

informal logic

newsletter

newsletter

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The bulk of this issue is taken up with responses to papers written on the inductive-deductive distinction which appeared in ILN, ii.2 and ii.3. This has been a lively exchange, and although it would appear that no one taking part has changed her or his position appreciably, there is no doubt that many of the underlying issues have been brought to the surface. Although we do not wish to become known as the "Deductive-Inductive Newsletter", we will continue to consider responses and articles on this issue, particularly if they break new ground in the dispute.

We would like to draw readers' attention to the announcement of "The New Logic Course" program at the APA Western Division meetings

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
coming up in Milwaukee on April 23-25, 1981. We heartily congratulate the Western Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy for organizing this program, and hope that many of our readers will attend.

We also applaud the initiative that Teaching Philosophy and its editor Arnold Wilson have taken in offering a \$200 prize and publication in that journal as incentives for writing papers on teaching informal logic and practical reasoning for the APA "The New Logic Course" program. Contributors to the Informal Logic Newsletter who have sent us course outlines may well want to write their teaching ideas up and submit them. Remember the December 15 deadline.

A new feature, "Chestnuts and Paradigms" is launched with this issue. We hope scholars among our readers will send us more goodies for this larder in the future.

As the ILN moves toward a newsletter-cum-journal, we hope that readers will remember that our initial objective of serving as a clearing house for ideas, notices, news, announcements of interest to people teaching informal logic courses remains central. This is your mouthpiece, your notice-board. Please continue to feel free to send us any and all material you would like to share with others. The sense of isolation, of working alone in the dark, which so many of us felt while we were teaching informal logic/critical reasoning courses a few years ago, has to some extent lifted. The devotion of part of an APA program to informal logic indicates that things have begun to change; our subject is becoming respectable. May this augur a more self-confident and vigorous exchange of ideas in these columns.

Ralph H. Johnson continues to serve as co-editor while on sabbatical this year (1980-81). West coast (North American) readers may be interested to know that he is located in Los Angeles, and can contact him directly at 2553 Tanoble Drive, Altadena, California 91001 (213-791-3519). *



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responses

The "inductive-deductive" debate continues unabated in this issue. David Hitchcock's article in ILN, ii.3 sparked a response from Trudy Govier, in which she argues further that deductive standards and inductive standards do not exhaust the standards of argument. Fred Johnson reacts also to Hitchcock, but mainly to Sam Fohr's article in ILN, ii.2; Johnson suggests we should talk about inductive and deductive arguings, not arguments. Fohr himself has a response to the criticisms by Hitchcock and Govier of his original piece in ILN, ii.2, as well as some comments on Fred Johnson's suggestions; Fohr remains convinced that the inductive argument vs. deductive argument distinction is sound and exhaustive, and that his way of characterizing it is correct. Finally--so far as this issue goes, at any rate--Perry Weddle, who began the exchange with his article in ILN, ii.1, responds to Hitchcock (ILN, ii.3), Fohr (ILN, ii.2), and Govier (ILN, ii.3); and Weddle hasn't much changed his mind, either. Is that clear?

Assessing Arguments: What Range of Standards?

Trudy Govier
Trent University

David Hitchcock, following Brian Skyrms, defends the inductive-deductive dichotomy by taking it to be a dichotomy of standards, rather than an exhaustive division of arguments into two basic types.¹ He says that in deductive logic, we have a theory of the circumstances in which premises do or do not make it logically impossible for a conclusion to be false. And in inductive logic, we have a theory of the circumstances "in which an argument is inductively strong or inductively weak--that is, in which it is more or less probable that its conclusion is true, given that its premise(s) are true." Within each theory there are various types of logic: in deductive logic we have the logic of truth-functional sentence connectives, first-order quantifiers, the logic of identity...; and within inductive logic we have "the logic of

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