Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29
ISSN 2562-8429

CJERS Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies
Revue canadienne d'études européennes et russes

Western Hegemony and Russia's Eurasian Turn: Probing the Liberal Order's Place in Contemporary International Society

Zachary Paikin[1]
Centre for European Policy Studies

Abstract
With the resumption of great power rivalry, the Western-led liberal order appears to have failed to become synonymous with global order itself. Russia's "pivot to the east" and its deepening partnership with China have raised fundamental questions concerning the future role and pre-eminence of liberal states – including Canada – in the emerging global order. Given dueling European and Eurasian elements of Russian identity and foreign policy discourse, Russia remains a good case study for probing the extent to which a future world order can root itself in a monist frame in today's pluralistic world. This paper explores this question from a perspective rooted in the English School of International Relations, with the aim of deriving conclusions regarding the liberal international order's ability to maintain its hegemonic position in global international society.

[1] Dr. Zachary Paikin is a Researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy in Toronto.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War was initially greeted with calls for a Europe "whole and free", embodied in the Paris Charter that was adopted in 1990. Dating back to the mid-eighteenth century, Russia had been recognized as a great power in the "European family" of states (Watson 1984a, 70-71). The end of hostility between the Western and Eastern blocs was supposed to presage Russia's "return to Europe", having been cut off from the bulk of the continent for several decades by the Iron Curtain. However, what these idealistic calls precisely implied for the future of Europe's political and security order remained unclear. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev initially spoke of the need for an inclusive "Common European Home", although his vision was that of a "house with several rooms" (Casier 2018, 21). Gorbachev envisioned a convergence of equals between capitalist and communist blocs along the lines of European social democracy (Tsygankov 2013, 5), with Eastern European countries becoming either neutral or Finlandized to ensure that Moscow's security interests would be met after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the collapse of their one-party regimes (Gvosdev and Marsh 2013, 209-210). However, according to Sakwa, this was met with a Western foreign policy aimed at pursuing "Russia's adaptation to the stringencies of an existing [American-led] order, not the creation of an expanded community" (2017, 18). The United States (US) settled into a "primacy mindset" – a foreign policy strategy rooted in "disregard for the core interests of potential adversaries" (Lind and Press 2020).

Following a series of increasingly sharp disagreements throughout the post-Cold War era over the nature of state sovereignty, the legitimacy of military interventions, and the principles that should underpin the Euro-Atlantic and global orders, the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis made it clear that "the era is over of building an all-Europe house using blueprints devised immediately following the Cold War" (Lukyanov 2019). These developments affect not only the future of the European political and security system but also the foundations of the so-called liberal international order. The failure of the Russian economic and political system to develop fully along liberal lines implies that the Western-led liberal order has not succeeded in becoming identical to global order itself, nor even necessarily the "dominant element in the global system" (Chalmers 2019). This raises questions concerning the future place of liberal states and the liberal order in a world where, despite its many successes and elements of appeal, liberalism has not become synonymous with universalism. With Washington's global hegemony now being challenged in the context of a renewed great power contest (Allison 2020; Feigenbaum 2020), such questions have become of direct relevance to Canada, a country that has benefited significantly from deep economic integration and close security cooperation with the United States in the post-Cold War era.

This article will explore the enduring normative and identity-related elements of Russia's relationship with Europe against the backdrop of Moscow's 'pivot to the east' and its recently launched 'Greater Eurasia' vision, with the aim of uncovering the extent to which the Western-led liberal international order can retain its global appeal. Using a framework drawn from the English School of International Relations (ES), it will first dwell on the place occupied by the liberal order within international society. It will then examine the extent of Russia's Eurasian turn before deriving conceptual conclusions regarding the liberal order's ability to maintain its hegemonic status in global affairs. In doing so, it will explore ways to find synergies between varying ES approaches while also dwelling on the implications of contemporary normative contestation for Canadian foreign policy.

Hegemony, International Society and the Liberal Order

For most of modern history, international orders have been bounded by general wars and have featured a hegemonic state in addition to one or several challengers (Knutsen 1999, 6-8). Such wars have usually been fought over which rules and principles should underpin the order and the English School has usually been thought of as a good home to theorize on questions of legitimacy in world affairs (Coker 2015, 37-88; Clark 2011, v). From Yugoslavia to Libya to Ukraine, questions of legitimacy have been at the heart of some of the central disputes between Russia and the West throughout the post-Cold War period, including the rights that great powers should legitimately be accorded and the instances in which state sovereignty can legitimately be set aside.

The English School's core conceptual contribution to the discipline is the notion of "international society" – that international relations have the capacity to proceed according to a social logic rather than a merely systemic one. Wight defines an international society as a common set of norms that "define the boundaries of a social system" and "condition [states'] behaviour and identity" (1977, 13). Modern international society possesses several "primary institutions" – not formal bodies as conceived of by liberal theory but rather core principles that are "essential for producing and maintaining order" (Flockhart 2016, 12). Among these, for instance, is the balance of power, contractually negotiated among states rather than operating automatically or mechanistically as neo-realists would contend (Barkin 2010, 130).[2]

ES scholars have disagreed on what constitutes social interaction in international affairs. Earlier contributions to the School contended that states that became "sufficiently involved with one another" constituted an international system, whereas an international society was forged only when interactions crossed over from the merely regulatory and into the realm of shared norms and values (Watson 1992, 311). More recent scholarship, however, asserts that there can be no such thing as a pre- or non-social system, as the mere act of mutual recognition is inherently social (Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017, 31). Perhaps most famously, earlier accounts claim that the norms and institutions of the contemporary international society of states were formed in modern Europe before expanding – with mixed results – across the globe through periods of colonialism, industrialization, and decolonization (Watson 1984b, 32; Bozeman 1984, 405). By contrast, recent accounts emphasize international society's "globalization" through a "polycentric pattern of expansion," with entities such as the Sinosphere, the Islamicate, and Latin Christendom all interacting with one another over the course of history and the latter only eclipsing all others in the nineteenth century (Phillips 2017, 43-60).

These divergent views on whether cultural heterogeneity should be equated with the erosion of social norms inform differences among ES scholars with respect to how contestation should be conceptualized. Due to their conceptualization of the balance of power as representing a primary institution of international society, earlier voices within the School feared that "anti-social primacy" pursued by a "rogue hegemon" could lead to the erosion of the ties that bind international society's actors together (Clark 2011, 37-38). More recent accounts, however, have come to view contestation as not just "incorporative or corrosive, but as an engine of international social development" (Reus-Smit and Dunne 2017, 36).

---

[2] Donnelly contends that neo-realists' privileging of anarchy as the core notion on which the international system is based leaves them poorly positioned to contribute to discussions surrounding international order, as anarchy merely illustrates one fashion in which global affairs are not ordered (2017, 244-245).

Recent discussions surrounding the resumption of great power rivalry have centred to a significant extent on its impact on the so-called liberal international order. However, the scope and breadth of this order has been the subject of significant contention. Some effectively consign the order to the Western alliance and its associated norms and institutions (Sakwa 2017, 18-44). Such a conceptualization views the liberal order as oscillating between periods of "enlargement" and "consolidation" or "defence" (Jahn 2013, 29) and is therefore compatible with Flockhart's (2016) notion that the post-Cold War world has come to be composed of several competing orders rather than a single overarching order. Others, by contrast, emphasize the progression that liberal internationalism has undertaken since the Industrial Revolution, viewing it more as a philosophy for "how to organize international space" along broadly "open, rules-based and progressively oriented" lines (Ikenberry 2018, 12). If such a conceptualization were to account for the existence of a global international society of states, then this would be a society far more open to liberal ordering practices. According to this view, what is occurring today is most likely to be characterized as a "crisis of the American governance of liberal order and not of liberal order itself" (Ikenberry 2013, 92). A third perspective sees the liberal order not as necessarily representing an international convergence of ideals but rather as embodying the growing global appeal of the norms of independence and interdependence since World War II (Sørensen 2016, 200-205).

Although these accounts all point to different embodiments of the liberal order, it is possible to fuse them into a coherent whole. Cox notes that a "system of state power" underpins the liberal order (2013, 115). In other words, although the principles that the liberal order nominally upholds enjoy a degree of support at the level of global international society, the order nonetheless relies on the transatlantic alliance and its appendages. Such a conceptualization therefore contends that the liberal order may co-exist and compete with other international orders, leaving an imprint on international society without having come to encompass it entirely (Paikin 2020). With Sakwa contending that today's international society is rooted in a "structure of Western hegemony", one can therefore conceive of a Western-led liberal international order that occupies a hegemonic position within global international society, but due to the latter's distribution of power and cultural-normative diversity, has not become completely synonymous with it (2017, 43).

In a world composed of multiple regional or identity-based international orders, it is therefore not merely states, but orders as well, that can be hegemonic. Lebow defines order as "legible, predictable behaviour in accord with recognized norms" and contends that an order must possess a degree of solidarity among its members to remain robust (2018, 305-306).[3] Furthering its well-known Gramscian characterization as being rooted in a mixture of coercion and consent, hegemony has more recently been defined as "a status bestowed by others" – resting on "recognition by them" – that "confers special rights and responsibilities on a state (or states) with the resources to lead" (Clark 2011, 35). As such, the agreed-upon legitimacy of one's hegemonial status is key to that status being maintained. Legitimacy, for its part, has been described as "an inherently social phenomenon", with the legitimacy of an actor or action depending on "perceptions made with reference to prevailing intersubjective understandings" (Reus-Smit 2014, 341-8).[4]

[3] This emphasis on predictability is also discussed by Tang, who notes that "an order exists within a social system whenever there is some predictability within the system" (2016, 34).
[4] Lebow (2008, 67) similarly distinguishes between the Greek notions of *hegemonia* as legitimate authority and *arche* as the raw exercise of power.

A hegemonic state or order must therefore demonstrate restraint and a desire to play by perceived rules if it is to retain its hegemonic status. However, the liberal order's dual existence as one international order among many but possessing a degree of universal appeal at the level of international society lends itself to an inherent tension, as the states that underpin the order act to advance their own interests and not just the values and principles that the order nominally upholds.[5] Monteiro, employing a structural realist framework, notes that the imbalance of power distribution in unipolar systems renders the uncertainty over the hegemon's intentions even starker, even if it aims to maintain the status quo in its relations with other major powers (2014, 159). From a normative perspective, the state of rivalry that this engenders increases the likelihood that the hegemon will make missteps, or be forced into situations where it is unable to show restraint, which in turn affects the durability of its hegemonic status, even if it fails to affect the unipolar distribution of power.[6] Moreover, in addition to open multilateralism and rules-based cooperation, "there is an expectation that a liberal international order will move states in a progressive direction, defined in terms of liberal democracy" (Ikenberry 2018, 11). It is therefore the hegemonic character – both material and normative – *and* the nature of the liberal order that have helped to drive normative contestation in the post-Cold War era.

The challenges facing the Western-led liberal order outlined above are therefore interpreted by the two most prominent ES accounts of international society in differing – but ultimately similar – ways. The earlier 'expansion' narrative would contend that the contradictions generated by the liberal order's hegemonic position will ultimately lead to the erosion of international society's shared norms, potentially reverting it to a systemic rather than a social state. This is a problem exacerbated by the hegemonic position of European international society as the point of origin of global international society's contemporary norms. In other words, it is not just the liberal order's position that is currently in jeopardy but the very notion of Western normative leadership as well, suggesting the emergence of a new global system of cultural heterogeneity and diffuse influence. While the second account – the 'globalization' narrative – does not view Western normative hegemony as being as important a structural feature of international society, it takes such heterogeneity for granted. Therefore, the structure of the emerging global order as understood by both major accounts is broadly similar, although the 'globalization' narrative does not fear the emergence of a non-social system from today's nascent great power rivalry. Where earlier scholars would see normative erosion, more recent ones see increasing normative complexity. In all cases, however, the outcome is change of a fundamental, historically contingent, and structurally similar nature (see Table 1). The fact that the content of international society is becoming increasingly complex is not incompatible with the notion that shared norms and identities between powers may be relatively thin in a culturally diverse world.

---

[5] Sakwa captures this inherent duality in the Western-led order by dubbing it a "power system combined with a liberal values order" (2017, 282). Similarly, Nye calls the postwar liberal order "a combination of Wilsonian liberalism and balance of power realism" (2019, 71).

[6] Acharya succinctly describes this phenomenon in practical terms, noting that the "degree of US dominance of the world will decline, even if the US itself does not" (2018, 135).

Table 1: English School interpretations of post-Cold War contestation and change

<table>
<tr><th>Account of global international society</th><th>Post-Cold War society and order</th><th>Driver of change</th><th>Outcome</th></tr>
<tr><td>Expansion</td><td rowspan="2">Diverse global international society, hegemonic liberal order</td><td>Tension/contradiction between order and society produces crisis of legitimacy</td><td rowspan="2">Thin/complex global order and society</td></tr>
<tr><td>Globalization</td><td>Normative contestation as inherent feature of international society</td></tr>
</table>

How to characterize the emerging global order has been the subject of considerable debate. Rather than draw a stark contrast between liberal and illiberal states, some have begun to envision a world that is merely increasingly 'post-liberal' (Milbank and Pabst 2016). Others question whether there was ever a liberal order of global scope to begin with, noting that in the post-Cold War era "the international order got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold" (Barnett 2019).[7] In line with Flockhart's (2016) conceptualization of a 'multi-order world', Acharya foresees a world of "parallel and intersecting orders" featuring a "more diverse, complex, and fragmented multilateralism" in which a form of "pragmatic globalism" can take the place of an "ideologically charged liberal internationalism" (2018, 76; 158-59). Coker provides a different conceptual take, claiming that the world today features a number of "civilizational states", including China, with civilizational uniqueness inherently placing constraints on any universalist impulses in global affairs (2019, 167).[8] In all cases, there exist significant structural impediments to the spread of liberal norms and values on a global scale.

Mounting Tensions and Divergent Relations

The end of the Cold War was initially marked by Russian attempts to integrate into the Western-led order, with Moscow even flirting with the idea of allowing a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) military presence in those areas of the former Soviet Union that were experiencing ethnic-based tensions, while also supporting the Western security agenda in places such as Serbia and Iraq (Tsygankov 2013, 72-86). However, this trend of unambiguous support for the Western-led liberal order encountered an early roadblock in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, which saw nationalists make gains as Russia's traditional reservoir of support for statism began to reassert itself in the wake of popular "fears of insecurity, instability, and poverty" (2013, 64). This reservoir is buttressed by the centuries-old "politics of 'catching up' modernization" present in Russia which "traditionally imagines that the gap with more developed countries

[7] Sushentsov (2019) also notes that the notion of an international order as a "Western centric system of liberal democracies" was never fully considered by Russia to be "global, legitimate and efficient."
[8] A more limited claim allows for a form of "universal solidarity" emerging that does not require "conformity" with the "vision of the good life" emphasized by the hitherto hegemonic state or order (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 153).

will be closed through the leadership of the state" (Kudrin and Mau 2018, 17-25). Other factors cited as underpinning popular support for statism in Russia include "resigned acceptance" of the status quo and the absence of plausible alternatives (Bressler 2008, 123), as well as a desire to fulfill a sense of national "mission" as a cultural mediator between East and West (Richter 1996, 81), reflective of the elite perception of Russia's "special status and aura – no longer an empire in the traditional sense, but certainly more than an 'ordinary' nation-state" (Lo 2015, 16). As these early post-Cold War challenges – which preceded NATO expansion and the 1999 Kosovo intervention – were partly rooted in enduring elements of Russian distinctiveness, this gives credence to more recent ES accounts that see contestation as an unavoidable feature of global politics.

Events over the ensuing years exhibited clearer instances of tensions fostered in response to Western hegemony and perceived overreach. In addition to the Alliance's eastward expansion, NATO's decision to intervene in Yugoslavia without UN support "caused the first serious post-Cold War rupture" in Russia-West ties, with Moscow's view of the West as "dangerously unilateralist and militarily menacing" becoming entrenched despite both sides resuming cooperation over the ensuing years (Hill 2019, 94-8). The Kosovo crisis cast doubt on the ability of Russia to integrate into a transformed West that could accommodate Moscow's independent interests. In key instances, it appeared as if NATO members tended to "formulate common positions amongst themselves" and then "engage in rather desultory and non-binding conversations" with Russia (Smith and Latawski 2003, 112). In the mid-2000s, the zero-sum nature of European Union (EU)-Russia relations in the context of the "colour revolutions" laid to rest any notion that a Brussels-centric model could consolidate the wider European space into a single political and economic order, while the prospect of further NATO expansion helped to bring about the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Various scholars capture this dilemma in conceptual terms, with Lukin contending that the West attempted to adopt the model for German unification as the model for European unification, pushing for a single set of standards across the entire continent (2018, 5). Or, as Neumann put it, Western countries prioritized the pursuit of "sameness" of values in place of the more traditional competition that has characterized international politics (1995, 207). Both principal ES narratives can account for these developments, which can be seen as a deliberate attempt at normative transformation and a form of tension that is the by-product of the liberal West adopting "some sort of tutelary relationship" with international society (Sakwa 2017, 42).

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow engaged in attempts at territorial revisionism in Ukraine, revealing a continued focus on Europe despite the breakdown of the pan-European security system (Kolesnikov 2015). This reflects the fact that the Ukraine crisis was caused in part by clashing regulatory orders in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) designed to provide Kyiv with an alternative to the proposed EU Association Agreement (Studin 2018a; Sherwood 2018, 56). However, Russia's focus soon shifted eastward, emphasizing not only its previously declared "pivot to the east" but also a new vision of an integrated "Greater Eurasia" spanning the entire supercontinent (Karaganov 2016). In contrast with the more monistic view of global order advanced by the liberal West, Moscow asserts that Europe is welcome to join the Greater Eurasian community if it agrees to uphold its pluralistic principles, even if this fledgling vision is still lacking in detail (Lukin 2018, 187).

Some contend that the Greater Eurasia project is designed to buy Russia time to respond conceptually to China's Belt and Road Initiative and position itself as an equal co-architect of an emerging supercontinent-wide order (Paikin et al. 2019, 238; Lo 2019a). Others assert that Russia's eastward pivot has less to do with searching for an alternative to the West and is more

concerned with deepening ties with an economically dynamic Asia and the need to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East (Lukin 2018, 174). This reflects the fact that most Russian and Chinese policy commentators stress that the deepening Sino-Russian entente is aimed primarily at solving common problems rather than balancing against the West (Sakwa 2017, 294). Such an understanding would emphasize that Russia has genuinely grown to value its relationship with China and is not merely using it instrumentally to secure its "strategic rear", even though the gradual de-securitization of their relationship grants both parties greater freedom to pursue their core interests in Eastern Europe and East Asia respectively (Kofman 2019). Lukin contends that the Ukraine crisis marks a "pivotal" year in which Russia's Eurasian turn became "actual" and not just "verbal" (2018, 15).[9] In any case, initial post-Cold War aspirations to forge a "Greater Europe" have been superseded by a new overarching paradigm, with NATO enlargement having ensured that Russia and West "do not run a shared security system for Europe" (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 429). These divisions within Europe writ large highlight the thin character of the Russia-West relationship that has consolidated over the past three decades, but also increased complexity evidenced by the proliferation of rival geopolitical discourses and imaginaries. Buzan succinctly captures this phenomenon, resulting from post-Cold War liberal monism and hegemonism, noting that "the continued projection of contested western values (human rights, democracy, the market) on to the rest of the world creates considerable scope for differentiation between the West and the rest" (2012, 25).

Clashing visions and regulatory orders between leading actors have driven the resurrection of the Russia-West rivalry, with implications for Canada. While Brussels has maintained that "selective engagement" with Moscow is still in the EU's interest, Ottawa distinguished itself in the Western community by its particularly stern response to Russia's intervention in Ukraine (Popeski 2015), as well as through its inconsistent positions in the context of the Euromaidan revolution. While the Canadian government initially indicated support for an agreement reached with protestors to institute a coalition government and hold early elections (Government of Canada 2014), the subsequent fall of the Yanukovych government saw a call just three days later by Prime Minister Stephen Harper for Ukrainians to reject "the past" (The Canadian Press 2014). Reciprocal sanctions were imposed between Ottawa and Moscow and, with the brief exception of an attempt to re-engage on Arctic issues under Stéphane Dion's tenure as Foreign Minister, relations between the two countries have remained at a post-Cold War low. While a rising "Eurasian" discourse has marked Russia's relationship with Europe in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, it has also been contended that Moscow has pivoted "to itself" rather than to the east, with the aim of charting a course as a "major independent player" in place of joining a larger whole such as the West (Lee 2020). In essence, Russia is gradually finding its bearings as an independent actor for the first time in its post-communist history. If this results in an increasingly assertive international posture, there could be uncertainty over Moscow's future behaviour in regions adjacent to Canada such as the Arctic, where thus far Russian aims have largely been geared toward preserving regional stability (Buchanan 2020).

[9] Morozov similarly notes that 2014 represented a "watershed in Russia's relations with the West," although he qualifies this by noting that it did not lead to any fundamental change in Putin's international security discourse (2015, 139).

Russia between East and West

While one should not downplay the notion that clashing interests helped to bring about today's state of rivalry between Russia and the West, interests are partly the product of the context in which they are forged. For example, it could be against Moscow's interests to integrate fully into the existing European economic and regulatory order, given the current structure of the Russian economy and polity (Greene 2016; Kluge and Richter 2020). However, Russia's interest in unambiguously rejecting the geographic growth of the Western-led order is not always evident. Trenin (2019a) has called Moscow's fixation on NATO expansion a "fundamental error of Russian foreign policy" rooted in an "outdated mode of strategic thinking that assigns excessive importance to the factor of geography and strategic depth" no longer relevant in a world of strategic aviation and nuclear weapons . He also describes the Kremlin's role in helping to re-entrench the image of a hostile Russia on the world stage as a "strategic defeat". According to Sushentsov and Wohlforth (2020), it is NATO 'centrality' – the notion that the major issues of Euro-Atlantic security are decided between Americans and Europeans with little meaningful input from Russia – that drives contestation between Russia and the West rather than the transatlantic alliance's expansion, which suggests the importance of status-related concerns rather than a divergence of immutable material interests. Geographic determinism aside, the notion that entrenched interests drive zero-sum rivalry between Russia and the West does not sit well with the reality that Russia initially attempted to join the West after the Cold War.

Despite mounting disagreements with the West, Moscow's aims remained limited for much of the post-Cold War period. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which it opposed, high-level Russian politicians largely eschewed attempts to entrench Russia's position as a pole in a multipolar world, preferring instead to focus on shaping Euro-Atlantic decision-making to enhance their country's security and prospects for further economic development (Smith 2012, 145). Similarly, rather than actively balance against the overwhelming power of the United States throughout the 1990s, Moscow's attention was centred on more limited foreign policy aims designed "to keep the international order from impinging" at a moment of significant instability and volatility in global affairs (Rozman 2014, 197). Although the advent of a Brussels-centric conception of Europe had become unrealistic and no "mode of reconciliation" was found between it and more pluralistic visions of European order, the aim of constructing a series of "common spaces" from Lisbon to Vladivostok remained in place until the 2013-14 Ukraine crisis (Sakwa 2015a, 558-62). Even as Russia-West ties frayed in subsequent years, Moscow has been keen to stress that the EAEU is complementary to the EU, although without compromising on its insistence on an "equal" relationship with Europe (Sakwa 2017, 147).

Russia's "pivot to the east" remains in many ways unformed. While the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China has led both countries to "agree on most international issues", stronger bilateral military cooperation is not akin to the establishment of a deeper alliance aimed at entrenching a comprehensive set of post-Western norms and institutions (Lo 2019b). Kortunov (2019) cites the views of those who believe that Russia will always be destined to be a second-class player in the Asian theatre behind the likes of China and India, thus leaving "a Russian return to the European fold as foreordained". Neumann, for his part, suggests that Russia's debate over Europe has been so central to its identity formation in recent centuries that it is difficult to imagine it disappearing in its entirety (1995, 210). Rozman even considers Eurasianism to be "faulty as a cultural ideal" (2014, 202), which is in line with traditional binary accounts of the world's European and Asian "cultural and administrative traditions" (Watson 2006, 69). Morozov contends that Russia developed a "subaltern" relationship with Europe as early as the start of the sixteenth century, when trade moved to the

high seas from its more traditional land- and river-based routes, rendering Russia a supplier of commodities to the "global core" at the beginning of its imperial development (2015, 86-90). The central position occupied by Europe and the broader West in Russian identity formation is visible in that even in instances when Russia tries to distinguish itself from European political trends including liberalism, it often posits itself as embodying "true" European values (Neumann 1995, 194).

However, Russia's concern over questions of status has also produced a tendency to distinguish itself through non-European identities or discourses. Although Europe has long been the main "Other" against which Russia has measured itself, the latter's inclusion into European international society "divided the intellectual culture" of the country along the lines of the extent to which it is (or should be) European or Western (Neumann 1995, 202). Lo cites a belief held by some Russians that their country is "not European or Asian, Christian or Muslim; it is *all* those things, a civilization unto itself" (2015, 17). Nearly all of Russia's "most important economic and political centres", including Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk, are located "deep in the mainland" of Eurasia and not in or adjacent to the European peninsula (Silaev and Sushentsov 2018, 9). Moreover, Russia began its current "pivot to the east" in the early 2010s, even before the onset of the conflict over Ukraine, suggesting that Russia's Eurasian turn is not merely a reaction to Western policies (Bolt and Cross 2018, 12; Bordachev 2018, 83). Some go so far as to assert that in the centuries that followed Tsar Peter the Great's initial efforts at Westernization, Russia had already begun to decouple, in identity-related terms, from Europe. While the Russian political elite in the eighteenth century insisted that their country was firmly European and culturally superior to Asia, nineteenth-century intellectuals often saw Russia as embodying an East-West hybrid or a "world of its own"; by the end of the Second World War, and as communism spread, Moscow had become more comfortable asserting its affinities with Asia (Tolz 2001, 151).

Such views highlight the enduring elements of diversity in global international society, casting doubt on the durability of any monist and expansionist liberal hegemony. Moscow's recent pivot toward Eurasia has been accompanied by a conservative turn in the country's political discourse, with Putin beginning to espouse the "conservative values of the majority" upon his return to the Kremlin in 2012 (Sakwa 2017, 125). However, even many Russian liberals view NATO as a threat to their country's security, despite their ideological preferences and desire for a modicum of cooperative relations with the West (Tsygankov 2013, 92). Even in the absence of a turn away from liberalism, the Russian leadership has determined that integrating with the West would prevent it from retaining its sovereignty (Lukin 2018, 176-7), "freedom of action" (Trenin 2019b), and "independent strategic concerns" (Sakwa 2017, 244). The mere establishment of "friendly relations" with the US and Europe is now viewed as necessitating Moscow's "complete political submission" (Lukin 2018, 15). For a country that considers independent great power status as being "inseparable from national identity", acquiescence to the vision of a global order rooted in American leadership is impossible (Petersson 2013, 11).[10]

[10] Although the Trump administration was accused of abandoning the principle of American global leadership, it nonetheless went further in some respects than the Obama administration in challenging Russian interests by providing lethal assistance to Ukraine, increasing the American military presence in Eastern Europe, withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies Treaties, directly striking the Russian-backed al-Assad regime in Syria, and pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). As such, while it is possible that a gradual decoupling has begun to occur between liberal ordering practices and Washington's pursuit of primacy, the dynamic of Moscow's inability to acquiesce to key aspects of an American-dominated order has remained unchanged. For further analysis of this dynamic, see Paikin (2019).

Russia's launching of the EAEU and the consolidation of rival regulatory orders in the wider European space has led to calls for dialogue and bridge-building between these orders (Dienes et al. 2019, 33-52). However, in large part, hope for high-level discussions has been met instead by mere "informal contacts" between the European and Eurasian Commissions, with the EU preferring to engage with EAEU member states on a bilateral basis (van der Togt 2020). Even a more ambitious harmonization of both projects would represent an "integration of integrations" rather than Russia's integration into the Western order as initially envisioned by many after the Cold War. Studin (2018b) suggests that Canada now faces a somewhat related dilemma regarding the need to construct "interstitial regimes between international blocs", including between the EAEU and the "post-NAFTA architecture for North America – across the Arctic space". A regulatory logic for relations between blocs lends credence to the 'expansion' ES narrative that sees the decline of sociability as the advent of systemic relations, while the proliferation of new institutional architecture would conform to the 'globalization' account's prediction of increasingly complex content being the result of normative contestation.

Russia has been influenced by both the West and the East throughout its long history. Even the liberal Yeltsin-era foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev spoke as early as 1992 about the importance of not definitively choosing between East and West (Bolt and Cross 2018, 34-5; Lukin 2018, 73), even if Moscow's overriding aim was to pursue integration with the latter.[11] Moreover, the debate surrounding whether Western liberalism is suitable for Russia is merely a product of the past two centuries and is separate from the more longstanding questions concerning how Russia can catch up with Western countries' technological, military, and economic prowess (Kuchins and Zevelev 2012, 182). This highlights how the difficulties associated with Russia integrating into any Western hegemonic order are compounded by the liberal character of the contemporary West. The result – even in the case of a country such as Russia with its European affinities – is a global order featuring salient elements of normative thinness and diversity. Although Moscow's eastward turn may be partial and the politics of Eurasianism may take multiple forms, the rise of the Eurasian dimension in Russian political discourse is likely to buttress the relative importance of statism and great power status in the realm of national identity, solidifying some of the dividing lines that have prevented Moscow from reaching an accommodation with the contemporary liberal order (Laruelle 2017, 145-56).

Liberal Order and International Society Revisited

Enduring elements of Russian distinctiveness and its concerns over international status, when combined with disagreements over the shape of post-Cold War Europe, have led to the erosion of the liberal order's hegemonic position. Trenin highlights Washington's reduced reach by asserting that Moscow's actions in Ukraine "essentially took Russia out of the post-Cold War system" and that its subsequent campaign in Syria "broke the de facto monopoly of the US and its allies on military interventions" (2018, 20). Any hegemon's status in international society is "permanently conditional" and "subject to ongoing contestation in terms of its degree of legitimacy" (Clark 2011, 49). If the US wishes to "retain its own monopoly" and not forge a collective hegemony with other great powers, it may now be forced to "seek social sanction within a more limited constituency" (2011, 66).

[11] For more on how Russian bicontinentalism is intertwined with Russia's great power identity, see Sakwa (2015b).

However, having already embarked on a large-scale project to transform international society, a 'retreat' to a strictly bounded community would generate the perception that Washington's pursuit of continued pre-eminence was being decoupled from its liberal ordering practices. On the other hand, doubling down on the liberal order's pursuit of universal scope would lead to a continued a roadblock in the form of international society's embedded normative polycentrism (Phillips 2017, 43-60; Watson 2006, 54). In either instance, the perceived legitimacy of the liberal order's hegemonic position in international society would be downgraded. The first of these two options reflects the challenge to the liberal order's global hegemonic position posed by the Trump administration, in which the United States is accused of abandoning a set of ordering principles once it no longer appears to be in its interest to pursue them. But the latter option reveals how the liberal order's hegemonic position was already beginning to erode before the election of Donald Trump. An ES approach can therefore serve to illustrate the extent to which the Trump administration has been more of a catalyst than the cause of the advent of a global order beset by great power rivalry. This contrasts with liberal scholars such as Ikenberry who have asserted that the crisis of the liberal order "can only be averted by more liberal order" (2013, 101).

The aforementioned structural challenges facing the liberal order can inform Canadian foreign policy under the Trudeau government and beyond, which in recent years has been geared toward an explicit effort to uphold the "rules-based international order" (Government of Canada 2017). Since the liberal international order has failed to become synonymous with international society, it would be logical to draw the conclusion that the former must eventually "come to terms with other ideas about and approaches to world order" (Acharya 2018, 158). Per this logic, if Canada has an abiding interest in maintaining stable relations with its Arctic neighbour Russia, then its commitment to strengthening global multilateralism must be calibrated to acknowledge the limited global appeal of Western norms and hegemony. Yet if Canada adopts a more hands-off approach toward promoting liberal norms and values, it has the potential to affect Ottawa's relations with Washington under the Biden presidency, given the former US Vice President's stated commitment to restoring American global leadership (Biden 2020). While the precise nature of US international engagement under the Biden administration remains to be determined, the very notion of leadership has the potential to generate a self-sustaining posture of primacy. As Shapiro (2020) notes,

> [A]lliances create their own logic that helps justify ever greater U.S. engagement on the global stage. Once an alliance is created, you must defend it and therefore need to constantly expand your military infrastructure and even the alliance itself. To do otherwise is to leave allies exposed and risk losing the credibility that holds the whole system of leadership together.

Therefore, even in the absence of a US-led effort to spread the geographic frontiers of the liberal order, antagonistic relations with other great powers are likely to endure. When paired with the high level of Canadian dependence on the United States in a post-Cold War era that has featured continental free trade and a hegemonic liberal West, the task of reaching a new Canadian foreign policy equilibrium is a significant challenge.

Early ES writers such as Wight contended that a states system often develops into a universal empire such as in the Chinese and Hellenistic-Roman worlds (1977, 33-43). However, despite Russia's centuries-long participation in the European balance-of-power system, no such universal empire has been produced in post-Cold War Europe. Some may point to the fact that Russia and China have thus far not been able to advance their own "broad set of alternative ideas for the organization of world order" (Ikenberry 2018, 23). However, the presence of a

clear alternative is not always necessary for change to occur at the international level, with Lebow contending that an order may break down when "the discrepancy between behaviour and the principles of justice" on which existing hierarchies rest becomes "great and obvious" – a concise conceptual description of the difficulties resulting from the liberal order's inherent tensions outlined above (2008, 26). In fact, in the international realm rather than the domestic one, orders are "more sensitive to unit-level change" due to the presence of fewer actors (2008, 507).

Russia's ambiguous relationship with Europe – to say nothing of its conflict with the Western-led liberal order – can provide an indication of the norms informing global international society in today's era of rivalry. The English School's list of primary institutions has included the balance of power, great power management, and sovereignty, among others (Buzan 2014, 101-12). If one adopts a Europe-centric 'expansion' account, then certain primary institutions such as the balance of power and great power management, which Russia inherited from Europe in the centuries after Westphalia, have since become an obstacle to Russia's integration into the Western political community. The legitimacy of those two primary institutions, while expressed in universal bodies of today's international society such as the United Nations, sits uncomfortably with the principles that are unique to the liberal order, an order averse to the notion of spheres of influence and rooted in US leadership (Allison 2020). The persistence of institutions such as great power management and the balance of power is crucial to the notion, central in Russia's identity and foreign policy discourse, that Moscow plays an important and legitimate role in upholding a stable global order (Rumer and Sokolsky 2020). The fact that contestation continues to occur over the shape, or even the very legitimacy, of these institutions in the context of a largely unipolar distribution of power demonstrates that the English School remains a useful lens through which to analyse contemporary great power relations. This utility is reinforced by Moscow's often "constitutionalist" foreign policy predisposition in recent decades, preoccupied with *who* gets to make international rules rather than with what the rules precisely are (Allison 2013, 203).

Regarding the institution of sovereignty, various scholars have cast doubt on the traditional account that it had consolidated in any recognizable form by 1648 (Bartelson 1995, 137; Teschke 2003). Contemporary ES and constructivist scholars have illustrated how non-Western powers played a significant role in developing the norm of sovereignty, extended to all on the principle of human equality, as it is understood today (Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 2013, 181; Buzan 2014, 141). Sovereignty only became fully synonymous with non-intervention in the twentieth century, and in prior centuries was deeply intertwined with the notions of the right to wage a just war or the balance of power between faiths (Morozov 2015, 142-43; Tilly 1992, 61). Therefore, Moscow's attachment to the norm of sovereignty can be interpreted more as an expression of support for the institutions of global international society rather than the norms of a West-centric liberal order.[12] Again, this shows the utility of an ES approach in interpreting contemporary great power relations, as it enables us to understand the (admittedly inconsistent) "conservative institutionalist" and not just instrumental nature of Moscow's defence of certain international normative tenets (Sokov 2018).

A comprehensive ES analysis bringing together the assumptions of earlier and later accounts demonstrates the diffuse and decentralized character of the emerging international society. However, this does not necessarily imply that the momentum favouring deeper cooperation

---

[12] Sakwa's (2017, 47) conception of Russian neo-revisionism explicitly contends that Russia perceives itself to be challenging the liberal order while defending the autonomy of international society, a position which aligns with the conclusions reached in this article.

ISSN 2562-8429

and some normative convergence will cease in its entirety, as international society's pluralistic fabric is historically linked with the centuries-old impulse toward some form of universal solidarity (Buzan 2014, 99-100).[13] Nonetheless, it has now become clear that even Russia, a power heavily influenced by European international society for centuries, has been unable to find a satisfactory place for itself in the Western-led order commensurate with that order's norms and expectations. It therefore stands to reason that China, which never aspired to join a 'Greater West' as Russia did after the fall of the Iron Curtain, will also have difficulty forging an intimate relationship with the West that is rooted in shared identities and common understandings surrounding the legitimate shape of key norms and institutions (Sakwa 2017, 291). If one acknowledges a distinction between systemic and social realms, then the liberal international order may be capable of functioning as an international system focused on common rules of external behaviour, but not as a world order encompassing the diverse identities and normative preferences of global international society.[14]

Conclusion

The existence of some form of hegemony has traditionally been the norm in international society (Buzan 2014, 52-53). With the resumption of great power rivalry, the liberal order as currently conceived has clearly failed to retain its hegemonic capabilities, to say nothing of its professed universal appeal. Whether this contestation leads to greater instability or to the further development of international society's agreed-upon norms and institutions, the outcome is invariably a form of change.[15] It is possible that a more inclusive form of collective great power hegemony may take the liberal order's place once the dust from the current global disorder has settled, which may not be entirely dissimilar to the 'diffused hegemony' of great powers that composed the Concert of Europe (Kofman 2018; Watson 1992, 239-240). However, if relations between great powers continue to exhibit a primarily rivalrous character, one may be forced to contemplate the conceptual contours of order – and even, to a certain extent, universalism – without hegemony, with implications for liberal and non-liberal states alike.[16] Such an order would not exhibit the contradictions of liberal hegemony nor the tensions between a monist liberal order and pluralist international society, although Washington may still gear its international posture toward preserving its material primacy (Beckley 2020). Therefore, although Canada's relative material dependence on the United States might endure, some of the more normative constraints on Canadian foreign policy in terms of recalibrating

---

[13] Sørensen encapsulates this idea by predicting a "more decentred world" even as "globalization, global institutions and common global problems" continue to tie humanity together (2016, 20).

[14] Zakaria (2019) captures this by noting that American engagement with communist China has been successful in moderating Beijing's external behaviour over the long term, and that it was not primarily designed to transform the country's internal economic and political system in any fundamental fashion.

[15] This is also in line with the expectations of scholars cited in this article who study hegemony's normative dimensions. Lebow claims that his "cultural theory" of international relations privileges "process over structure and change over stability" (2008, 58). Watson notes that swings in his "pendulum" model, which measures the relative power and influence possessed by a hegemonic state, appear more permanent than they actually are (1997, 123).

[16] Lebow already contends that the international orders of the modern era "were not imposed by a dominant power but the product of negotiation and compromise among multiple parties" (2018, 145-146). However, this question is even more conceptually germane in the context of the post-Cold War world, which features the first international order of genuinely global scope (Khanna 2019, 2), not rigidly divided by blocs or explicitly featuring a core and a periphery.

ISSN 2562-8429

its relations with Russia may wane, albeit only after the current cycle of normative contestation has run its course.

REFERENCES

Acharya, Amitav. 2018. *The End of American World Order*. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity.

Allison, Graham. 2020. "America and the New Spheres of Influence." *Foreign Affairs*, February 10, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence.

Allison, Roy. 2013. *Russia, the West, and Military Intervention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barkin, J. Samuel. 2010. *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, Michael N. 2019. "The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed." *The Global*, April 16, 2019. https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/.

Bartelson, Jens. 1995. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beckley, Michael. 2020. "Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century." *Foreign Affairs*, October 6, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-06/illiberal-american-century-rogue-superpower.

Biden, Jr. Joseph R. 2020. "Why America Must Lead Again." *Foreign Affairs*, January 23, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.

Bolt, Paul J. and Cross, Sharyl N. 2018. *China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bordachev, Timofei. 2018. "Russia's Eurasia Moment: Politics, Economics, Business." In *Eurasia on the Edge: Managing Complexity*, edited by P. Dutkiewicz, R. Sakwa and F. Lukyanov, 69-90. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bozeman, Adda. 1984. "The International Order in a Multicultural World." In *The Expansion of International Society*, 1992, edited by H. Bull and A. Watson, 387-406. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bressler, Michael L. 2008. "Politics." In *Understanding Contemporary Russia*, edited by M.L. Bressler, 91-127. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Buchanan, Elizabeth. 2020. "Why Russia Wants Stability in the Arctic." *The Maritime Executive*, September 27, 2020. https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-why-russia-wants-stability-in-the-arctic.

Buzan, Barry. 2012. "How regions were made, and the legacies for world politics: an English School reconnaissance." In *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation*, edited by T.V. Paul, 22-47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ISSN 2562-8429

Buzan, Barry. 2014. *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Canadian Press. 2014. "John Baird leading Canadian delegation to Ukraine." February 25, 2014. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-baird-leading-canadian-delegation-to-ukraine-1.2551235.

Casier, Tom. 2018. "Gorbachev's 'Common European Home' and its relevance for Russian foreign policy today." *Debater a Europa* 18: 17-34.

Chalmers, Malcolm. 2019. "Which Rules? Why There is No Single 'Rules-Based International System'." *Royal United Services Institute*, April 2019. https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/Which-Rules-Why-There-Is-No-Single-Rules-Based-International-System.

Clark, Ian. 2011. *Hegemony in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coker, Christopher. 2015. *The Improbable War: China, the United States and the Logic of Great Power Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Coker, Christopher. 2019. *The Rise of the Civilizational State*. Cambridge: Polity.

Cox, Michael. 2013. "Power and the Liberal Order." In *After Liberalism?: The Future of Liberalism in International Relations*, edited by R. Friedman, K. Oskanian and R.P. Pardo, 103-116. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dienes, Alexandra, Sergey Afontsev, Peter Balás, Rodica Crudu and Diana Galoyan. 2019. "Economic Integration." In *A Consensus Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia*, edited by S. Charap, J. Shapiro, J. Drennan, O. Chalyi, R. Krumm, Y. Nikitina & G. Sasse, 33-52. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Donnelly, Jack. 2017. "Beyond Hierarchy." In *Hierarchies in World Politics*, edited by A. Zarakol, 244-265. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feigenbaum, Evan A. 2020. "Why the United States and China Forgot How to Cooperate." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 28, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/why-united-states-and-china-forgot-how-to-cooperate-pub-81673.

Flockhart, Trine. 2016. "The coming multi-order world." *Contemporary Security Policy* 37 (1): 3-30.

Government of Canada. 2014. "Canada Welcomes Political Change Taking Place in Ukraine." Ottawa, February 22, 2014. https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/02/canada-welcomes-political-change-taking-place-ukraine.html.

ISSN 2562-8429

Government of Canada. 2017. "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities." Ottawa, June 6, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.

Greene, Samuel A. 2016. "Future approaches to the US." *EU Institute for Security Studies – Russian Futures: Horizon 2025*, no. 26, edited by H. Haukkala and N. Popescu: 41-46.

Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Christopher Marsh. 2013. *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Harrison, Ewan. 2009. "The Contradictions of Unipolarity." In *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation*, edited by A. Freyberg-Inan, E. Harrison and P. James, 76-101. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hill, William H. 2019. "Russia's Search for a Place in Europe." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 61 (3): 93-101.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2013. "The Liberal Order and Its Discontents." In *After Liberalism?: The Future of Liberalism in International Relations*, edited by R. Friedman, K. Oskanian and R.P. Pardo, 91-102. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. "The end of liberal international order?" *International Affairs* 94 (1): 7-23.

Jahn, Beate. 2013. "Liberalism – In Theory and History." In *After Liberalism?: The Future of Liberalism in International Relations*, edited by R. Friedman, K. Oskanian and R.P. Pardo, 15-32. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Karaganov, Sergei. 2016. "From East to West, or Greater Eurasia." *Russia in Global Affairs*, October 25, 2016. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/From-East-to-West-or-Greater-Eurasia-18440.

Khanna, Parag. 2019. *The Future Is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Kluge, Janis and Michael Richter. 2020. "The Lisbon-Vladivostok illusion." *Riddle*, March 20, 2020. https://www.ridl.io/en/the-lisbon-vladivostok-illusion/.

Knutsen, Torbjørn L. 1999. *The Rise and Fall of World Orders*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Kofman, Michael. 2018. "Raiding and International Brigandry: Russia's Strategy for Great Power Competition." *War on the Rocks*, June 14, 2018. https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/.

Kofman, Michael. 2019. "Towards a Sino-Russian entente?" *Riddle*, November 29, 2019. https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente/.

Kolesnikov, Andrei. 2015. "Why the Kremlin Is Shutting Down the Novorossiya Project." *Carnegie Moscow Center*, May 29, 2015. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/60249.

Kortunov, Andrey. 2019. "Russia's Troubles and Options." *Global Brief* (Fall/Winter 2019). https://globalbrief.ca/2018/10/russias-troubles-and-options/.

Kuchins, Andrew C. and Igor Zevelev. 2012. "Russia's Contested National Identity and Foreign Policy." In *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia*, edited by H.R. Nau and D.M. Ollapally, 181-209. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kudrin, Alexei and Vladimir Mau. 2018. "The Principles and Goals of the Russian States in the Twenty-First Century." In *Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration*, edited by I. Studin, 17-30. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laruelle, Marlene. 2017. "When Eurasia Looks East: Is Eurasianism Sinophile or Sinophobe?" In *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy*, edited by M. Bassin and G. Pozo, 145-160. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Lebow, Richard N. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard N. 2018. *The Rise and Fall of Political Orders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Jongsoo. 2020. "Russia, China, and the Indo-Pacific: An Interview with Dmitri Trenin." *The Diplomat*, September 18, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/russia-china-and-the-indo-pacific-an-interview-with-dmitri-trenin/

Lind, Jennifer and Daryl G. Press. 2020. "Reality Check: American Power in an Age of Constraints." *Foreign Affairs*, February 10, 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-10/reality-check.

Linklater, Andrew and Hidemi Suganami. 2006. *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lo, Bobo. 2015. *Russia and the New World Disorder*. Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press.

Lo, Bobo. 2019a. "Greater Eurasia: The Emperor's New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come?" *Ifri*, Russie.Nei.Reports No. 27, July 2019. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/bobo_lo_greater_eurasia_2019.pdf

Lo, Bobo. 2019b. "Once more with feeling: Russia and the Asia-Pacific." *Lowy Institute*, August 20, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/once-more-feeling-russia-and-asia-pacific.

Lukin, Alexander. 2018. *China and Russia: The New Rapprochement*. Cambridge: Polity.

Lukyanov, Fyodor. 2019. "Dawn Breaks on New Era in EU-Russia Relations." *Carnegie Moscow Center*, July 8, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79452.

Mezhuyev, Boris V. 2008. "Modern Russia and Postmodern Europe." *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 2, 2008. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/modern-russia-and-postmodern-europe/.

Milbank, John and Adrian Pabst. 2016. *The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future*. London: Rowman and Littlefield.

Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. *Theory of Unipolar Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morozov, Viatcheslav. 2015. *Russia's Postcolonial Identity: A Subaltern Empire in a Eurocentric World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Neumann, Iver B. 1995. *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. 2019. "The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump." *International Affairs* 95 (1): 63-80.

Paikin, Zachary. 2019. "World Order Revisited: Resilience and Challenges." *Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations*, January 9, 2019. https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/opinions/world-order-revisited-resilience-and-challenges.

Paikin, Zachary. 2020. "Great power rivalry and the weakening of collective hegemony: revisiting the relationship between international society and international order." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 34 (1), doi: 10.1080/09557571.2020.1720602

Paikin, Zachary, Kaneshko Sangar and Camille-Renaud Merlen. 2019. "Russia's Eurasian past, present and future: rival international societies and Moscow's place in the post-cold war world." *European Politics and Society* 20 (2): 225-43.

Petersson, Bo. 2013. "Mirror, mirror… Myth-making, self-images and views of the US 'Other' in contemporary Russia." In *Russia's Identity in International Relations: Images, perceptions, misperceptions*, edited by R. Taras, 11-23. Abingdon: Routledge.

Phillips, Andrew. 2017. "International Systems." In *The Globalization of International Society*, edited by T. Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 43-62. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Philpott, Daniel. 2001. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Popeski, Ron. 2015. "Harper's tough stance on Ukraine out of step with international reality." *CBC News*, October 1, 2015. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/stephen-harper-ukraine-opinion-1.3251864.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 2013. "The Liberal International Order Reconsidered." In *After Liberalism?: The Future of Liberalism in International Relations*, edited by R. Friedman, K. Oskanian and R.P. Pardo, 167-86. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 2014. "Power, Legitimacy, and Order." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7 (3): 341-59.

Reus-Smit, Christian and Tim Dunne. 2017. "The Globalization of International Society." In *The Globalization of International Society*, edited by T. Dunne and C. Reus-Smit, 18-41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richter, James. 1996. "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity." In *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, edited by C.A. Wallander, 69-94. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rozman, Gilbert. 2014. *The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East vs. West in the 2010s*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rumer, Eugene and Richard Sokolsky. 2020. "Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, September 8, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657.

Sakwa, Richard. 2015a. "The death of Europe? Continental futures after Ukraine." *International Affairs* 91 (3): 553-79.

Sakwa, Richard. 2015b. "Dualism at Home and Abroad: Russian Foreign Policy Neo-revisionism and Bicontinentalism." In *Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations*, edited by D. Cadier and M. Light, 65-79. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sakwa, Richard. 2017. *Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shapiro, Jeremy. 2020. "The Future of U.S. Global Leadership." *Boston Review*, June 15, 2020. http://bostonreview.net/war-security-politics/jeremy-shapiro-future-us-global-leadership

Sherwood, Leah. 2018. "Eurasian Security Constructs and Institutional Capacity." In *Eurasia on the Edge: Managing Complexity*, edited by P. Dutkiewicz, R. Sakwa and F. Lukyanov, 53-68. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Silaev, Nikolai and Andrei Sushentsov. 2018. "Strategic Security in Eurasia." In *Eurasia on the Edge: Managing Complexity*, edited by P. Dutkiewicz, R. Sakwa and F. Lukyanov, 7-20. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Smith, Martin A. 2012. *Power in the Changing Global Order: The US, Russia and China.* Cambridge: Polity.

Smith, Martin A. and Paul Latawski. 2003. *The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Sokov, Nikolai. 2018. “The Putin-Trump Summit: In Helsinki, Three Worldviews Will Clash.” *The National Interest*, July 15, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/putin-trump-summit-helsinki-three-worldviews-will-clash-25766.

Sørensen, Georg. 2011. *A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Sørensen, Georg. 2016. *Rethinking the New World Order*. London: Palgrave.

Studin, Irvin. 2018a. “Ten Theses on Russia in the 21st Century.” *Global Brief* (Winter 2018). https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/chapter-1-ten-theses-on-russia-in-the-21st-century/.

Studin, Irvin. 2018b. “Canada’s Four-Point Game, Part II.” *Global Brief* (Winter 2018). https://globalbrief.ca/2017/11/canadas-four-point-game-part-ii/.

Sushentsov, Andrey. 2019. “Russia – a Global Revisionist?” *Valdai Discussion Club*, June 12, 2019. https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-a-global-revisionist/.

Sushentsov, Andrey A. and William C. Wohlforth. 2020. “The tragedy of US–Russian relations: NATO centrality and the revisionists’ spiral.” *International Politics* 57 (3): 427-50.

Tang, Shiping. 2016. “Order: A Conceptual Analysis.” *Chinese Political Sciences Review* 1: 30-46.

Teschke, Benno. 2003. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London: Verso.

Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.

van der Togt, Tony. 2020. “The EU and the Eurasian Economic Union: Dealing with a Common Chinese Challenge.” *Institut für Sicherheitspolitik*, April 30, 2020. https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/the-eu-and-the-eurasian-economic-union-dealing-with-a-common-chinese-challenge/.

Tolz, Vera. 2001. *Russia: Inventing the Nation*. London: Bloomsbury.

Trenin, Dmitri. 2018. “Russia as a Disruptor of the Post-Cold War Order: To What Effect?” *Raisina Files: Debating Disruption in the World Order* 3, edited by R. Passi and H.V. Pant: 18-23. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.

Trenin, Dmitri. 2019a. “20 Years of Vladimir Putin: How Russian Foreign Policy Has Changed.” *The Moscow Times*, August 27, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/27/20-years-of-vladimir-putin-how-russian-foreign-policy-has-changed-a67043

Trenin, Dmitri. 2019b. “It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy.” *Carnegie Moscow Center*, April 25, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78990.

Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2013. *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wallander, Celeste A. 1996. "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Russian Foreign Policy." In *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, edited by C.A. Wallander, 207-218. Boulder: Westview Press.

Watson, Adam. 1984a. "Russia and the European States System." In *The Expansion of International Society*, 1992, edited by H. Bull and A. Watson, 61-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Watson, Adam. 1984b. "European International Society and its Expansion." In *The Expansion of International Society*, 1992, edited by H. Bull and A. Watson, 13-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Watson, Adam. 1992. *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Watson, Adam. 1997. *The Limits of Independence: Relations between States in the Modern World*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Watson, Adam. 2006. *Hegemony & History*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Wight, Martin. 1977. *Systems of States.* London: Continuum International Publishing.

Zakaria, Fareed. 2019. "The New China Scare." *Foreign Affairs*, December 6, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare

 Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 14(1) 2020: 6-29
ISSN 2562-8429

Published by the Centre for European Studies at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Available online at: https://ojs.library.carleton.ca/index.php/CJERS/index

The Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies (CJERS – formerly Review of European and Russian Affairs) is an open-access electronic academic peer-reviewed journal: articles are subject to double-blind peer-review. Topics relate to the European Union, its Member States, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. The journal is published by the Centre for European Studies, an associated unit of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University.

CJERS aims to provide an accessible forum for the promotion and dissemination of high quality research and scholarship.

Contact:
Carleton University
The Centre for European Studies
1103 Dunton Tower
1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6
Canada

Tel: +01 613 520-2600 ext. 3117; E-mail: CJERS@carleton.ca

Creative Commons License

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

This Working Paper is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-
No Derivs 4.0 Unported License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

Articles appearing in this publication may be freely quoted and reproduced, provided the source is acknowledged. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes.

ISSN: 2562-8429
© 2019 The Author(s)