informal logic

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contents

from the editors

The bulk of this issue is taken up with responses to papers written on the inductive-deductive distinction which appeared in ILN, ii.2 and ii.3. This has been a lively exchange, and although it would appear that no one taking part has changed her or his position appreciably, there is no doubt that many of the underlying issues have been brought to the surface. Although we do not wish to become known as the "Deductive-Inductive Newsletter", we will continue to consider responses and articles on this issue, particularly if they break new ground in the dispute.

We would like to draw readers' attention to the announcement of "The New Logic Course" program at the APA Western Division meetings

coming up in Milwaukee on April 23-25, 1981.
We heartily congratulate the Western Confer-
ence on the Teaching of Philosophy for or-
ganizing this program, and hope that many of
our readers will attend.

We also applaud the initiative that
Teaching Philosophy and its editor Arnold
Wilson have taken in offering a $200 prize
and publication in that journal as incentives
for writing papers on teaching informal logic
and practical reasoning for the APA "The New
Logic Course" program. Contributors to the
Informal Logic Newsletter who have sent us
course outlines may well want to write their
teaching ideas up and submit them. Remember
the December 15 deadline.

A new feature, "Chestnuts and Paradigms" is
launched with this issue. We hope scholars
among our readers will send us more goodies
for this larder in the future.

As the ILN moves toward a newsletter-cum-
journal, we hope that readers will remember
that our initial objective of serving as a
clearing house for ideas, notices, news,
announcements of interest to people teaching
informal logic courses remains central.
This is your mouthpiece, your notice-board.
Please continue to feel free to send us any
and all material you would like to share with
others. The sense of isolation, of working
alone in the dark, which so many of us felt
while we were teaching informal logic/criti-
cal reasoning courses a few years ago, has
to some extent lifted. The devotion of part
of an APA program to informal logic indicates
that things have begun to change; our subject
is becoming respectable. May this augur a
more self-confident and vigorous exchange of
ideas in these columns.

Ralph H. Johnson continues to serve as co-
editor while on sabbatical this year (1980-
81). West coast (North American) readers may
be interested to know that he is located in
Los Angeles, and can contact him directly at
2553 Tanoble Drive, Altadena, California
91001 (213-791-3519).✳

responses

The "inductive-deductive" debate continues
unabated in this issue. David Hitchcock's
article in ILN, ii.3 sparked a response from
Trudy Govier, in which she argues further
that deductive standards and inductive stan-
dards do not exhaust the standards of argu-
ment. Fred Johnson reacts also to Hitchcock,
but mainly to Sam Fohr's article in ILN,
ii.2; Johnson suggests we should talk about
inductive and deductive arguings, not argu-
ments. Fohr himself has a response to the
criticisms by Hitchcock and Govier of his
original piece in ILN, ii.2, as well as some
comments on Fred Johnson's suggestions;
Fohr remains convinced that the inductive
argument vs. deductive argument distinction
is sound and exhaustive, and that his way of
characterizing it is correct. Finally--so
far as this issue goes, at any rate--Perry
Weddle, who began the exchange with his
article in ILN, ii.1, responds to Hitchcock
(ILN, ii.3), Fohr (ILN, ii.2), and Govier
(ILN, ii.3); and Weddle hasn't much changed
his mind, either. Is that clear?

Assessing Arguments: What Range of Standards?

Trudy Govier
Trent University

David Hitchcock, following Brian Skyrms,
defends the inductive-deductive dichotomy by
taking it to be a dichotomy of standards,
rather than an exhaustive division of argu-
ments into two basic types.[1] He says that in
deductive logic, we have a theory of the
circumstances in which premises do or do not
make it logically impossible for a conclusion
to be false. And in inductive logic, we have
a theory of the circumstances "in which an
argument is inductively strong or inductively
weak--that is, in which it is more or less
probable that its conclusion is true, given
that its premise(s) are true." Within each
theory there are various types of logic: in
deductive logic we have the logic of truth-
functional sentence connectives, first-order
quantifiers, the logic of identity...; and
within inductive logic we have "the logic of