

DIAGRAM I

OC_1 . But if market investment opportunities with a higher return are open to the worker he will not invest a single lira in his own firm, and will cash all of his share in the surplus. He will then invest a part of his surplus income in the market by equating his indifference curve (I_1) to the market investment opportunity line (MM). Thus he will consume less (OC_m) and invest more (OC_2).

Supposing that the workers own the surplus of their enterprise collectively the possibility of turning present surplus into future surplus would be represented by the FF line, which is no longer a straight line but a curve. (Diagram II). This accounts for the diminishing return to the reinvestment of the surplus in the self-managed enterprise. If the only investment opportunity available for the workers is reinvestment in their own firm, they will consume OC_0 , invest the amount C_0S_0 , and obtain the income C_1O in the next period. If the management of the fund can also invest in other opportunities in the market, they will invest less (S_0C_2) in their own firm, and will invest the amount C_2B in the market by borrowing from the capital market the amount BC_0 , thereby attaining a higher future income (OC_2) and higher satisfaction level (I_1). Therefore, when the workers own the surplus collectively instead of individually they will invest more in their own business.




DIAGRAM II

THE TURKISH ROAD TOWARDS A SELF-MANAGED SOCIETY

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In January 1978, Turkey underwent a governmental change which is important to the understanding of Turkey and of other less-developed countries which share similar social, economic and political problems. This paper, after a brief introduction (Section 1), will treat the historical background of this change (Section 2).¹⁾ General principles of the Republican People's Party (R.P.P.) which facilitated this change will constitute Section 3. The prospects toward a more democratic and participative society (Section 4) and the difficulties facing the new government (Section 5) will make up the rest of the paper.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the first week of this year, Turkey had a new government headed by Bulent Ecevit, leader of the R.P.P. Ecevit is sharing the power with eleven independent deputies who resigned from the Justice Party of Suleyman Demirel and the Democratic Party by only one member in the National Assembly.

The very significant increase in the percentage of the votes that R.P. P. won in the last three general elections is strong enough to show the desire of the Turkish people for change. Shown below (Table 1) are the proportion of votes received by the two largest political parties, the Republican Peoples Party and the Justice Party (J. P.).

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¹⁾ It is very difficult to understand the present and to predict the future without understanding the past. To see the mistakes made in the past by the Turkish intelligentsia may help other countries' intellectuals and politicians not to repeat the same. To give the flavour of the events, this section is the longest part of the paper.

Table 1
Distribution of Votes
1969, 73, 77

Year	R. P. P.		J. P.	
	% Votes	Gain/Loss	%Votes	Gain/Loss
1969	27.4		46.5	
1973	33.3	+5.9	29.8	-16.7
1977	41.4	+8.1	36.9	+7.1

II. WHAT DOES THIS CHANGE MEAN?

Historical background.

To understand the significance of this change, we must briefly review Turkey's history from the late Ottoman period to the present.

Turkey resembles a bridge between Europe and Asia, not only geographically but also socio-economically and politically. She inherited problems of the Ottoman Empire as well as the dispute between the "etatist-elite" and the "liberal-traditionalist"²⁾ which began during the Ottoman period. This dispute will be used extensively in explaining Turkish history.

Being part of the colonial world, the Ottoman Empire was dependent upon foreign loans since 1852. Not being able to pay the dues, the Empire became financially managed by a foreign commission. This dependency furthered pauperization in Turkey. During the same process of pauperization, a group of intellectuals mostly educated in Europe shared the power with the Sultan. This group of intellectuals, which will be referred to from now as the "etatist-elite", were in favour of introducing Western political and social institutions without understanding the totality of the system in which those structures functioned. The colonization process had made it impossible to industrialize and develop social classes of a European type, which would have restricted the mobility of the "etatist-elite".

Despite their good intentions to democratize life, the "etatist-elite" became a class of rulers "from the top". The European institutions suggested by them lacked roots and meaning in a Turkish context. The elite pursued its purposes "for the people — despite the people". The two processes — pauperization and modernization — appeared to be connected in many of the people's eyes.

Opposed to these developments was the "liberal-traditionalist" movement which, without offering a concrete programme of action, gained some support from the people. This movement was traditional in the sense that it was against the importation of European institutions, yet

²⁾ As it is used by E. Koglar in his intensive and valuable study, *Imparatorluktan Günümüze Kadar Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapısı*, Cem 1976.

liberal in the sense that it favoured the desires of the masses over the desires of the dominant elite.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a member, yet a very strong critic, of the "etatist-elite". He believed that without support from the people nothing could be changed. During the Independence War of 1920—3, he reorganized and united the army with the local organizations which were committed to the fight against imperialist troops occupying the homeland.

After the independence war, the dispute between the "etatist-elite" and the "liberal-traditionalists" continued. Four years after the 1946 introduction of the multiparty democratic system, the Democrat Party (D. P.) came to power. Its victory was made possible by the "liberal-traditionalist" support as well as by the desires engendered by World War II economic prosperity of the newly-generated well-to-do's and the economic difficulties of the masses.

Once in power, the Democrat Party moved to consolidate its hold on power. When in 1956—7, the economic conditions became worse (mainly because of unplanned expenditures and because of policies aimed at enriching a small percentage of the population), the government began to use legal and extra-legal measures. It sought to drive other parties from the political arena. The undemocratic governance and the failure in managing the economy resulted in lessening the people's sympathy to the D.P. In the 1957 elections, the D.P. lost more than 9 per cent of the total votes and it received 47.3 per cent compared with 56.6 in 1954.

The people's dissatisfaction with D.P. rule was at its height early in 1960. Instead of democratizing life and being responsive to the people's desires, the D.P. preferred to suppress the opposition. It is doubtful that they would have won the upcoming 1961 elections. Defeat was forestalled, however, by the May 1960 military coup de etat.

Following the Revolution, a new constitution was promulgated guaranteeing the autonomy of the universities, the courts and the radio. A State Planning Organization was set up to oversee economic development. The new courts formed entitled the right to check the constitutionality of laws and legality of governmental decisions. Despite all these democratizing measures, the move was "from the top". And as any other movement from the top, the Turkish people reacted to it. The masses perceived the Revolution of May 1960 as another action taken by the "etatist-elite" and a provocation of the R.P.P.³⁾ This interpretation by the people can be seen from the votes received before and after the revolution by R.P.P., D.P. and the parties which were founded after the Revolution and which claimed to be the successors of the D.P. (Table 2.)

³⁾ Suna Kılıç CHP de Gelişmeler, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1976.

Table 2
Distribution of Votes
1957—1965

Years	R. P. P.		D. P. ⁴⁾	J. P.	N. T. P.
	%Votes	Gain/Loss			
1957	40.6		47.3		
1961	36.7	—3.9	(48.5)	34.8	13.7
1965	28.7	—8	(56.6)	52.9	3.7

In a sense, the successors of the D.P. were supported more than the D.P. itself to reciprocate the intervention by the army. The idea of the R.P.P.'s being the provocator of the revolution made it lose 4 per cent in 1961 in comparison with the votes of 1957 and more in the following election.

So far the R.P.P. was the mirror image of the bureaucrats with respect to their achievements in Turkish politics. Despite the fact that, with the socio-economic conditions of Turkey in the middle of the 1960s one could do nothing "from the top", some of the intellectuals, frustrated by the results of the recent elections, tried to publicize the old idea of "revolution by the army". To support their view, they interpreted the last century of Turkish politics in terms of accomplishment by progressive bureaucrats (e. g., military bureaucrats). They maintained that "most of the people were illiterate and not able to follow politics. People did not know where their advantages were", etc. This view proved to be incorrect. The military action which was very much provoked by the leftist "etatist-elite" materialized on March 12, 1971. Hence, it was an absolute disappointment for the intellectuals when it was understood that "there was nothing revolutionary in this action, but reactionary and rightist". The government formed after the memorandum of March 12 (which was given by senior army commanders) harassed and imprisoned many leftist intellectuals.

Ecevit, R.P.P.'s present leader, immediately reacted against the military memorandum. This was a manifestation of his decisiveness about the democracy. At the time, he was the General Secretary of the party. The party still had some "bureaucratic-reformists". The leader of the party was Ismet Inonu (the very historic figure of the Independence War and the Turkish politics). Because Inonu decided to support the government formed after the memorandum, Ecevit no longer wanted to keep his position in the party. His ideas, however, had already been accepted by the majority of the party.

⁴⁾ After the Revolution of 1960, the two parties, the Justice and New Turkey's Party (N.T.P.) claimed that they maintained the spirit of the D.P. and deserved the success. The supporters of the D. P. too, were confused by the two. It would not be a very big mistake nor very significant for our analysis to assume that what J. P. and N.T.P. votes totaled were close to what the D. P. would have received if it had been not closed.

Shortly after a battle in the party, Ecevit was elected as the new leader of the R.P.P. The last "bureaucratic-reformists", "etatist-elite" had to resign from the party, following the victory of Ecevit's ideas.

The military memorandum forced the demise of the government of the Justice Party led by Suleyman Demirel. Demirel in the last three years had complained about the luxurious freedoms given by the constitution which prevented him from suppressing the opposition and the youth movement in Turkey.

At the beginning, the government formed after the memorandum promised many reforms, all of which were aspired to by the people and the leftist intellectuals (e. g., a just land reform). But none of these reforms could be materialized. As time passed, the government leaned toward the right. It amended the constitution and restricted the freedoms in the way Demirel had desired for years but had not been able to attain. Now "Demirel's ideas were in power" without his responsibility.

This type of political structure was no more realistic for Turkey than the one suggested by the "etatist-elite" — i. e., "rule from the top". And it soon lost its ground. The resolute opposition of the R. P. P. to the attempts aimed at curbing freedoms and democratic rights (e. g., right to strike, meetings, demonstrations) was witnessed by the people. The military action lost its influence gradually. Exactly two years after the memorandum, one of the signers of the memorandum, then the chief of the armed forces, resigned from his position and sought to be elected as the new president, but received no support from the parliament. This was the last interference of the army in Turkish politics.

A more liberal government was formed until the new elections were held in October 1973. The result of the election showed a turning point in the R.P.P.'s history and a victory for the new leader, stand and cadres. The voter punished Demirel's Justice Party because of the support he had given to the non-democratic actions in Turkey. The J.P. won only 29.8 per cent of the total votes in 1973 compared with 46.5 per cent in 1969. The R.P.P. had 33 per cent as compared with 27 per cent in 1969.

The elections did not give the majority to any party. Therefore, a coalition was formed three months later. This government headed by Ecevit had many problems with its coalition partner, the National Salvation Party (Muslim Fundamentalist). They had conflicts concerning the internal economic policies as well as those of foreign politics.

Participation of the workers in management of state economic enterprises, channelling some of the available resources to the "people's enterprises" and the cooperatives, and planning to carry on very big industrial projects by means of the "people's sector", were among the very important features of the programme which would later lack support by the partner N.S.P. and cause the government to resign.

In March 1975, the coalition of the four parties (J.P., N.S.P., Nationalist Action Party and the Republican Reliance Party) which formed the "nationalist front" led by Demirel came into being.

Despite the coalition, the parties constituting the "nationalist front" realized that they were losing the prestige they had and an election would not bring victory. They built up a campaign (which was the main thrust of their unity) to alert the people to the "communist nightmare"

which was presumably coming from the streets — the schools the teachers' associations, etc. They maintained the view that the communist activities were supported by the R.P.P. To gain material for their propaganda they supported the street movements and did not prevent the reactions caused by them. The result was the death of more than 200 youths all over the country in a period of two and a half years. On the other hand, their newspapers were preaching how "nationalist" and "anti-communist" the Turkish army was, hoping that they could have another chance similar to the one on March 12, 1971. Now the Turkish society had a social structure to defend the democracy despite the rightist politicians. The rightists were not "liberal" anymore. The myth of being "liberal-traditionalist" ended as did the myth of the "etatist-elite". The democracy was supported by the lower income people for which it would operate thereafter.

The elections of 1977 gave a clear lead to the R.P.P. and after the resignation of 11 deputies from the J.P., (those deputies were against the way Demirel ruled the country and the party in the last couple of years), Ecevit could form his government.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Following the path that is explained in Section 2, the party was changing at least as fast as the social structure in Turkey. The final outcome of the philosophy which started in 1965 as "left of centre" and interchangeably called "social-democrat" or "democratic leftist" is the programme of November 1976. Not to have any international connotations, the party agreed on the "democratic left" as its scope.

Maintaining the six old principles and reinterpreting them, the party now has six new principles which constitute the content of its "democratic leftist" philosophy. The six old principles are comprised of R.P.P., republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secularist and revolutionary. These are the six principles inherited from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the party. The six new principles are freedom, equality, solidarity, superiority of labour, integrity of development and self-management by the people.

To elaborate these shortly: it has to be admitted that the party programme makes use of all the recent scientific findings and the criticisms made of both the centrally-planned socialist economies and the Western type capitalist systems. The criticisms made of the former are that they bring economic equality but stay passive in human rights and do not solve the problem of alienation. While the latter gives freedoms, at the same time it allows for the exploitation of labour and maintains economic inequality and alienation.

In the programme,⁵⁾ "freedom is one of the main conditions for human beings to constantly improve their personalities, thoughts and comprehension, abilities and creativity. It is a necessity for both human beings and the society to surpass themselves".

⁵⁾ Programme CHP, 1976.

Equality refers to "legal equality, equality in the eyes of government, in rights and freedoms, work, education and self-improvement, participation in decision-making, and equality of benefits from the national prosperity. Thus, it requires equality in economic, social, cultural and political rights.

"Solidarity" — every individual should contribute to the society as much as she/he can, and the society, too, should justly satisfy the needs of every individual". "Solidarity is essential for humane living, thus everybody cares for the society, works for happiness, freedom and prosperity of the people. The society, too, regards every individual as equally important". "Superiority of labour": "Labour as a source of creativity and productivity has a supreme value and in a healthy society, labour by itself is a reason for respectability".

"The value that is produced by labour should remain in the hands of those who produce it. The labourers should have the right to decide on how to use the savings created by their labour for the benefit of the society and they also should have the right to determine their working conditions."

"Integrity of development": "Development with its social, economic and political dimensions is one integral unit". The goals of economic development should aim at improving in every respect the society as a whole. It should enhance the prosperity, freedom and happiness of the whole society and remove all the barriers that restrict the development of one's personality. To postpone these (prosperity, freedom, happiness, etc.) to a later stage of economic growth creates insurmountable imbalances in both the economic and social structure of the society. There is no way of arriving at a just order by unjust ways nor to humane goals with inhumane means. Therefore, economic growth should be accelerated simultaneously with the attainment of justice and freedoms".

"With every stride toward economic growth and development, the principles of freedom, equality and superiority of labour must be kept in mind. This can be materialized only if the people govern themselves".

"A society in which the people govern themselves can provide faster economic growth and integrate it with social development more healthily than either an alienated state bureaucracy and/or an economic system which exploits the people".

"Self-management by the people". "Self-management by the people is necessary for accelerating development as a whole and it is the main principle of democracy".

"A free, non-exploiting, just and humane social order can materialize as long as the people govern themselves... Self-management by the people should be actualized in organizing the work conditions, the local administration, the state administration as well as all other aspects at all levels of social life".

The above translations from the party programme represent a historical synthesis for both Turkey and other developing countries who suffer from either capitalist exploitation and military or other types of bureaucratic elitist "from the top" administrations.

IV. TOWARD A MORE DEMOCRATIC AND PARTICIPATIVE SOCIETY

When it comes to the institutionalization of the principles above, the party suggests a development which starts from the village, a principle so far ignored. Associated with this principle is a just land reform.

Turkish villages — due to some historical reasons — are extremely scattered and in the form of very small living units (e.g., 40 houses). If we recall that 60 per cent of the population still live in rural areas, it becomes clear how hard it is to bring public services to each village. It is not only economically unfeasible but it is also a waste of other opportunities. So the R.P.P. is programming to form village-towns (Köy-kent) in which nearby villages will eventually settle. These villages will not only benefit from services provided to them (roads, schools, mosques, hospitals, electricity, water, etc.) but they will also become economic centres for marketing farm products and farm inputs. As well as industries oriented toward farm inputs, those that use farm products as inputs will also be viable. All these transactions can be carried out by cooperatives in which people will actively participate not only in production but also in decision-making. Thus, these new self-sufficient village-towns will start the development from the grassroots.

The surpluses created by the agricultural sector and reinvested by the villagers in village-towns will further improve their life. Also, the state would direct loans for the same purposes. The immigration problem which creates ghettos in the outskirts of big cities will slow down as the opportunities created by the village-towns remove the causes. People will benefit from the advantages of big cities without losing their values which, for the Turkish village as it is for other countries' villages, consist of closeness, sincerity and solidarity. They will not become alienated from their own value, and it will be possible to protect them from the "individualism" of capitalism.

The R.P.P. is programming the "people's sector" to make up very large part of the economy. The people's sector is made up of enterprises that are owned by the people and run by democratic management. The "savings" of the main security institutions, such as the social security board which saves all the retirement funds of organized labour in Turkey and the retirement office which does the same thing for the white collar workers of the government, will invest their money in democratically-managed enterprises which will primarily produce goods very necessary for the masses. Workers' Companies (WOC) constitute a branch of the people's sector.

"Workers' companies" were either initiated by Turkish workers employed abroad (in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, etc.) or by private entrepreneurs, and later sold most of their shares to migrant workers. Generally, these joint stock companies have 100 to 250 shareholders, of which no individual may possess shares in excess of 5 per cent of total capital. It is convincingly stated that, as a movement, workers' companies are unique to the Turkish workers. Other masses of workers who have gone from the south Mediterranean have not done the same. Turkish workers with their very high saving ratios and commitment, or strong desire for development of their region, have brought their savings together and formed these enterprises.

Legally, they operate like any joint stock company. However, they have an ideological commitment which is stated in most enterprises' statutes: first, they want to contribute to the development of their region, and second, they want to break down the conflict between capital and labour. Some of them have stated that the employees working in the enterprise have to buy shares and become members, to participate in decision-making and profits. Some of them have put limits on the amount of shares that one can acquire, setting the maximum at 2 per cent. Some applied the principle of "one person, one vote", a person being the shareholder.

The first examples were initiated by a few Turkish workers. Mr. Ecevit, who was the Minister of Labour then (1964), was inspired by this and later formulated it as "one of the wheels" constituting the "peoples' sector". The other two are the SEE's and the VDC's. As R.P.P. started campaigning for the WOC's, another and stronger response came from the workers abroad.

For democracy at the work place, all they gave was hope. Due to the lack of a specific legal framework, they had to contend with Turkish Companies Law. They are formed as joint stock companies only in those enterprises where all the employees own shares, and they participate in decision-making with respect to their numbers. In some other cases, founders are given preferred stock with the right to more than one vote per share. Now let us ask the question: Are these firms diluted capitalist or diluted participatory? I prefer the first. If well planned, guided and coordinated, they may still help economic democracy, but not within their existing set-up.

State Economic Enterprises (SEE's)

Turkey has a mixed economy. The SEE's produce half of the total industrial product and materialize half of the investment in industry. They are involved in sectors which include textile, mining and processing, industrial chemicals, special steels, casting, petroleum, fertilizers, cereals, electrical energy, sea, air and railway transportation, petrochemicals, coal, motors, machinery and tools, electromechanics, electronics, electro-communication, etc.

They are giant enterprises with high capital intensity and large numbers of employees. They operate mostly at a loss, either due to bureaucratic, inefficient management and/or governmental price policies.

Their losses generally are paid by the state treasury. If not matched with effective tax policies, but by increased money supply, the burden is put on all the fixed income, wage and salary-earning people. Inflating the prices thus leads to every kind of resource misallocation, speculations of land, and other types.

Originating from both ideological beliefs and economic necessities, the present government is very much interested in starting some kind of workers participation in the SEE's. Not having the necessary political support, initiatives have been slow. However, commitments were made public by the Prime Minister himself, the Minister of Enterprises, the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Tourism and Information.

Some work has been going on for a long time and necessary legal amendments are being made. However, it seems it will take some time to implement these new principles.

The third avenue, following the State Economic Enterprises (SEE's) and Workers Companies (WOC's) is of the *Village Development Cooperatives* (VDC's.)

As Turkish labourers came into demand in Europe in mid 1965, a new opportunity was sought by Turkish planners. They suggested that a quota be allotted to villages which form a development cooperative and present an investment project which was consistent with the development plans. According to this quota, the cooperatives would send some of their members with promises to contribute their shares from the savings that they would make in Western Europe.

The Ministry of Village Affairs formed a special unit to help in feasibility studies, and to provide credits which would amount to as much as 60 per cent of the total investment. After a while, like mushrooms, the VDC's grew all over the country. This growth was mainly aimed at providing jobs abroad, which were much better paid. The Ministry of Village Affairs was not able to uphold its promise of guidance and support. By 1977, there were about 6590 VDC's of which only about one thousand had a programme of investment.

The features that made the VDC's special and one of the avenues towards economic democracy are as follows: First, of those very few (about one out of six) cooperatives which survived, all are democratic. Governmental influence or interference is minimum. Second, they are committed to the idea of integrated rural development and economic democracy in Turkey. They have put this in their statutes and they struggle for it publically. Third, they have gained a certain momentum which is irreversible. They have accumulated some experience which made it possible to survive and expand, even when the political climate was not friendly enough. Fourth, they have learned that without having economically viable projects which are very well-prepared, success is not possible; and without accomplishments in the economic sphere, they cannot expand. Fifth, as a result of the previous factors: well-considered projects are carried out by regional unions of cooperatives. Technical and managerial staff are employed and benefitted from, more frequently in the Central union. The Central Union (Köy Koop) has instigated the purchasing of bank shares (Bağcılar Bankası), such that it can control and convert them into a cooperatives' bank.

A new approach is considered for economic planning. Planning will be democratic more than central. People in an organized manner will have influence on the decisions taken and strategies suggested by the State Planning Organization.

The socio-economic conditions of the country dialectically seem to suit the party programme. In other words, the party programme has emerged as a result of the interactions between needs, experiences and conditions.

The final aim is defined as arriving at a just, non-exploiting, free and humane order in which people govern themselves.

V. DIFFICULTIES IN STORE

The end defined in the above paragraph may not be very easy to arrive at. This section will not analyze the very complex issues to emerge during the process, but rather the simpler difficulties awaiting Ecevit's present government.

Some of those difficulties are of the short-run and created by the recent rightist governments, especially in the last three years, the most important of which is the deficit in the balance of payments. In June 1977, Turkey was announced as being "on the edge of bankruptcy". The Central Bank of Turkey had almost run out of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, industries dependent on imported parts and materials were in a crisis. This, of course, negatively affected the economy as a whole. As it can easily be estimated for a country in this position, IMF people are in Turkey now as they were six months before the Ecevit government was formed. They are negotiating with the Turkish government for the conditions under which some loans can be provided. Among some of the suggested measures are freezing wages, stopping new investments, and a major devaluation of the Turkish lira, all of which will push up inflation: inflation itself is another major problem that has constantly plagued the Turkish economy. In the last three years, inflation averaged above 20 per cent a year. This accelerates the pauperization process and worsens the already very unequal income distribution.

Nonetheless, Turkey four years ago had a surplus of 1.5 billion U.S. dollars in its foreign exchange reserves. The remittances of the workers employed in Germany reached about 90 per cent of the value of the total export Turkey could attain in the years 1973—75.⁴⁾

The previous coalition could not agree on economic policies to adjust the deficit. By no means did they discourage tourist trips which amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars while the economy was seriously in need. They did not encourage investments by the workers employed abroad⁵⁾ and the workers preferred saving their money in foreign banks.⁶⁾

Ecevit's government has the chance to benefit from workers savings as it constitutes an important feature of the party's and the government's programmes. Also Ecevit will be able to benefit from loans offered by friendly governments of Europe which are run by social democrats and maintained a good relationship before Ecevit came to power.

⁴⁾ The figures below are from Çok Öntakli Sirketler, D.P.T. 1975. 1973

	Workers Remittances \$	Export	%
1973	1,183,300,000	1,318,000,000	89.8
1974	1,424,900,000	1,532,200,000	93
1975 (1st 6 months)	471,000,000	637,900,000	73.9

⁵⁾ Milliyet, March 29, 1977, an interview made by Furuzan with the workers in Germany emphasizes their willingness to invest their money at home, under the leadership of a trustworthy and workers-oriented government.

⁶⁾ The amount of savings that is deposited in foreign banks is debated to be 6 to 20 billion U.S. dollars, which is incredibly enough for any developmental effort to take place in Turkey (Milliyet, Furuzan and Cumhuriyet, S. A. Yüksel).

wer. This will ease the problem of deficit and minimize the effect of policies suggested by the IMF.

Reactions of the right youth organizations supported by rightist politicians who have lost their hopes for democracy are getting more violent. They want to prove that the new government cannot stop violence or anarchy and the "authoritative government" (probably of Latin American type) should come.

These are the problems on Ecevit government's agenda, but none of them are insurmountable. Time and patience are needed on every account.

The problems that are related to the long-run are more serious. Among the very important economic policy measures would be capital management, once the available resources start to be channelled to the people's sector.

This is where the secrets of development with high employment and better income distribution hide. Again, an antiinflationary policy would be very hard to conduct within the existing set-up. An extensive educational campaign together with very active and viable economic programmes must also take place to evaluate the "values" of the old system and to rouse the people for a new and more humane order.

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TURSKI PUT U SAMOUPRAVNO DRUŠTVO

Mehmet Nezir UCA

R e z i m e

Sredinom šezdesetih godina analizirajući situaciju u Turskoj u širem istorijskom kontekstu Bulent Ecevit (sadašnji turski premijer) i njegovi prijatelji lansirali su u okviru Republikanske narodne partije (RNP) nov, tzv. demokratsko-levičarski program. Ovaj novi pokret imao je za cilj da okonča tradiciju "etatističkog elitizma" od kojega je RNP patila. Na izborima koji su usledili partija je ubedila većinu da ima puno poverenje u narod i demokratiju. I ne samo to, nego i da demokratija treba da ima ekonomsku dimenziju. Samoupravljanje bi vodilo neeksplotatorskom i demokratskijem društveno-ekonomskom poretku. Ecevitov pokret dobija u zamahu i to kako u partiji tako i u čitavoj zemlji. On je 1972. godine bio izabran za predsednika partije.

Izbori 1973. godine bili su prvi — u toku dvadeset tri godine — koje je RNP dobila postajući najvećom političkom partijom. Kada se pokazalo da je zaista leva (tj. na strani ekonomski "hendikepiranih" slojeva naroda) i demokratska u svakom smislu, partija je znatno ojačala. Na izborima 1977. godine osvojila je u Narodnoj skupštini 213 od 450 sedišta. RNP je bilo potrebno još trinaestak glasova pa da formira sopstvenu vladu.

Usled teškoća u koje su zapale desničarske partije četrnaest poslanika napustilo je Partiju pravde i odlučilo da podrži vladu koju bi vodila RNP. Ova vlada je formirana u januaru 1978., i od tada do danas je na vlasti.

Dve nove socioekonomske činjenice u Turskoj: porast broja radnika u gradovima, visoka stopa rasta uz pogoršanje raspodele dohotka pripremile su u ranim sedamdesetim godinama uslove za promene u vlasti od desničarsko-konzervativnih ka levičarsko-demokratskim partijama. Novi principi RNP koji integrišu želje masa sa nužnošću izmene trulog kapitalističkog poretka su: sloboda, jednakost, solidarnost, superiornost rada, integralnost razvoja i samoupravljanja naroda.

Državna ekonomska preduzeća, kooperative i narodna preduzeća, predstavljaju osnovna sredstva koja vlada koristi u cilju demokratizacije. U državna ekonomska preduzeća u početku treba da bude uvedena neka vrsta radničkog učešća u upravljanju koje postepeno treba da prerasta u puno samoupravljanje, tj. da državna preduzeća transformišu u samoupravna. Kooperative su klasičan organizacioni oblik koji sam sebe objašnjava. Treći organizacioni oblik predstavljaju najčešće preduzeća u svojini radnika (pre svega onih koji rade u Nemačkoj i drugim zapadnoevropskim zemljama); ona su u svojini velikog broja ljudi od kojih svaki poseduje manji broj akcija i koja imaju demokratsku strukturu (obično jedan čovek jedan glas).

S druge strane, turska privreda prolazi kroz veoma velike teškoće usled zamašnog deficita platnog bilansa. To je glavni problem s kojim se suočava sadašnja vlada.

Na duži rok, međutim, mere ekonomske politike "samoupravnog" karaktera (npr., podsticanje pomenutih radničkih preduzeća) mogu rešiti taj problem (turski radnici u Evropi poseduju milijarde nemačkih maraka koje drže uložene u nemačkim i drugim bankama) ako bi vlada poradila na stvaranju mogućnosti da radnici investiraju u sopstvenoj zemlji.