore, [Aspinall and Sukmajati \(in Hicken, 2008\)](#) explain the definition of clientelism which consists of three things. First, contingency or reciprocity: Goods or services of one party (patron or client) are a direct response to the reply of the other party (Hicken, 2008, p. 291); usually, material sources are exchanged with sound or other forms of political performance. Second, hierarchy: There is an emphasis on unequal power relationships between patrons and clients. Third, repetition: Clientelistic momentum persists ([Aspinall, Davidson and Weiss, 2016](#)). In Aspinall's experience with the concept of patronage that has been reviewed before, he alluded to the fact that to overcome the problem of reciprocity, politicians usually use relationships that are clientelistic to launch the practice of patronage, because in a clientelistic relationship, patronage is not merely a short-term issue with material exchange) between a candidate and a voter, but part of a long-term relationship that is equal on both sides ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)).

Furthermore, in Aspinall and Sukmajati's presentation of clientelism, they describe a clientelistic relationship in the form of the vote broker network commonly used in Indonesia, where the form of broker network is formulated based on the results of research related to money politics in general elections or the legislative elections of 2014. The forms of vote broker network in

this case include three forms of the Success Team networks, social networking machines, and political parties. Each of Aspinall and Sukmajati's wise vote brokers are described below:

The Success Team. The vote broker network that falls into the category of the Success Team is a vote broker network that is commonly used. A variety of titles are usually used, such as, in this case, "winning team." In general, the success teams are usually personalized and promote campaigning for individual candidates, though often the success teams also work for a number of candidates in the form of tandem campaigns ([Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2015](#)). The problems that often occur in the success teams that create reciprocal problems that should be overcome through the use of the success teams are embezzlement, inaction, and fraud brokers. Therefore, usually, the politicians or candidates in the election are very concerned about these issues. Apart from the broker network in the form of the Success Team, there is also a broker network in the form of social networking machines.

The social networking machines in the reviews provided by Aspinall and Sukmajati are more like influential community leaders. It is not uncommon for these public figures to have formal positions in government such as village heads and RT/RW heads, and they may also be chairmen of formal associations in the form of ethnic groups, clubs, including sports clubs, and even religious groups. The utilization of community leaders as a social networking machine is carried out by candidates in the hope that followers of these figures can be encouraged to support it.


From the two forms of brokerage network that have been disclosed, the success team and brokerage network, Aspinall and Sukmajati observe that the broker structure uses at least two different routes to reach the voters, namely through the Success Team (or political party) organized territorially and through the social network. Along with the two forms of brokerage networks that have been described above, the last brokerage network is a political party.

A political party is a broker network that plays the smallest

role in organizing a grassroots campaign to support the candidate. Political parties are usually used by candidates who are members of the party. This means that even if the political party turns out to be the most minimal mobile mobilization network, it will become effective when based on candidates who are from party officials rather than cadres who are not party administrators. The use of political party cadres to mobilize votes for one of the candidates, who are usually the administrators or even party chiefs at the local and central level, must be a disadvantage for other candidates from the same party who are also competing.

In relation to this research, the concept of patronage and its various forms and clientelism along with the form of mobilization network of voters described above in reference to Aspinall and Sukmajati is the concept that is used as the theoretical foundation in this research. From the above explanation, the researcher here will also provide a chart that will illustrate these two concepts to present a clear picture of the mechanisms of patronage or patentee patronage work that will be described as being modified from the patron-client cluster and patron-client pyramid charts presented by James Scott.


Although James Scott's concept was not the main reference in the theoretical framework used by the research, the researcher felt that the chart could illustrate the patentee patronage and patronage framework in this study, with some modifications from the researcher to fit the context of this study and to fit the main focus of the study:



Source: The modification from the patron-client pyramid chart of Scott (1992).

FIGURE 1. PATRONAGE

Figure I provides an explanation of how the pattern or framework of political patronage is referred to in this study, in which the distribution of profits from the candidates to the voters is done directly without the broker network, which is more clientelistic. The distribution of these benefits can also be to individual voters (not personalistic) as well as to specific social groups in society. The way of distributing candidates to individuals and certain social groups here is more of a one-off relationship, as is the distribution of benefits that follow cultural values in society to deal with reciprocal issues that have been previously reviewed. Distribution can also be to groups or individuals who are familiar with the candidate, but have no personalistic relationship with the candidate, only to a casual introduction that has no long-term and repetitive value.



Source: The modification from the patron-client pyramid chart of Scott (1992).
FIGURE 2. THE PATRONAGE CHART IS CLIENTELISTIC

Figure 2 explains how the work patterns or mechanism of

patronage work are clientelistic. Patronage that is clientelistic, as can be seen in the chart above, is the distribution of benefits through certain mobilization networks such as success teams, social networking machines, and political parties themselves. Personalistic, hierarchical, and repetitive relationships are usually established between candidates and brokers, who serve as a winning team or candidate campaign team. The relationship between the broker and the voter may also be personalistic, but that between the voter and the candidate is not personalistic, hierarchical, or repetitive. Therefore, it is said that this patronage is clientelistic.

RESEARCH METHODS

The type of research used is descriptive with a qualitative approach. The focus of this research is to look at the political practices of the Democrat Party in the 2014 election in Ponorogo Regency. The location of research in Ponorogo with research sites is the Democrat Party of Ponorogo Regency. For data collection, researchers used observation techniques, interviews and documentation. Qualitative data analysis is used as proposed by Miles, [Huberman and Saldana \(2014, p. 33\)](#).

DISCUSSION

THE PATRONAGE PRACTICE OF THE DEMOCRAT PARTY IN PONOROGO

The phenomenon of giving money during the night and even early in the morning, which is often called the “dawn attack” by the community, is certainly no stranger to elections. In 2009, the granting of money in the form of dawn raids was still carried out by the candidates and continued with the district election in 2010. Continuing into the legislative elections in 2014, this practice of giving money is increasingly evident and not covered up completely. Of course, in the 2014 legislative election in the Ponorogo Regency it could be called vulgar, because giving money was no longer hidden and secret as the cadre through the net-


work shared the money when the voters went to the polling station. The election was ravaged by candidates who used sound purchases in the form of money or goods in the 2014 election in the Ponorogo Regency ([LSMPRC, 2015](#)).

This openness of money giving practices is balanced by the activities of candidates who approach the community as voters by providing goods and social assistance. This occurred during the campaign period and even started before the campaign took place. Such practices are performed by entering the social activities of the community and offering political contracts and social assistance. The legislative election in Ponorogo in 2014 targeted young people more, who represented many first-time voters. Candidates offered a variety of goods to gain the sympathy of young people whose activities they had been entered. Besides that, the incumbent legislative candidate has more to do with the political practice of pig barreling or pork barreling to the society of their election area. The project with the above candidates was rampant in the legislative election in 2014. Assistance in developing the village road and irrigation is mostly done by the cadets of incumbent (2015)

The provision of social assistance to the community conducted by Democratic candidates has a target. The candidates' target is young people and women religious study (Interview Community in the Electoral District 1, 2015). The purpose and objective is to draw the votes of the novice voters and sympathy from among the mothers of women religious study. The practice of giving goods by the candidate from the Democrats does not stop there because they are targeting the preservation culture of the Ponorogo *Reog* by providing assistance to villages and community groups that do not have *reog*. Farming groups, which dominate among the community, are also targeted by the candidates with the provision of assistance such as agricultural equipment. The practice of patronage in the form of club goods in certain communities in society, and some that use more money in particular, even these candidates collaborate both of these patron-

age practices in order to attract the sympathy and support of the community.

In addition, the pure patronage in the Ponorogo Regency is realized by giving money either directly or through the network to select candidates. Distribution of vote buying/pocket money and the provision of goods are often termed patronage as shown below:



Source: Compiled by the Author (2015).

FIGURE 3. VOTE BUYING DISTRIBUTION FLOW

The process of distributing money itself has a very different plot, starting directly with the red line community (pure), through a success team to the voters up through the group leader (pure) to distribute money to individuals within the group. Proper patronage practices can be seen from the existence of a direct award from the candidate to the community without going through the clientelistic network (Community in the Electoral District 6, 2015). Other giving of money to individuals is mostly done by candidates not directly but through individual community figures and success teams. In addition, it would be more interesting to see the distribution of money through the group for the individuals in it done through the Success Team and community leaders and directly from the candidate who is closer to the chairman of the group. In addition to vote buying there is also the purchase of votes through the election, often called “vote

trading.”

The pocket money (*sanggu*) is distributed into two different ways: through intermediaries and directly to the community (Community in the Electoral District 2, 2015). In the intermediary way, it can take place through the Success Team and the group leaders who target individuals in the group (patronage is clientelistic) (Community in the Electoral District 3, 2015). The selection of youth group targets is a separate strategy because young people and novice selectors are very easily influenced by the group leader. The influence of the group leader on the members is proof of the high degree of *sendikodawuh* from the members to the chairperson. (Community in the Electoral District 5, 2015). The amount of money is very diverse, ranging from 25,000 to 100,000/person. The giving of this item is often referred to as an individual gift, which in practice in Ponorogo is in the form of a calendar, t-shirt, or wall clock (Community in the Electoral District 4, 2015). In addition to the voters, there is a candidate in the Electoral District 6 who buys votes from the election organizers by raising results from the votes of other candidates in one party. This practice was carried out in the village of Karangrejo in the Sampung Regency (Poling Station 12) by members of the PPS (jaringan.news.com, 2015), not only in the form of money given to the voters but also to the needy.

The granting of this item is referred to as “club goods” (Aspinall, 2014). This term is used for the giving of goods to social groups, in contrast to individual gifts, which refers more to the giving of private goods to society, whereas club goods refers more to giving goods needed by nonmember groups. Youths are the group most targeted by providing assistance in the form of goods that can be leased to the community for the purpose of getting rent as group income, the goods being in the form of tents, generators, and other equipment (Community in the Electoral District 2, 2015). Goods in this group are also given to agricultural groups because almost half of the land in Ponorogo is agricultural. Goods such as sickles, fertilizers, and rice grinding

machines are provided (Community in the Electoral District 3, 2015). In addition to targeting young people and GAPOKTAN, distribution of goods in this group also targets mothers and mothers' groups, women's religious study groups, and reog art groups (reogart figures, 2015).

In practice, the political patronage in Ponorogo has many terms such as *open-openan* area in Java. The local language has become the basis of the vote of political parties and even the vote base of the actors. The provision of pork barreling is very binding to the voters who are open because the culture of helping each other in Mataraman is highly esteemed (Harsono, 2015). The form of this pork barrel is the provision of road-building assistance, irrigation, and culvert making (The Success Team in the Electoral District 4). The distribution from pork barrel in the Ponorogo Regency is made easier with the diagram below.


The area was given the name *open-openan* because this was the base of the vote at the previous election (The Success Team in the Electoral District 1, 2015). In addition, as the target of the goods group of the *open-openan* area this becomes the focus of pork barreling by the candidate to the constituents. Pork barrels are a government aid that should be distributed to those constituents who supported the previous election and usually this is carried out by an incumbent candidate.

The provision of pork barrels is binding on voters in the *open-openan* areas because the culture of helping each other is highly respected (Harsono, 2015). The form of pork barrel is the provision of roads, irrigation, and culverts (4). The distribution of pork barrels in the Ponorogo Regency is shown in Figure 4.

The use of government funds to aid misuse as a political strategy is a form of patronage politics with pork barrels. The distribution of aspiration funds in Ponorogo Regency is generally carried out in two ways through the SKPD and BKAD (inter-village cooperation councils) (The Success Team in the Electoral District 4, 2015). First, the fund is derived through the regency's agencies to work on projects in the field. The mechanism of this is a

proposal submitted directly by the community to the SKPD and the situation of the area is review edit can be considered.

This first distribution method is not an option for the board to put its name to the project because of the work and process through the SKPD. Projects through the SKPD are purely reviewed in the area and do not become parliamentary entrants, in contrast to the funds through the BKAD (The Success Team in the Electoral District 4, 2015).



Source: Compiled by the Author (2015).
FIGURE 4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARK BARREL

The second method of distribution is that funds can be disbursed through the BKAD and channeled to the accounts of community groups both within one region and incorporated into a cube consisting of at least 15 people to a member of the DPRD (The Success Team in the Electoral District 3, 2015). A member of the Regional People’s Legislative Assembly gave a letter of rec-

ommendation on the proposal submitted by the residents and then the proposal was brought by the personal assistant to the BKAD (The Success Team in the Electoral District4,2015).


The distribution of government project funds (aspiration funds) utilized by Democrat Party incumbent candidates is to be discussed through the BKAD. Government projects that should be purely for the needy areas with the submission process from the community through the SKPD should be used by candidates to enter into the pork barrel project. This is done through the process of extending the hands of brokers and success teams to act as a bridge between the community and the candidate. Communication between the Success Team and communities greatly affects the success of a project that gets responses from the legislature.

THE CLIENTELISM NETWORK OF THE DEMOCRAT PARTY IN PONOROGO REGENCY

According to Aspinall and Sukmajati's (2015), there are at least three mobilization network routes to be discussed here. First is the Success Team. The successful of this team is carried out by almost all Democrat candidates who are either in or out. Second are social networking machines. The candidates utilize public figures ranging from village bureaucrats to religious and cultural figures. Third is preserve political party machine. The Democrat candidates utilize the political machine in terms of cadres located at the bottom of the PAC in each village and the election district.

There are the network of the Success Team, community leaders, and political parties in distributing patronage to the community. In the three forms of mobilization network of voters who have this clientelistic relation, based on the data of candidates of the researcher, all speakers admitted to using the network of success teams in order to win the nomination. Furthermore, social networking machines such as community leaders, most of the speakers only claim to use more as a driver, or can be

said as people who are used for the power of community in the application of various forms of patronage politics, as well as some who use it as a network of voter mobilization. In contrast to the political party machine this is only used for the implementation of the Democratic Party's pork barrel. First, this explanation discusses the success team that spearheads the candidates:



Source: Compiled by the Author (2015).
FIGURE 5. THE ROLE OF THE SUCCESS TEAM

The candidate's approach by always collecting success from mid-2012 until the 2014 election is a form of emotional approach to the candidate's success team, and the formation of a Success Team is done by pre-empting the request of willingness such written agreement from the Success Team to the candidate that the supporting candidates entirely as well as the 2009 nomination. The number of success teams from the Democrat candidates for nominating DPRD level can be fairly selective, remembering that this is done to get a success team that can actually work for the candidate. Of course, good sorting like this avoids the cheating done by the success team because sometimes there is a double Success Team (Candidate, 2016). The form of success team selection became a candidate's readiness to fight in the legislative

elections in the Ponorogo district in 2014.

The structure of the Success Teams in this section is well organized and tends to be stratified. The structure of the Success Teams can be said to be effective for the seizure of seats in the local parliament. Of course, the effectiveness of this network will be paid off when the candidate wins in accordance with the acquisition of his votes. This difference occurs because, as can be seen, the level of the success team from the top level is the success team leader who is in the district as the holder of a success team command on behalf of the candidate, of course. Then enter the next level to the Village Coordinator which is divided into three, so the implementation will be easy. Ease in this structure as it is clear the duties and functions of success teams that are under the command of the success team of the chairman in the district. The task of the village coordinating team is to achieve success in the *open-openan* area and the most important is the task for new and vulnerable areas. Communities recruited as success teams also have a clear task of maintaining votes at the “open-pure” and community level. The most important tasks are derived from the group leader who is in charge of his group by utilizing “joint risk” in the Matraman culture. After discussing the next Success Team of social network which is more dominated by *warok* and village elites who are members of the winning team of candidates.

Warokis the strongest network in Ponorogo because of the wise attitude and is obeyed by the public as the target of candidates to attract entry into the net (Candidate, 2015). Therefore, the blessing and assistance of *warok* are needed by the candidates to attract voters. People who are trusted by the *warok* community can contribute a lot of votes to the candidates. In addition, village elites such as RT to village heads become the candidate choice as a network because they are closest to the community (candidate, 2015). The proximity of the village elite to the community is the second strongest network after *warok*. The last is the political machine network, where most are the heads of the village

where there are most members of political parties. The position of the village chief is considered the most ideal for networking because candidates can distribute pork barrels directly to the village head (candidate, 2016). This is what makes the village head's bond with the political party very strong because it keeps the *open-openan* area as a recipient of pork barrels or club goods.

The use of patronage is the most widely adopted patrol because the use of pure patronage is very vulnerable to its implementation, while the disadvantage of pure clientelism is that there are a lot of costs borne by the candidate. So candidates prefer to use patronage that is clientelistic.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion can be drawn from the results of this study that the Democrat candidates, first using patronage in the form of votes, gives outgroup goods and pork barrels. Giving money is targeted at communities, group members, and election organizers. The political money used in Ponorogo is termed "pocket money" of 25,000–100,000. The distribution of public goods in Ponorogo targets youth groups such as youth cadres, martial arts, GAPOKTAN, art groups, and women's religious study groups. Areas with open communities are targeted as candidates for public goods and pork barrels such as roads, irrigation, and culverts. The distribution process is through the BKAD (inter-village co-operation agency) and is directly distributed to the community. Secondly, the clientelistic network of the Democrat Party candidates uses success teams, social networks, and political machinery. The Success Teams are set up ahead of time and have their own functions ranging from the chairman to village coordination, whereas social networks are dominated by the nearest *warok* and village elite forces within the community. The politics used by the Democrats uses the cadre of village heads to keep the *open-openan* areas. Patronage with various deficiencies and clientelism as well as the use of patronage that is clientelistic are more desirable from Democratic candidates and candidates from

other parties.

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INTERVIEW DATA

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