

Trade Unions and the State: An Interpretative Essay on the
Historical Development of Class and
State Relations in Canada, 1889 - 1947

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INTRODUCTION

This essay investigates the interaction between the Canadian state and trade unions during the first half of this century primarily in terms of the political incorporation of trade unions in Canada. The basis of our investigation is the work of those theorists who spoke to the importance of the state and trade unions under advanced capitalism and whose familiarity in this area aided our historical exploration. We discovered that incorporation of Canada's Unions was an uneven process with the federal level taking the lead over the provincial. We conclude by expanding on certain notions of the state and the role trade unions play within advanced capitalism.

Theories stressing the limits and possibilities of trade union action in capitalist societies can be subsumed under two broad categories. First, what might broadly be termed the sociological tradition was founded upon such writers as S. Perlman (1928) in the United States and Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1902) in the United Kingdom. More recently, a group based at the Berkeley Institute of Industrial Relations and which included such noted academics as Daniel Bell, R. Dubin, Clark Kerr, S.M. Lipset and A.M. Ross came to dominate the field in the 1950's and 1960's. In Britain as well there are many theorists who belong in this tradition. Some, such as Alan Fox (1974) and J.H. Goldthorpe (1974) are more 'radical' in their approach while others like H.A. Clegg (1951), A. Flanders (1965), H.A. Turner (1962), G.S. Bain (1970), to mention only a few, remain more "liberal" in their orientation. Second, there is the Marxist tradition which

includes revolutionaries such as K. Marx, A. Gramsci, R. Luxemburg, V. Lenin and L. Trotsky. It is represented today by a growing number of young practitioners, mostly, though not exclusively, from Great Britain: Robin Blackburn (1967), Victor Allen (1972), Richard Hyman (1971) and Perry Anderson (1967).

THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

The dominant sociological approach centres on the changing dynamics of class consciousness and class conflict under advanced capitalism. Distilling from the literature, we can outline at least five major interrelated propositions. First, industrialization is depicted as a modernizing trend which will eventually eliminate vestiges of traditional institutions and values. In other words, the secular will come to replace the sacred.¹ Second, as Michael Mann (1973: 10) notes with reference to the "end of ideology" theorists, their "central tenet would be that there is an inherent strain in the industrialization process toward the compromise of class interests and the institutionalization of conflict." Third, once institutionalized, class conflict becomes isolated or fragmented into separate spheres of dispute. This is due to an argument that sees the institutionalization of conflict necessarily involving the isolation of economic from political action. As Mann further argues "the institutionalization of industrial conflict is nothing more nor less than the narrowing down of conflict to aggressive economism and defensive control" (Mann, 1973: 21). In addition, it is held that such conflict is so fragmented that it no longer threatens social stability but becomes a functional part of society.² Put another way, the segmentation of life in advanced capitalist society constitutes an obstacle to the realization of class consciousness (Dunlop: 1958). Fourth, the rising standard of living or working class affluence in advanced industrial societies inevitably

leads to a decline in conflict. And, finally, the working class is reasonably content with its lot and exhibits little indication of alienation, deprivation or socialist consciousness.

Trade unions enter the picture as reducing the class nature of the conflict by focusing almost exclusively on economic or instrumental demands. They represent the organization apparatus which has plugged into the complicated web of government and business agencies, boards and committees. Although it varies from industry to industry, generally the older the labour union, the more complete the institutionalization of class conflict would be, thereby reducing the necessity for the organization to exhibit a radical political content.

The process of institutionalization is never complete. The sociological explanation for why this happens can be reduced to two root factors. First, we must consider the particular characteristic of each national economy; this includes the important differences in the industrial segments of mining, and manufacturing, and the service sector which, in turn, result in variations in the level of legitimate trade union involvement in the national economy. Second, employers of labour become critical components in the working out of the role of trade unions under capitalism. As employer attitudes change away from what Richard Lester has called the "commodity concept" of employment to the "welfare concept", a reduction in the intensity and violence of industrial conflict results. On the other hand, the reverse is also true. Class conflict will intensify if the employer refuses to play by the rules of the game which include trade union recognition and collective bargaining (Ingham: 1974: 16).

The major thrust of the sociological approach characterizes capitalist social relations as tending towards the isolation of conflict into separate industrial disputes and the narrowing of

conflict to aggressive economism provided the employer will play the game. In all, compromise and sectoral conflict are seen to be the dominant tendencies which bear on the problem of trade unions under advanced capitalism.

THE MARXIST TRADITION

The sociological approach has indeed borrowed many of the ideas which were germane to the Marxist tradition. A key difference is the political thrust of their arguments.³ While the sociological approach ends with the limited or constrained political role of trade unions the Marxist tradition moves in a revolutionary direction while at the same time acknowledging certain limitations to trade union action under capitalism.

The limitations of trade union action under capitalism were seen to be the result of the fact that trade unions crystallized or institutionalized the existence of the working class in the factory. They did not transcend capitalist social relations. Trade unions were the expression of class relations and as such would become a prisoner of them. Consequently, as Lenin came to argue, the labour movement by itself can only develop trade union consciousness that is, "the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight employers and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation" (1967: 117). Such consciousness, he argues, cannot transcend the existing social structure without the intervention of a revolutionary party. Socialism as the political generalization of immediate economic interests had to be learned, and it was up to the party cadres to become the active participants within the working class to bring about the desired goal.

We do not intend to go into any detail on the historical experiences which led most revolutionaries to this position, nor will we delve into the important differences in strategy and tactics within this

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tradition. The problematic of the contracted political role of trade unions under advance capitalism is shared by both the Marxist and sociological traditions - each of which provides some indication as to why this has occurred. What distinguishes the Marxist tradition from the sociological approach centers on the theoretical analysis of the exploitive relationship between capitalists and workers. The inherently antagonistic interests between the two great classes of capitalism rest on the appropriation of surplus value by capitalists from the working class. Therefore, the incorporation of the working class and its organizations can only be of limited success. The fundamental contradiction still remains and is a constant source of conflict for the system as a whole (Hyman, 1975: 68, 96, 103).

One, but by no means the only Marxist to contribute to the understanding of this problematic was Leon Trotsky. Just before his assassination he was investigating the question of the role of trade unions under late ...capitalism (1975). He added certain dimensions to the study of this problem by stressing trade union bureaucratization and the "growing together" of "modern trade union organizations throughout the world" with the state (1975: 68). He saw this process as being "equally characteristic of the neutral, the social democratic, the Communist and the anarchist trade unions" because it derived from "social conditions common to all unions" (1975: 68-69). As with Lenin, these common social conditions were seen to stem from the emergence of monopoly capitalism which forced trade unions to "confront a centralized capitalist adversary, intimately bound up with state power". As such, trade unions - "insofar as they remain on reformist positions, i.e. on positions of adapting themselves to private property (must) adapt themselves to the capitalist state and ...contend for its cooperation" (1975: 69).

Unlike the sociological approach which made impressionistic

references to the impact of industrialization on trade unions and the changing attitudes of employers, Trotsky stressed the centralizing tendencies of capital and its connections with the state. This facilitated both the consolidation of trade union organizations and their bureaucratization, a process which Hyman (1971) refers to as Trotsky's thesis of incorporation. Here Trotsky, more explicitly than Lenin, encompasses in his examination the intentional strategies of industry and the state. He notes, how, particularly in periods of economic and political 'difficulty', government and leaders of large corporate enterprises deliberately plan to integrate trade unions into state structures thereby mitigating threats from below to the dominance of capital. While government and industry viewed positively an incorporated, and therefore more easily regulated and controlled labour force, the trade union leadership, for its own bureaucratic reasons also favoured such a development. Trade Union leaders would see their primary task as "freeing the state from the embrace of capitalism, in weakening its dependence on trusts, in pulling it over to their side" (1975: 69). In this manner, they mistakenly believed the "independence" of trade unions would be assured and a better deal for the workers could be extracted from the profits of monopoly capitalism. Reformist leaders using their authority gained by "delivering the goods" in periods of expansion now function to condone, if not promote, this strategy. "Implicit in this argument," says Hyman (1971: 18), "is the thesis of incorporation: that union leaders, having acquired authority over their members, are used to assist capitalism in controlling the workers."⁴

In a period of capitalist decline and crises, Trotsky predicted that trade unions could move in one of two directions, either to serve as "secondary instruments of capitalism for the subordination and disciplining of workers or, on the contrary, the trade unions could

become the instruments of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat" (1975: 71).

The tendency (not "iron law"), towards incorporation differs fundamentally from the notion of the institutionalization of conflict discussed above. It is analysed as a tendency which attempts to temporarily counter the dynamic of class conflict. The conflictual dynamic between the two dominant social classes within capitalism is endemic to it and remains central here as it is in all writings within the Marxist tradition.

It is not necessary for this short essay to deal with the criticism that Trotsky did not envision the durability of capitalism after World War II and that his projections therefore failed to include the renewed basis for reformist action in the trade unions. His analysis has shown that one fruitful avenue to explore towards understanding the limited political role of trade unions would be an historical investigation of the interaction between the state and trade unions. To this question we now turn.

TRADE UNIONS AND THE STATE IN CANADA:
1889 - 1947

Over the past three-quarters of a century, a most important development for the working class in Western capitalist countries has been the expansion of the state's involvement in the class struggle. In the pages to follow, we intend to trace the historical development of the federal and provincial government's role in incorporating trade unions into specific state structures under the domination of capital. We begin our investigation by delving into some of the background statements and past positions taken by the Federal government concerning labour legislation in Canada.

THE ROYAL COMMISSIONS

We intend to refer to two Royal Commissions, The Royal Commission on Labour and Capital (1889) and The Royal Commission on Industrial Relations (1919), both influenced by similar musings in Great Britain, in order to outline the government's position on organized labour. First, the Royal Commission on Capital and Labour (1889) tells us that:

Labour organizations are necessary to enable working men to deal on equal terms with their employers. They encourage their members to study and discuss matters affecting their interests and to devise means for the betterment of their class. It is gratifying to be assured by many competent witnesses that labour bodies discourage strikes and other disturbances in industry, favour conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and adopt conservative and legitimate methods for promoting the welfare of the producing members of society. It is in evidence that most labour bodies strive effectively to promote temperance throughout the country, and especially among their members (emphasis added). 5

Two points are clear from this statement. First, "responsible" and "competent" trade unions were those which were effectively able to foster "temperance" in their membership by "discouraging strikes" and "adopting conservative and legitimate methods" to achieve their ends. The Royal Commissioners sought trade union leaders who were willing and able to compromise on their demands and minimize disruptive actions by the rank and file against the sanctity of property. Second, to focus on the legitimacy of trade unions as bargaining agents with capital in the era of "laissez-faire" capitalism is one indication of the far-sightedness of the Commissioners.

The Commission argued that on the basis of testimony from individuals representing all sections of Canadian society, trade unions should be accepted as representing the interests of the working class. Their willingness to compete for rewards within the system and not against

it must have compelled the Commissioners to view trade unions as "responsible" agents for the working class. As such, a further explanation for the position taken by the Royal Commission could have been due to the fact that industrialization was still in its infancy in Canada.

With an eye to Great Britain the commissioners may have felt that the exploitation and degradation of nascent capitalism there had resulted in indiscriminate acts of vandalism and destruction by the workers (e.g. Luddism). The restraints which trade union organizations could exercise over their membership may have been seen as a means of protecting property and fixed capital from those same destructive tendencies which appeared to be inherent in early industrial capitalist development.⁶

THE POLITICAL LOGIC

Important as that early statement may have been, it must be qualified to some extent. Not all unions were viewed in this manner by both the federal and provincial levels of the Canadian government. For instance, in 1903, a Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in British Columbia emphatically stated that "foreigners" from the United States who were nothing more than "socialist agitators of the most bigoted and ignorant type" should be punished for their trade union activities. These men came to Canada for no other reason than to "keep up unceasing friction between the employer and the employed."⁷ The action taken by the Federal Government in this matter has been neatly summarized by John Crispo:

"this report sparked the Senate of Canada to propose a similar amendment to the Criminal Code. Although the Bill was defeated by an overwhelming margin in the House of Commons, a member of the Senate put forward a comparable bill four years later. This time, however, it was tossed out by the Senate itself. The CMA (Canadian Manufacturers Association) proposal of two years later had no better luck. This series of defeats hardly suggests that the Canadian government was prepared to make an issue

of international unionism (1967: 292).

What we see emerging is the divergent paths which the two levels of the Canadian government follow when they seek to interpret and deal practically with the role of trade unions in Canadian society. The Federal government will come to endorse their positive role, at least in words and occasionally in deeds, while the provincial governments will not, until many bitter struggles have been waged. But, it was not simply a matter of dealing with trade unions per se which annoyed the leaders of the more industrialized provincial governments; it was also the incursion of American-based international trade unions into 'their' territory. On the other hand, the Federal Government's position towards international unionism appeared to be an affirmation of their role and contribution to Canadian society and industry.

Another important event which symbolized the Federal Government's positive attitude towards American-based international unions came when the president of the AF of L was invited to address a Joint Session of both Houses of Parliament in April, 1917. This was the first time that such an invitation had been made to any labour leader. And, that it was not a Canadian but an American labour leader "must be taken as a sign of the esteem in which international unions were held by the government of the day" (Crispo, 1967: 292).⁸

Twenty years later, we hear again the echo of the spectre of international trade unionism. This time it comes from Mitchell Hepburn, premier of the province of Ontario. In commenting on the strike between the United Auto Workers and General Motors at Oshawa, Ontario in 1937, Hepburn remarked:

The issue is whether or not foreign agitators, who already have brought the United States to a state of anarchy, were to attain their goal of smashing our export business. We know what these agitators are up to, they are working their way into the

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lumber camps, the pulp mills and our mines. Well, that has got to stop and we are going to stop it. If necessary, we will raise an army to do so (Ware, 1937: 66-67).

All of the premier's rhetoric went to no avail. Besides losing the Minister of Labour and the Attorney General over the strike, he failed to enlist the support of the federal government in this matter.

Mr. King showed no sympathy for Mr. Hepburn's position, while the Dominion Minister of Labour, the Honourable Norman McLeod Rogers, laid down the Dominion's attitude on the rights of trade union organizers crossing the border. He said that American organizers had free entry into Canada as representatives of the AF of L or the C.I.O. or any other organization. The Dominion Government had no interest in the differences among organizations whether native or alien and was ready to offer its conciliation services on request (Ware, 1937: 70-71).

The history of the Quebec government's attitude towards international trade unionism is probably better known and is not significantly different from Ontario's or British Columbia's attitudes described above. The one important qualification concerns Quebec's endorsement of the Catholic syndicate movement at least up to the Asbestos Strike.

The position of the Federal Government at this time, in contrast to the provincial governments was certainly aimed at facilitating the incorporation of international trade unions within the political framework of Canadian society. The provincial governments and the Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA), on the other hand, lobbied against the international trade unions. They were prepared to support national trade union organizations against the international if need be, but would have preferred not to deal with trade unions at all.

Why do we see bifurcation of political interests on this issue? One plausible explanation, besides the oft noted influence of British legislative precedence on the Federal Government, rests with the economic interests which lie beneath both levels of the state apparatus. The

Federal Government was allied to finance capital and foreign, primarily U.S. controlled, international corporations (Armstrong and Nelles, 1973; Naylor, 1975). Big business is not always as challenged by trade union demands as are locally based industries since it is more difficult for a trade union to paralyze a large corporation than it is to close down a small domestic one. It is also noteworthy that the financial institutions, such as the large Canadian banks, were always able to thwart unionization attempts and were therefore under no serious threat from the Canadian labour movement. Therefore, big business can, if necessary, tolerate trade unions and in the long run may even attempt to use them to their advantage (Bendix, 1956; Weinstein, 1968).

The provincial governments and local business present a different case. The Governments of more industrialized provinces such as Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia were more strongly influenced by small-scale domestic manufacturing industries and the independent commodity producer (Armstrong and Nelles, 1973; Nelles, 1974), whose political conservatism should be noted. During the first half of this century, many provinces felt the impact of the rise of important petit bourgeois parties (Macpherson, 1953; Quinn, 1960; Young, 1971).

Putting these pieces together, we can argue that the parts played by both levels of the Canadian state vis-à-vis trade unions can be understood if they are situated historically in terms of the two different class interests which they in many respects reflected. The provincial state's intransigence toward international trade unions, for instance, can be seen as a response to the small-scale businessman's fears that a large and, relatively speaking, powerful international trade union could destroy his business. Such fears, on the other hand, would not necessarily be felt as strongly by banking and large-scale business interests which would explain the Federal Government's more positive

attitude towards international unions. This interpretation is in part borne out by The Royal Commission on Industrial Relations commissioned in 1919.

This commission was more analytical than the former study (1889) and therefore provides a clearer insight into the problem of class conflict in Canada in the early 20th century. The problem, it seems, fell on the internal divisions within Canada's capitalist class.

Employers may be divided into three classes --
(1) those who deny the right of their employees to organize....(2) those who, while not denying that right of their employees to organize, refuse to recognize organization among their employees....and
(3) those who not only admit the right of their employees to organize, but recognize and bargain with the organization on behalf of their employees...
There are not many employers in Canada who belong to the first class, but there are a very large number who belong to the second class. To the third class belong the great railway, telegraph and mining companies and many building trades....

We believe the frank acknowledgement of this right by employers will remove one of the most serious causes of unrest (emphasis added). 9

Class struggle in Canada was primarily seen as resulting from the large number of business organizations which did not acknowledge the legitimate role of trade unions in the nation's economy. It was only the giant corporations at this point in time which were able to transcend their parochial interests and face up to the legitimacy of the collective representation of workers in Canada.

The statements from these Royal Commissions have shown the Federal State's concern for labour's role within Canadian capitalist society. It only remains to describe the stages in which the Federal Government attempted to implement these concerns.

THE POLITICAL 'PRAXIS'

The implementation of these concerns has followed roughly two stages. As indicated in the previous section, the Federal Government

endorsed labour's contribution to the development of the Canadian economy. However, Government only provided for registration, conciliation and arbitration on a voluntary basis.

The object of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of June 17, 1925 is essentially the voluntary settlement of disputes before they develop into stoppages of work. The instrument employed is an ad hoc body consisting of three members, one appointed on the recommendation of the other two members. The Minister of Labour makes any appointments necessitated by failure to recommend.¹⁰

The principal problem with this arrangement, as soon became obvious, was the institutional separateness between the State, industry and organized labour. Only in times of crisis and only through ad hoc committees do the three parties involved come together. As long as labour was ket out of society, then the potential for violence always remained.

The establishment of appropriate labour legislation would permit if not the complete incorporation of labour, at least its significant integration through its organized representatives, within the state system. The process of establishing such procedures as trade union recognition and collective bargaining by the Canadian state was about to begin.

This leads us to the second phase -- direct State intervention between Capital and Labour. The first piece of legislation to help accomplish this end became the Federal Government's adoption of P.C. 1003 in 1943.

WARTIME LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD

Concerning the particular contribution of P.C. 1003 effected for the incorporation of organized labour into Canadian society, Professor Logan notes:

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P.C. 1003 means the bringing of the Wagner Act and American experience under it to Canada. But it involves more: for in some respects it goes beyond, while in others it modifies the pattern. It copies the American Act in setting up a special board, in strictures it directs towards employers regarding unfair labour practises, in compelling negotiations in good faith with certified representatives of their workers, in vote taking, majority rule, etc. It goes beyond it: (1) in naming and prescribing unfair practices by unions....(2) It goes beyond the American Act also in assuming a responsibility by the State to assist the two negotiating parties to reach agreement....(3) It exceeds the American Act again in that it forbids strikes and lockouts during negotiations and for the term of the agreement and compels the parties to fulfil (emphasis added). 11

The important points to bear in mind are contained in the thrust of the legislation towards state intervention and the behavioural control of trade unions. Significantly, this piece of labour legislation set down the basic ground rules which management, certified trade unions and the state must still follow today.

The machinery implemented to bring trade unions into Canadian society was the Wartime Labour Relations Board, composed of a chairman and eight representatives of employers and employees -- four from each group. The Board's effect on trade union activity was immediately felt. The principal cause for many strikes, union recognition, had been removed. In the words of Arthur MacNamara, the Deputy Minister of Labour during the war period:

...a wartime experiment in industrial relations was to prove to have more than temporary utility, and was subsequently embodied in peacetime legislation.

This was the introduction, in 1944, of compulsory collective bargaining between employers and the certified bargaining representatives of their employees....

Its introduction had the effect of virtually ending strikes over the issue of union recognition; a result of considerable importance during a period when unions were more than doubling their membership (emphasis added).

Certainly the increasing pressure from below which came from the doubling of trade union membership in the first few short years of the war contributed to the Canadian state's positive intervention in regards to trade union recognition (Jamieson, 1973: 90-91).

But on matters pertaining to manpower programs and social legislation, the Canadian state took a more "cautious route" by consulting with labour, management and third parties before implementing policy. Again, we hear from Arthur MacNamara:

A significant feature of the manpower program was the care that was taken to consult with labour, management and other groups on policy matters. Before regulations were passed and put into effect they were reviewed by the National Selective Service Advisory Committee, made up of representatives of labour, management, the armed forces, agriculture, the universities and other groups (emphasis added).¹²

In matters pertaining to social legislation, a similar procedure was followed: for example, the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940:

...the insurance fund, financed by compulsory contributions from the employer, employed worker and the government is an excellent example of responsibility and cooperation that may exist between groups of citizens (emphasis added).¹³

The importance of these consultations did not rest in the equal status of the contending parties. Indeed such was not the case as labour did not have an equal voice with management. What is significant centers on the conscious action by the Federal State to open the ground for future acts of incorporation.

CONCLUSION

In summary, with the above changes in industrial relations the various sections of the Canadian trade union movement had by 1947 moved significantly in the direction of incorporation.¹⁴ They became increasingly enmeshed in the complicated machinery of state agencies beginning, of course, on the federal level. Furthermore, this trend of the Canadian labour movement was facilitated by the fact that, with the

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short-lived exception of Western syndicalists, it had always been a reform movement and never desired to seriously challenge capitalist hegemony in Canada. This despite the fact that at certain historical moments, such as the massive strike waves of the post-World Wars and particularly the later years of the depression, a revolutionary leadership could have posed a substantial challenge to corporate rule in Canada. However, it was only when its legitimacy within the system was not guaranteed that the trade union movement felt compelled to display a show of force. Once it gained recognition and collective bargaining rights and was accepted as an integral part of Canadian society the dynamics of class conflict could become more routinized.

As a social institution, the unions now form not only an integral part of the community but also of the nation. The labour Congresses make known the view-points of their members on national affairs through the presentation of briefs to government. In addition, representatives of unions as well as of management organizations now serve on many governmental boards and committees (emphasis added). 15

By 1947, every province in Canada, except Saskatchewan, had, in effect, adopted P.C. 1003 as standard labour policy. Variations between provinces as to its implementation were due to differences in constitutional interpretation and on the relation of class forces, that is, large versus small capital, the strength of the independent commodity producer and working class militancy. Conflict continued but the implementation of P.C. 1003 virtually across Canada meant that organized labour's role moved away from fighting for recognition at the national level towards consolidating these gains at the provincial level. In general, the arena within which industrial conflict would be concentrated in the post World War II period would be in those provinces whose political machinery had the strongest support coming from local businessmen and independent farmers.

In all, then, the role of the Canadian State is a complicated picture because the two principal levels of the State, the Federal and the provincial, acted in contradictory ways. The Federal level was clearly in the vanguard of the political incorporation of trade unions while the provincial state apparatus had to be dragged.

Finally, a theory of the state and trade unions must also include an analysis of the key responses and initiatives of the working class. In dealing with process of political incorporation of trade unions in Canada, we had to assume the oppositional influence of class conflict that so dramatically surfaced at such historical moments as the Winnipeg General Strike (1919), Oshawa (1937), Windsor (1945), Asbestos (1949), to mention just a few examples.¹⁶

On the basis of the above overview, then, it appears to be too simple to see the state in capitalist societies as acting only in one direction or manner at every historical point in time. A theory of the state and trade unions must be expanded to incorporate different levels of the state apparatus and an analysis of class fractions within society which ally themselves to these different levels. In other words, the explanation for the uneven or incomplete process of incorporation of trade unions within civil society must include an analysis of the effectiveness with which the local businessmen and independent commodity producers are capable of politically implementing their ends in the face of a growing industrial working class. In our opinion, such an approach was not forthcoming from the sociological tradition but can be seen to derive from the Marxist theories.

Footnotes

1. 'Secular' in terms of working class politics refers to instrumental attitudes, that is, the sober calculation of material advantages. See R.T. MacKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble (London, 1969).
2. There are of course partial exceptions to functionalism. For example, Clark Kerr has argued that "aggressive industrial conflict cannot be eliminated and can only be temporarily suppressed". He grounds his thesis on four assumptions; "labour-management conflict flows inevitably from the unsatiated desires of men, the relationship of managers and managed, the need to adapt to changed conditions in one fashion or another and the drive for institutional separateness". His mixture of hedonist philosophy and liberal pluralism does not contradict the conservative thrust of his conclusion: "but conflict may be destructive as well as constructive, and thus it needs to be guided if the social fabric is to be protected and serious injury to individuals and groups avoided" (1954: 230,231,234).
3. See the "debate with Marx's ghost" in Irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (New Jersey, 1968).
4. For further elaboration on trade union officials' power "over" versus "for" members, see Hyman (1975) Chapter Three.
5. The Labour Gazette, September 1950, p. 1346.
6. For an alternate explanation see Eric Hobsbawm's "The Machine Breakers" in Labouring Men (London, 1964).
7. C. B. Williams, "Development of Relations Between Canadian and American National Trade Union Centers 1886-1925", Industrial Relations (Quebec), Vol. 20, No. 2, 1965.
8. There is some evidence that the same Samuel Gompers was quite acceptable to business interests. In a 1901 address to the National Civic Federation he had proclaimed "a community of interests .. between the organization of the wage earners and the organization of the employers" (Cited from Howard and Scott in Teeple, 1972: 69).
9. The Labour Gazette, September 1950, p. 1347.
10. International Labour Organization, Studies and Reports, Series A., No. 34, Conciliation and Arbitration in Industrial Disputes, Geneva, 1933.
11. H.A. Logan, "The State and Collective Bargaining", CJEPS, 1944, Vol. 10, p. 482. "(up to 1943) the Canadian Acts, however, provided no special machinery for enforcing their provisions, a most serious omission." H.A. Logan and M.J. Inman, op. cit., p. 596.
12. The Labour Gazette, ibid., pp. 1342, 1344, 1345.
13. Ibid., p. 1369.
14. While we have emphasized the legislative aspect of industrial relations in this sketch, a more thorough investigation would also note the role of state coercion i.e., use of the police and judiciary.
15. The Labour Gazette, op. cit., p. 1372.
16. See I. Abella (ed.) On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada 1919-1949 (Toronto, 1974).

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