

# Critical Review

## *The Philosophy of Argument*

**Trudy Govier**

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**James B. Freeman**

In *The Philosophy of Argument*, Trudy Govier has presented the informal logic community with a very timely collection of essays. Certain essays argue for the legitimacy of informal logic in the face of current intellectual trends and critiques, in particular from postmodernists, feminists, and multiculturalists. Other essays argue for the legitimacy of informal logic within philosophy. Still others highlight open problems within informal logic. Although this does not exhaustively classify all the topics Govier addresses, I shall focus on these in this review.

Postmodernist rejection of universal standards of evaluation and charges—especially by some feminists—that argument is adversarial, that to argue is to attempt to get power over one’s interlocutors, that argument is a tool of male domination and oppression in particular, foster a cultural environment not at all congenial to informal logic. Seeking to develop general standards for evaluating arguments and prizing the institution of arguing when satisfying these criteria puts the movement at odds with these cultural trends. To the objection that argument is adversarial, even militaristic, seeking to force others to accept one’s conclusion, Govier in the first essay, “Philosophers are More Than a Luxury! Politics and Argument Under Uncertainty,” calmly replies that this is to take an incomplete view of argument. That the practice of argument has had negative features does not mean that the practice cannot be refined or that these negative features are essential to argument. “If we look more closely, we see something else in argument: the bringing forward of evidence and reasons in an effort to rationally persuade another person that the conclusion claim is acceptable” (8). Bringing forward evidence in an attempt to rationally persuade is not an attempt to force someone to accept a conclusion either through hostile argument or propagandistic manipulation. It is an act of respect for the other as a rational person. This is “a very good way to respond to disagreement” (9). Indeed, as Govier sees it, to reject argument in this

sense is to reject something healthy. It is to reject controversy—different people holding different views and thereby recognizing their being logically committed to rejecting and arguing against incompatible, contrary viewpoints. It is to reject what Govier calls “minimal adversariality.” But this is to reject critical reflection on issues and opposing view-points, and to reject the epistemic benefits such critical reflection can bring.

Govier returns to this point in the fourth essay, “Feminists, Adversaries, and the Integrity of Argument,” and in the last essay in this collection, “The Positive Power of Controversy,” with which she brings her considerations on the philosophy of argument full circle. In this last essay, Govier questions whether all adversariality is bad. In particular, is minimal adversariality bad? One who holds a belief thinks it true and that those who hold the opposite think something wrong. One differs from them, and should the occasion arise to argue for one’s view, one would be arguing against them and casting them in the role of opposition. But what is bad in itself about this state of affairs? Hostility is not essential to it. Govier also makes this last point in “Feminists, Adversaries, and the Integrity of Argument.” It is not essential to argument that it be conducted confrontationally, ending with winners and losers. To eliminate argument is to eliminate giving reasons and evidence for claims and the obligation to give reasons when claims are questionable. To eliminate argument would eliminate the possibility of our examining the reasons for our views and leave us vulnerable to various propagandistic strategies. By explicitly giving reasons rather than making implicit suggestions, we show respect for others and their intellectual autonomy. By trying to rationally persuade them, we need to take into account their beliefs and values, and this is to show respect for them. On the basis of the reasons given, *they* can judge whether or not to accept the conclusion. This is not *force* anyone to accept a premise or a conclusion, and can be done without confrontational behavior or attempts at domination. Indeed, Govier is skeptical that one could forego the practice of argument, of giving reasons and evidence for conclusions. Eliminating “the practice of offering arguments would probably not even be possible, since the practice of argument is so basic to human exchange and may even lie at the core of thought itself” (55).

But, Govier asks, does her conjecture simply reflect a cultural perspective, not what is true of humanity in general but only of western culture, as some multiculturalist critics allege? How, then, is disagreement addressed in other cultures, if not by argument in some form? Are there really Non-Argument cultures or does the style and context of argument vary across cultures? Govier is very skeptical that there are any cultures whose members never challenge or give reasons for claims, or reflect on reasons given. In short, she is very skeptical that there are Non-Argument cultures. Even if there were, would it be an expression of cultural imperialism to teach logic and argument to the members of that culture? As long and those people will have contact with other cultures or seek to live within a pluralistic society, they will be at a

great disadvantage and subject to exploitation and manipulation, if they are ignorant of argument. Teaching argument should be culturally sensitive, but in itself is not imperialist.

These considerations should certainly encourage those committed to holding that argument has integrity and to the informal logic project of setting out criteria whereby the integrity of an argument may be assessed. It gives them a position from which to address the cultural critics of argument. The courteousness of this position should be immediately manifest. Will it further convince those critics of argument? I am not sure. Those who feel that adversariality is bad still have a position from which they can maintain their view. They may deny, for themselves at least, what seems obvious to Govier: that to hold a belief is to hold that it is true and those holding a contrary belief hold something false. This is because they deny that there is such a thing as truth or falsehood, or that people should ever be asked to change their minds on the basis of reasons. People should not be asked to change their minds at all. We have the beliefs, values, feelings we do. We need go no further than being able to empathize with each other. This may very well reflect the radical individualism of our postmodern age. I believe it requires a response more trenchant than any which Govier has offered. Her good sense for giving reasons may hold her back from engaging this view, which many, we believe, would regard as ultimately self-defeating. But we cannot pursue this line further here.

Govier considers one other feminist critique of logic and argument, that women think differently from men—a view she does not endorse. This view alleges that masculine thinking displays certain salient characteristics. It is suited to the categories of deductive and inductive. It applies universal generalizations—even sweeping generalizations, separates reason from emotion, and seems less concerned with relationships. Allegedly feminine thinking is just the opposite. Govier points out that within informal logic there are good independent reasons for avoiding these “masculine” characteristics. “There is nothing in the practice of argument *as such* that requires formalism, rigidity, or deductivism, . . . ignoring emotion, context, situations, or relationships, . . . that requires support for claims to be inductive or deductive” (52). Govier holds that if there is a distinctive “female thinking style,” the practice of argument and the teaching of informal logic should comprehend it.

In “The Poverty of Formalism,” Govier addresses not the cultural criticism of argument but the apparent attitude of indifference toward informal logic or more generally the philosophy of argument within mainstream professional philosophy. Her opening statement should certainly get attention, claiming that work in informal logic has shown that the assumption that logic both is identical with formal logic and constitutes the canon for evaluating arguments is not tenable. “Either logic is identified with formal logic and does not give us the standards we need for assessing arguments in natural language, or

logic may give us such standards and is not to be identified with formal logic” (83). Govier points out a number of reasons why formal deductive logic is not the proper canon for evaluating everyday arguments. Not only are many everyday arguments not deductive, formalizing them would involve significant problems even if they were. Furthermore, in properly analyzing and evaluating texts, there are a host of interpretive questions—what is the conclusion, what are the premises, how should missing premises be phrased—to which formal methods are not suited.

Govier admits that there can be better or worse interpretations of passages involving arguments, and that this apparently opens the door for an objection to her view. Does not evaluation presuppose criteria or rules, which are general and thus formalizable? Govier disagrees. Certain rules that might characterize whether some intelligent activities are done correctly or incorrectly have *ceteris paribus* clauses. Applying such rules requires judgment to see whether or not all things are equal, whether or not the rule applies in this particular case. Formalizing the *ceteris paribus* clause would require spelling out all the conditions where the rule would not apply. But that is “not possible because the range and possible combinations of factors is simply too great” (91). Not all rules then are purely formal or formalizable rules.

Having criticized the complacently accepted formal approach, Govier notes that “the central philosophical questions about argument have crucial implications about such topics as reason, truth, justification, universals and particulars, evidence, form and meaning, and the integration of individual and social perspectives” (95). If more philosophers were to realize this through reflecting on argument or on the different perspectives and assumptions involved in teaching informal logic as opposed to formal logic, they would see the philosophical worth and legitimacy of a “nonformal, philosophical theory of argument” (95). This, of course, is timely encouragement for those working in the theory of informal logic.

Govier concludes her argument for the philosophical legitimacy and importance of informal logic by noting a number of philosophical questions about argument which are currently receiving attention among those working in the field. These include determining just what types of arguments there are and how may the proper norms for evaluating them be understood. Indicating these open questions further enhances the timeliness of this chapter for those working in informal logic. I especially appreciate Govier’s comment that evaluative “issues, most evidently relevance and sufficiency, presuppose a stand on the matter of types of argument” (98), suggesting an order in which questions should be addressed, a research agenda if you will.

*The Philosophy of Argument* contains contributions Govier has made to some of these open questions. She has long maintained that the traditional deductive/inductive dichotomy does not adequately represent the diversity of arguments, analogies and conductive arguments being distinct types. “Eu-

clid's Disease and Desperate Violinists" concerns analogy, in particular logical or *a priori* analogy, while in "Reasoning with Pros and Cons," Govier turns to conductive arguments. By arguing for the distinctiveness of these types of arguments, Govier has established that any adequate theory of ground adequacy or ground sufficiency for non-demonstrative arguments needs to take account of these types.

If an adequate account of premise sufficiency requires an account of argument types, *a fortiori* it presupposes an understanding of what an argument is. The standard understanding in logic is that an argument may be "laid out" in a text, where certain statements are premises and at least one other is a conclusion. This contrasts with the understanding of argument in the pragma-dialectical school, with which many working in informal logic have come into contact and by which they have been influenced. Pragma-dialectics understands argument as "a part of a discourse procedure whereby two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at agreement. Argument presupposes two distinguishable participant roles, that of a 'protagonist' of a standpoint and that of a—real or projected—'antagonist'." Govier objects to this conception as a general understanding of argument. It does not seem to fit certain arguments, such as those addressed to audiences not able to respond to the proponent, at least in a direct or literal way. Govier addresses this in the essay "When They Can't Talk Back: The Noninteractive Audience and the Theory of Argument." Such audiences are not rare, the addressees of mass communication being a prime example. How can there be an exchange between a proponent and a mass audience leading to a rational resolution of a difference of opinion when the audience has no way of contributing to the exchange? Given the diversity of the mass audience, does the protagonist even have a sufficient factual basis for projecting what the contributions of the mass audience to the exchange might be? How could one determine that the protagonist and the noninteractive audience had reached a rational resolution of their dispute? Govier comments, "To say that the argument is good or successful if and only if the dispute is resolved to the satisfaction of both parties will mean to avoid normative appraisal. Or, if there is a normative appraisal and it is attributed to some stage of the fictive critical discussion, the use of more conventional logical or epistemic standards is misleadingly disguised" (187).

Govier sees the pragma-dialectical model of argument where the antagonist is a noninteractive audience as actually skewing argument evaluation. From the point of view of the argument evaluator, she questions whether there is any advantage in trying to imagine his evaluation concerning an agreement or resolution of difference of opinion reached between a noninteractive audience and the arguer in the concluding stage of a critical discussion. The person evaluating the argument will by himself judge "whether the premises are rationally acceptable and provide good reasons to accept the conclusion.

Absent noninteractive others do not do part of the work, and to think of oneself as having hypothetical critical discussions with them is only to shift one's own issues of evaluation into a fictive domain" (190). The evaluative questions are paramount for evaluating the argument as text. What dialogues the author may have engaged in, actual or in imagination, are beside the point. In evaluating arguments the issue is not the audience with whom the author intended or imagined he was in dialogue. In evaluation, the audience is the evaluator critically considering the argument text.

Govier contrasts direct and indirect evaluation. In direct evaluation, one takes oneself as the intended audience and asks whether one finds the argument cogent. In indirect evaluation, one asks whether some other audience, in particular the intended audience of the argument, would find the argument cogent or whether the argumentation would be sufficient to resolve their difference of opinion with the arguer. She comments that "the pragma-dialectical theory would seem to point to indirect evaluation, whereas informal logic tends to point to direct evaluation" (193).

I believe that Govier's critique is important but needs to be refocused. Rather than showing defects in the pragma-dialectical position, we should understand it as highlighting both the differences in perspective between dialectics and logic, two different disciplines both studying the phenomenon of argumentation, and the dangers of logic appropriating dialectical concepts without recognizing this difference in disciplinary perspective. Govier is criticizing the pragma-dialectical approach from the point of view of a logician, one who considers arguments as products, laying out arguments as texts and evaluating them according to such criteria as acceptability of premises and their relevance and sufficiency to support the conclusion. Dialectic is concerned with argument as procedure. This involves rules for regulating argumentative communication so that the interlocutors can "reach joint understanding or critical decision." For a logician, argument evaluation is direct evaluation, while for a dialectician it is indirect evaluation. This is not to say that one discipline is inferior to another, but that they are different and approach the phenomenon of argumentation from different perspectives. Govier's criticisms thus highlight the danger of one discipline—logic in particular—uncritically appropriating criteria pertinent to the perspective of another discipline or proceeding without recognizing this diversity of perspectives. Seeking to frame criteria for *logical* evaluation which accommodate the dialectical perspective could lead to confusion. Not recognizing disciplinary perspective could lead to the further confusion of critics across disciplines talking past each other rather than criticizing the mistaken appropriation in their own discipline of concepts from the other.

In "Becoming Dialectical: Two Tiers of Argument Appraisal?" Govier turns to critiquing Ralph Johnson's use of dialectical concepts within informal logic. According to Johnson, argument evaluation concerns not just whether the premises of an argument are rationally acceptable, relevant to the conclusion,

and sufficient for accepting that conclusion—this is the first tier of argument appraisal—but “how well the argument addresses objections and alternative positions” (203). For Johnson, to be cogent an argument must contain a dialectical tier where objections to its conclusion or steps made in the argument itself, and alternative positions to its conclusion are specifically addressed. Govier supports including thinking about alternatives to one’s own conclusion and objections to one’s argument in teaching informal logic. However, she feels there are problems with Johnson’s position. First of all, it entails a radical revision of our understanding of argument, at least of argument as product, argument from the logical point of view. No longer can a simple nexus of premises and conclusion count as an argument. A text will express an argument only if it includes a dialectical tier. Govier suggests, however, that this problem can be addressed terminologically. The premise-conclusion core can still count as an argument, but for a complete case, the arguer needs to present a dialectical tier which “will include further arguments, supplementary which address objections and alternative positions” (213). Govier feels however that two further objections pose radical problems for Johnson’s view, and we must consider them here.

First, Johnson’s view apparently leads to an infinite regress. What does it mean “to deal *well* with objections and to *adequately* address alternative positions”? (215, italics in original). The arguer deals with objections and alternative positions by presenting arguments against them. To deal with them well, these arguments must be cogent. Does this mean only that *their* premises need to be acceptable, relevant, and constitute sufficient grounds for their conclusion? Do not these arguments need to be dialectically adequate also? “It seems arbitrary and *ad hoc* to demand that an arguer’s initial argument must be supported by a dialectical tier, yet claim that the supplementary arguments need no such further support” (215). But then, for these supplementary arguments, we need a dialectical tier of supplementary arguments which deal with objections and alternative positions. But those arguments in turn require a dialectical tier, and we are well on our way to an infinite regress. Govier’s second main objection questions just how many objections and alternatives need to be considered on the dialectical tier. In many cases, it would seem impractical to consider *all* objections and alternatives. There are just too many. But if only *some* need consideration, which ones? We have no direction here.

To give this direction and to deal with the various objections she has brought against Johnson’s position, Govier proposes a constructive alternative. The arguer’s main or core argument for a conclusion consists of one or more premises put forward to support that conclusion together with any subarguments needed to support some premise introduced at some point in the construction. Arguments are developed over time and at some points challengers may put forward objections or alternative positions. At such points, “the arguer has a dialectical obligation to respond by addressing these objections and alternative positions” (216). In fact, the arguer has a dialectical

obligation to respond to important objections of which he or she is aware, even if no interlocutor has enunciated them. By presenting the initial core argument and supplementary arguments on the dialectical tier, the arguer builds a case for his or her position. Govier distinguishes between an Exhaustive Case for a position at time  $t$ , where the arguer has put forward a cogent core argument for that position and has addressed *all* objections and alternatives which have arisen before  $t$ , and a Good Case, where the arguer addresses just those objections and alternatives which need to be addressed. Should objections to the supplementary arguments and further alternatives which need to be addressed subsequently come to light, then one can no longer judge that the arguer has given a Good Case. That judgment is not final but fallible. Govier feels this is not an undesirable consequence, even if one has to accept that argumentation may need to continue indefinitely. How does one discriminate which objections need to be considered from those which do not? Govier comments that “Articulating such grounds will be no easy matter” (218).

In “Progress and Regress on the Dialectical Tier,” Govier addresses the discrimination problem. First, just what is an alternative position to a claim or conclusion  $C$ ? Is it just not- $C$ ? This suggests that always there are just two sides to an issue, two alternatives, which seems simplistic. One might propose that the alternatives to be considered are audience relative. What positions are held by members of an audience which entail not- $C$ ? What is an arguer to do then if the audience is non-interactive or biased so that none of its members subscribe to certain “socially significant or intellectually important” (225) alternative views? Govier considers a third explication, Qualified Audience Relativity, where the alternatives to a position  $C$  “are all those positions entailing not- $C$  which are (a) held by [audience]  $A$ , or (b) might plausibly be held by  $A$ , or (c) might plausibly be held by a rational person to whom this argument for  $C$  could plausibly be addressed” (226). But Govier still sees a problem: How does one distinguish between a position alternative to  $C$  and an objection to  $C$ ? If  $C$  is a universal generalization,  $X$  presents a counterexample to  $C$  or asserts that such counterexamples exist,  $X$  is an objection to  $C$  but intuitively does not appear to be an alternative to  $C$ . “To be an alternative position, a claim must not only entail not- $C$ , it must compete with  $C$  in the sense that it could potentially or in theory play the same role” (227). Thus we would expect a genuine alternative to  $C$  to itself be a universal generalization.

But the question still remains concerning which alternative positions should be responded to. I do not find Govier’s conjecture that one should reply to all convincing. Her claim that on several issues with which she was familiar, she could find between four and eight alternative positions, and thus a manageable number of alternatives, is obviously based on too small a sample. If we do not require all, we face the discrimination problem of identifying those alternatives which require consideration. An epistemic approach would say that only intellectually credible alternatives need replies, while a pragmatic approach would require responding only to those present in a given audience. The pragmatic

approach encounters to the problem of the non-interactive audience, while Govier sees the epistemic approach allowing the arguer to decide for himself or herself that a position is intellectually credible. That criticism, I believe, can be met with appropriate work in epistemology.

Let me elaborate briefly. Govier seems to me to be approaching the question of alternatives too abstractly. I believe her discussion would be greatly helped by an account of the types of statements one may encounter and thus of the types of statements one may argue for. Classical rhetoric distinguishes between descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations, and this distinction may be sustained on epistemic grounds. Not every statement can meaningfully be said to have alternatives. Explanatory hypotheses certainly do. If one argues that a phenomenon is due to the operation of a certain relevant variable, the alternative hypotheses would concern alternative relevant variables and their combinations. What these are is not a matter of subjective choice but of current scientific knowledge. Policy statements obviously have alternatives—other ways to accomplish some agreed upon goal. But that some course of action might lead to a certain goal is a causal claim. Our general causal knowledge may indicate with some precision what courses of action are feasible alternatives to realize that same goal. This need not be a matter of intellectual preference or whim. But suppose a prosecutor was arguing that the accused held a knife to the throat of his victim from the premise that five witnesses had testified under oath that they had seen him do this. The prosecutor is arguing for a description. In what way is there an alternative to this description as there would be causal hypotheses alternative to the one being argued for? It is not at all obvious to me that there will be alternatives to the conclusion of every core argument. If there are genuine alternatives, must all be responded to? Again, I believe epistemological considerations can clarify this issue. Are all abstractly possible alternative causal hypotheses genuine alternatives? Might not our background knowledge in some cases indicate that only some hypotheses are plausible, that the burden of proof would be on a challenger to show first that some other hypothesis was a genuine causal possibility? Absent this argument, why is there a need to reply to this alternative?

How does the discrimination problem arise for objections as opposed to alternatives? For Govier, to present an objection to an argument is to claim either that the argument itself is defective or that its conclusion is flawed. Such a claim must at least implicitly be in the form of an argument giving a reason as premise for the alleged defect. Govier identifies five categories of objections—those raised against the conclusion, the argument itself, the arguer, the situation of the arguer—his or her “qualifications, personal characteristics, and circumstances” (231), and the way the argument is expressed (231). (Given Govier’s characterization of the situation, I do not understand the difference between objections against the arguer and objections against the arguer’s situation.) Within each category we may distinguish strong objections, which “allege that the defective feature indicates that the case is

false, wrong, incorrect” and mild objections, which “raise evidence suggesting the conclusion may be false or may need qualification, or the argument may be flawed, or the arguer in a false position.” (231) Given these ten types of objections, it is easy to see that ordinarily there will be a plethora of objections one may bring against an argument, making responding to all of them unmanageable. How may we discriminate? Govier argues for a criterion of salience which requires arguers to address all strong objections brought against the conclusion or the argument itself.

Not only with this discussion of the discrimination problem for objections, but throughout Govier’s discussion of the dialectical tier, I am bothered by a certain assumption she is making. She assumes that the objections are arguments, explicit or implicit. She speaks of the dialectical tier as a collection of arguments, numerically distinct from the core argument and numerically distinct from each other. This contrasts with her understanding of the core argument, which may include subarguments for certain of the premises directly supporting the main conclusion and perhaps sub-subarguments for certain of the premises in the subarguments, not *ad infinitum* but possibly extending indefinitely. In other words, the core argument may display serial structure while still counting as one argument. By contrast, I would like to suggest that objections—certain objections at least—be thought of as rebuttals in Toulmin’s sense, and replies to them as further premises in an extension of the core argument. The extended argument would still be numerically one argument. As I see it, this would not only open up the dialectical tier to Toulmin’s understanding of rebuttal, but also to Rescher’s account of formal disputation and its dialectical exfoliation. This, I believe, would foster progress on the dialectical tier, at least progress in understanding the nature of this tier and how arguers are to proceed on it. Various moves a challenger may make define objections to arguments, and the countermoves of a proponent indicate how there may be a response.

I conjecture that from this perspective, a number of problems Govier finds with the dialectical tier may be addressed. Arguing—I hope successfully—for this conjecture must await another occasion. However, Govier’s two essays on Johnson’s dialectical tier mark another way in which the essays in this collection are timely. Johnson’s conception has received attention from a number of scholars of argumentation theory. Thus these essays are part of the current exchange over this issue. They furthermore again highlight the caution those approaching argumentation from a logical or philosophical perspective need to exert in approaching dialectical concepts.

This review does not cover all the topics Govier considers in *The Philosophy of Argument*. In particular, she discusses two patterns of reasoning, slippery slope and *tu quoque*, which are standardly regarded as fallacious, but where in some instances the verdict of fallacy conflicts with other intuitions indicating that the argument is not fallacious at all. We have not even covered

explicitly all the ways in which these essays offer timely encouragement to those working in informal logic. Govier discusses testimony in “When Logic Meets Politics,” giving a model for evaluating testimony which is both universal or general, contra feminist critics, but which by incorporating recent work in the epistemology of testimony is able to be sensitive to feminist concerns. Assimilating this work is important for those working in informal logic. Again in the first essay, “Philosophers are More than a Luxury!” to Benjamin Barber’s complaint that the arguments of political philosophers are “too refined and abstract” (3) to provide direction for citizens deliberating about the common good—citizens who need such direction—Govier answers that the types of arguments studied within the informal logic tradition provide just such direction. She feels that informal logic’s replacing the soundness criterion for argument cogency with the requirement for acceptable premises providing reasons sufficient in some context for accepting a conclusion puts it in a position to make such a contribution.

Overall, then, I want to commend Trudy Govier’s *The Philosophy of Argument* to the informal logic community. By showing the legitimacy and value of argumentation as a human activity in the face of certain cultural critics, by indicating the philosophical importance and fertility of informal logic in the face of disinterest in the community of professional philosophers, and by indicating open problems within informal logic, Govier has given us a beautiful book of timely encouragement.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Those who do wish to pursue it may consult Harvey Siegel, *Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 4-6.

<sup>2</sup> Govier develops further her views on the nature and need for judgment in Chapter 8, “Rosebuds, judgment, and critical thinking.”

<sup>3</sup> Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans *et al.*, *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), p. 277; quoted on p. 183 of Govier’s book.

<sup>4</sup> Joseph W. Wenzel, “Jürgen Habermas and the dialectical perspective on argumentation,” *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 16 (1979), 84. This article contains a classic description of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic as three disciplines studying argumentation from different perspectives.

<sup>5</sup> This is objection (8), pp. 215-16.

<sup>6</sup> See my “What types of statements are there?” *Argumentation* 14 (2000), pp. 135-57.

<sup>7</sup> See *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 101-102.

<sup>8</sup> I have called such premises counterrebuttals in *Dialectics and the Macrostructure of Arguments* (Berlin and New York: Foris Publications, 1991). See pp. 161-65.

<sup>9</sup> See *Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), Chapter One.

<sup>10</sup> I also believe that this material together with the dialectical notions of presumption and burden of proof may allow us to dissolve the regress problem which Govier has found so intractable.

<sup>11</sup> See "What is wrong with slippery slope arguments?" and "Political speech, Oliver Sacks, and the credibility concern" respectively.

*James B. Freeman*  
*Department of Philosophy*  
*Hunter College / CUNY*  
*695 Park Ave.*  
*New York, NY, 10021*

*jfreeman@shiva.hunter.cuny.edu*

### Thanks to Referees

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Richard Andrews (*University of York*)

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