BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN POLITICAL IDENTITIES

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Abstract

The article is devoted to identifying key differences between Ukrainian and Russian political identities. It is ascertained that the basic parameters for Ukrainian political identity are individualism, rejection of the authoritarian principle, love of freedom, etc. The idea of freedom has been long embedded in the mentality of Ukrainian people. By contrast, as regards the Russian people (Muscovites) mentality, slavish obedience has long been considered a virtue. According to eyewitnesses, Muscovites considered deception to be a proof of great intelligence. They are not ashamed of lying.

Ukrainian political identity representatives should not be expected to automatically submit to the authorities, as the reputation and legitimacy of the leader are important for them. Ukrainians can force an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally to relinquish the power.

The bearers of Russia's political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. This state of Russian political culture, where decision-making is delegated only to rulers, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. Atomization, that is, the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of Russia's political identity nowadays. Due to the atomization of society and people being unable to trust each other, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in Russia are impossible.

1. The concept of identity. Individual and collective types of identities

The concept of identity (Lat. *identicus* – the same, identical) was introduced into socio-humanitarian discourse scientific circulation in the 1960s by an American psychoanalyst Erik Erikson (Vakulova, 2014). Identity is a key individual feature that determines relations between a persona and his or her social environment.

When considering the identity phenomenon, traditional approaches focus on the concept of

individual (own, personal) or collective (national, social, etc.) identity (Kuts, 2007). It is quite difficult to make a conceptual demarcation between the concepts of individual and collective identity because it is not always possible to clearly distinguish certain parameters.

In its traditional sense, collective identity mainly refers to a person's self-expression in national / regional / territorial and other contexts. Manifestation of such self-expression is the awareness of one's own involvement in a particular community and in the system of values shared by this community (Melnyk (ed.), 2014).

At the same time, new forms of individual involvement in certain communities that are not related to territorial or time constants are emerging today. An individual, immersed in information flows, chooses certain forms of communication or such types of communities (prioritizing them in such a way) that can eventually significantly change his or her collective identity. The modern human being "tries to declare his or her own existence through communication, identifying him- or herself with segments of certain networks and, as a result, with virtual communities" (Yakubina, 2014, p. 236). This means that stable (sustainable) identities are complemented by temporary (flexible) identities in the modern world.

According to M. Guibernau (2012, p. 10), "the defining criteria of identity are continuity in time and differentiation from others". It should also be noted that the correlation of its parameters with spatial, value, semantic and temporal forms is important for the integrity of identity (Kyrydon, 2017).

In our understanding, the content of the concept of collective identity will correlate with the concept proposed by J. Gray. Criticizing the Enlightenment's "abstract concept of man", detached from culture and transformed into zero, the theorist noted that such a person is "devoid of history and nationality, has no attachments, which determines our identity in the real world" (Gray, 2003, p. 19). Thus, the concept of collective identity refers to a certain set of attachments: ethnicity, religion, culture, nation, and so on.

Shattering such attachments can be painful for an individual who is forced to reject that perception after identifying him- or herself with a certain community or mentality for a long time. In such a context, the voiced opinion of V. Hösle should be considered:

> Despite the severe danger of instability caused by the collective identity crisis, it is impossible to assess the latter exclusively negatively. If there were no identity crises, there would be no progress for individuals and institutions; hence, it is necessary to face identity crises and to use them for development (Hösle, 1994, p. 122).

Therefore, identity crises should be perceived as normal phenomena that contribute to the transition to a new level of relations.

The issue of collective identity is especially relevant in the modern world. According to I. Wallerstein, this is due to the fact that the world has entered a new era – a period of the capitalist world economy disintegration. No ideology will be able to exist during this period, because no individual is able to survive among the structures that are disintegrating (because man will not even be able to express himself). Hence, "it is no coincidence that the question of 'group identity' has come to the fore on a scale previously unknown to the modern world-system" (Wallerstein, 2003, p. 228).

A.D. Smith noted that individual identity for a person is a discovery of oneself, and, in accordance with the collective identity problem, each "I" for the individual "is also a social self, category and role" (Smith, 1994, p. 12). This means that collective identity is quite diverse; it includes different roles, namely: family, territorial, class, religious, ethnic ones and so on. According to A.D. Smith, ethnic and religious identity are closely correlated, having many common features. Together, these identities can assemble and sustain strong communities.

National identity often appropriates other types of collective identities (class, religion, ethnicity) due to its multidimensionality. Thanks to multidimensionality, "national identity becomes such a flexible, unyielding force in modern life and politics and can be effectively combined with other powerful ideologies and movements without losing its own character" (Smith, 1994, p. 25).

In general, collective (national) identities are an acquired phenomenon. They are not something natural; on the contrary, they are artificial phenomena that change historically over time. In communities, the formation of a collective identity is based on the following three parameters: communication, experience and memory (Yakhtenfuks, Kolyer-Kokh (eds.), 2007). The commonality of these principles ensures the emergence of traditions that contribute to the formation of long-term collective identities.

2. Problems of national identity

According to E.M. Thompson, there should be a distinction between protective nationalism and aggressive nationalism. The protection of national identity is the basis of protective nationalism, while aggressive nationalism is aimed at exporting its own national identity to conquered territories. For example, "Russian nationalism is both aggressive and

defensive, and its aggressive form has been transformed into an imperial desire to colonize lands adjacent to ethnic Russian territories" (Thompson, 2006, p. 19).

Literature, art, theater, and other forms of culture bearing a reprehensible attitude to the recognition of other nations' identity (that were part of these empires) were involved in the formation of dominant identities in empires. Such rhetoric implicitly suggested that "deprived national groups deserve condemnation by the very fact of their identity differences" (Thompson, 2006, p. 26). In the scientific socio-humanitarian discourse, there is still a point of view that the growth of national consciousness in colonized nations is perceived in a negative light, and the processes of self-identification based on nationalism are considered a kind of disease. In fact, devaluing the national identity of enslaved peoples is one way of subjugating them. In such cases, aggressive nationalism often imposes a kind of stigma on politically weaker nations as "those guilty of nationalism" and, at the same time, justifies force demonstrations of politically stronger nations.

Protective nationalism preserves national identity. However, quite often representatives of imperial identity describe it as xenophobia or as antisocial behavior, seeking to neutralize its mobilizing potential for a particular nation. For example, during Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union:

> the integrity of nations was recognized and even encouraged if it served leisure and manifested itself in folk art, dance and music; however, the aspect of nationalism that highlighted differences between nations was condemned regardless of its source (Thompson, 2006, p. 259).

Accordingly, all attempts to use national identity as a mobilizing force were punished severely enough to prevent the liberation of this nation from imperial oppression.

In this context W. Kymlicka's point of view on the issue of national identity is rather interesting:

> Western states misjudged the stability of the minorities' national identity. External signs of national identity can change in a short time – for example, national heroes, myths and traditional customs. However, identity itself – the feeling of belonging to a nation with its own national culture – is much more stable (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 34).

Thus, national identity is quite stable.

National identity is characterized by a versatile force, determined by the multi-vector functions that national identity takes on in terms of communities' and individuals' lives. According to M. Guibernau (2012, p. 20), national identity means "a collective feeling based on a belief in belonging to one nation and in the commonality of most of the attributes that make it different from other nations". National identity, according to the theorist, "has five dimensions: psychological, cultural, territorial, historical and political" (Guibernau, 2012, p. 20).

Analyzing the phenomenon of national identity, A.D. Smith (1994) defines its following basic features: (1) historical territory (native land); (2) myths common to the nation and historical memory; (3) public (mass) culture; (4) rights and responsibilities that are common to all community members; (5) common economic space.

A.D. Smith singled out the external and internal functions of national identity. External functions include territorial, economic and political functions. After all, nations provide control over territorial, economic and many other resources. "By defining membership, boundaries and resources, national identity makes it possible to rationally justify the ideals of national autarky" (Smith, 1994, p. 25). From a political point of view, the most important political function of national identity is the legitimation of the existing legal institutions in the country. This includes uniform legal rights and responsibilities that determine the priority values and the character of a nation. Thus, in the political context, national identity is the main means of legitimizing public order and solidarity.

The internal functions of national identity are the unification of individuals into a community, which is facilitated by a standardized state mass education system. "The nation is also supposed to develop social ties between individuals and classes, creating a set of common values, symbols and traditions" (Smith, 1994, p. 26). The use of symbols (flags, coins, anthems, monuments, ceremonies), which reminds us of the common cultural heritage and cultural kinship and strengthens the sense of common identity, plays an important role in the formation of national identity.

E.M Thompson (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the symbolic component of national identity. She notes that the basis of national identity is a set of myths, the formation of which has its own specifics when it comes to each nation. Most often, such a set of myths was created by a certain elite group, because education in ancient times was a privilege given to few members of the upper caste. Subsequently, mass education, as well as technology development, contributed to the widespread introduction of these myths in modern society. However, neither education nor technologies became decisive in this process for empires. "The futility of attempts to accelerate the formation of nations, such as the Yugoslav, Soviet and Czechoslovak, is explained by

the lack of a set of symbols that could be common to these false taxonomic groups" (Thompson, 2006, p. 30). Empires were unable to secure the loyalty of colonized peoples due to the absence of common memory models.

In order to form a common set of symbols, a powerful group of authors and artists must be introducing common national myths through literature and art for a long time. It should be understood that changes in culture do not happen at once. As F. Fukuyama rightly points out, "official rules can easily change as a matter of public policy; cultural rules only change after a considerable time, and therefore it is much more difficult to control their development" (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 58).

Another quite important condition for the introduction of common myths in the public consciousness is the availability of free time in groups of people who create myths. For example, in the pre-industrial era, people did not have enough psychological freedom or free time to create a nation. Therefore, nationalism appeared quite late by historical standards (only two centuries ago).

Accordingly, nationalism is not only a phenomenon of the modern era, but also a promising trend of the future era. According to E.M. Thompson, that is the reason so many new nations have emerged in recent decades. It should be noted that this position contradicts the widespread expectations among nationalist theorists that nationalism will completely disappear and wane from the political arena.

According to E.M. Thompson, the active development of the national literature / art / cinema contribute to the formation of a stable national identity. "Literature is a very important 'building block'. At the same time, it is a means of expressing national identity" (Thompson, 2006, p. 31). The reflection of the past in literature shapes the attitude of nations towards victories and defeats. Moreover, wars played a decisive role in the formation of national identity, and it does not matter whether they ended in victory or defeat. The only thing that matters is the attitude to these events, which is reflected in the literature / cinema / theater. For example, Poles have lost nearly all wars since the 18th century. The only exception was the Polish-Soviet war they won in 1920–1921. However, such a continuous chain of national catastrophes only strengthened Polish national identity. As for Ukraine, E.M. Thompson (2006) noted that the Ukrainian set of myths is still in its infancy as Ukrainians restore their self-assertion, which their Russian colonizers have tried to deprive them of.

Thus, the category of experience, in particular, common positive experience, becomes important in the formation of national identity. In this regard, it should be noted that Ukraine has a lot of powerful ideas, historical facts, events, personalities, based on which it is possible to form a stable national identity.

3. Key parameters of Ukrainian and Russian identities: historical background

The basic characteristics of Ukrainian identity are individualism, rejection of authoritarian principles, love of freedom, etc.

The specificity of certain values is often determined by the basic features of the national character. In order to identify the essential fundamental features of Ukrainian national identity, some of the oldest reported by eyewitnesses characteristics of Slavs who lived on modern Ukraine lands in ancient times should be analyzed first. Thus, in *Strategikon* – a script dating back from 6th-7th centuries which was devoted to military affairs – there are accurate descriptions of the essential features of Slavs' character who then inhabited the territory that is nowadays modern Ukraine. The authorship of *Strategikon* is attributed to Maurice – a Byzantine emperor (582–602). This work includes descriptions of routines, social order, habits of individual peoples, including Slavs, Antes and Persians.

The aspiration for freedom and love of freedom have long been characteristic of the Slavs. Thus, the *Strategikon of Maurice* states that "the tribes of the Slavs and the Antes are similar in their way of life, in their customs, in their love of freedom; they can in no way be enslaved or subjugated in their own country" (Strategikon, 2004, XI.5). That means that already in the sixth century foreigners noted a desire for freedom in Slavs which has been embedded in the identity of Ukrainians since ancient times. This raises parallels to the correlation of essential features of Ukrainian identity with the fundamental postulates of the political ideology of liberalism, for which the concept of freedom is basic.

The *Strategikon of Maurice* also states that the Slavs do not have a military system and a single commander; they do not know how to obey or fight (Strategikon, 2004, IX.3). Accordingly, the Slavs of that time (living on the territory of modern Ukraine), on the one hand, had a feature of a certain rejection of power and disobedience to authority. On the other hand, the roots of the proverb "Where there are two Cossacks, there are three hetmans" can lead to the character of the Slavs. This means the absence of a single leadership (that is, the lack of obedience to only one person), which was typical of the Slavs. However, the *Strategikon of Maurice* states that the inability of these people to obey only one person

can be successfully exploited. If there are many leaders among the Slavs "and there is no agreement between them, it is good to attract some of them to their side with things or gifts" (Strategikon, 2004, XI.5), making sure that not everyone obeys one leader.

Similar observations have come down to us from Procopius of Caesarea, who lived in the Justinian era. He described the military campaigns of the Slavs in the Eastern Roman Empire (6th century). Procopius of Caesarea noted that "these tribes, Slavs and Antes, are not ruled by one man, but have long lived in democracy (democracy), and therefore their happiness and unhappiness in life is considered a common cause" (Kuts, 2011, p. 116). In general, it is noted that the Slavs are good people and not villainous at all.

The essential features of the Muscovites (modern Russians) are described by an eyewitness, namely a German diplomat Johann Korb (1701) in the work *Diarium itineris in Moscoviam Perillustris*. This Diary was published in 1701. Johann Korb was the first foreign author to describe Muscovy of Petrine times. Subsequently, almost all copies of the Diary were destroyed at the request of the Muscovites. According to J. Korb, Muscovites form a nation for slavery; they hate even the shadow of freedom (Korb, 1701, p. 204). These people are placid when oppressed and they all willingly admit that they are serfs of their sovereign. When addressing the nobles, Muscovites have a tendency to call themselves diminutive names, serfs or vile, contemptuous slaves of the Grand Duke (Korb, 1701, p. 203). They consider all their property not their own, but the sovereign's.

Muscovites have long sold their own children. In J. Korb's *Diary* it is noted that the power of the father in Muscovy is considerable and is very burdensome for the son (Korb, 1701, p. 206). The law allows a father to sell his son four times: this means that if a father sells his son once, and he somehow frees himself or his master grants him freedom, the father can sell him again according to the father's right. And then he can make the same sale again. But after the fourth sale, the father loses all rights over his son.

Unfortunately, this attitude towards their own children has not changed, in terms of Russia's modern war against Ukraine! For some reason, parents in modern Russia do not persuade their sons not to go to war in Ukraine. Instead, they expect profits, payments and looted bloody "trophies" of their sons. The value of their children's lives is still equivalent to some material goods. And Ukrainians are surprised that Russian mothers do not stand for their sons who are in captivity in Ukraine. Because Russian mothers are waiting for payments again. It turns out that it is better for them if their children die, because it has

long been normal for Russians to get money for their own child.

Muscovites, as J. Korb states, are devoid of any good manners. Therefore, in their own opinion, deception is proof of great intelligence. They are not ashamed if the lie becomes detected. "The seeds of true virtue are so foreign to this country that even sin is glorified in them as dignity" (Korb, 1701, p. 204).

4. Mediation of Ukrainian political culture between West and East

In modern Ukraine, there is a coexistence of two cultural traditions, namely "Western" and "Eastern" ones (Tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003). Moreover, the Western cultural tradition is the basis of socio-political interactions, while the Eastern tradition is Christian-spiritual in its core.

The "Eastern" cultural tradition (or Byzantine-Orthodox) has become crucial in shaping not only Ukrainian's spirituality, but also a specific world perception. Regarding the "Western" cultural tradition, it should be noted that it "has become dominant in the field of social experience and practice: the political and social structure to which Ukrainian people organically aspire, primarily related to the principles of European political development" (Tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 287). It is worth emphasizing the fact that the "Eastern" cultural tradition extended mainly to the spiritual level of Ukrainian culture. The rejection of Byzantine traditions is most often evident on the socio-political level. In particular, it concerned the rejection of the ideas of restriction of individual freedom, autocratic despotism, expansionism, etc. Finally, "intertwining and interacting "Eastern" (Byzantine-Orthodox) and "Western" (democratic) cultural traditions has determined the nature and course of Ukrainian socio-political sentiment development" (Tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 288).

Going back to the characteristics of Russian culture in the outlined context, it becomes noticeable that it was more influenced by the Byzantine tradition in comparison with Ukrainian culture. First of all, this applies to the socio-political level of Russian culture, to which the "Eastern" (Byzantine) cultural tradition has spread its influence. It should be noted that Russian and Ukrainian cultures show significant differences in the socio-political dimension, in particular, in the perception and the attitude of carriers of these cultures towards government. Thus, it is typical of Ukrainian mentality to be distrustful of all kinds of power. This causes the necessity of relying on one's own, contributing to the strengthening of

individualistic tendencies. Instead, Russian culture is dominated by the communitarian principle.

This is explained by the natural conditions of the formation of the Russian ethnic group: on poor podzolic soils, in conditions of difficult-to-pass swampy forests, only large communities could survive. The conditions for the formation of Ukrainian culture were exactly the opposite: fertile black soil (chernozem) dating back to the ancient Trypillian agrarian culture ensured the survival of small associations of people, such as farms, or even separate families (Tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 301).

The intertwining of "Eastern" and "Western" traditions in Ukrainian culture periodically led to various forms of confrontation (religious, electoral, sociocultural, etc.). The facts of such confrontations can be found in Ukrainian history if we delve, for example, into the problem of religious vicissitudes. The modern confessional diversity of religion in Ukraine is not least caused and determined by the binary nature of the "West-East" paradigm. The schism of Christianity in 1054 not only initiated the Orthodox and Catholic traditions in the religious life of Europe, but also led to the unique existence of two dissimilar cultural worlds in the bosom of European Christian culture. Throughout history, the idea of restoring the unity of Christianity has periodically emerged, manifesting itself not only in the concepts of leading philosophers of various eras, but also in church life. These ideas were embodied in the religious life of Ukraine, determining not only its religious diversity, but also the search for ways to interfaith dialogue and tolerant coexistence. The process of self-identification of Ukrainians living between the eastern and western neighbors is inextricably linked with the evolution of religious self-determination of Ukrainian people.

Historically, Ukraine is on the borderline of two cultures: Eastern and Western. It was this "transitory" that contributed to the emergence of Greek Catholicism in Ukrainian culture. A peculiarity of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which was established in 1596 at the Brest Church Cathedral, is a combination of the Catholic and Orthodox dogma, which preserves Orthodox rites.

Delving into the details of the "Eastern" and "Western" value confrontation problem, long-standing differences between Latin and Byzantine morals are faced. According to Fareed Zakaria, classical Latin values are a strong family, religious norms and perseverance (Zakaria, 2004). Byzantine values are most often associated with paternalism and behind-the-scenes solutions. Latin values mean the reliance on own strength in solving various problems, but Byzantine values, by contrast, imply that the state

should take care of a person, and an individual puts all his hopes on the highest wisdom of the ruler.

The theory of "Byzantinism" was developed by a Russian philosopher K. Leontiev, believing that Byzantinism is able to protect power from all sorts of innovations (Grosul (ed.), 2000). In his opinion, Byzantinism could protect Russia from the pernicious influence of the West, from the destructive European progress, while preserving Russian identity.

For Pope John Paul II, the coexistence of two traditions in Europe was obvious: Western Latin and Eastern Byzantine. He believed that "Europe is a unity and its abundance lies in the multitude of cultures that form it" (Modzheyevski, 2008, p. 133). Latin culture is more sensible and logical, while the Eastern tradition is more mystical and sensual. To describe these two traditions, John Paul II sometimes used the allegory of "two lungs", noting that without one of the lungs, Europe could not breathe. He called Ukraine "the border and gateway between East and West", because there was a crossroads of different cultures. It is on Ukrainian soil, as Pope John Paul II said, that the church "two lungs of Eastern and Western traditions" breathe (Modzheyevski, 2008, p. 133). In his opinion, Christianity as a common denominator of European self-determination is the constitutive factor of Europe.

The mediation of Ukrainian political culture is not a bitter fate; it is a purpose the benefits of which the bearers of Ukrainian political identity have yet to grasp.

5. Ukrainian political identity vs Russian political identity: modern aspects

The Revolution of Dignity (winter 2013–2014) and the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014 and has continues to this day, had a strong influence on recoding the modern national Ukrainian identity. The intense phase of Russia's aggression against Ukraine shifted from a hybrid to an open form in February 2022. It should be noted that the usage of the concept of "Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war" is approved by national security scientists of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine, who were among the first to introduce this concept into scientific circulation (Horbulin (ed.), 2017).

Revolution of Dignity is the name of the events of November 21, 2013 – February 22, 2014, happening on the Maidan in Kyiv and in many cities of Ukraine, which were accompanied by large-scale demonstrations and rallies, which led to the reformatting of power in the state. The reason for the Revolution of Dignity was the refusal of the then

President of Ukraine V. Yanukovych to sign the "The Eu-Ukraine Association Agreement", although he was the one who constantly declared his commitment to Ukraine's European integration course. In the mass consciousness of Ukrainians, Ukraine's course towards the European Union meant the real (rather than pretense) development of democratic institutions and the dismantling of the clan-oligarchic model of political relations. For most Ukrainians, the EU is associated with the rule of law, respect for the individual, transparent rules for the functioning of the political system etc. Therefore, Ukrainians expected to peacefully build democracy in their country by joining the family of European nations. That is why Ukrainians turned a blind eye to the government's corruption, oppression of freedom of speech, and lack of transparent rules of the game in all spheres of public life, hoping that the government's declared European integration course would bring Ukraine closer to democratic standards. The reason for the emergence of the Revolution of Dignity was similar to the cause of the Orange Revolution (2004), which was a definitive rejection of double political standards.

Many Ukrainians describe this Maidan (Euromaidan) as a Revolution of Dignity, believing that this is where the test of humanity took place. The Revolution of Dignity united people of different ages, places of residence, social status, ethnicity, religious and ideological views. There is a demand for politicians who are sincere in their actions, decent and truthful. Populism was absolutely not accepted.

The Revolution of Dignity was not peaceful. Authorities periodically suppressed popular protests, leading to bloodshed and death as well as to disappearance of many people. Finally, a wave of popular outrage reformatted the government in Ukraine. The Revolution of Dignity, like the former Orange Revolution, has reaffirmed that Ukraine has a strong demand for transparent and fair rules of the political game.

The Revolution of Dignity outlined the prospects for the formation of a new network-corporate identity. Everyone who came there at least once noted the presence of cohesion, friendliness, sincerity, high self-organization and order. Each individual could create their own interesting ideas, fitting into the overall structure of the diverse projects of the Maidan, which were organized by its participants. This synthesis of multilevel network-corporate relations has contributed to the emergence of various self-governing initiatives.

Regarding the analysis of the influence of Maidan's ideas on the formation of Ukrainian identity, we turn to O. Zinchenko, according to whom "Maidan

has become a Rubicon between epochs and a tectonic shift in the minds of Ukrainians. We are completing gestalts that were not closed a hundred years ago" (Zinchenko, 2016). In the 1920s, the proclamation of the independence of Ukrainian People's Republic and the Bolshevik aggression against it took place almost simultaneously. A similar situation repeated at the end of February 2014. That is, both times there was a need to rebuild the Ukrainian army almost from scratch. But the positive thing today is that there is no discussion in Ukrainian society about whether an army is needed or not. Accordingly, this gestalt is completed. Also, according to O. Zinchenko (2016), "we (Ukrainians) have closed another gestalt: from the belief in the messiahs we are gradually moving to the realization of civil liability."

According to German historian Karl Schlögel, "The Maidan has answered the question of how to create a political nation based on very different parts of Ukraine. It seems to me, it is very important for Europe to understand it as well. This awareness would be a condition for Ukraine's support abroad" (Oharkova, 2016). After all, the influences of different former empires and different cultures can still be seen in Ukraine even today. The history of the Cossacks and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, of Poland and the Habsburg Empire, the Russian and Ottoman Empire and others are intertwined in the history of Ukraine. There is a certain complexity in such a diverse combination, but it is also the historical wealth of Ukrainian people.

A certain liberation from paternalism is also a positive process of a new post-Maidan Ukrainian identity formation. However, Ukrainians still tend to over-trust populist ideas. In general, such categories as self-organization, solidarity, and trust began to take an important place in the Ukrainian collective mentality.

Thus, on the one hand, the recoding of Ukrainian collective identity is related to the present-day and, on the other hand, to the future. After all, Ukrainian identity is being reformatted in such a way as not only to survive the war and defend an independent Ukrainian state, but also to preserve positive gains for effective development of the country (volunteer activities to help the army in the Russian-Ukrainian war, public aid, self-sacrifice phenomenon, etc.).

The main goal of the hybrid Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014, is not so much the conquest of territories as the struggle for people's minds (Rushchenko, 2015). Hybrid wars, as the Ukrainian experience shows, begin with a strategy of divisions that are specifically introduced into different groups (social, ethnic, religious, territorial, etc.) of a country. In split strategies, the main emphasis is on recoding

the identity of a community, demonstrating its "superiority" over other groups, which, in the end, only accelerates conflicts.

It should also be noted that there is a stratum of people in Ukraine for whom it is quite painful to re-code identity in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Mostly, these are the people of Ukraine who are characterized by a predominance of pro-Russian or Soviet thinking models. A moment will come when these people will have to clearly answer only one question: "Whose war is this?". Because during a war there are still two sides: allies and enemies. If a person is convinced that this is not his or her war, then the following conclusion immediately arises: this is not his or her country. That is, over time, people with borderline identities will still be forced to seek a way out of their own collective identity crisis. Of course, it is desirable for this way out to be constructive for both the individual and the state.

In general, Ukrainian political identity is characterized by individualism, love of freedom, and rejection of authoritarian principles. These values correlate with the values of liberalism to a certain degree. On the other hand, there is also some correlation with the principles of conservatism, since

> The peculiarity of Ukrainian culture type is mostly predetermined by the fact that Ukrainian territory belongs to the area of ancient agricultural settled culture, which for many centuries, if not millennia, found its roots in traditionalism (Tsekhmistro (ed.), 2003, p. 277).

Individual freedom is important for Ukrainian political culture. Carriers of Ukrainian political identity should not be expected to automatically obey the governors, as the authority and legitimacy of the leader are important for Ukrainians. Ukrainians can get rid of an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally. This was witnessed, for example, during Maidan (2013–2014), when the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, who completely lost his legitimacy in the eyes of Ukrainians, was forced to flee to Russia. If necessary, Ukrainians are able to "function without a chairman at all, having horizontal relationships and on terms of agreement" (Starodubska, 2022).

The bearers of Russia's political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. This state of Russian political culture, when decision-making is delegated only to governors, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism. That is why in Russian society "any autonomy and awareness of the responsibility and consequences of every citizen's actions is not publicly encouraged

and punished" (Starodubska, 2022). Moreover, the population accepts even the unworthy and criminal behavior of rulers, because expressing their own opinion (if different from the one of the authorities) is punished by harsh condemnation at the public level. This leads not only to the manifestation of the "herd instinct" in submission to decisions dictated by the ruling elite. This situation eliminates the responsibility of Russian society representatives for their own actions: if committing a crime is ordered by the authorities, they do not consider themselves responsible for their criminal behavior.

The manifestations of collectivism are more characteristic of Russian identity than individualism. For the Russians,

> it is important not only to be different, but to dominate the inferior members of the group (up to violence and coercion) and to demonstrate the status that gives an opportunity to interact with people of a similar status (Starodubska, 2022).

In Russian society, manifestations of individualism are observed among those who have reached the highest positions in the government structure. One must "live up to it", deserve it. Only a person at the top of the power hierarchy has the right to express his own point of view, has the right to self-expression. In such a culture of political relations, it is considered the norm to give up one's own interests for the sake of group interests. Such behavior from the carriers of Russian political identity is expected as a default option, something natural.

For Ukrainian society representatives, the "willingness to give up one's own interests for the interests of the group (even the relevant one) is always a conscious choice, not something 'automatic' " (Starodubska, 2022).

For Russians, representatives of other communities are considered strangers. The concept of "strangers" in their perception are not considered to be "different", but often means "hostile".

By contrast, for the Ukrainian political identity carriers, representatives of other communities are perceived as "foreign", but they are not necessarily "hostile"; they are simply "other" communities.

In general, for the representatives of the Ukrainian political identity, the centralized decision of the government is not important if this government has lost its legitimacy in their opinion. In critical situations, Ukrainians quickly self-organize in small groups and make decisions themselves. For Russians only centralized government decisions are important; they are not ready to make decisions on their own, as it causes public condemnation and is considered unacceptable. Russians perceive other nations

judging from this point of view as well. For example, they mostly call the Ukrainians' ability to self-organize anarchy, not realizing that, for example, various Ukrainian volunteer communities during the war act in an orderly rather than anarchic way: they help the government solve problems where the government does not have time to solve them. Because of this misunderstanding of other communities by Russians,

> Attempts to interact with Russia on terms of "horizontal" relationships (agreements, mutual concessions) will not only be ineffective; it will be perceived as a manifestation of weakness and a signal to increase aggression, because this society understands only the logic of "vertical" practices: force, influence, coercion and significantly prevailing and unavoidable dominance (Starodubska, 2022).

Powerful Maidans in Ukraine (2004 and 2013–2014) demonstrated the Ukrainians' ability to self-organize on a horizontal level. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014, has led to an extensive network of small communities that have taken responsibility for providing for the Ukrainian army, helping refugees and more. These communities operate independently from the authorities and often help the government.

Atomization, which is the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of Russia's political identity nowadays. The reason for this is again the long tradition of authoritarianism in Russia's political system. After all, "people's ability to interact on the basis of consensus, agreement and responsible choice" (Starodubska, 2022) is suppressed under conditions of authoritarianism. Due to the atomization of society, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in Russia are impossible, because people are unable to trust each other.

6. Conclusions

The key differences between Ukrainian and Russian political identities and the basic parameters of Ukrainian and Russian national identities in the historical perspective have been analyzed. It has been stated that the basic Ukrainian political identity characteristics are as follows: individualism, rejection of the authoritarian principle, love of freedom, etc. The idea of freedom has long been embedded into the mentality of Ukrainians. Instead, in the mentality of the Russian people (Muscovites), slavish obedience has long been considered a virtue. According to eyewitnesses, Muscovites considered deception to be a proof of great intelligence; they are not ashamed of a lie to be detected.

Historically, Ukraine is on the borderline of two cultures: Eastern and Western ones. Delving into the details of the "Eastern" and "Western" value confrontation problem, long-standing differences between Latin and Byzantine morals are faced. Classical Latin values are a strong family, religious norms and perseverance. Latin values mean the reliance on own strength in solving various problems; by contrast, Byzantine values imply that the state should take care of a person, and an individual puts all his hopes on the highest wisdom of the ruler.

Carriers of Ukrainian political identity should not be expected to automatically obey the governors, as the authority and legitimacy of the leader are important for Ukrainians. Ukrainians can get rid of an illegitimate official who is also acting illegally.

The bearers of Russia's political identity are dominated by the need for a supreme leader who will make all important decisions on his own. This state of Russian political culture, when decision-making is delegated only to governors, and the role of the population is to implement these decisions, is determined by long-standing practices of authoritarianism.

Atomization, which is the disunity of society, is one of the dominant features of Russia's political identity nowadays. The reason for this is again the long tradition of authoritarianism in Russia's political system. Due to the atomization of society, all sorts of significant protests or rallies in Russia are impossible, because people are unable to trust each other.

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