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Editorial. The *International Journal of Educational Psychology*: Psychological Research for the Twenty-First Century

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Editorial. The *International Journal of Educational Psychology*: Psychological Research for the Twenty-First Century

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It is increasingly acknowledged that research should serve the public good. The international scientific community mainly agrees that scientific inquiry should inform ways to address the most important social challenges. This priority has left behind the old debate between descriptive and normative science, and between basic and applied research. The discussion is now focused on how to make scientific findings more relevant and useful in everyday life. Commitment to this social turn is a central reason for the emergence of the *International Journal of Educational Psychology (IJEP)*.

More than fifteen years ago, in *The Culture of Education*, Jerome Bruner (1996) stated that research about teaching and learning processes in pursuit of particular goals that takes into account the cultural setting of development is the stuff not only of *good policy research* but *good psychological science* (p.176). It is that kind of psychological research and science which IJEP aims at disseminating. IJEP publishes works that do not only provide new insights about the psychological mechanisms involved in most pressing problems in education, such as school failure and disengagement, but the journal is mainly concerned with what is –in Bruner's words- *Possible*, that is, IJEP shares how we can successfully tackle developmental threats to ultimately foster all students' learning. It is the *Possible* what administrators, policy-makers, educators, children, adolescents, and their families need to know for their activities in all the myriad of environments where learning and development take place every day and for every individual around the world. Accordingly, scientific

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studies of both qualitative and quantitative nature that deepen on psychological and socio-cultural strengths, actions, and programs that overcome threats to learning and development and open up opportunities for better education are of much interest for the *International Journal of Educational Psychology.*

Under any circumstance no child or adolescent should be deprived from an education that aids flourishing all her or his capacities and developing strongly at social, cognitive and emotional levels. Yet this right is rarely performed universally. One reason is because despite we have accumulated much understanding about how people learn and develop best, up to date, this knowledge has not been applied enough into creating suitable teaching and learning approaches, learning environments, and curricula. This disconnection between scientific research and practice in the field of learning and instruction is quite alarming. Unless instruction in schools takes into account evidence from research in educational psychology and in other educational sciences, educational systems will keep failing students from most vulnerable groups and will discourage their educational expectations. As researchers in educational psychology we should address this detachment between scientific research and educational practice. The *International Journal of Educational Psychology* is committed to do so. It contributes to keep lifting some educational practice above the level of supposition through publishing theoretical analyses and empirical studies of school and non-school learning environments that have proved to be *tools*, in Vygotsky's (1978) sense, that boost development. The final aim is that IJEP articles and reviews aid effecting evidence-based changes in education.

All the aforementioned principles (social utility of psychological research, the need for studying the Possible, and evidence-based education) are reflected in this inaugural issue, which starts "on the shoulders of giants" (Merton, 1965) with an article written by Dr. Jerome Bruner. Bruner sets the bases for the psychological study of educational processes; he claims that culture or mind cannot be understood without taking into account how they interact with each other in a given context, as it is through culture that we transcend our biological constrains. Accordingly, Bruner warns us that the study of mind apart from the "possible worlds" created by culture falls short to understand cognition. The *International Journal of Educational Psychology* acknowledges this dialectic and provides a forum for the communication and discussion of new "possible worlds" created through scientific discovery and which make positive development and enhanced learning available to all. This translates into the

publication not only of analyses of existing problems and constrains for better learning and development –the *Established*, for Bruner-, but also, and mainly, of social and cultural creations that can transcend those barriers –the *Possible*-.

This dialectic approach is evidenced in the findings reported in the article by Stephen Quintana. In his study of sojourner children's understanding of nationality from a developmental point of view, Quintana found that such understanding was influenced, on the one hand, by chronological age and, on the other hand, by degree of cross-national experience. Issues of national, racial, and linguistic identity were found to be affected by age, but culture played an influential role as identifications based on racial salience were different depending on degree of exposure to different cultures. This finding illustrates another central postulate in Bruner's article: the need for psychology to study behaviour and mind in their context. This idea finds its roots in Vygotsky's (1978) theory of development, and today it is supported widely among central developmental psychologists (Rogoff, 2003; Lave & Wenger, 1991).

Quintana's paper also illustrates the aim of IJEP of publishing articles that move us forward in the state of the art regarding central educational psychology issues and social challenges. Quintana presents a new developmental model of sojourner children's understanding of nationality, a relevant topic in societies which are increasingly diverse and require intercultural understanding to advance.

The article by Robert Sternberg shows another central principle of IJEP discussed before: the need for education to be grounded in research findings. In his article, Sternberg argues that much teaching is ineffective because it is not applied in an ethical manner. The shortcoming of schools for developing ethical reasoning in children has had negative effects in society. But Sternberg's analysis goes beyondshedding light on the problem. Sternberg announces both the *Possible*: ethical reasoning can be taught across the curriculum, and the tool to turn the possible into experience: an eight-step model of ethical reasoning. Schools do not need to try out ways to enhance the development of ethical reasoning in children; now they have an evidence-based model to be effective in that regard.

This possibility approach is also well illustrated in the article by Rocío García. Her paper presents the theory of dialogic learning, an innovative learning theory in line with the contemporary dialogic turn of the learning sciences. García deepens into this theory through analyzing specific ways in which some principles of the theory manifest and which have proved to be successful in raising the academic achievement of children from vulnerable

backgrounds. Further, García's article responds to another core principle of IJEP, the one about making research relevant for the public. García proves that the inclusion of the voices of people from ethnic minorities in the research process, in close dialogue with researchers, eventually improves students' learning and the school-community relations. As a whole, García's article combines what Bruner refers as *good psychological science* and *good policy research*.

IJEP also publishes reviews of books that share a new sight on central psychological and educational issues. As a first example of this, Molina reviews Gardner's book *Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Reframed. Educating for the Virtues in the Twenty-First Century*. Dr. Gardner claims that as societies have undergone tremendous changes over the past decades, the three classical virtues that have guided human thoughts and behavior throughout history have also experienced an important transformation. Therefore, Gardner claims that if schools are to cultivate these virtues in society, the teaching of truth, beauty, and goodness should be re-conceptualized. Importantly, Gardner shares how this can be done.

Overall, the set of articles and the book review that make up this first issue of IJEP serve the general commitment of the journal to contribute from scientific research in psychology to an education that simultaneously provides excellence in learning and enables personal development for all. For IJEP, this commitment is not a question of choice but the task of psychological research for the twenty-first century.

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What Psychology Should Study

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What Psychology Should Study

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Abstract

One cannot understand either culture or mind without taking account of the manner in which they interact in situ. The student of mind who ignores the cultural setting that mind requires in order to operate effectively fails to do justice to the contextualized nature of mental activity. And to describe culture without regard to the limits imposed by our mental capacities is equally disabling. This brief paper seeks to bring mind and culture into a workable relation with each other.

Keywords: culture, mind, community, interaction

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In the deepest sense, psychology seeks to research and to understand the human condition. But the human condition, given its multifaceted nature, is not easily understood. Or perhaps it would be better to say that it can be understood in many ways, ways that may often seem incompatible with each other. For in some deep sense, the human condition is shaped both by the biological constraints inherent in our nature as a species living in a particular physical environment, but at the same time it is also shaped by the symbolically rich cultures that we humans construct and in terms of which we live our lives communally.

Indeed, uniquely as a species, we are both limited biologically, while at the same time liberated from those limitations by our amazing capacity to go beyond them, thanks to our capacity to construct "possible worlds" that transcend those limitations –or, in any case, that go beyond what seemed like limitations. We transcend the seemingly irreversible laws of gravity by inventing flying machines, go beyond the constraints of interpersonal communication by creating the Internet. In a word, then, we are constrained by our seeming biology, but liberated from it by our capacity to create cultures that actualize the possible worlds that we can imagine. There is no other species on the face of the earth that lives such a duality. Our human lives are a never ending dialectic between seeming constraints and imaginable possibilities.

Our course, our capacity to recognize and to realize the possible, far-reaching though it may be, is also limited by what we might call the intrinsic constraints of culture. For in their very nature, the cultures we create are also constraining on those who live within their bounds. For cultures in their own unique ways also limit the sense of the possible among those who live under their sway. For cultures too, if they are to be viable, need to institute and to maintain a requisite stability and order, whether by custom or by law, both which specify what is permitted and what forbidden. In a word, cultures, while freeing us to explore. Possibility also bind us to what is established.

Our human lives, then, are an endless dialectic between established convention and the temptation of the possible. And yet, for all that, it is a livable, feasible dialectic –though, alas, we must also pay a price in conflict and anxiety for living such dialectical lives.

But it is this perpetual compromise between the already Established and the imaginably Possible, however much it may generate conflict and anxiety, that also generates our remarkable human creativity. For living life in full conformity to the Established soon creates boredom and a desire to escape. Yet, living with a desire only for what is Possible easily becomes the road to crime and unacceptable non-conformity. So the challenge of human life is to find a viable compromise between the Established and the Possible.

And it is this challenge that I want to address now, for in my view, it is this very challenge that shapes how psychology should go about its business in researching the human condition. And let me confess that I did not reach this conclusion only through general speculation. Indeed, I was forced into it by my own earliest research. Let me begin, then, by telling you briefly how this came about.

It began with my earliest efforts to clarify what constitutes perception, how we go about recognizing what it is that is impinging on our senses. How lengthy a sensory input is needed for "the word out there" to be correctly recognized? My research instrument was a tachistoscope, a gadget that varies the length of exposure of a display. I'd begin by showing each of my experimental subject a display (in some experiments a picture, in others a word or pseudo-word) show it to them, say, for a thousandth of a second. Having got their report on what they'd seen, I'd then increase the exposure time. How lengthy an exposure would it take for them to correctly recognize the display?

I very soon discovered that my subjects, no matter how brief the exposure, almost always reported seeing something, though they'd often confess that they were only "guessing". But their guesses were by no means wild. First of all, their so-called guesses were highly conventional, even banal, no matter how brief the input exposure might have been. Typically, for example, pseudo-words (like VERNALIT) were conventionalized into real words that conformed to English orthography (like VERBATIM).

And subjects often got trapped in their stereotypes. For, as exposure time increased, they would often stick to the "guesses" they'd made to the previous, briefer exposure.

Eventually, of course, given a long enough time exposure, they'd recognize the exposed picture, word, or pseudo-word correctly. But it would take longer for them to recognize the display correctly than it would if they'd not first been exposed to those prior fast exposures. They seemed to be, as it were, victims of their earlier wrong guesses.

And note two other things about their finally correct recognitions under these circumstances. First, they were often accompanied by a gasp of surprise, so convinced were our subjects they that they'd already recognized it correctly on a briefer exposure. Plainly, they were victims of their own previous conventionalizing efforts.

All of which led me to propose what I called a hypothesis theory of perception: that perceiving was guided by, steered by hypotheses about the conventionally expected. So, for example, eight-letter pseudo-words that were distant approximations to English took a much longer exposure time to be recognized than ones that more closely approximated conventional English letter sequences. Words (and pseudo-words) are processed with the expectation that they conform to spelling conventions or to social convention generally. With respect to the latter, for example, dirty words (and lewd pictures) take much longer to recognize than conventionally "proper" ones if you start the sequence of exposures way down below threshold level. Subjects get stuck with their wrong, early conventionalizing hypotheses.

But note one other characteristic thing. Once a subject has been tachistiscopically exposed to a lewd picture or dirty word, he'll more easily recognize such pictures or words when they're subsequently presented to him. I asked one of our undergraduate subjects why thought this was so. "Good Lord", he said, "you don't expect to be shown dirty pictures in a Harvard lab, do you? But then things change". And that remark from that seventeen-year-old freshman led me to another line of work –and to a refinement of the hypothesis theory.

It had to do with the nature of expectancy. Let me put it this way. Your expectations are situationally determined, to be sure (you don't expect to be exposed to dirty pictures in a respectable Harvard laboratory), but those situational determinants also reflect broader features of your own culture and of your orientation toward that culture, what the French like to call your deformation professionelle. So, for example, I sometimes look at the world passing by as a seasoned old New Yorker, sometimes

as a psychologist law professor, sometimes as an adventurer out for some fun. All of which will depend on whom I'm with, on what I'm doing, and other circumstantial matters.

Can a psychologist ignore such obvious matters in studying human behavior? And do our conventional psychological methods of research – the laboratory, the conventional interview, standardized tests, and the rest – do these take such considerations into account? A psychologist can learn a lesson or two from the anthropologist, the sociologist, even the historian. We will never understand human behavior simply by studying it in vitro or out of context, without taking account of the uneasy historical compromise that exists between the Established and the Possible, to revert to a distinction I made earlier.

I began by exploring so intimately personal a matter as visual perception. And I want now to go to the opposite extreme, to illustrate how these matters also affect the seemingly impersonal domain of law and jurisprudence.

Let me begin by asking why, for example, the United States is the only country left in the Western World that still punishes capital crimes with de death penalty? Public opinion polls indicate that Americans are no more in favor of such a practice than any other country. How come, then, that we go on using this barbaric and demonstrably ineffective practice – ineffective, for it is well known than American states that still use the death penalty do not thereby reduce their capital crime rate. My colleague David Garland (2010) has just published a stunning book on this baleful topic and it it is inrsistence of this barbaric practice depends upon a massive distortion of the concept of punishment as retribution and an aspect of assuring public welfare. Capital punishment is presented, instead, as part of a war against crime. We kill people in wars, don't we? Consider this typical verbatim transcript of a prosecutor's closing argument to the jury in a recent murder trial: "I say to you we're in a war again in this country, except it's not a foreign nation, it's against the criminal element in this country. The defendant, William Brooks, is a member of the criminal element, and he's our enemy" (Garland, 2010, p. 63). So, the administration of justice is converted into a "war on crime," and, as in war, your duty is to destroy the enemy. Not to do so is unpatriotic.

To do it right, as I've already hinted, requires that we appreciate the "rules" of conventional narrative genres – as with the prosecuting attorney's plea to the jury in the case just cited. A murderer in that genre deserves nothing better than death, eye-for-an-eye retribution in a "war on evil."

To grasp this more fully, we psychologists must return to the origins of this genres in our canonical bank of story forms. And that bank, we must never forget, is in origin and in form a bank of conventional narrative genres. And we as psychologist must come to understand better the nature and origins of these genres. For these deeply affect the shape and course of human thought. Which brings us back to what psychology should be concerned with. How can we ever understand the course of thought without taking this deep-lying human tendency into account?

And so we must go beyond our conventional studies of logical and associative thinking and into the realm of narrative thinking. And that inevitably leads into partnership with those engaged in narrative analysis elsewhere, whether in literary studies, cultural and anthropology, or even in historiography. Indeed, it even partners us with that rigid and hidebound discipline of law and jurisprudence where judicial decisions are so often influenced by narrative verisimilitude.

We must come to understand better how a culture's narrative forms become incorporated into our individual ways of conceiving of the world, how a culture maintains itself by shaping and governing the minds of those who live under its sway. This is a question that has puzzled mankind for a very long time, often quite productively. Indeed, it might be worthwhile to have a brief look at the past to see what we can learn.

Let's begin with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza drew a crucial distinction between what he called the "rightful power of rule" (potestas) and the "actual power of government" (potential). Let's translate these as, roughly, "political rights" and "government rights." Political rights are well defined in Rousseau's famed Le Contrat Social and are characterized as the customs, beliefs, and opinions of a people. He refers to these as "the State's genuine constitution." These rights, to quote the Oxford legal scholar, Martin Loughlin (2009), "imperceptibly

could not exist without them.

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Psychology, then, must concern itself with how the communal "force of habit" shapes a fitting "force of government" and how, in the long run, the latter manages to support and shape the former. Put psychologically, how indeed do the two interact, the subjective and the institutional? Developmental psychologists, at last, are beginning to concern themselves with such issues. Not Piaget, but surely Vygotsky puzzled over how individuals "internalized" the norms of their culture and incorporated them into their sense of Self. It is a line of inquiry that surely merits further study.

How, for example, does such internalization evolve with the growth of a culture? Do we, as many have suggested, come in time to draw a sharper distinction between our own beliefs and those incorporated in the culture generally – between the "inner" and the "outer." Comparative anthropological psychology must be a concern of the general discipline of psychology proper. Just as we pursue comparative psychology to study the evolution of species, so must we study how cultures evolve. Bronislaw Malinowski is surely as relevant to psychology as Charles Darwin!

Let me, finally, emphasize a point that I have already touched upon. I am deeply convinced that psychology cannot go it alone. The life of mind is not isolated from or independent of the life of the cultural community in which it develop and lives. Nor is it independent of the history that has shaped that cultural community. Our fate as human beings is shaped not only by our individual qualities but by the cultural circumstances in which we live our lives. Why, to take a striking exam-

ple, why is our North American system of punishing crime so much more punitive than it is elsewhere? We in America have some five hundred per hundred in prison, though we've known for nearly a half century that the chances of somebody committing a crime are roughly four times as great if they have served a prison term for a previous crime. Though we know this chilling fact, we still put roughly ten times as many people in prison per hundred thousand than any country in the civilized Western world.

I want psychology to enter the world more fully, as Malinowski did nearly a century ago, in his brilliant Crime and Custom in Savage Society. I think such cultural inquiry (which is growing) is essential for cultivating and maintaining psychology's breadth and scope. They make us forever aware of the constraints and the opportunities that characterize the human condition.

I have said little thus far about education and educational psychology. Psychology in its varied forms has become one of the most challenging disciplines of our day, particularly when it is paired with its historical, cultural, and biological cousins. We have learned about how our species manages to cope both with the culturally established while testing the limits of the possible. We are learning much about how our species reinvents itself to cope both with the constraints of our biological nature and with the opportunities of the cultural worlds that we create. And this has real implications for education.

Education is not and should not be devoted exclusively to the transmission of established knowledge. It should also dedicate itself to cultivating awareness of the human condition and to generating skill in understanding the nature and sources of knowledge. That is to say, education is not only about mastering content, but also about gaining insight into the nature of knowing and understanding. Yes, I am saying that we should cultivate an appropriate epistemological sensitivity in our school children, an awareness concerning the processes involved in learning and thinking and not just in the finished products that we call a curriculum. It is absurd to say that children are not capable of understanding such matters. Their spontaneous play activities are full of explorations of the possible, of what might be and why it sometimes is and sometimes isn't. I strongly urge that we cultivate that sense of the possible in our educational practices.

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Sojourner Children's Developmental Understanding of Nationality

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Sojourner Children's Developmental Understanding of Nationality

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Abstract

A developmental model of children's understanding of nationality (Nationality Perspective-Taking Ability or NPTA) was proposed and evaluated in this study. The NPTA model expands extant definitions and provides a theoretical foundation for the developmental progression of national identity. Children (Mean age = 9.33 years) from Latin American and Asian countries who were sojourners in the U. S. for an average of 20.70 months were administered the NPTA assessment and scored according to the NPTA model. Results indicated children's understanding of nationality was predicted by children's chronological age and by the amount of their cross-national exposure. Additionally, the relative importance of children's identification with their national, racial and linguistic status was explored. A developmental trend revealed that children's identification with nationality increases across age while identification with racial status declines across age.

Keywords: children, nationality, identity, development, race

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How children conceive of their nationality has received relatively little attention even though there has been considerable interest in children's attitudes toward members of their own nation and other nations. There was growing interest in investigating children's conception of nationality in North American and Western European countries during the 1950s and 1960s, with renewed interest in nationality identity for children in the recently formed European Union (e.g., Barrett, Whilsoon, & Lyons, 2003; Barrett & Oppenheimer, 2011; Bennett, 2004). To review, Piaget and colleagues (Piaget & Weil, 1951; Inhelder & Piaget, 1967) extended Piagetian cognitive developmental theory to identify the sequelae of egocentricism, concrete operations, and formal operations for children's conception of nationality. Piaget and Weil found that this developmental progression begins with a stage dominated by egocentricism, in which children's understanding of nationality is determined by their impressions and perceptions of the local environment. The next stage, sociocentricity, involves children's tendency to identify more strongly with their nationality—this identification usually reflects personal, familial, and local bias or loyalty toward their home country. The final stage involves children's abstract awareness of their country.

Piaget's early work was extended by investigation of children's views of foreigners (Lambert and Klineberg, 1967). As in Piaget's research, there were several trends identified in Lambert and Klineberg's research. Young children tended to exaggerate the postive attributes of their own group as well as the negative characteristics (e.g., strange, unfriendly) of foreigners. Additionally, young children's descriptions tended to be focused on observable characteristics. Early forms of ethnocentrism was followed by an increase in the complexity of children's reasoning about foreigners and an increase in their openness concerning the positive characteristics of foreigners. The third phase in this development reflected children's tendency to describe their own group as well as foreigners in more subtle and subjective features (e.g., personality traits), but these descriptions also reflected less favorable attributions toward foreigners than at the previous developmental phase.

More recent research has supported and also extended this early, seminal research into children's conception of nationality. Nugent

(1994) examined Irish children's understanding of nationality and found general support for the trend of young children's understanding of nationality to be dominated by egocentricism and focused on observable features of their country and that older children develop more abstract, realistic conceptions of nationality. More generally, Nugent interpreted his findings as being supportive of a developmental progression of perspectivism. Namely, this development begins with young children who are unable to have objective views of their country or to be aware of perspectives on their country other than their own. This phase is followed by another phase in which children become aware of alternative perspectives on their country. During this second phase, however, there remains a tendency for children to lack objectivity about their country, resulting in a 'defensive patriotism.' More advanced forms of development were interpreted by Nugent as reflecting greater levels of cultural or national perspectivism in which older children demonstrated ability to integrate different perspectives, compared to younger children. Nugent applied this interpretative framework in an apparent post hoc manner based in an exploratory, qualitative research design.

More recent work across a variety of local contexts in the European Union has supported a general developmental progression (Bennett, 2004): (a) during early to middle childhood, children develop the ability to make classifications into national groups, including self classification, and they associate behaviors (e.g., like football, are friendly) with differences across nationality to (b) during middle to late childhood, children are able to identify belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs, national creed) associated with cross-national differences.

The purpose of the present study is to extend the previous research in several ways. First, we posit and evaluate a developmental model based on perspective-taking ability of nationality (i.e., NPTA, see Table 1). This model represents an extension of a model of ethnic perspective-taking ability (i.e., EPTA) previously evaluated (Quintana, 1998; 2010; Quintana, Ybarra, Gonzalez-Doupe & de Baessa, 1999). Indeed, there seems to be important consistency between the developmental framework of EPTA and previous research on children's understanding of nationality. For example, children's understanding of both ethnicity

and nationality appears to begin with a focus on observable and physicalfeatures such as skin color for ethnicity (Quintana, 1998) and the physical environment for nationality (e.g., Nugent, 1994). Mature forms of development in both domains involve awareness of abstract characteristics including personality and cultural features (Nugent, 1994; Quintana, 1998). However, extending EPTA to the NPTA model provides a more detailed characterization of developmental milestones in children's understanding of nationality and grounded in an established theory of perspective-taking (Selman, 1980). The NPTA model (see Table 1) proposed herein suggests development proceeds from a physicalistic and egocentric perspective (level 0) to a literal perspective (level 1) in which children become aware of nonphysical and nonobservable features of nationality, such as psychological preferences for one's own national customs. The level 1 of perspective-taking ability involves children's emphasis of the literal aspects of nationality (e.g., language, customs, traditions, and heritage). The next level is a social perspective level (level 2) in which children describe social features associated with nationality, such as national differences in social norms. Subsequent to this social perspective level, a group perspective (level 3) is theorized which would be associated with children's ability to form a collective identity for their national group and be able to generalize and posit group characteristics. Based on research with EPTA (Quintana, 2010; Quintana et al., 1999), this group perspective is expected to be associated with an increase in stereotyping of other groups.

Table 1
Summary Description of Children's Answers of Perspective-Taking Ability for Nationality

Level 0:	*Physicalistic and Egocentric Perspective of Nationality* Understanding of physical features associated with nationality (e.g. reference to physical features of environment (e.g., "It snows in U.S. but not in my country.") Egocentric views (e.g. reference to idiosyncratic features such as "I have grandparents back home, but not here.")

Level 1: *Literal Perspective of Nationality*
Literal aspects of nationality (e.g. reference to language, clothes, birthplace, citizenship)
Social Perspective of Nationality
Level 2: Social features are emphasized (e.g. "people here [in U.S.] walk too slow … don't like to be touched" or "Mothers [in the U.S.] buy more things for their children.")
Level 3: *Group Identification Perspective of Nationality*
Group perspective (e.g. "Latin people have big heart", "We are all sisters and brothers.", or "People in the U.S. think they're the best.")

The present study extends previous research which has been limited to investigations of children who are in their native country and who usually have little, if any, contact with children from other countries (e.g., Barrett & Short, 1992; Nugent, 1994). Research suggests even small amounts of personal cross-national experiences (e.g., vacationing in a foreign country) had a critical impact on children's knowledge and attitudes toward foreigners (Barrett, 1996). Impersonal sources of information about foreigners (e.g., television), the dominant sources of information about foreigners for children in Barrett's study, were associated with stereotyping of foreigners. In contrast to previous research, the sample for the present study had indepth exposure to foreigners. Specifically, we evaluated international children who were sojourners in a foreign country. In this regard, children in our sample have had experiences living in and interacting with adults and peers in at least two countries.

The second major purpose is to evaluate the relative salience of several social identities. Nationality is often confounded with other important forms of social status. In much of the previous research the terms used to denote nationality were confounded with linguistic status (e.g., Spanish, English, and German). A similar problem is found in the research on children's racial attitudes in which the use of racial terms that also have chromatic connotations (e.g., Black, White) has created problems with interpreting research findings: it is unclear if children are

responding to the chromatic or the racial connotations of the racial/chromatic terms (Hirschfeld, 1993). The problem may be pernicious for the study of children's attitudes and understanding of nationality for two reasons: (1) much of the research has used nationality terms with a duplicity or multiplicity of connotations and (2) children have been shown to confuse nationality with other forms of social status such as linguistic, racial status, and local residence (Hirschfeld, 1994; Bennett et al., 1998). Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research investigating the developmental progression in the ability to differentiate among these three forms of status and investigating the relative salience of these forms of social status in children's social identifications. Consequently, we were interested in examining developmental trends in the relative salience of these forms of social status. The children who are the focus of this study were exposed to peers who differ from them based on ethnicity or race, nationality, and linguistic status. Previous research (see Quintana, 2010) suggested that racial status is one of the first forms of social difference that young children can reliably identify, in part because racial status is often marked by physical and observable characteristics. Conversely, nationality status is a form of social status that is more subtle, less marked by physical characteristics, and more abstract than is racial status (Barrett, 1996).

Study Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Developmental trends in children's perspective-taking ability of nationality and salience of identity statuses were predicted. Specifically, an increase across age in children's NPTA scores and age and NPTA would be positively related to children's tendency to identify more closely with nationality was expected. That is, younger children were expected to identify racial status as salient at higher rates than older children. Nationality status is expected to be more salient for older children compared to younger ones, relative to other identity statuses. A developmental trajectory for salience of linguistic status is more difficult to predict.

Hypothesis 2. Additionally, the amount of cross-national experience was expected to be associated with NPTA and with salience of identity statuses. Specifically, the level of exposure to two countries was expected to be associated with higher levels of NPTA development. The relative salience of racial, linguistic, and nationality status was expected to be associated with the amount of exposure to the two countries, but the direction of the relationship was not hypothesized.

Exploratory Analyses. Finally, differences between the two groupsof children on NPTA and salience of social statuses were expected. This study included an Asian (i. e., Korean) and Latin American sample. No significant differences between the two groups of children based on national origin for NPTA were expected as this developmental model has been found to be applicable to a wide variety of contexts and populations. Thee were no expectations concerning differences based on national origin and salience of identity status.

Methods

Participants

Participants in this sample were a total of 41 sojourner children attending public elementary and middle schools (grades 1 - 7) in the United States. Specifically, there were 21 children from Korea and 20 from Latin America. The first language of children was either Korean, Spanish, or Portuguese and most (n = 38) continued to speak their native language in their home in the U.S. These sojourner families were in the U.S. because a parent was attending university in the United States and all families planned to return to their home countries subsequent to the completion of the parent's university education. The children were in the U.S. for an average of 20.66 months, with 20 girls and 21 boys in this sample.

Instruments

NPTA Interview. The interview consisted of questions (20 - 30 minutes to administer) designed to assess children's developmental understanding of nationality. The questions were designed to probe for children's highest level of perspective-taking ability of nationality.

Interviewers, who were native language speakers of the child's home language, probed children's answers to clarify responses when they were ambiguous. The interview referenced visual aids to facilitate inquiry into children's reasoning and to increase children's attention to the interview questions. These aids were illustrations of individua lchildren, groups of children, and families representing the child's nationality as well as citizens from the United States. All answers were audio-recorded, transcribed, and coded. Answers were scored according to criteria based on the NPTA model depicted in Table 1, all of which were modeled after scoring manuals for ethnic and racial perspective-taking ability.

The NPTA interview procedure has been modeled after interviews of children's understanding of ethnicity and race (EPTA; Quintana, 1994, 1998, 2010), which were, in turn, based on Selman's (1980) model of Social Perspective-Taking Ability. The EPTA interview has demonstrated good psychometric properties. Inter-rater reliability has been established at $\underline{r}$ = .94 (Quintana, Ybarra, Gonzalez-Doupe, & de Baessa, 1999). Moreover, validity has been demonstrated with a large validity coefficient ($\underline{r}_{xy}$ = .86) and with significant relationships between scores based on the EPTA interview and criterion variables (ethnic knowledge and social perspective-taking ability; Quintana et al., 1999). The validity coefficient computed for the NPTA for the present study was found to be high ($\underline{r}_{xy}$=.70).

Salience of Children's Nationality, Racial, and Linguistic Identity Measure. This measure was specifically developed for this study. Children responded to a series of social identity comparisons with each comparison involving two children who differed in nationality, racial status, and/or language usage but who shared at least one of those status with the participant. Racial status was depicted with illustrations of children varying based on racial phenotype (hair, eye, and skin color as well as facial features). Linguistic status was depicted by cartoon-like thought balloons in which the illustrated children were offering a friendly greeting (e.g., "Hi", "Hola"). Finally, national status was depicted with a colorful map of the world's nations and by placing the illustration of a child on a nation to depict nationality. The participant was asked to choose among two options which option was most

similar to the participant. An example for a Korean participant follows:

Option A: English-speaking, Asian child born in Korea
Option B: Korean-speaking Asian child born in the U. S.
Which child is most similar to you?

This particular example compares the relative salience of linguistic vs. national status because racial status did not vary across the options. Option A involves the same nationality as the participant, but different native language while Option B involves the same native language as the participant but different nationality. Children choosing Option A were scored as reflecting greater salience of their national identity compared to their linguistic identity. Other items compared salience of nationality to racial status, and linguistic to racial status. There were six comparisons contrasting these three features. An estimate of reliability was computed for this measure using canonical correlations analysis in which the three scale scores from the first three questions were correlated with the second three questions. Even though this is essentially a six-item questionnaire for three identity subscales, results suggested that the split-half reliability was 0.74.

It is important to note that the indices of identity salience are not three separate dimensions because participants responded by choosing one status relative to another (in each item by choosing one was scored such that they could not choose the other). Consequently principal components analyses were performed to reduce the number of indicies used to reflect the relative salience of identity statues and thereby deriving dimensions that were linearly independent. Results from principal components analyses revealed two independent components were extracted (Eigenvalues 1.65, 1.35) that accounted for 100% of the variance of the three indices. The interpretation of the first principal component based on the factor coefficients for race, nationality and linguistic status (-.96, .82, and .22, respectively) suggest that this component indexes the relative preference of nationality over racial status. The coefficients for the second component (-.26, -.57, and .98, respectively) suggest that this component reflects the relative salience of linguistic status over the other two statuses.

Parental Interview. One parent for each participant, typically the mother, was interviewed in order to obtain information about the child's

age, length of stay in the U. S., visits to native country and families' intention of returning to its native country.

Procedures

Participants were recruited by contacting parents from international student organizations and by soliciting volunteers from ESL (English as a Second Language) classes. Parents who expressed interest in the study completed parental consent forms and were subsequently contacted to schedule individual interviews for their children. The interviews were conducted in the families' homes. The child's parent was interviewed to obtain demographic information about the child. All other information was provided by the children. The children were provided with assent forms in writing as well as orally. All interviewers were fluent in the child's native language and were of the same ethnic status as the family. The order of administration of the child measures was randomized to control for order effects.

Results

Descriptive Results

Children departed from their native country, on average, at 91.34 months (sd = 32.77). The average current grade level in the U.S. was 3.23 (sd = 2.56). All families planned to return to their home country when the parent(s) had finished their schooling in the United States. Nine of the families had visited their native country at least once since arriving in the United States. The mean scores for the salience of racial, national, and linguistic status are reported for descriptive purposes along with the NPTA across the two groups of children in Table 2. The salience scores represent the number of times that each form of social status was selected by each child as being a basis for similarity. The salience scores for each status range from 0 - 4.0. Across the sample, the children tended to choose racial status as an important form of their identity, with this tendency stronger for Korean children than for Latin Americans. Conversely, national status was particularly salient for Latin American children. Results listed in Table 3 suggest that children who scored at NPTA level 0 were among the youngest and that by 8.5

years, children had progressed beyond level 0. The largest portion of children scored at level 1, with a wide age range. There were no children younger than 9 years of age who scored at level 2 and only 3 children (who tended to be the oldest in the sample) were scored at level 3.

Table 2
Descriptive Results

		Korean Children	Latin American Children	All Children
Racial Identity	M	2.67	1.78	2.23
	SD	1.20	1.37	1.35
National Identity	M	1.10	2.58	1.82
	SD	1.14	0.96	1.12
Linguistic Identity	M	2.24	1.65	1.95
	SD	1.89	1.27	1.12
Perspective-taking ability	M	1.04	1.42	1.23
	SD	0.74	0.90	0.83
Age	M	8.41	10.30	9.33
	SD	1.54	2.43	2.22
Months in U.S.	M	24.90	16.20	20.66
	SD	25.48	13.89	20.87

Table 3
Breakdown of NPTA by means of age and months in U. S.

NPTA level	Number of children	Mean Age	Range (age)	Months in U. S.
Level 0	7	7.61	6.92 - 8.42	15.43
Level 1	20	8.70	6.17 - 12.83	20.63
Level 2	10	10.40	9.17 - 13.08	24.55
Level 3	3	13.25	12.92 - 13.58	25.33

Developmental analyses: Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis that perspective-taking ability of nationality and salience of nationality would be predicted by the developmental markers (i.e., chronological age and NPTA) was evaluated with Pearson correlational analyses (see Table 4). Both of these indices

were significantly related to age: $r(40) = .70$, $p = .001$ for perspective-taking ability of nationality; $r(40) = .51$, $p = .002$ for salience of nationality. Contrary to expectation, salience of nationality identity was not significantly related to NPTA.

Table 4
Correlational analyses investigating developmental hypotheses

	Age	NPTA
NPTA	.71***	-
Component #1 (Nationality over Racial status)	.51***	.17
Component #2 (Linguistic status over other two statuses)	-.054	.02

Cross-national exposure analyses: Hypothesis 2

The test of the second hypothesis that the amount of cross-national exposure would be associated with perspective-taking ability and the salience scores was tested in a series of regression analyses in which the predictor variables were the amount of time participants were in the United States and the amount of time they were in their native country (see Table 5). It is important to note that there was a strong correlation between chronological age and age at which the child left home country ($r = .77$, $p < .001$), but the relationship between age and number of months in the U.S. was not significant ($r = .06$, $p = .70$). Consequently, chronological age and time spent in home country are empirically confounded. Nonetheless, as expected, perspective-taking ability was predicted by the amount of time spent in the U.S. as well as the age at which the child left his or her native country. Similarly, the tendency to identify more closely with nationality relative to racial status was predicted by these two predictor variables. Hence, after controlling for the amount of time spent in the U.S., children who spent more time in their own country tended to identify nationality as an important basis for social identification and, analogously, after controlling for the amount of time the children spent in their home country, the more they spent in the U.S., the more likely they were to choose nationality over racial status as a basis for similarity.

Conversely, salience of linguistic status relative to the other two statuses was significantly predicted by only the number of months the children spent in the U. S. with those children in the U. S. for longer periods of time choosing linguistic status as an important basis for social identification.

Table 5
Predicting NPTA and identity salience from cross-national exposure

Criterion Variables	Predictor Variables	Beta	t-statistic
NPTA	Months in U.S.	0.67	4.81***
	Months in native country	0.86	6.14***
Component #1 (Nationality over Racial status)	Months in U.S.	.48	2.81**
	Months in native country	.62	3.60***
Component #2 (Linguistic status over other two statuses)	Months in U.S.	.39	2.25*
	Months in native country	.09	0.44

Note: * p<.05, **p<01, ***p< .001.

Differences across nationality: exploratory analyses

MANCOVA analyses were performed to evaluate for differences on perspective-taking ability of nationality and the identity salience variables across Korean and Latin American children. Age and time spent in the U.S. were used a covariates because of differences between these groups on these variables. Results indicated that there were significant group differences on these variables ($F(3,35)=3.09$, $p=.040$) even after variance associated with age was controlled. Univariate analyses (analogous to *ANCOVAs*) indicated that both components (salience of nationality over racial status and salience of linguistic status over the other two statuses) were significantly different between the two groups ($F(1,37)=4.19$, $p=.048$; $F(1,37)=4.34$, $p=.044$), with no significant differences for NPTA ($F(1,37)=0.14$, $p=.70$). Salience of linguistic status over nationality and racial statuses was higher for Korean children and salience of racial status over nationality was higher for Latin American children.

Discussion

To reiterate, results suggest that there were strong developmental trends in children's perspective-taking ability of nationality (NPTA) and in their identifying more closely with nationality relative to racial status. Moreover, the amount of cross-national exposure was related to children's development of NPTA and to their relative identification with social statuses. Finally, there were significant differences between Latin American and Korean children for identification with their nationality relative to racial status.

The main purpose of the present study was to posit and evaluate the construct of NPTA. Study results provide tentative support for the validity of this construct, but also some of its limitations. The NPTA scores showed a strong developmental trend across age and were also positively associated with the amount of cross-national exposure. Importantly, there were no cross-national differences for NPTA, after controlling for differences due to age and length of stay in U.S. This provides support for the cross-national validity of the NPTA construct. Comparing results from previous research to those of the present study suggest that the perspective-taking ability scores were higher than previous estimates of children's understanding of nationality. For example, Nugent (1994) and Lambert and Klineberg (1967) suggested that children aged 10 years had not progressed beyond a relatively concrete understanding of nationality (roughly NPTA levels 0 and 1), but in the present study most of the children 10 years or older and some children 9 years of age had demonstrated awareness of a more social basis in their understanding of nationality (i.e., NPTA level 2). The differences between this study and previous investigations into children's understanding of nationality may be due to differences in the populations sampled and/or measures used. First, sojourner children in the present study who have extensive cross-national exposure might be expected to have more advanced conceptions of nationality than children in previous research who had little or no cross-national experience. The present study, like studies of racial and social perspective-taking ability, involved samples with considerable exposure to comparison groups. Not surprisingly, the range for perspective-taking ability in the present study is, however, consistent with investigations

of racial and social perspective taking ability in other domains (Alejandro-Wright, 1985; Marini & Case, 1994; Selman, 1980; Quintana, 1998; Quintana et al., 1999). Indeed, in the present study, there was an association between the amount of children's cross-national exposure and their NPTA scores. Previous research (e.g., Barrett, 1996) has also found that personal exposure to foreigners, mostly on a limited basis (e.g., as tourists) was associated with amount of knowledge and attitudes regarding foreigners. Consequently, cross-national exposure seems to accelerate children's understanding of nationality.

Secondly, the children's understanding of nationality in the present study may have been estimated to be higher than in previous research because of methodological reasons. The individually administered NPTA interview was designed to probe children's level of reasoning about nationality, whereas most other research used predominately group-administered measures that evaluated more spontaneously-generated descriptions of nationality. Like in the present study, Barrett (1996) and Bennett (200; Barrett & Short, 1992) also employed an individually-administered interview soliciting open-ended answers from children. Although somewhat difficult to interpret within the NPTA framework, Barrett found 10 year old children, compared to 6 year olds, relied less on concrete or physical terms (analogous to NPTA level 0) when describing nationality and tended to use more sophisticated kinds of descriptors. Unfortunately his coding scheme could not differentiate reliably between behavioral and psychological descriptors (Barrett, 1996; p. 360) and although the scheme for behavioral and psychological descriptors seemed to include primarily NPTA level 1 kinds of descriptors, there were some aspects of this classification that were consistent with NPTA level 2. Hence, it appears that Barrett's (1996; Barrett & Short, 1992) estimates of children's descriptors of nationality may be higher than in most other previous research that did not use individualized interviews. In turn, estimates of these abilities in the present study which included individualized interviewing and children with considerably cross-national exposure were higher than in Barrett's studies. Elsewhere research (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1993) has shown that methodological innovation has been successful in detecting higher levels of children's

cognitive functioning than previously demonstrated.

The extension of the EPTA and NPTA theoretical and methodological framework offers several advantages. First, this framework allows for a comparison and integration of research on children's understanding of nationality with the considerable body of research on children's understanding of race and ethnicity. Second, this framework provides a theoretical heuristic for developing a general model of cultural perspective-taking ability that can be applied across several domains, such as nationality, race, ethnicity, and possibly other forms of social status (social class, gender, etc.). Third, the framework is based on methodology that evaluates explicitly for perspective-taking ability. That is, there is an intensive semi-structured interview designed to evaluate specifically for children's level of perspective-taking ability.

Although supporting the utility of the NPTA construct, study results also suggest some limitations. Specifically, NPTA was not associated with any of the identity salience scores. Interestingly, although the tendency to identify more closely with nationality than with racial status was associated with chronological age, it was not associated with NPTA. Clearly, there are other forms of development unrelated to NPTA that influence the relative salience of various social statuses. Future research may find that the relative salience of identities is more related to attitudinal dimensions than to cognitive-developmental dimensions, such as perspective-taking abilities.

The second main purpose of this study was to investigate the relative salience of racial, nationality, and linguistic status. In this regard, we found the anticipated trend of older children identifying more with nationality than with racial status. The developmental pattern appears to be as children age, the salience of race declines while the salience of nationality increases. This finding is consistent with much previous research that establishes that children can distinguish racial differences at an early age (e.g., Aboud, 1994; Quintana, 2010). As mentioned previously, nationality status is not as easily identifiable as is racial status to young children, which may account for why the salience of nationality increases over time (Barrett, 1996). The present study appears to be the first to examine specifically the developmental

increase in children's identification with nationality relative to racial status. In addition to age, children's exposure to U. S. culture was associated with less emphasis on racial status relative to nationality. That is, identifications based on racial salience were lower for children with greater exposure to the U. S. There may be socialization differences between the children's experiences in the U. S. compared to these other countries that may account for this relationship. Specifically, these international children tend to live a racially-diverse community within the U. S. that attempts to promote acceptance of racial differences compared to the children's experiences in their home country in which there appeared to be less exposure to racial diversity and less emphasis on racial tolerance. Although this finding may be limited to sample characteristics, it suggests that exposure to a community of diversity and tolerance may have an impact on racial attitudes or salience of racial status. Moreover, the amount of time that children spent in their home country was significantly associated with the salience of nationality over racial status in children's identifications of similarity. Not surprisingly, those children who lived longer in their home country tended to identify more closely with their nationality. Nonetheless, this somewhat intuitive finding demonstrates some of validity for the salience of identification measure employed in this study.

It was also found that children from Latin America identified more closely with their nationality relative to their racial status than did Korean children. During interviews, Korean children seemed to express favorable attitudes toward the U. S. Conversely, during the interviews Latin American children tended to express somewhat ambivalent attitudes toward the U. S. This group difference in salience of nationality may be associated with geo-political events (e.g., U. S. involvement in Korean Conflict, U. S. policies toward Latin American countries).Also, Korea tends to be more racially homogenous than is the U. S. or Latin America. It may be that Korean children identify more closely with their racial status in part because of the relative racial homogeneity of their country.

Conversely, linguistic salience was not associated with chronological age but was predicted by the amount of exposure to the U. S. The failure to find a significant relationship with age was

expected because linguistic status is easily detected by young children but may also connote for older children an abstract basis for social affiliation. The findings that (a) the amount of time spent in the U. S. was positively associated with salience of linguistic status and (b) that the amount of exposure to the child's home country was not significantly associated with linguistic status were somewhat unexpected. The more exposure to the child's linguistic group would be associated with identification with linguistic status was found for salience of nationality (those who had more exposure to their own country identified more closely with nationality). However, during interviews it appeared as if newly arrived sojourners were optimistic, even naïve, about the ease of overcoming linguistic barriers. During these interviews, children who had been in the U. S. for greater lengths of time although they seemed to acculturate in several important ways to U. S. norms, they prided themselves in maintaining their native language. Given that this was the first study of its kind on children sojourners, future research may be needed to clarify the nature of the relationship between linguistic status and cross-national exposure.

There are several caveats related to this study's methodology. The salience measure was newly developed and although it appeared to reflect adequate reliability and validity, more research will be needed to investigate its relationship to other measures of racial, linguistic, and nationalistic identities. Additionally, given that this study was the first one to examine sojourner children's understanding of nationality and to introduce the NPTA framework, this study's findings should be regarded as preliminary until more research is completed comparing sojourner children with children who remain in their home country using the NPTA interview. Moreover, this study's design did not allow for comparisons across specific countries and a different sampling of children within various countries would provide more information about children from specific countries.

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Teaching for Ethical Reasoning

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Teaching for Ethical Reasoning

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Abstract

This article argues for the importance of teaching for ethical reasoning. Much of our teaching is in vain if it is not applied to life in an ethical manner. The article reviews lapses in ethical reasoning and the great costs they have had for society. It proposes that ethical reasoning can be taught across the curriculum. It presents an eight-step model of ethical reasoning that can be applied to ethical challenges and illustrates its application. The eight steps range from recognizing there even is a situation to which to respond, to acting. It is argued that ethical behavior requires the completion of all eight steps. It further points to a source of frustration in the teaching and application of ethics: ethical drift. Finally it draws conclusions.

Keywords: ethical reasoning, ethical drift, bystander intervention

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The beginning of the end, it is generally agreed, was in 1962 ("Centralia, Pennsylvania: Truth is Stranger than Fiction," 2009). Someone burned trash in the pit of an abandoned strip mine in Centralia, Pennsylvania, USA. It was illegal; it was unethical; but people do this kind of thing all the time. An exposed vein of coal caught fire. The fire was doused with water and town officials thought the fire was extinguished. But it wasn't, and the fire erupted again, unexpectedly, in the same pit just a few days later. More water was applied and town officials thought that was the end of it. But again, it wasn't.

The fire spread underground. People debated long and hard as to what to do about it. As they debated, life went on. People attended to the problems that confronted them in their daily lives—making ends meet, raising their kids, marrying and divorcing—meanwhile relegating the fire to the backs of their minds. Every once in a while, though, the fire or its byproducts would emerge from the ground. Toxic gases would start to come up out of the ground. A basement would become very hot and eventually people would realize that the fire had reached under their basement. Roads would start to buckle from the heat. Half-hearted efforts would be made to extinguish the fire, but the longer people waited, the more the fire spread, and the more expensive it would be to extinguish it. The government started to pay people to relocate. They had little other choice.

Today, Centralia, Pennsylvania, is a ghost town. All but the steadfast few have abandoned the town. The town no longer appears on some maps. Relatively few people even remember the fire that still burns under the ruins of Centralia. Among those who do are the residents of Ashland, Pennsylvania, because the fire is making its way in their direction. They fear they are next.

The Need to Teach for Ethical Reasoning

The story of Centralia is a precautionary tale for our society as a whole. We need to teach for ethical reasoning (Sternberg, 2010)! The whole mess in Centralia started with one clearly unethical act. Local, state, and government officials had a chance to do something about it, but they failed adequately to recognize the looming crisis. And so the

crisis spread underground, erupting here and there, until it became unmanageable. The financial costs were staggering. But what about the ethics of making only a half-hearted attempt to control a fire that eventually would destroy the entire town, including the homes both of innocent victims and of those who did nothing?

One can argue that lapses such as occurred in Centralia are exceptions, scarcely the rule. The financial collapse of 2008 appears to have been partly a result of pure greed on the part of certain banks and bankers. At the time this is being written, at least one well-known investment bank is under criminal as well as civil investigation. In 2010, coal miners died in a mine shaft that had been cited numerous times for inadequate ventilation, and a record-breaking oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico occurred at least in part because of improper safeguards against such spills.

Such problems are nothing new. A. H. Robins went bankrupt in 1985. The company could not afford settlements for the more than 300,000 lawsuits filed against them as a result of their production and marketing of an unsafe intrauterine device for birth control, the Dalkon Shield. In 2001, Enron collapsed after *Fortune* magazine had named it America's most innovative company for six years in a row. It was a house of cards, built on phony books and fraudulent shell companies. Worldcom's bankruptcy came a year later, in 2002. It had incorrectly accounted for $3.8 billion in operating expenses. More recently, we have seen the end of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and numerous other financial enterprises. Few people reached the depths of Bernard Madoff, the epitome of unethical behavior on Wall Street, who sits in a prison cell.

As a university administrator, I, like other administrators, have discovered that students' ethical skills often are not up to the level of their ability-test scores. Colleges run the full gamut of unethical behavior on the part of students: drunken rampages, cheating on tests, lying about reasons for papers turned in late, attacks by students on other students, questionable behavior on the athletic field. Faculty members, of course, are not immune either: Few academic administrators probably leave their jobs without having had to deal with at least some cases of academic or other misconduct on the part of faculty.

Teaching Ethical Reasoning
Ethical Reasoning can be Taught

Schools should teach ethical reasoning; they should not necessarily teach ethics. There is a difference. Ethics is a set of principles for what constitutes right and wrong behavior. These principles are generally taught in the home or through religious training in a special school or through learning in the course of one's life. It would be challenging to teach ethics in a secular school, because different religious and other groups have somewhat different ideas about what is right and wrong. There are, however, core values that are common to almost all these religions and ethical systems that schools do teach and reinforce, for example, reciprocity (the golden rule), honesty, sincerity, compassion in the face of human suffering.

Ethical reasoning is how to think about issues of right or wrong. Processes of reasoning can be taught, and the school is an appropriate place to teach these processes. The reason is that, although parents and religious schools may teach ethics, they do not always teach ethical reasoning, or at least, do so with great success. They may see their job as teaching right and wrong, but not how to reason with ethical principles. Moreover, they may not do as good a job of it as we would hope for.

Is there any evidence that ethical reasoning can be taught with success? There have been successful endeavors with students of various ages. Paul (Paul & Elder, 2005), of the Foundation for Critical Thinking, has shown how principles of critical thinking can be applied specifically to ethical reasoning in young people. DeHaan and his colleagues at Emory University have shown that it is possible successfully to teach ethical reasoning to high school students (DeHaan & Narayan, 2007). Myser (1995) of the University of Newcastle has shown ways specifically of teaching ethics to medical students. Weber (1993) of Marquette University found that teaching ethical awareness and reasoning to business-school students can improve from courses aimed at these topics, although the improvements are often short-term. But Poneman ("First Center to Study Accounting Ethics Opens," 2010) and Jordan (2007) both found that as leaders ascend the hierarchy in

their businesses, their tendency to define situations in ethical terms actually seems to decrease.

How does one actually teach ethical reasoning? In my view, the way you teach ethical reasoning is through the case-study method, which is the principal method I now use in my course on leadership. Ideally, ethics is taught not just in a course on ethics but in any course in which ethics might potentially apply. Otherwise, there is the risk that what the students learn will be inert—that students will not see how to apply it outside the one course on ethics. Students need to learn how to reason about and apply ethical principles by being confronted with ethical problems in a variety of domains. They also need to be inoculated against the pressures to behave unethically, such as occurs when there is retaliation for whistle-blowing.

Problems for Teaching Ethical Reasoning

A famous, perhaps now classical, problem for teaching ethical reasoning is the following:

A train is going out of control and hurtling down the tracks toward four people who are strangers. You are unable to call out to the people or get them off the tracks. However, it is in your power to press a button that will divert the train. But there is a problem, namely, that there is a person on the tracks onto which you would divert the train. This person will be killed if you divert the train. Thus you can touch the controls and divert the train, resulting in the death of one person, or you can not touch the controls, and four people will die. What should you do?

Consider other more realistic problems:

1. A university in New York City has run out of room. It is confined on all sides in a crowded city and cannot fulfill its expanding academic mission with the real estate currently available to it. Its solution in the past was to buy up as much neighboring land as it could. But it has run out of willing sellers. The university now is attempting to use the law of eminent domain to take over land by having the city kick out landowners. In order to do so, it has claimed that some of the areas into which it wishes to move are blighted. Landowners of these adjacent properties point out that the university has no right to their land and that

if the adjacent areas are blighted, it is because the university itself has failed properly to maintain properties it has bought and thus as been a major contributor to the blight. What should be done?

2. Your friend is the CEO of a powerful company in your town. You follow the local news and know that there have been some rumblings about his performance because as CEO, he has just awarded a large no-bid contract to manage the construction of a new research center owned by the company. In other words, the winning contractor did not have to compete against any other companies for the contract. At a dinner party, you ask your friend the CEO how his vacation was, and he mentions that it was really nice. He and his family went on a weeklong free skiing vacation at the mountain house of Mr. X. You realize that Mr. X is none other than the owner of the company that received the contract to manage construction of the new building. What should you do?

3. Doctors sometimes write notes on pads furnished them by pharmaceutical companies with pens also furnished by such companies. Some doctors also may accept free meals, club memberships, subsidized travel, and research funds from such companies. With regard to gifts and subsidies from pharmaceutical companies to doctors, what kinds of guidelines do you think ought to be in place, and why? Is there an ethical failure here, and if so, is it in the pharmaceutical companies, the doctors, or both?

4. Mr. Smith, a close friend of yours with whom you have worked closely in your company for 40 years, is clearly dying. There is no hope. On his deathbed, he tells you that he has been burdened for many years by the fact that, between the ages of 35 and 42, he had a mistress whom he saw frequently and subsidized financially. He asks you to tell his wife what he has told you and to tell her that he begs her forgiveness.

Mr. Smith has now died. What should you do about his request?

Other examples are given in Table 1 (See Appendix).

If students are not explicitly given a chance to confront ethical dilemmas, how are they going to learn to solve them? In my own instruction, I care less about the conclusions students come to than I do about their reasoning processes in coming to those conclusions.

There are no easy answers to any of these problems, but that is the point: Teaching ethical reasoning is not about teaching what one should do in particular circumstances—perhaps that is the role of religious training. Teaching ethical reasoning is about teaching students how wisely to make very difficult decisions involving ethical considerations where the answers are anything but clear cut.

A Model of Ethical Reasoning and its Translation into Behavior

Not all ethical problems are as difficult as these. Yet people act unethically in many situations. Why? Sometimes, it is because ethics mean little or nothing to them. But more often, it is because it is hard to translate theory into practice. Consider an example.

In 1970, Bibb Latané and John Darley opened up a new field of research on bystander intervention. They showed that, contrary to expectations, bystanders intervene when someone is in trouble only in very limited circumstances. For example, if they think that someone else might intervene, the bystanders tend to stay out of the situation. Latané and Darley even showed that divinity students who were about to lecture on the parable of *The Good Samaritan* were no more likely than other bystanders to help a person in distress who was in need of—a good Samaritan! Drawing in part upon their model of bystander intervention, I have constructed a model of ethical behavior that would seem to apply to a variety of ethical problems. The model specifies the specific skills students need to reason and then behave ethically. The skills are taught by active learning—by having student solve ethical-reasoning problems, employing the skills they need.

The basic premise of the model is that ethical behavior is far harder to display than one would expect simply on the basis of what we learn from our parents, from school, and from our religious training (Sternberg, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). To intervene, individuals must go through a series of steps, and unless all of the steps are completed, they are not likely to behave in an ethical way, regardless of the amount of training they have received in ethics, and regardless of their levels of other types of skills. Consider the skills in the model and how they apply in an ethical dilemma—whether a student, John, should turn in a

fellow student, Bill, whom he saw cheating on an examination:

1. Recognize that there is an event to which to react.

John has to observe the cheating and decide that it is a situation in which he potentially can do something.

2. Define the event as having an ethical dimension.

John has to define the cheating as unethical. Many students do so; but some others see it as a utilitarian matter—it's ok if Bill get away with it.

3. Decide that the ethical dimension is significant.

John has to decide that Bill's cheating on the examination is a big enough deal that it is worth paying attention to. Some students may see it as an ethical issue, but not as a significant one.

4. Take personal responsibility for generating an ethical solution to the problem.

There are ethical problems that are serious but that are not necessarily your ethical problems. John may decide that there is an ethical problem here, even a big one, but that it is none of his or her business. For example, John may look at it as the teacher's responsibility, not his, to turn in Bill.

5. Figure out what abstract ethical rule(s) might apply to the problem.

What rule applies? If there is no honor code, is there a rule by which John should turn in Bill? Perhaps John believes, on the contrary, that the rule is to mind his own business, or to avoid cheating himself, but not to turn in Bill.

6. Decide how these abstract ethical rules actually apply to the problem so as to suggest a concrete solution.

Perhaps John believes that one should turn in cheaters, but cannot apply the rule in this situation, realizing that he could not prove that Bill cheated.

7. Prepare to counteract contextual forces that might lead one not to act in an ethical manner.

John may be reluctant to turn in Bill because he believes that other students, including but not limited to Bill, will shun him or retaliate against him for being a "snitch."

8. Act.

In the end, the question becomes one not of how one thinks, but of what one does. It can be very difficult to go from thought to action. But the ultimate test of ethical reasoning is not just in how one thinks, but also in how one acts. John may believe he should turn in Bill but just not get up the guts actually to do so.

The model applies not only to judging others but to evaluating one's own ethical reasoning. When confronted with a situation having a potential ethical dimension, students can learn literally to go through the steps of the model and ask how they apply to a given situation.

Effective teaching of ethical reasoning involves presenting case studies, but it is important that students as well generate their own case studies from their own experience, and then apply the steps of the model to their own problems. They need to be actively involved in seeing how the steps of the model apply to their own individual problems.

Ethical Drift

Even if students understand the steps involved in ethical reasoning, they must be prepared to face another challenge, ethical drift (Sternberg, in press). In *Lifeboat*, a film by Alfred Hitchcock, several marooned individuals who have survived the wrecks of their two ships drift in the middle of the ocean. Their meager supplies soon begin to run out, and as they do, the drifting of their lifeboat becomes a metaphor for the drifting of their ethical standards. Within less time than one might have imagined, they and their audience find the survivors acting in ways none of them ever would have thought possible.

Ethical drift is the gradual ebbing of standards that can occur in an individual, a group, or an organization as a result of the interaction of environmental pressures with those subjected to these pressures (Sternberg, in press). It often occurs insidiously and even without the conscious awareness of those being subjected to it. Just as a boat adrift in the midst of the ocean can travel long distances without any visible change in its location, so can ethical drift occur without people even realizing that they have changed (usually for the worse) their ethical standards.

If one is adrift at sea, eventually one can see one has drifted because the constellations, which are fixed in position, seem to have moved because one has oneself moved. But it can take a while before one realizes that the constellations seem to be in a different place, and by the time they seem to be in a different place, one may have forgotten where they originally seemed to be. Similarly, when ethical drift occurs, one typically realizes it only after a great while and by then, one may have lost one's original bearings.

The biggest challenge of ethical drift is that, because it typically is insidious, people are not even aware it is happening. They may believe that they are adhering to the same ethical standards they had before. Or, by the time they realize that their standards have changed, it may be too late. that they are adhering to the same ethical standards they had before. Or, by the time they realize that their standards have changed, it may be too late. We often assume that people who act unethically simply decide to behave in a way that they or anyone else can see is clearly wrong. Frequently, however, they have experienced ethical drift, whereby their frame of reference has changed so gradually that they are not even aware that they are behaving unethically. Others may be appalled by their actions—except those who have drifted along with them.

Students, for example, may begin by lifting a few words from materials gathered from the Internet, and gradually progress to sentences, paragraph, and then major parts of, or even, whole papers. The process is much more insidious than when a student merely decides to "buy" a paper from a paper-writing mill. The students may not be aware the process even has taken place, although of course they should have been.

I once talked to an individual who had gone from working in one organization (a university) to another (a consulting company). He described to me in some detail the unethical practices of the firm. I asked him why he did not leave. He replied that the down-drift in ethics had occurred over a long period of time, or at the very least, he had become aware of it only over an extended period of time. Had he realized it at once, he would have left, but the process had been so slow he had not even been aware it was taking place. At that point, he felt he

would have trouble finding another job, and had himself become somewhat ethically compromised.

Such drift can happen in many contexts, of course. The quality of intimate relationships can decline, as can the quality of life in a particular home or town. What is potentially different about ethical drift is how it eats away at the individual's humanity and leaves the person caught in a situation that can be not only ethically, but also, potentially legally compromising.

Ethical drift is provoked by at least four environmental forces. First, it typically occurs when there is intense competition for resources, as on the lifeboat. Second, people start to feel that they are in a zero-sum game, often with relatively meager rewards, again as characterized the lifeboat. Third, people perceive, or think they perceive, others acting in ways that are ethically compromised, as Hitchcock's characters saw each other acting in more and more ethically challenged ways. Sometimes, when individuals or organizations compete, team members actually may encourage an individual to act in ethically compromised ways. Finally, people may see no other viable way out of the quandary. They feel they cannot just leave the situation (as, for example, where exit from the lifeboat meant almost certain death).

When we teach students ethical reasoning and behavior, we need to make them aware of the challenges of ethical drift. People who experience it often started out acting according to ethical principles and may not realize that they have drifted into behavior that no longer upholds the ethical standards they originally set for themselves. For example, students may start off setting high standards for themselves in writing papers, but after observing others lift material from the Internet without attribution, may start doing so themselves, with the amounts of material lifted increasing from one assignment to the next. Or a scientist may start "cleaning" data and proceed to "massaging" and then to "falsifying" it. Or a college administrator may exchange a home renovation for a vendor contract at his college, thinking that's what others do so why shouldn't he?

If one looks at people who have committed serious transgressions, often, one finds, they started out just like anyone else. Consider, for example, two notorious employees of banks. Jerome Kerviel at the Societe General and Kweku Adoboli at UBS, from what the records

show, started off as honest but aggressive traders. They made bets that went wrong. They tried to recoup the money they lost, at first, through legal activity, then through activity that went beyond the bounds of legality and ethicality. In the end, their behavior became egregious and they were caught. They were in an intense competition for resources; they experienced it as a zero-sum game—they are either making money or losing it; they were acting in banking cultures that encouraged aggressive risk-taking and even going beyond the bounds so long as the actors did not get caught; they finally saw no way out of their quandary except to recoup their losses illegally, although of course they could have turned themselves in, perhaps losing their jobs but not exposing themselves to possible prison terms. Perhaps the most critical element was the organizational culture of ethical drift—that it is all right to shave a little here, a little there, so long as appearances are maintained and the ends are alleged (falsely) to justify the means.

What can one do to discourage ethical drift in one's colleagues, one's students, or even oneself? First, an organization needs to recognize and warn its members of the phenomenon of ethical drift. Second, there needs to be a culture of no tolerance for ethical drift. Third, actors need to be warned to be vigilant for ethical drift in themselves and others. Fourth, mechanisms must exist to identify ethical drift when it occurs (such as curbs on illegal trading, in the case of the banks, or services such as Turnitin—which detects plagiarism--in the case of colleges and universities). Finally, those who are caught drifting beyond the permissible bounds must be quickly, visibly, and appropriately punished. For example, at Oklahoma State University, the university where I teach and where I am an administrator, students are taught from Day 1 that ethical practice and leadership are the core of our land-grant mission. For those who take another path, we use a grade of "F!" to indicate dishonesty, as distinguished from a grade merely of "F" for a failure.

Ultimately, the greatest protection against ethical drift is wisdom—recognizing that, in the end, people benefit most when they act for the common good. Wisdom is the ultimate lifeboat (Sternberg, 2005; Sternberg, Jarvin, & Grigorenko, 2009).

Conclusion

Figuratively speaking, we are all living in Centralia. But should we do anything to stop the fire, and if so, what? Is it worth the cost? Or should we just deal with the consequences of the fire as they erupt, as we have been doing? Deciding what to do is one of the most challenging ethical problems of all (Sternberg, 2011a, 2011b). And if we do nothing, what will happen to our metaphorical Ashland—the next generation for whom we bear responsibility as we do for our own? We need to take responsibility for teaching students to reason ethically. Otherwise, we risk the fire burning further out of control, with catastrophic results for our nation and the world.

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Appendix:
Sample Items for Measuring Ethical Reasoning

You are running for president of your student organization, of which you are currently treasurer. At the elections meeting, paper ballots are handed out and you hand yours in. You notice that one of your friends is there. You happen to know that he has not paid his dues for the past year and thus is ineligible to vote, but you don't think much of it at the time. After the meeting, your friend mentions to you that he voted for you and thinks you will do a great job. The next day, the results are announced. To your dismay, you win by one vote. You now recall that your friend, who was ineligible to vote, said he voted for you. What should you do?

You are a waiter at a school festival, which is raising money for a local charity. You serve food to a man you don't know; he pays you, and you give him change. An hour later, the man comes up to you and says that you shortchanged him. He says that you gave him change for a $5 bill when in fact he had given you a $20 bill. He demands the correct change, which is $15 more than you had given him. What should you do?

Your friend's father is the mayor of the town. You follow the local news and know that there have been some rumblings about his performance because as mayor, he has just awarded a large no-bid contract for repaving roads in the town. In other words, the winning contractor did not have to compete against any other companies for the contract. You ask your friend how his vacation was, and he mentions that it was really nice. He and his family went on a weeklong free skiing vacation at the mountain house of Mr. X. You realize that Mr. X is none other than the owner of the company that received the contract to repave the town roads. What should you do?

You take a part-time job in a fairly fancy and quite expensive local restaurant. Your job is a lowly one—washing dishes. After working in the restaurant for just a day, you are thoroughly disgusted. You have seen that the kitchen is very dirty and has an infestation of cockroaches. You mention this to a fellow worker and he gives you a wink and a nod. Then he walks away. What should you do?

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Out of the Ghetto: Psychological Bases of Dialogic Learning

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Out of the Ghetto: Psychological Bases of Dialogic Learning

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Abstract

The conception of learning in the information society has been affected by the dialogic turn of educational psychology. The effective teaching-learning processes respond more and more to the communicative conception of learning in which dialogue and interaction are key elements. In this framework, the dialogic learning emerges as an interdisciplinary conception that collects contributions from psychology of education, particularly from sociocultural theory, and from those contributions that have located learning as the result of social interaction. This article presents the psychological basis of dialogic learning on the basis of which it is developed this eminently communicative and transformative conception. Specifically, it focuses in five of the seven principles of the dialogic learning of which it is illustrated with the voices of teachers, families and students, by means of the collected data in an elementary school of an underprivileged area in the south of Europe.

Keywords: dialogue, interaction, dialogic learning, educational success

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A conception of transformative education that tries to meet successfully the challenges presented in the 21st century cannot obviate the dialogic turn of societies (Flecha, Gómez, & Puigvert, 2001). The dialogic turn refers to the centrality that dialogue takes in all the social spheres, from institutions to the life of individuals and social groups. From the analysis conducted by the contemporary social sciences (Beck, 1998; Habermas, 1987; Touraine, 1997), issues on the old power relationships from the industrial society are questioned, and there is a major presence of dialogue in the current society and in the decisions that affect us. The dialogic trend that we live in is the result of social changes that have been produced and that we observe both in the construction of scientific knowledge such as in the academia, within the schools and the same classrooms. The centrality of dialogue and the interaction have gone through the current conceptions of learning that are located in the dialogic turn in educational psychology (Racionero & Padrós, 2010). According to Racionero and Padrós (2010) this dialogic turn has meant a prior change of paradigm that understands that the knowledge and believes are structured in mental sketches of thought, in order to facilitate the transition to the current perspective in which knowledge and thought are developed through dialogue and interaction. The dialogic construction of knowledge includes dialogue with people of the community (Tellado & Sava, 2010). Vicente shares this transformative learning conception that includes him and the diversity of people and cultures existent within the community in the teaching-learning processes. The dialogic orientation of learning becomes crucial to learn to think together (Mercer, Wegerif, & Dawes, 1999) and to reach a point of thinking education from the diversity of cultures and experiences of the people in the community. These are a valuable guide for the students learning who are offered the possibility of acquiring a deeper comprehension of the world from the contributions of their knowledge.

In this sense, we observe that the dialogic dynamic of societies has been affected by the demonopolization of the expert knowledge (Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1997). The increase of dialogue in the current information society includes the reflection of the individuals considered as "non experts". More and more is accepted that there are no expert individuals that have all the social and cultural knowledge required to

respond to the needs of everyone. This process breaks with the monopoly traditionally given to the people considered "experts" in any of the fields such as health, politics or education, and leads to consider that all the individuals can contribute with arguments and cultural resources to dialogue. In the compulsory education stage, we can see this process, for example, in the teachers as monopolizators of knowledge. Students, family members and people in the community have more and more access to information, in a faster way and easy to get. They bring to the classroom the knowledge that has obtained in their houses, internet, in their own daily experience. In that sense, the classrooms stop being monological spaces to develop themselves in a chain of dialogues that are created together (Bakhtin, 1981). Therefore the thought and knowledge is created in an intersubjective approach. Teaching and learning processes are also affected since schools and classrooms are not at the margins of the dialogicism that is being included in how we teach and learn.

The international scientific community is developing theories that frame this dialogic turn and try to explain how this process define new guidelines for the interaction, learning, families' involvement, in short for the transformation of the schools (Gatt, Ojala, & Soler, 2011). In fact, the only Integrated Project of the Research Framework Programme conducted on school education, INCLUD-ED. Strategies for inclusion and social cohesion in Europe from education (CREA 2006-2011), and that is the research with most resources and highest scientific rank ever done on education in Europe, has identified schools that are implementing Successful Educational Actions (INCLUD-ED Consortium, 2009) which are based on a communicative conception of learning. In this framework is located the conception of dialogic learning (Flecha, 2000) in which in this article will be studied in depth.

The dialogic learning requires of dialogue and interaction between the diversity of people of the school and of all the community to achieve learning. The seven principles on which this conception is based have an interdisciplinary basis of social sciences that share the centrality of dialogue and are aimed at the educational and social transformation. Among others, it gathers the contributions of Habermas from from the Communicative Action Theory (Habermas, 1987) in the field of sociology, the current developments of the symbolic interacitonism

(Mead, 1934) and the sociocultural theory (Vygotsky, 1978) in psychology, and the Dialogic Action Theory in education. Those theoretical contributions provide key elements that help to define dialogue as a fundamental tool to create optimum contexts for the development and learning and, to achieve higher levels of democracy and social equality.

In the first section of this article the theoretical conception of dialogic learning is presented. Second, several fundamental theories are presented that are in the psychological basis of dialogic learning, because these contribute especially to the development of a instructional process of top-quality that facilitates both the academic success as well as the emotional development of children of different ages, socioeconomic contexts and geographical areas. The dialogic learning principles are depicted including the voices of teachers, family members and students, from an elementary school located in a neighbourhood of very low socioeconomic level and with higher concentration of cultural minorities. The reflections that the people of this centre provide put in dialogue the theoretical basis of the dialogic learning with the experiences and lifeworld of children, teachers and families. Together all advance towards the maximum levels of instrumental learning and emotional development.

Dialogic Learning. Transforming the learning context and the sociocultural environment by means of dialogue

Dialogic learning overcomes the prior conceptions of learning, typical of the industrial society, such as the objectivist conception and the traditional learning or the constructivist conception of significative learning (Aubert, Flecha, García, Flecha, & Racionero, 2008). The emphasis, here, is that learning not only depends of the experiences within the classroom but more and more depends on the coordination of the actions within the classroom, the school, the home and the streets (Aubert, García, & Racionero, 2009). We could hardly explain that all that a child learns depends on the time period spent in a classroom classroom in interaction with the teacher and the contents learned, as

many constructivist explanations stated. Now, we know that in the current information society, the learning depends more and more of the correlation of the child interactions with other people of his /her surrounding, besides the teachers. According to this communicative conception of education, the knowledge is created in situations of interaction between diverse individuals that may bring other knowledge, experiences, and feelings. Therefore, the learning resulting of these processes makes possible a deeper understanding of the world given that transforms the prior knowledge of individuals before participating in the dialogue; it widens and provides a more complex knowledge, promoting a personal transformation that also influences in the sociocultural environment (García, Duque, & Mircea, 2010).

The dialogic perspective in the teaching and learning processes is gathered in the educational research at the international level and analyses the central role of dialogue and interaction in the line presented by the dialogic learning. In agreement with Wells (1999) the communities of dialogic inquiry facilitate that all and each one of their participants participants create knowledge and obtain results that none of them could have achieved separately. This is possible by working together and in collaboration between all the individuals of the group.

Classrooms and the schools advance towards organizational forms that are more and more influenced by the dialogic dynamics for which the main tool of learning and thought is language. For example, the dialogic teaching involves the active participation of students in the use of language and in the communication processes avoiding the re-education of the classroom dynamic to the discourse of the teacher (Alexander, 2004). Evidences provided by prior research indicated that the quality of education in the classroom improves in the measure that communicative and reasoning abilities are promoted (Mercer et al., 1999; Wegerif, Mercer, & Dawes, 1999). If we pay attention to the type of classrooms that offer major opportunities to promote such abilities, we gathered the contributions of research pointing out that the organizations within the classroom in working groups is much more effective that the traditional organization in the classroom (Galton, Hargreaves, & Pell, 2009). With this kind of organisation of the classroom the interactions are richer, related to the question posing, offering explanations, making suggestions or expressing agreement or

disagreement (Galton et al., 2009).

But, what are the interactions and dialogues that promote the maximum learning and transform the sociocultural environment? what are the interactions that lead to the overcoming of inequalities? From the conception of dialogic learning, these are the ones that follow the seven principles that define it. Taking the definition given by Aubert, Flecha, García, Flecha and Racionero (2008, p.167) states:

> Dialogic learning takes place in "dialogues" that are "egalitarian", in interactions in which is recognized the "cultural intelligence" of all people and are oriented to the "transformation" of the prior levels of knowledge and the sociocultural context to advance towards the success of all. Dialogic learning takes place in interactions that increase the "instrumental learning", favor the personal and social "meaning creation", are guided by principles of "solidarity" and in which "equality" and "difference" are compatible values and mutually enriching.

Therefore, in order for the schools to become authentic spaces of critical and transformative education, it cannot be avoid that human nature is eminently dialogic, as Freire presented (1970), as well as it is also the thought. The sociocultural psychology (Vygotsky, 1978) establishes the intrinsic union between mind and society, and supposes a fundamental basis of dialogic learning that is present in the seven principles that guide the theoretical development of the conception as well as its practices in the schools. The following section deepens in five of the seven principles –egalitarian dialogue, cultural intelligence, transformation, instrumental dimension, meaning creation, solidarity and equality of differences – which theoretical basis is illustrated with the voices of the main characters of the educational community: families, teachers and students form an educational centre of elementary and primary education. By means of their reflections is possible to observe the transformational potential that resides in the principles of the dialogic learning, given that is a school that has experiences a deep transformation going from a ghetto situation to a successful school (Aubert, 2011). It is a centre located in a neighbourhood in Spain with higher rates of poverty and exclusion, in which the population has low educational levels and higher rates of unemployment. In addition it has

a higher percentage of Roma population, merchera[1] and immigrants (Aubert, Elboj Saso, García Carrión, & García López, 2010). From a dialogic conception of learning, the public school of the neighbourhood has demonstrated to overcome a serious context of crisis, characterized by higher levels of school failure, absenteeism and school leaving, serious conflicts between students, with teachers, and teachers with families. It has demonstrated to achieve higher levels of learning that favor the educational success and social inclusion (Valls & Padrós, 2011). Specifically, in the following section are included the reflections obtained by means of two communicative daily live stories with a Roma mother and a Roma student of the last year of primary education. In addition, there are included the results of two semi structured interviews with a teacher course tutor and a teacher of elementary education.

Psychological Basis of Dialogic Learning: Transformative approach towards success and inclusion.

Dialogic learning is defined by its 7 principles in which are collected the main contributions of the current developments of social sciences such as sociology, philosophy, economy, anthropology, and others. We will dedicate this section to the development of the 5 first principles and its theoretical basis from the psychological aspect as a crucial fundamental conception of learning.

1. Egalitarian dialogue

Dialogue is egalitarian when the contributions of the people are considered according the validity of their statements and not the position of power of the one making them. Among the different contributions that reside at the basis of this principle, we gather the concept of the Communicative Action Theory of Habermas (Habermas, 1987) of power claims and validity claims: have the intention to impose an action by force or with violence (physical or symbolic). It is based on the "argument of strength". We will say that the claims are of power when the actions are guided by the imposition of the interests, interpretations, norms and values of a group of people over another. On the other hand, the validity claims: have intentions of truth and target

the consensus and understanding. These are proposals of collective actions that depend on the arguments that each participant provide to the dialogue. In this case are based on the "strength of the arguments" that each person can provide to the dialogue.

The egalitarian dialogue starts from the idea that all individuals are capable of language and action, and therefore can reach an understanding and define agreements. The option decided by the substitution of power claims by validity claims points to the development of initiatives that promote egalitarian dialogue among all individuals and collectives involved in the educational task. The classrooms of dialogic organisation, such as the interactive groups, are an example of it in which predominates the validity claims not only among teachers and families, but also between teachers and students. From the interview held with Susana[2], teacher of sixth-grade primary school at the centre we can observe that the egalitarian dialogue guides the interactions in the groups both between students, and between students and teachers, volunteers, or between teachers and families that enter the classroom. Susana recreates in her words the habermasian concepts of validity claims and power claims, and demonstrates the dialogic dynamic of her classroom:

> Each one can provide their arguments, yes. The most important is the validity of the arguments, not the status of "I am the teacher and I lead", try a Little, because they are not used to have one speaking and the other listening, they want to do it all at the same time, they do not respect each other, then step by step, since we do it daily we achieve it (EM3, 2, 14).

2. Cultural intelligence

This wider concept of intelligence than the used frequently is not a simple cognitive dimension but considers a plurality of dimensions of the human interaction. The cultural intelligence considers that all individuals have the capability of participating in a dialogue and provide knowledge acquired through multiple forms. The cultural intelligence, also, includes the academic abilities, the practical abilities and the communicative abilities (Flecha, 2000).

Traditionally the school institution has valued the academic abilities as superior to others, considering as little "intelligent" the

underprivileged social groups. The use of tests of intelligence that pretended to measure it on the basis of the intellectual coefficient, contributed in a negative way. One of the most damaging consequences was de development of the "deficit" theories that associated diversity to inequalities, and attributed individual limitations to social causes (Martín Rojo & Alcalá Recuerda, 2003). Later, many research overcome such limitations that had generated the traditional conception of intelligence, and made the difference between academic and practical intelligence (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). The cultural intelligence includes the capability that all individuals have of communication and make use of language and search new forms of communication to collaborate with others and then solve problems. This orientation that provides the cultural intelligence offers the suitable framework to overcome the theories of deficits and provide us the possibility to transform our lives and especially, offers the possibility to overcome the situations of exclusion that live the most vulnerable groups, such as the Roma people and the immigrants. (Oliver, de Botton, Soler, & Merrill, 2011).

In the schools and multicultural communities families provide cultural, linguistic and religious knowledge (Alexiu & Sorde, 2011) that enrich the learning and promote the development. In this sense, Moll and collaborators (González, Moll, & Amanti, 2005; Moll, Amanti, Neff, & Gonzalez, 1992; Moll & González, 2004) demonstrate the richness that all communities may bring to the school by means of the funds of knowledge that they have. The concept of funds of knowledge makes reference to the "bodies of knowledge and abilities historically accumulated and culturally developed essential for the functioning of a home or individual and welfare" (Moll et al., 1992: 133).

On the basis of cultural intelligence, the educational centres can take advantage of the *funds of knowledge* (González et al., 2005) that families have in the decisive and educational participation of the community (Díez, Gatt, & Racionero, 2011). By means of the interactions given in the classrooms, children use them as a potential and a resource that favours a school instruction of quality. In addition, the teachers value the contributions that families form their cultural intelligence do, recognising their practical and communicative abilities.

From their experience as course tutor, Susana describes how a mother with a low educational level participates in the assembly, "she provides ideas, and explains how she sees the classroom". In addition, she recognises that the families can bring certain knowledge that the teachers do not have. The knowledge of the families, including the one of illiterate people, provides an added value to the centre and she recognizes it: "She is good and surprising, maybe there is something I don't see, she sees it". This benefits both the learning of the students as well as the learning of the same participating people. The recognition of the cultural intelligence that all people have has facilitated that this wealth is taken advantage of in the classroom and that their academic identity of these women has become reinforced who once left the school and they only completed primary education. This is the case of a mother in the classroom of Susana, that participates in the decision making spaces such as the assembly and other spaces of the school in which it is recognised and valued her cultural intelligence.

> Well, when we do the assembly she participates, giving ideas, explaining how she sees the classroom, she observes it, she may see it different to how I would see it, she is very good, and surprising, and maybe she sees something that I don't, she sees it. She works on everything, on the rules, habits, classroom organization, spaces, times… And then in curricular topics she does not have much time since she has not returned to study. Then she helps on the curricular level up to what she can but she provides other knowledge… (EM3, 10, 23).

3.Transformation

This principle is based on the premises of Freire (1997) that people "are beings of transformation and not of adaptation". For that reason the dialogic learning transform the relationships between people and their environment. The approach on education and learning towards change breaks with the fallacy of the impossibility of avoiding the reproduction of inequalities. Dialogic learning overcomes the remedial or adaptative orientation to break then with the circle of social inequality. It consists of developing a transformative action that improves the context in which the children live and improve at the same time their learning.

The influence that the expectations have on the students' performance and in the creation of the personal self-concept has been widely studied. Mead (1973) explains that this influence that other people has on each one of us by means of the concept of the other generalized. Each person includes within herself the other people with whom she or he is in relation with; not only have we included dialogues, but also gestures, looks. Then, we adapt our attitudes of "the other", we include them in our "self" and react before an influence of these attitudes with a "me". This is how we internalize the type of behaviour that is expected of us in a given social situation. Therefore, the power of the expectation in the interactionist conception of self that we find in Mead is huge. To believe that a child has more or less interest on studying or that is more or less capable of achieving certain learning, that is, the concept that we have of our students and their families, will be manifested in the interactions that we establish with them. The attitudes, the thoughts and looks and any interactions with the students is incorporated in the academic "self" of the students and then the students themselves respond to the expectations that the teacher projects.

The classrooms and schools that are organized around the dialogic learning generate transformational processes characterised by the higher expectations towards the academic possibilities of students and families. In the next, following Lucia's story, in which her words transmit the feeling that "raises your morale". Now their academic "me" is full of possibilities of being "wiser" and see oneself in secondary education. Now the "self" of many more children is the result of those interactions, as in consequence the absenteeism of the school is reduced and the registration increases:

> **Now what do they tell you?**
> Well, that if we want we can achieve it, that once we enter secondary education we will be wiser, they raise our morals.
> **Have you noticed that more children want to come to school?**
> Yes
> **Why?**
> I don't know, but for sure more children have come to school to register (RN4, 4, 11-16).

In the educational context, the transformation is generated in the measure that spaces of participation are opened and promote such dialogues and interactions for later develop new actions that promote change processes of change and transformation. Dialogue and interaction developed between individuals that collaborate in the development of an activity together, entails several changes and transformations at the individual level, that at the same time have been generated in at the social level. Equally, this process of transformation returns in the social sphere, creating a spiral of change. The metaphor of the spiral used by Wells regarding the creation of meanings is what the author explains by means of his called spiral of knowing (Wells, 2001). This process includes four dimensions and is initiated on the first place with the experience of the person in the individual context; this one is extended with the information from the interpretation of other people and the contexts on the same meaning. The process continues with the creation of knowledge in which a transformation of the collective comprehension takes place with regards to a specific aspect and with its use onto the public domain. Finally, takes place comprehension that occurs in a more personal level and will define the later action. This spiral of knowing assumes a transformation of the person and it is understood as metaeducational.

4. Instrumental dimension

Dialogic learning is not opposed to instrumental learning, it intensifies it. Adapting or reducing learning has no place in dialogic learning. Freire (1970, 1997) connects dialogue to epistemological curiosity. Dewey (1930) from democracy in education aims at providing the same learning opportunities for all. The concept of dialogic learning seeks to give maximum learning opportunities to all students, especially those most at risk of suffering exclusion. It avoids a double discourse that leads to curriculums of competence for some privileged students and a curriculum "of happiness" to those at risk of social exclusion. Mariana's experience, a Roma mother who has three children, illustrates the importance of the instrumental dimension of learning:

> As you can see now, the school is very happy, they are learning, which is the most important thing. Because the fact that the school is doing well and children are learning, is crucial and you realize that and you think: "Look at the younger child knows a lot and the oldest one, who did not know anything before, now is doing very well (RF4, 4, 76).

Again, referring to Mead's interactionist person concept (1934), all learning, experience and human thought has its origins in social interaction with others. Actually, Habermas (1987) considers Mead's work as a fundamental contribution for the theory of communicative action action in sociology as well as for the concept of communicative rationality that promotes intersubjectivity. In this vein, dialogic learning also involves communication and intersubjective dialogue as a crucial force to engage in learning in all subjects, in primary and secondary education, and particularly in those instrumental subjects such as language, maths, etc. The instrumental dimension of dialogic learning is present in all the dialogues established in the school. It aims at having everyone achieving key competences to ensure that no child is excluded from the information society. For this reason, all the interactions that include the instrumental dimension of learning are promoted in the school. For example, Lucía, who is a sixth-grade student, participates in classroom meetings that rely on the participation of family members. There, students, teachers and family members share words and reflections by creating dialogic interactions (Soler & Flecha, 2011) and introducing curricular contents in the meeting:

> **What about meetings?**
> Now if we play a match, we talk about it all together, or about what we have done, but also we talk about mathematics, and we also have meetings in English.
> **Do you talk about the things you learn?**
> Yes, and we also talk about why we come to school and what we like and what we don't.
> **How does that affect?**
> Well because it influences if the teacher knows why children come to school, if they are doing well, they will do better for more children to come to school (RN4, 4, 39-44).

In these dialogues we can observe the use of language as a tool of

thinking that allows us to think and act together (Mercer, 2000). Through language we reach new understanding and interpretations of an event or relationship, and this serves people and communities to build a collective thought. From the instrumental dimension of dialogic learning, teachers incorporate learning aspects into the meetings and informal conversations with families and other community members.

5. Creation of meaning

The sense is the driving force of our actions, what lead us to be involved in school, in a social movement, or to participate in an activity or project. According to Bruner (1990), any action seeks to understand the culture and find the creation of meaning. Dialogic learning is developed to create meaning in all those people involved in the teaching and learning and, like all learning is situated in the context (Lave & Wenger, 1991).

The challenge is therefore to overcome the loss of meaning that can have many academic experiences when there is no space or recreation opportunities for dialogic, hope or dream. The school cultivates beliefs, skills and feelings that are transmitted in the cultural forms that we have to interpret the social world in which we live (Bruner, 2000). In many cases the beliefs and skills that grow in the school are actually so remote from personal feelings that there is a loss of meaning; that is, there arises a gap between what is expected of the school and what the school actually is. This crisis of meaning especially affects the most vulnerable people, according to the context in which we find ourselves. Bruner explains that loss of meaning as follows:

> School begins to present a vision of the world which appears so alien or remote that many learners can find no place in it for them or their friends. This is true not just for girls, or blacks, or Latinos, or Asians, or other kids we target for special attention as potentially at risk. There are also those restless, bored kids in our sprawling suburbs who suffer the pandemic syndrome of "What I am doing here anyway? What's this to do with me? (Bruner, 2000, p.115).

The principle of creation of meaning promotes the overcoming such breach. Dialogic learning promotes the development of schools that are part of the lifeworld of girls and boys and their families. Thus schools are achieving dialogic orientation and reaching deeper changes in

students' attitudes regarding the school, from rejection to acceptance and desire to attend. The re-enchantment in the communication between teachers, families, community members and students through egalitarian dialogue has facilitated the implementation of successful educational actions and has improved children and families' lives (Flecha, 2011). A collective dream done by the whole community is a way of re-enchantment and becomes a source of meaning to everyone involved (Sanchez, 1999). Desires, expectations, thoughts and feelings of the community are reflected in their dreams, and the whole community organizes themselves to make those dreams become true. In these cases, school feels closer to children and families' lifeworld, it becomes part of them and it is incorporated into their "me" (Mead, 1973). This is illustrated by Susana's experience, who is a teacher in the fourth-grade. She talked about the change that took place in the families' vision about the school:

> Families have changed their vision about education. They have begun to value education and now you can hear comments from mothers who say "I really want that he continues studying and that he goes to high-school, going to college to have a better future, to have a good job, and for that, he has to come every day to school "And they [mothers] get to bring children to class every day and the absenteeism has been greatly reduced. Families are realizing that education is the tool to be included in society today and to have a better future (EM3, 6, 25).

Conclusions

The dialogic turn of educational psychology has framed the development of the concept of dialogic learning, which places dialogue and interaction with the community as key factors of learning. Dialogic learning principles provide the theoretical basis for addressing successful schooling, promoting complex and richer teaching-learning processes, generating a deeper understanding and facilitating better emotional development and values. The transformative orientation of dialogic learning transcends the individual vision of the development of the person and englobes the transformation of socio-cultural context, including the entire community into the learning spaces. It emerges as a conception of learning that successfully responds to the challenges of information society by providing students, families and communities the

skills and competencies needed to avoid falling into social exclusion. Hence, the emphasis on the instrumental dimension of learning that accounts for cultural intelligence and develops on the basis of an egalitarian dialogue, generating social transformation and creation of meaning. The dialogic turn of educational psychology has facilitated the shift from previous conceptions of learning such as the objectivist or the subjectivist ones, to the communicative conception of learning. As part of the communicative conception, dialogic learning has promoted moving from the adaptation to the context to the transformation of the context, including the entire community in the learning. That is the step which is collected in the words of Vicente with which the article starts, the transformation that more schools and communities are enabling, which from a dialogic conception are ensuring the educational success all children have the right to.

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Notes

[1] Mixed identity between Roma and non Roma. This is the way the same population defines themselves in the neighbourhood.
[2] All names included in the text are pseudonyms.

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Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Reframed. Educating for the Virtues in the Twenty-First Century

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Review

Howard Gardner. (2011). *Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Reframed. Educating for the Virtues in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Basic Books.

Three classical virtues that have guided human thoughts and behavior through history, truth, beauty and goodness, are the focus of Howard Gardner's book. Gardner discusses the role and importance of these virtues in current society, which has seen important transformations since these virtues, "the trio", were first conceptualized. The postmodernism and the advent of the digital media are two central events that have shaped societies in the last decades. In this new context, the classical virtues need to be "reframed", and reframing the classical virtues in society entails rethinking how to educate on these three virtues.

Postmodern theories questioned the possibility to ascertain truth as well as its value for human existence, arguing that it is only an expression of power. These views also treated beauty as irrelevant and have been skeptical about goodness. The media technologies, in turn, challenge the ideas of truth, goodness and beauty, as they offer great amounts of information, with different levels of rigor and sometimes contradictory, offer different and new ways of relating to others, and allow mew forms of creating, acceding, and storing works of art.

Despite this challenging picture, Gardner believes that the core characteristics of truth, beauty and goodness can be preserved and defends the usefulness and the deep meaning that the three virtues have for people today. He reviews the current status of the classical virtues from a multidisciplinary perspective, contributing with reflections from history, biology, psychology, sociology or anthropology. From this

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review, he concludes that the search of truth is today possible if we base for people today. He reviews the current status of the classical virtues from a multidisciplinary perspective, contributing with reflections from history, biology, psychology, sociology or anthropology. From this review, he concludes that the search of truth is today possible if we base on scholarly disciplines and professional crafts, which have provided empirical contrastable knowledge through history. As regards goodness, he emphasises the need to differentiate between the "neighborly morality", which characterises good relations with others, and "the ethics of roles", which refers to being a "good worker" or a "good citizen" in changing societies with increasing new situations to deal with, new problems to solve and new forms of relation. Finally, he contends that beauty should be formulated as the personal experience caused of an object which is interesting, its form is memorable and invites further encounters.

The author acknowledges that the three virtues are qualitative different and that they have different histories, being the history of truth "convergent and confirmatory", the history of beauty "divergent", unpredictable and more dependable on personal experiences, and the history of goodness having one consolidated part –the neighborly morality– and another more recent –the ethics of roles–. Furthermore, they are also different in terms of their relevance for life, being beauty the less determinant for survival. Nonetheless, Gardner clearly supports the importance of the three virtues, as he understands the experience of beauty as one main reason for living once survival is granted. In this regard, he considers: "The trio of virtues, while unquestionably in flux and under attack, remain essential to the human experience and, indeed, to human survival. They must not and will not be abandoned" (p.13). It is noteworthy the capacity Gardner attributes to persons in the development of "the trio". Gardner gives to individuals, working alone or together, the power to achieve desirable goals, starting from the premise that: "what is distinctly human is our capacity to change, or to transcend, whatever traits and inclinations we may have as initial endowment, courtesy of evolution" (p.15).

For this reason, he offers an educational approach to ensure the pass of these values to new generations, and also to improve the way in which adults can reconceptualise the virtues in this new context.

tion synergies are noted as powerful to achieve these objectives: while the accumulated experience of old people can help young persons being introduced in values with a long tradition, they can introduce their elders in new realities such as the media, which provide new experiences and contexts to reframe them.

What makes Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Reframed an essential book for teachers, educators and families, is being a relevant and meaningful work for today based on values that have always been on the agenda.

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