

from the editors

In an effort to make maximum use of the pages available to us, we've moved. Except on those occasions when we feel the need for greater space, this is where you'll find us from now on.

Your editors have both been on the move in another sense, having travelled to Amsterdam last June for the First International Conference on Argumentation. It was a magnificent experience. Some 400 scholars and researchers from all over the world gathered for four days of papers and discussion in fascinating surroundings. We were heartened to learn of the intense interest in informal logic in other countries. It became apparent to us that what we call informal logic shares much in common with what Europeans call Argumentation-Theory. We left with the impression that the future of informal logic is bright. Congratulations and thanks are due to Professor Frans van Eemeren and Dr. Rob Grootendorst for organizing this very successful international event.

Worth mentioning in the same connection is the upcoming XVIIIth World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton, England, August 21-27, 1988. We already have learned that Professor Georg Bruntian, a member of the Department of

Philosophy and Philology at Yerevan State University in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic is organizing "A Round Table on Argumentation." It is our understanding that AILACT (The Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) is also sponsoring a session. We hope that many of our readers will make an effort to submit papers so that the area of informal logic will be well-represented on that occasion.

In this issue we are happy to welcome the following contributors: Lenore Langsdorf, who brings the perspectives of phenomenology, critical theory and hermeneutics to bear on critical thinking in a thought-provoking way; Dilip Basu, our first contributor from India, with some new thoughts on an old fallacy--begging the question; John McMurtry, the eminent interpreter of Marx, who wishes to add a new fallacy to the roster; and John Hoaglund, no stranger to these pages, who has some thoughts about how class logic can be used in reasoning and problem solving. Andrew Lugg has a reply to Fogelin's position on deep disagreement, and Thomas Leddy argues that the fallacy of small sample is not necessary as a fallacy distinct from unrepresentative sample.