

KAPITALIZAM

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S a ž e t a k

U ovom ogledu autor analizira političko-ekonomske karakteristike kapitalizma kao društveno-ekonomskog sistema.

U prvom dijelu oglada ispituje se, na osnovu historijskog materijala, proces političke liberalizacije nakon buržoaskih revolucija. Od tri ideala francuske revolucije, sloboda je interpretirana formalno i negativno, kao sloboda od a ne sloboda za; jednakost je sprovedena kao formalno-pravna jednakost; a bratstvo nije ušlo u buržoaske ustave niti je moglo da se održi u buržoaskom društvu. Proces političke liberalizacije bio je izuzetno spor. Ako se politička demokracija definiira kao muško pravo glasa, tajno glasanje i odgovornost vlade parlamentu, onda je ona prvi put uspostavljena tek prije stotinjak godina. A ako se uključi i žensko pravo glasa, onda politička demokratija u svega nekoliko pionirskih zemalja datira tek od početka ovog stoljeća. U većini slučajeva ona je rezultat borbe radničkih organizacija: sindikata i partija.

U drugom dijelu oglada iznose se podaci o eksproprijaciji nezavisnih proizvođača kao rezultatu kapitalističkog razvoja. U vrijeme engleske i američke revolucije, između tri četvrtine i četiri petine stanovništva su nezavisni farmeri, obrtnici i trgovci. Pri kraju epohe liberalnog kapitalizma preko četiri petine aktivnog stanovništva prinuđeni su da se unajmljuju kod privatnog kapitala ili države. Autor zatim analizira proces koncentracije i centralizacije kapitala koji se završava dominacijom malog broja transnacionalnih kompanija.

U trećem dijelu oglada izvršena je periodizacija kapitalističkog razvoja. Prijelazno razdoblje između feudalizma i kapitalizma traje u Evropi oko tri stoljeća. S industrijskom revolucijom 1760-tih godina u Engleskoj započinje epoha liberalnog kapitalizma koji ima dvije faze. Konkurencija preovladava u prvoj fazi koja se završava velikom krizom 1870-ih godina. U drugoj fazi razvijaju se monopoli i taj razvoj završava se svetskom ekonomskom krizom 1930-ih godina. To je ujedno i kraj liberalne epohe i započinje epoha reguliranog kapitalizma. Ona također ima dvije faze. U prvoj državnom intervencijom na osnovu Keynezijanske ekonomije dolazi do stabilizacije, pune zaposlenosti i brzog privrednog rasta. Ta faza završava se krizom 1970-ih godina i pokušajima izgrađivanja novog svetskog ekonomskog poretka. To znači da su mogućnosti intervencija nacionalnih država iscrpljene i da je kapitalizam ušao u fazu transnacionalnog razvoja. Time ujedno kapitalizam dolazi do kraja svojih logičkih i historijskih mogućnosti. Zbog toga se transnacionalna faza može ujedno smatrati početkom prijelaznog razdoblja prema jednom novom društveno-ekonomskom sistemu.

WORKERS' MANAGEMENT AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM:
SOME ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

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I. INTRODUCTION: THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THIS PAPER

One of the chief issues that has emerged from recent discussions of workers' management is its relationship to the transition from capitalism to socialism in the advanced industrial nations. Many workers' participation schemes and programs for "co-determination" are seen as devices by which productivity can be increased and labour-management conflict reduced, without significantly modifying management control over the means of production and the accumulation of capital. Critics on the left see these programs as devices for strengthening modern industrial capitalism in an age of anxiety and alienation, much as trade unionism and collective bargaining, social legislation and full employment policies served to ease the tensions and conflicts inherent in the industrial capitalism of an earlier day.

On the other hand, programs for management of industry directly by workers have long been a feature of the socialist ideology. Guild socialism in England, the anarcho-syndicalist enterprises in Spain, and the syndicalism of the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States are examples of programs for workers' management within the framework of democratic socialism. Gramsci (1919—20) and Gorz (1964) saw workers' management as an alternative to trade unions and collective bargaining, with a strong revolutionary potential. Pateman (1970) suggested that workers participation schemes serve to heighten workers' consciousness. Coates and Topham (1968) argued that nationalization of industry and workers management are both necessary to a viable socialist program. Panitch (1978) has recently argued that workers' management can develop into a force for revolutionary change if it is led by a vanguard political party. And Sik's "third way" (1976) includes workers' management, along with indicative planning and market socialism, in his alternative to the monopoly capitalism of the west and the authoritarian socialism of the east. We appear to be at a crossroads: workers' management could develop into one means by which industrial capitalism adapts to the growing crisis and renewed contradictions of the se-

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cond half of the twentieth century; or it could be a major step toward a democratic socialist society. Indeed, it may be both.

Much of this discussion of workers' management has been political in nature, focusing on the strategy and tactics of change and the relationship of workers' management to the politics of socialism. I propose to examine the issue from a somewhat different point of view, using an analysis of the relationship between workers' management and the developing forces of production in modern industrial capitalism as the basis for discussion of strategy and tactics in the transition to socialism.

Workers' management would change the relationships between people involved in production. It seeks to shift control over the means of production from managers and owners in a hierarchal decision-making system to working people who are direct participants in the production process. It seeks to replace an authoritarian decision-making system with one emphasizing some form of participatory democracy. In terms of socialist theory, it contemplates a revolutionary change in the relations of production. Control over the levers of power in the production process move from one social class to another.

Socialist theory tells us that changes in the relations of production — in the personal and class relationships embedded in the processes and forces of production — are closely related to the larger political and ideological superstructure of the social order. Any change in production relations within economic units will affect and be affected by the political and ideological superstructure, often in very complex ways. Indeed, a very large portion of socialist political theory is devoted to the relationship between production relations (social classes) and the superstructure.

Socialist theory also tells us that changes in production forces, processes and technology are intimately related to changes in production relations and social classes. For example, Marx's analysis of industrial capitalism showed that the forces and relations of capitalist production generate a process of capital accumulation that drives the capitalist system toward a crisis in which its mounting contradictions and conflicts lead to a period of social revolution out of which a socialist society could emerge. I propose to use this analytic model of the forces and relations of production to examine the economic base of workers' management as a means of defining the key issues and problems connected with workers' control and the transition to socialism.

II. THE ISSUES DEFINED

We can start with a stylized account of the early development of capitalism in England, based on Marx's discussion in Volume I of *Capital*. That was a period in which capitalists were able to gain control of the processes of production, much as today the movement toward workers' control seeks control of production by working people. The key element in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was development of exchange relations in the labour sector — a nascent labour market — that enables employers to buy the labour time of workers. Employers were able to use their control over the worker to restructure production processes

to their own advantage. Employers were also able to appropriate the surplus value derived from the use of labour time and thereby appropriate the economic surplus. Control over the accumulation of capital then enabled employers both to expand the production and exchange of commodities and the sector of capitalist production as a whole relative to the feudal and guild sectors. We should emphasize the point that employers were able to gain control over *both* the processes of production and the accumulation of capital through the employment of workers.

At this stage the bourgeoisie was not dominant in the political sphere. In sixteenth century England business interests forged an alliance with the monarchy, helping to promote Tudor authoritarianism in opposition both to the local feudal barons and the universalism of the Catholic Church. The Tudors as well as the traders saw those two centers of power as political and economic rivals. But it was an uneasy alliance: the Tudor kings and queens tried to use the economic strength of the expanding commercial economy as a bulwark of their centralized power, while keeping political dominance for themselves; commercial interests, while profiting from their alliance with the crown, had continually to guard against being gobbled up by the rulers' thirst for power and wealth, for they were the subordinate part of the political coalition. Nevertheless, the Tudor era featured much legislation favorable to capitalist interests, government spending that channeled taxes on land through military spending into the hands of business and financial interests, and legislation designed to control the emerging working class.

The uneasy symbiosis of business interests and the royal family broke down in the seventeenth century. The English revolution shifted control of governmental power from royalty to a parliament dominated by commercial and financial interests. But this was the second stage of the social revolution. The first stage had come in the previous century, when capitalist interests had carried their control over the forces of production and accumulation of capital to the point that an effective political coalition with royalty could be formed. It was not until the seventeenth century, after the power of the feudal nobles and the church had been broken, that business interests were able to achieve political dominance.

Once business interests were in control of the political superstructure they were free to continue the transformation of the forces of production. In the eighteenth century the beginnings of the agricultural and industrial revolutions set the stage for the emergence of modern industrial capitalism. Business interests were in command of the forces of production, controlled the process of capital accumulation, and held the levers of political power.

I want to stress two aspects of this schematic outline of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. First, in the early stages of the transition a key element was the ability of individual capitalists to control both the processes of production and the accumulation of capital. In the commercial economy of the time the two went together: purchase of labour power in the market gave the employer ownership of the product and enabled him to appropriate the surplus. The production process transformed labour power into capital, and the property system placed

control of both the production process and capital in the hands of the capitalist.

This leads us to a first principle: if workers' management is to be part of a transition to socialism, it must include control over the process of capital accumulation. Control over the processes of production is not enough. Workers management can provide significant gains for workers in any industrial economy: reduced alienation and heightened consciousness of humane values; increased productivity and significant economic gains for workers. But as long as profits are retained by the private enterprise itself or paid as dividends to shareholders — as long as workers do not control the process of capital accumulation — it is at best a very tentative move toward socialism. It can become a significant move toward socialism only if control of the processes of production is preliminary to or part of a shift toward workers' control over the accumulation of capital.

A second important point emerges from our stylized account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The new structure of power emerged first in the economic base and only later in the political superstructure. Reorganization of the forces of production that put control into the hands of capitalists developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and that new form spread at the expense of older feudal and guild forms of production in the following centuries. Political power followed more slowly, in two stages already outlined, and was not fully achieved until the late seventeenth century. The message contained in this sequence of events is the old proposition that changes in the economic base are a necessary prerequisite for changes in the political superstructure.

It should not be necessary for Marxist socialists to relearn this lesson, but it has been turned on its head by Leninist political theory. The theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of a vanguard political party suggests that political power can come first (because the working class is a majority) and that transformation of the economic base can follow. In practice this policy has led to authoritarian control of a hierarchal administrative system much like of fully developed industrial capitalism. Transformation of the economic base to provide for workers' control of production and accumulation is perhaps as great a threat to the centers of power in Soviet-type economies as it is in industrial capitalist economies. One of the lessons of twentieth century history seems to be that Leninist policy can lead to the same authoritarian managerial society that developed in the capitalist economy but without even the trappings of political democracy.

The problem is complicated by historical development of the national state as an instrument for accumulation of capital. In the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, when the modern national state was in its infancy, the crude methods of tax collection then available prevented the national state from being an effective mechanism for appropriating and mobilizing the economic surplus. The modern "tax state" (Goldscheid, 1958; Schumpeter, 1954) was a product of the industrial capitalist era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In our time the tax revenues of the national state are second only to corpora-

te retained earnings as a source of accumulation in the east-European Soviet-type economies.

The political aspects of the workers' control movement are therefore much more complicated than the political aspects of the transition to capitalism. Control over the accumulation of capital requires not only control within the individual enterprise, but also political control of the national state and its tax-collecting powers. The implication is that workers' management and a politically oriented socialist movement need to be developed simultaneously.

Finally we come to the question of technology. The capitalist entrepreneur of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries used the existing handicraft technology of his time, but he reorganized it to develop more centralized control over the work process. The two chief innovations were the domestic system (handicraft workers employed in their own homes) and the large shop (handicraft workers employed in a single place under direct supervision of the employer). The new technologies of modern industrial capitalism were not developed until much later, with the agricultural and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth century. One important feature of the new industrial technologies, however, involved production relations: they tended to separate workers from each other as well as to centralize control over production processes in foremen, supervisors, and managers. The technology of industrial production as it developed in the industrial era reflected, reinforced and extended the pattern of authoritarian control of the workplace characteristic of capitalist relations of production (Marglin, 1974—75; Braverman, 1974).

This suggests a third aspect of workers' management — one that has received almost no attention in the discussions of recent years. Worker control may begin with a reorganization of work at the shop-floor level or in the office. But this is only a first step. In the larger technological scheme of which the shop or office is a part, the entire production system is based on a technology developed for use in a system of authoritarian and hierarchal control whose objective is to minimize out-of-pocket costs and maximize net money gains. In the modern producing enterprise the twin goals of control and maximization of gain are mutually reinforcing, and the structure of technology is consistent with both.

A system of workers' management implies a different technology. Costs and benefits are defined in new ways, including such costs as the feelings of alienation and hostility of working people, and benefits like participation and heightened awareness of the work community. With a more broadly defined concept of costs and benefits comes a broader and more complex set of criteria for maximization and a different concept of production efficiency, which in turn imply a new and different technology. The particular form the new technology will take cannot be predicted in advance, but some strategic guidelines are already emerging (Bookchin, 1971; Schumacher, 1973);

1. Production technologies that bring workers together into small groups.
2. Relatively small production units.
3. Technologies that facilitate shifting of individual workers between jobs.

4. Technologies that enable workers at relatively low skill levels to learn the next higher skill level on the job, thereby facilitating upward mobility.
5. Communication technologies that emphasize lateral communication among workers at the production level, rather than technologies based on communication upward through the managerial hierarchy.
6. Technologies that rely on the decision-making abilities of workers at all levels, in place of the present pattern of routinizing individual work and centralizing the decision process at higher levels.

These guidelines apply to technology some of the principles already developed in programs that seek to reorganize the workplace in the interest of workers' control. The point made here is that reorganization of the workplace is only a first step. The gains to be made from such reorganization will be limited by a technology that has developed for over two hundred years around a hierarchal and authoritarian structure of organization and power. The next step is the conscious restructuring of the technical relations of production, moving away from a technology appropriate to authoritarian control and toward one consistent with workers' control and management.

We have identified three elements of a strategy for the development of a democratic socialism based on workers' management. First, control of the economic base requires control over the process of capital accumulation as well as production processes themselves. Since the business enterprise and the national state are the chief instruments for capital accumulation, socialist strategy requires an economic and political program for workers' control of those institutions as well. But we have to guard against the dangers inherent in trying to establish socialism from the top down, as in the Leninist strategy. An economic base in shop and office must be built. Finally, we need research and innovation in new technologies suited to participatory production relations, to resolve the contradiction between workers' management and a technology suited to authoritarian control.

III. FROM STRATEGY TO TACTICS

Theory can be a guide to strategy, but tactics are another matter. Here we leave the relatively firm ground of principles and enter a swamp of unresolved problems.

For example, are German co-determination schemes, in which worker representatives sit on boards of directors and participate in management councils, a step toward socialism based on workers' management? Many advocates of workers' management argue that co-determination merely perpetuates the existing structure of power, bringing union leadership into closer relationship with management, and leaving workers just as far from positions of control as they were before. There is much to be said for this criticism. On other hand, co-determination may be a step toward ultimate worker control of capital accumulation, especially if it leads, over time, to significant influence over dividend

and investment policy. Co-determination at the level of top management is no substitute for shop-floor workers' control — but shop-floor democracy does not bring control over the distribution of profits, either.

The same point can be made about worker ownership of enterprises, like the recent development of employee-owned plywood factories in the U. S. Pacific Northwest or an employee-owned asbestos mine in Vermont. These are examples of what has been called "blue collar capitalism" rather than workers' management. Nevertheless, they can also be viewed as experiments in worker control of the accumulation of capital. Admittedly, they are very small and imperfect steps in that direction, and these enterprises still rely very heavily on financing from banks and the other private financial institutions that stand astride the flows of capital. But they should be regarded as possible beginnings of a move toward workers' control of the flow of capital.

Labour unions are also seen by many as antagonistic to workers' management (Gramsci, 1919—20; Gorz, 1964). In some respects there is an inherent contradiction between workers' management as a rank-and-file movement, and the centralized leadership that has developed in many labour unions. And where labour union leadership has developed a symbiotic relationship with management both tend to be antagonistic to workers' management. On the other hand, labor unions can take the lead in generating programs for shop-floor democracy, like some of those pioneered in the United States (Bluestone, 1977) and Japan (Yoshida and Torihara, 1977). If programs for workers' management develop from within the working class itself (Pannekoek, 1942), labor unions and collective bargaining may well be an effective instrument for its spread.

In evaluating these developments we should keep in mind that changes of these sorts often take place by stages, and over substantial periods of time. For example, in the domestic system of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the business entrepreneur did not have full control over the production process, or, if the worker held some land, full control over the economic surplus. And in the political sphere business interests were clearly subordinate to the interests of the crown. Thus, to cite one issue, we should not close the door to the possibility that, in spite of its limitations, co-determination as practiced in West Germany may lead ultimately to worker control over investment policy. Indeed, within the co-determination schemes there has been a trend toward continuing extension of worker participation in key decisions of enterprises, much to the dismay of many German business leaders.

A much more difficult issue, it seems to me, is the problem of worker control of the accumulation of capital in the economy at large. Personal savings are no problem: relatively little capital accumulation comes from that source, and what does is allocated very largely through the large privately-owned and management-dominated financial institutions that dominate the financial markets. Nationalization of financial institutions could provide for social control of capital accumulation, but this path opens up the possibility of control by a relatively small managerial bureaucracy along lines developed in the USSR. Similar problems are present when the national tax system is used as a means of accumulating capital.

The key problem of the transition to socialism based on workers' management lies in the area of capital accumulation. How can a centralized process of capital accumulation, institutionalized in large financial organizations and the national state, be reconciled with principles of workers' management and participatory democracy? Our earlier discussion of strategy becomes relevant here. Clearly a socialist political program must be allied with a drive for workers' management. But we can extend that strategic concept: the type of socialism to be adopted must extend the basic principles of workers' management to the political superstructure. At the present time we are experimenting with a variety of mechanisms for new relations of production and power structures within the individual enterprise. The far greater and far more important problem is how to extend the same principle to the process of capital accumulation and to the political process in general.

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RADNIČKO UPRAVLJANJE I PRELAZ U SOCIJALIZAM

Daniel R. FUSFELD

R e z i m e

Da li je kontrola radnika nad procesom proizvodnje dovoljna za prelaz iz kapitalizma u socijalizam? Odgovor autora članka na ovo pitanje je negativan. On smatra da, »ako radničko upravljanje treba da bude deo puta u socijalizam, ono mora da uključi i kontrolu nad procesom akumulacije kapitala. Kontrola nad akumulacijom kapitala zahteva ne samo kontrolu unutar granica pojedinačnog preduzeća nego i političku kontrolu nacionalne države i njene poreske moći. To implicira potrebu simultanog razvoja radničkog upravljanja i politički orijentisanog socijalističkog pokreta. Pitanje strategije i taktike prelaza nije dovoljno razmatrati samo u terminima promene proizvodnog odnosa. Autor smatra da je u diskusijama o strategiji prelaza donekle zanemareno pitanje izmene proizvodnih snaga. Stoga on za polaznu osnovu svojih razmatranja uzima analizu odnosa radničkog upravljanja i rastućih proizvodnih snaga u modernom industrijskom kapitalizmu, što ga dovodi do pitanja tehnologije. Naravno, tehnologija nije neutralna u odnosu na proizvodni odnos: jedno od najvažnijih obeležja nove industrijske tehnologije sastoji se u njenoj težnji da međusobno odvoji radnike i da centralizuje kontrolu nad proizvodnim procesom u rukama preduznika, nadzornika i menadžera. Tehnologija savremene industrijske proizvodnje odražava (i uslovljava) obrazac autoritarne kontrole radnog mesta koja je karakteristična za kapitalističke odnose proizvodnje. Ne samo pojedinačni pogon, već i celokupni proizvodni sistem zasnovani su na tehnologiji koja je razvijena tako da može služiti sistemu autoritarne i hijerarhijske kontrole čiji je cilj minimizacija troškova i maksimizacija neto prihoda. U modernom kapitalističkom preduzeću dvostruki ciljevi kontrole i maksimizacija koristi međusobno su uslovljeni, a struktura tehnologije kon-

sistentna je sa oba ova cilja. U sistemu radničkog upravljanja trebalo bi, međutim, na drugačiji način definisati i troškove i koristi. Na šire definisani koncept troškova i koristi treba da se nadoveže i širi i kompleksniji skup kriterijuma maksimizacije i drugačiji koncept proizvodne efikasnosti. Implicitno, radničko upravljanje upućuje na potrebu za novim i različitim tipom tehnologije, kako bi se razrešila protivrečnost između radničke kontrole, upravljanja i tehnologije koja odgovara autoritarnoj kontroli i hijerarhijskoj strukturi moći koja se razvijala poslednjih dvesta godina.

Autor dakle, identifikuje tri osnovna elementa strategije razvoja socijalizma zasnovanog na radničkom samoupravljanju: kontrolu ekonomske baze koja uključuje kontrolu proizvodnog procesa i kontrolu akumulacije, ekonomsku i političku kontrolu preduzeća i države kao glavnih instrumenata za akumulaciju kapitala, i, na kraju, novu tehnologiju koja će odgovarati parcipativnim proizvodnim odnosima.

Ovi osnovni elementi strategije razvoja u pravcu samoupravnog socijalizma mogu da vode veoma različitim vrstama taktike. U ovom trenutku nije dovoljno jasno koji konkretni pravci razvoja u privredama sa privatnim preduzećima vode efektivnoj radničkoj kontroli akumulacije kapitala kako u preduzeću tako i na nivou države, i transformaciji tehnologije u tipove različite od onih koji odgovaraju samo autoritarnoj, centralizovanoj kontroli. Posebno, društvena kontrola krupnih finansijskih institucija koje dominiraju tržištima kapitala, predstavlja nerešen problem. Danas se u razvijenim kapitalističkim privredama eksperimentišu s brojnim mehanizmima koji treba da dovedu do uspostavljanja novih odnosa proizvodnje i nove strukture moći u pojedinačnom preduzeću. Važniji problem, prema mišljenju autora, predstavlja pitanje proširenja istih principa na proces akumulacije kapitala, i, uopšte, na politički proces.

CATCHING FLIES WITH HONEY: AN INQUIRY INTO MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES TO HUMANIZE WORK*

Stephen A. MARGLIN**

THE ORIGINS

For a time in the early '70s Americans could hardly pick up a magazine without reading of workers' discontents. *Atlantic Monthly* and *Newsweek* ran stories complete with covers in a *Modern Times* motif, Chaplin trapped in the cogwheels of an assembly-line. *Life* ran a cover story on auto-workers who had struck General Motors — in defiance of their union — over the pace of the line rather than the size of their paychecks. The Government too got into the act. In 1972 the Senate held widely publicized hearings on "worker alienation" and in the same year Nixon's Department of Health Education and Welfare took official cognisance of the problem in a booklength report titled *Work in America*.)

A common theme ran through all these documents. Work was dull, repetitive and meaningless, especially for the younger generation. The solution? Greater control of production by workers themselves: job enlargement, substitution of a variety of tasks for the single task typical of the minutely divided work of the typing pool or assembly line; better yet, job enrichment, delegation of authority and responsibility for the organization of work to the individual or small group, without the intermediation of foreman or supervisor.

Orthodox economics accounts for worker disaffection and managerial responses only with the greatest difficulty. According to its logic, work organization should *always* reflect workers' preferences with res-

*) This essay, particularly the discussion of job enrichment under the heading *The Paradox of Successful Failure* (pp. 41—47), has been informed by discussion with successive groups of students in my course on work organization at Harvard and the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) between 1971 and 1975. In particular, the contributions of two students, R. Michael Kaus and Craig Coit, should be acknowledged. Their undergraduate honors theses (Harvard University, 1973) provide substantial additional evidence supporting the theory advanced here. Remarkably similar views are presented in Andrew Zimbalist, "The Limits of Work Organization", *Review of Radical Political Economy*, vol. 7, Summer 1975, pp. 50—59.

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;) Later published by Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, no date.