The Challenge of the Believing Intellectual: Religion and Modernity

by

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of Professor al Faruqi as a believing intellectual who contributed toward the development of an alternative model of modernity in which religion plays a definite and contributory role. Alternative modernity is not inevitably secular or nonreligious. This Islamic version of modernity is one amongst the multiple modernities of the globalized world. It puts forth a "modern" knowledge. Professor al Faruqi contributed to this venture through his project called the "Islamization of Knowledge." In this way, Professor Ismail al-Faruqi illustrates the changing role of believing intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century.

Religion and modernity interact in changing ways in the modern era. This interaction is not simply between two abstract and reified concepts. It is embodied in the lives and thought of believers and intellectuals as they confront issues of faith in the contexts of modern history. It is commonly thought that religious belief and modernity are fundamentally antagonistic. In this view, believers and modern intellectuals are rivals, representing different worldviews. As a result, the idea of a "believing intellectual" seems to many to be self-contradictory. However, by the final quarter of the twentieth century, it became clear that "modernity" is not inevitably secular or non-religious. In this context, an intellectual who is also a committed believer in a major religious tradition is not an anomaly, and believing intellectuals are recognized as playing important roles in defining the diverse modernities of the evolving modern world. Scholar-intellectuals like Ismail al Faruqi illustrate the dynamics of the changing roles of believing intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century.[1]

The beginning of the 1980s was an important time of transition in the relationships between "religion" and "modernity." The establishment of

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the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a result of the revolution of 1978 and 1979, emphasized the continuing strength of religion as a force in the modern world; religion was not simply an anachronistic and disappearing remnant of "traditional" society, it was a modern phenomenon as well. The Iranian revolution highlighted what came to be identified by many as the "Islamic resurgence" of the final quarter of the twentieth century. In this resurgence, modern educated intellectuals who were also religious activists played an important role. The intellectual nature of the contributions of important believing activists in the 1980s is reflected in the contributions of people like Hasan Turabi (Sudan), Anwar Ibrahim (Malaysia), Khurshid Ahmad (Pakistan), and Ismail al Faruqi to the deliberations of a conference organized in 1980 by John L. Esposito, and held at the University of New Hampshire in the United States.[2] Activist believing Muslim intellectuals played an important role in the long-term modern Islamic resurgence and were in many ways the articulators of the ideas and programs of contemporary Islamic movements.[3]

By the 1980s, it was becoming clear that the key concepts of "religion," "modernity," and "intellectuals" were changing significantly in their meanings and in the human phenomena to which they referred. As "believing intellectuals" became more active as public intellectuals, the broader relationships between religion and modernity were redefined in significant ways. *Intellectual*, *religion*, and *modernity* are not stable terms and may even, in some ways be considered what W. B. Gallie called "essentially contested terms."[4] The changing definitions reflect important dimensions of the changing realities of "religion" and "modernity" in contemporary globalized societies.

Intellectuals and Religious Belief

The classic image of the modern "intellectual" emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, "when the Dreyfus Affair [in France] sparked a positive and almost messianic collective identity among intellectuals."[5] In their self-definition, intellectuals believed themselves to be without corrupting ties to economic class or specific social institution. In what became an influential foundational analysis of the sociology of intellectuals in the 1920s, Julien Benda argued that the duty of the true intellectual was "to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth, in opposition to the peoples and the injustice to which they are condemned by their religions of this earth."[6]

The concept of "intellectuals" as a separate body of objective, disinterested thinkers able to engage in unbiased analysis, which would lead to knowledge of "The Truth," crystallized in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The definition of this "intellectual" was shaped in many ways by developments in France. In the context of French politics and intellectual life at that time, the activism of the writers, artists, and academics who were viewed as "intellectuals" came to be identified with liberalism, and although there were some prominent ideological conservatives, "the intellectual quickly came to stand for the upholder of leftist values."[7] In this context, the concept of the intellectual became tied to French intellectual anti-clericalism and secular worldviews. "Modern" intellectuals around the world were basically viewed as competitors with the representatives of the major religious traditions, and "religion" and "modernity" became viewed as opposites.

In this polarity between religion and modernity, an important distinction was made between belief and rationality. In the middle of the twentieth century, a major Christian thinker, Paul Tillich, defined this tension. Defining the intellectual as "he who asks," and noting that the intellectual "as intellectual, questions everything," Tillich observed, "if asking becomes the dominant function of the intellectual, then a tension arises between the intellectual's radical will to ask and the immediate, blessed certainty of the religious man and woman."[8] The image of the "intellectual" as an objective agnostic (or atheist) is strongly embedded in modern attitudes, and continues in the twenty-first century. The view is well illustrated by the works and reputations of public intellectuals like Christopher Hitchens, whose recent best-selling book has the subtitle, "How Religion Poisons Everything,"[9] or Sam Harris, whose recent book on science is described as a "blistering take-no-prisoners attack on the irrationality of religions."[10]

The concept of the pure-rational-objective "intellectual" already was evolving during the first half of the twentieth century, as it was recognized that intellectuals had personal identities that could shape their "disinterested" objectivity. The influential Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci argued simply that the concept of "the intellectuals" as a distinct social category independent of class is mistaken. "All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals. When one distinguishes between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, one is referring in reality only to the immediate social function of the professional category of the intellectuals, that is, one has in mind the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards

intellectual elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort."[11] Intellectuals, in this perspective, are organically tied to their class or basic interest group within society, and their function is to provide the persuasive narratives of authority for that class or group.

The key element in the function of the intellectual, whether viewed as a separated rationalist or a class-based "organic" intellectual, is the development of conceptual frameworks, and the intellectual's tools are ideas. Thomas Sowell, in his discussion of contemporary intellectuals, defines this clearly: "'intellectuals' refers to an *occupational* category, people whose occupations deal primarily with ideas – writers, academics, and the like.... *An intellectual's work begins and ends with ideas*."[12] These ideas have an important function in human societies in creating authoritative narratives for the public. Edward Said argued that "the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public."[13]

By the second half of the twentieth century, there was a growing recognition that intellectuals were, in fact, advocates, not simply disinterested observers. The works of scholars like Thomas Kuhn helped expand the recognition that even "modern science" involves accepted structures of rational thought and methods that are not absolute and are constantly engaged in processes of reconceptualization and correction.[14] It became more common to recognize, with Said, that intellectuals presented messages, and this process made possible the recognition of religiously-believing intellectuals along with secular, old-style intellectuals.

In the early 1980s, an important transition was becoming visible. People who were scholars were willing to admit that they had a message. The intellectual turmoil of the opposition in the United States to the Viet Nam War had emphasized that even the most analytical social scientist was a committed person with institutional interests and analytical biases. In religious studies, scholars of Islam and Muslim began to understand that belief and critical analysis were not always adversarial. In this process, scholars like Ismail al Faruqi played an important role as increasing numbers of Muslim intellectuals became identified as religious rather than secular in their perspectives and approaches.

Religion and Modernity – and Intellectuals

The concept of the intellectual was changing throughout the twentieth cen-

tury, and this process continues in the twenty-first century as well. The changing image of the intellectual is closely tied to the changing understanding of the relationships between "religion" and "modernity." Just as the nature of the intellectual has been reimagined, the concepts of "religion" and "modernity" have also been subject to profound transformations. The old image of the intellectual was quite monolithic – a secular, objective, and critically-removed individual – and most "intellectuals" were basically the same. Similarly, images of religion and modernity were mono-conceptual – that is, there was one category or definition that was applied to all cases.

In this older framework, intellectuals were often assumed to be the advocates of "modernity," and opponents of established religion. Almost a century and a quarter ago, a debate about Islam reflects this situation clearly. In 1883, the French philosopher and critic Ernest Renan gave a lecture in which he argued that Islam and modern science were incompatible. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a highly visible Muslim thinker at the time, responded in an exchange that reflects the nature of modern intellectual reservations about religion.[15] Al-Afghani argued that "Religions, by whatever names they are called, resemble each other" and that in the suppression of science and philosophy in its history, Islam was not unique.[16] Although al-Afghani in general argued that "Islam was in harmony with the principles discovered by scientific reason,"[17] the two men agreed on the validity of rational science. Renan responded to al-Afghani favorably, saying, "It is by listening to the most diverse voices, coming from the four corners of the globe, in favor of rationalism, that one becomes convinced that if religions divide men, Reason brings them together; and that there is only one Reason."[18]

In these early discussions about religion and modernity, both sides of the debates accept the idea that there is only "one Reason," and that "modernity" takes only one form. The difference between Renan and al-Afghani was primarily that Renan believed that monolithic "religion" was incapable of being compatible with modernity, while al-Afghani argued that even though historic "Islam" at the end of the nineteenth century had a heritage of opposition to science and philosophy, it had the potential for compatibility with modernity. However, the intellectuals could agree that there was a major conflict between religion and modernity.

During the first half of the twentieth century, an important dimension of the tension between religion and modernity was expressed in terms of political reform. In political discussions in the Muslim world (and elsewhere),

modernity was primarily viewed in terms of the necessary development of secular nation-states. In these discussions, secularist intellectuals debated and disagreed with religious scholars on a variety of issues, viewing the religious leaders – in the words of a prominent secular intellectual in the 1940s, Khalid Muhammad Khalid – as gullible advocates of ignorance following anti-materialist philosophies of the East.[19] Khalid was advocating a secular state and elicited a response from Muhammad al-Ghazali, a prominent activist religious scholar, who argued that "the simpletons among the leaders of Egypt who feel that it is necessary to separate the state from religion are still reading books from the previous century about the history of Europe" when there was antagonism between the state and Christianity, but, given current political rhetoric, that is obviously no longer the case.[20] However vitriolic the debates were, the two sides tended to agree on one thing: that what was considered "modern" was not what mainstream Muslim thinkers identified as Islamic. "Modern" was understood to be identified with the practices of Western societies, and modernization meant the creation of basically similar, Western-style societies around the world.

By the middle of the twentieth century, secularization had become an issue in the relationship between religion and modernity. In the debates between Renan and al-Afghani, the primary issue was rationalism versus belief, but during the first half of the twentieth century, secularism became an important part of the intellectual discussions of the relationship between religion and modernity. Since modernity was defined by many people as being an increase in the secularization of society, and since the definition of secularization involves the reduction of the role of religion in society, by definition there would not be any way that religion could be seen as effectively compatible with modernity.

Religion and Modernity in the Era of Area Studies and Radical Modernity

By the 1960s, a new framework for understanding the relationship between religion and modernity was emerging. This development had important consequences for intellectuals, especially in what came at that time to be called "underdeveloped" societies. In scholarship, old-fashioned positivist intellectuals and Orientalists were gradually replaced by "area studies" specialists. The area-studies approach was development oriented, and the conceptualizations of modernity changed as the actualities of modern and

"modernizing" societies changed. For the study of Muslim societies, the old Orientalism was replaced by "Middle Eastern Studies," and the basic unit of analysis was usually a set of imagined semi-secular nation-states clustered in a region. Activists and intellectuals within these frameworks developed ideologies for mobilizing people based on nationalism or radical socialism.

"Religion" was a marginal part of this emerging world. Although radicals and nationalists rejected imperial and neo-colonial control, they generally accepted the assumptions of modernization theory that the public role of religion would be reduced as societies became modern. In this ideological context, the relationship between religion and modernity was less combative and, instead, involved a tolerant acceptance of some "religion" in the formulations of "modern" programs and ideologies in order to secure support from the more "traditional" masses. A well-informed observer of the Arab world could state in the late 1960s that in "most intellectual circles, the slogan of secularism no longer raises a serious issue," although there was still some tension between "the out-and-out westernizers to whom religion is largely irrelevant in public life ... and [Islamic reformers who want to make Islam] a more progressive faith, adapted institutionally and theologically to modern life."[21]

Among Muslim thinkers and activists, believers had to define their faith in relationship to the dominant ideological positions of the time. Some, like Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, explicitly shaped their positions as refutations of the modernity-defined concepts of Arab nationalism or class-based revolution or moral reformism: "This blessed program would not have belonged to God alone if the call [to Islam by the Prophet Muhammad] had begun in its earliest stages simply as a nationalist call or a call for a social-class movement or a call for moral reform or if it had raised any emblem other than 'There is no divinity but Allah'."[22]

Other important Muslim thinkers were beginning the process of articulating their faith in more contemporary terms in ways that redefined important movements of the time in Islamic frameworks. In these endeavors, a change in the understanding of the relationships between religion and modernity is visible. The basic questions were changing. The concern was not the old nineteenth-century question of whether or not Islam (and "religion") was compatible with modernity. Instead Islamically-identified thinkers were concerned with the ways that fundamentally modern concepts, ideologies, and institutions could be redefined in religious/ Islamic terms.

In the 1960s, major themes in the dominant secular movements includ-
ed nationalism and radical socialism. Secular intellectuals often attempted
to add Islamic terminology to give popular appeal to the ideologies of
ethnic nationalism and secular socialist radicalism. This marginal recog-
nition of Islam can be seen in the limited place of Islam in the Egyptian
National Charter of 1962, which was a defining document for ideological
Nasserism. Similarly, some Muslim thinkers added a "modern flavor" to
their conservative positions in order to appear to be up-to-date.

In addition to the simple efforts of terminological syncretism, some
important Muslim thinkers, emerging as truly believing intellectuals,
worked to define intellectual syntheses of major modern and Islamic posi-
tions. While much of the discussion of "Islamic socialism" in the 1960s
and 1970s was superficial, some influential intellectuals were articulating a
genuine synthesis of concepts. Ali Shariati (1933–1977), the Iranian intel-
lectual considered by many to be a major ideologue of the Iranian Revolu-
tion, was "well acquainted with Western sources and remarkably versatile
in utilizing them to expound the sociological fact of Islam," while at the
same time he grounded his discourse in important Islamic traditional sym-
bols, emphasizing, for example, the image of a companion of the Prophet
Muhammad, Abu Dharr, as a "paragon of Islamic struggle for social jus-
tice."[23] In the Arab world, Hasan Hanafi was developing a concept of "The
Islamic Left," which also was a critical synthesis of Western and Islamic
visions.[24]

Ismail al Faruqi began, in the early 1960s, a major effort in redefining
the major ideology in the Arab world of that time – that is, Arab nation-
alism in both its Pan-Arab and more localistic forms. Arab nationalism
had been and was being articulated within the conceptual framework of
Western modernity and European modes of defining "nation" and "state."
Al Faruqi did not attempt simply to define Arab identity by restating West-
ern-style nationalism using Islamic terminology, as was frequently done
in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, he set out to reconceptualize the whole
framework of Arabism. He began his major work on this subject with the
statement of his basic position: "Arabism, or the pursuit of 'urubah, is not
'Arab nationalism.'"[25]

In his analysis, al Faruqi carefully defined Western-style nationalism
and then distinguished it from 'urubah. He rejected "thinking, as many
Westerners do, that that which we are trying to analyse is the product of
the twentieth century; or, as some Western-inspired Arab nationalists have
thought, of a century or so earlier. Conceived as an offspring of Western

nationalism, with similar or identical character, Arab nationalism is of recent origin and certainly new. But conceived as pursuit of 'urubah, Arabism is as old as the Arab stream of being itself."[26]

Most discussions of Arab nationalism at the time were framed in relatively secular terms, showing how Islam was a part of the national identity. In this mode, someone like Ibrahim Jum'a could argue that "Arab nationalism was an existing reality before the emergence of Islam ... Arab nationalism achieved its completed form with the creation of the Arab state by Islam."[27] This conceptual marginalization of Islam was rejected by al Faruqi whose basic analysis placed Arab identity within the framework of Islam rather than the more common position at that time: for example, Jum'a's identification of Islam as simply a part of the Arab identity.

For al Faruqi, the true nature of being Arab, which he called "*'urubah*," is inclusive and open to all humanity as a "universalistic ummatism" or universalistic communalism.[28] After an analysis of different perspectives, al Faruqi says, "We may therefore conclude ... that without Islam, Arab nationalism runs aground in ethical shallowness and superficiality. Islam has not only furnished our ethical ideals, but has ethicized whatever values our pre-Islamic ancestors had."[29] This reconceptualization of Arab identity and its relationship to the concepts of nationalism dominant at that time represented a major alternative to Marxist leftism as well as radical Arab socialism.

With his emphasis on the centrality of Islam in the Arab identity, al Faruqi was unusual among the intellectuals of the 1960s. An informed observer concluded in the early 1970s that the "modern intellectuals have broken decisively with the Islamic past" and "nationalist loyalties have largely taken the place of religious loyalties among the educated classes."[30] This reflects the continuing understanding of "modern" as being monolithically Western and secular in its nature and the view that "intellectuals" are secular in their modernity. In many ways, al Faruqi was a harbinger of the future in which believing intellectuals would play an increasingly important role.

Intellectuals and the Change from Modernity to Modernities

One of the major changes by the early 1980s was that the way that people understood "modernity" was changing in important ways. The processes of modernization were beginning to be recognized as being much more

complex than the theories of modernization assumed. Assumptions from the 1950s and 1960s that this transformation was basically a linear process following the historic paths of societies in Western Europe and North America[31] began to be altered as diverse patterns of modernity began to be visible. Analysts began to recognize that modernization is not identical with Westernization. As S. N. Eisenstadt notes, "The appropriation of different themes and institutional patterns of the original Western modern civilization in non-Western European societies did not entail their acceptance in their original form. Rather, it entailed the continuous selection, reinterpretation and reformulation of such themes, giving rise to a steady crystallization of new cultural and political programs of modernity."[32] To use Eisenstadt's terminology, the result of this complex set of appropriations was the emergence of a world of "multiple modernities."

In these alternative modernities, one of the major divergences from the old-style monolithic modernity was the "resurgence of religion" and the decline of the importance of strict secularism in nontraditional institutions. In the Muslim world, the Iranian Revolution was one of the most visible manifestations of this new mode. Despite attempts by more secular-oriented observers to portray the Iranian revolutionary movement as a return to medieval modes, the Iranian Revolution was a creation of modern developments and was revolutionary rather than "traditional" or reactionary in its nature. It was also distinctively non-Western and non-secular and, as a result, represented a different mode of modernity from the secular-Western mode.

In this changing context of the resurgence of religion and multiple modernities, the role of intellectuals who were believers became more significant. In Edward Said's words, the task for intellectuals of articulating a message could and did involve formulating the message of the new modernities in religious terms. This undertaking took many forms in the Muslim world, with the most visible being what many came to call "Political Islam." Believing intellectuals, like Rashid Ghanushi in Tunisia and Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, began defining a new Islamic political modernity, which was not a copy of old-style nationalism nor was it a repetition of the old-style Islamism that had developed within the framework of the old monolithic concepts of modernity as identified with "the West."

The changing nature of modernity and how people understood it opened the way for the articulation of modernities, which were not secular and could be religiously identified. This required more than proclaiming political platforms; it required undertaking the task of creating an "Islamic

modernity" that could take its place among the multiple modernities of the increasingly globalized world. Ismail al Faruqi argued that this undertaking involved the fundamental redefinition of "modern" knowledge. In this context, he defined and set in motion the project that came to be called the "Islamization of Knowledge."

The project for the Islamization of Knowledge involved transforming the modern scholarly disciplines. Muslim thinkers "must master all the modern disciplines in order to understand them completely.... Then they must integrate the new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic legacy."[33] The project was most successful in encouraging the development of Islamic economics, which combined modern modes of economic analysis with Islamic principles to create a variety of forms of Islamic banking and finance.

The project of the Islamization of Knowledge is a manifestation of the major changes in understanding of the relationships between religion and modernity. By the 1980s, it was clear that religion was not going to disappear as a major factor in human life. Modernization did not eliminate the power of belief in contemporary society. Instead, it became clear that belief systems are inherent in all human structures. What modernization did weaken was the old-style belief systems inherited from premodern times. However, believing intellectuals, like al Faruqi, in all religious traditions rearticulated their traditions and were part of the emergence of the multiple modernities of the late-twentieth century. In this new context, religion and modernity are not contradictory, and the debates are not between "religious" people and "modern" people; they are between representatives of different modernities.

Conclusion

Many things have changed since the initiation of the Islamization of Knowledge project and the rise of Political Islam in the 1980s. Both of those efforts have been replaced by a variety of new movements. However, the developments involving the change in the relationship between religion and modernity and the emergence of the believing intellectual as a significant voice continue to be an important part of contemporary history.

The nature of the modern "intellectual" has changed significantly from the days of Renan and al-Afghani. In their time, it was assumed that modernity and religion were contradictory and that "intellectuals" were modern and, therefore, were not believers. In the past century, profound chang-

es have taken place in human understanding of religion, in the nature of modernity, and in the role of intellectuals. As modernity ceased to be monolithically defined by Western conditions, religion came to be an important part of the emerging definition of an Islamic modernity. In this process, Muslim-believing intellectuals like Ismail al Faruqi played a significant role.

In more general terms, in the twenty-first century, believing intellectuals have growing importance. As a recent study affirms, "Around the world – from the southern United States to the Middle East – religion is on the rise."[34] Globalization has transformed modernity, religion, and the role of intellectuals. "A new world is in the making.... The major world religions are all taking advantage of the opportunities provided by globalization to transform their messages and reach a new global audience."[35] In this new world, the task of the believing intellectual in articulating the transformed messages of faith will be more important than ever before in modern times.

Endnotes

1. I initially explored the subject of the believing intellectual in John Obert Voll, "Believing Intellectuals and Their Contemporary Challenge," *American Muslim Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1997): 9–18. On August 26, 2010, I also presented the Annual Professor Ismail al Faruqi Lecture at the International Institute of Islamic Thought in Herndon, Virginia, on the subject "The Challenge of the Believing Intellectual: Religion and Modernity," and this essay benefits from comments made in the discussion period at that time.

2. See the essays in the publication that was the product of that conference: John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

3. See, for example, the activist intellectuals discussed in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

4. See W. B. Gallie, *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*, 2nd ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), chapter 8.

5. Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens, "The Sociology of Intellectuals," *Annual Review of Sociology* 28 (August 2002). Electronically accessed without pagination.

6. Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals*, trans. Richard Aldington (New York: Norton, 1969), 57.

7. Lois Oppenheim, "France Takes Its Intellectuals to Heart, Even as They Doubt Themselves," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 7, 2001, B8.

8. Paul Tillich, "Religion and its Intellectual Critics," *Christianity and Crisis* (March 1955). Electronically accessed without pagination.

9. Christopher Hitchens, *God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (New York: Twelve, 2007).

10. Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Science Knows Best." *New York Times Book Review*, October 3, 2010, 12. Review of Sam Harris, *The Moral Landscape* (New York: Free Press, 2010).

11. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) 1, 9.

12. Thomas Sowell, *Intellectuals and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 2–3. Emphasis in the original.

13. Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996) 11.

14. The classic study is Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

15. Important analyses of the Renan/ al-Afghani discussions are in Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapter 5; Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983) 84–97.

16. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, 182, 187.

17. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 123.

18. Quoted in Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, 91.

19. Khalid Muhammad Khalid, *Min hunā nabda'*, 11th printing (Cairo, Egypt: Maktabah al-Anglu al-Misriyyah, 1969), 55.

20. Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Min huna na'lim* (Cairo, Egypt: Nahdah Misr, 2005), 41.

21. Malcom H. Kerr, "Notes on the Background of Arab Socialist Thought," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3 (July 1968): 147.

22. Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* (Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Sharuq, n.d.), 35.

23. Abdulaziz Sachedina, "Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution," in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 197, 204.

24. Hasan Hanafi, " Madha ya'ni al-yasar al-islami?" *Al-yasar Al-islami* 1 (1401/1981): 5–48.

25. Ismail al Faruqi, *'Urubah and Religion*, vol. 1 of *On Arabism* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Djambatan, 1967), 1.

26. Ibid., 2.

27. Quoted from extract from Ibrahim Jum'a, *Idiolojiyya al-qawnmiyya al-'arabiyya* (Cairo, Egypt, 1960), as translated in Kemal Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 48.

28. Al Faruqi, *'Urubah and Religion*, 227.

29. Ibid., 198.

30. Nikki R. Keddie, "Intellectuals in the Modern Middle East: A Brief Historical Consideration," *Daedalus* 101, no. 3 (Summer 1972): 55

31. See, for example, W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

32. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities in an Age of Globalization," *Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers canadiens de sociologie* 24, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 289.

33. *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan*, 3rd ed. (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1995), 18. The first edition of this programmatic statement was published in 1982.

34. Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (November-December 2010): 93.

35. Ibid., 101.