ISLAMIC ETHICS: CONCEPT AND PROSPECT

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Islamic ethics as a discipline or a subject does not exist at the present. We do not have works that define its concept, outline its issues, and discuss its problems. What we have, instead, is a discussion by various writers— philosophers, theologians, jurisprudents, sufis and political and economic theorists—in their particular fields of some issues that are either part of, or relevant to, Islamic ethics. Philosophers like Abū Naṣr al Fārābī (d. 329/950) and Abū 'Alī Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), in their ethical works, have mostly rehashed Greek ethics. True, they have introduced, here and there, some Islamic terms and concepts and modified some notions that hurt their Islamic susceptibilities. But this does not make their ethics Islamic. They do not raise many issues that Islamic ethics must raise, and many ideas they have set forth cannot be considered to be Islamic unless they are seriously modified.

Theologians have, indeed, discussed some very important questions of Islamic ethics, such as the source of ethical knowledge, the meaning of ethical terms, and the basis of moral obligation. The views they have expounded are extremely significant. But they have been treated as part of theology rather than ethics, and they form only one aspect of Islamic ethics. Works on sufism, principles of jurisprudence (*usūl al fiqh*), principles of government and administration (*al aḥkām al sulṭānīyah*), and public revenue and expenditure (*al kharāj*), also touch upon ideas that are part of, or relevant to, Islamic ethics. We have in them an analysis, for instance, of some ethical virtues, a discussion on motives, priorities and preferences, levels of obligation, and political and economic justice.

There is, in short, much material scattered in the works of various disciplines that can be utilized to develop Islamic ethics. At present, while the discipline of Islamic ethics does not exist, it can be developed. Thirty years ago, Islamic economics did not exist, but thanks to the devotion of

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a number of scholars, we now have Islamic economics. I am sure that Islamic ethics will take even less time to develop, provided we give it the required effort. Let us hope this conference of ours initiates the process.

In this paper, I will try first to define the task Islamic ethics should perform, and then review, in that light, various streams of writings to which I have referred, and see what contribution each of these can make to the subject.

The first task of Islamic ethics is to understand and expound the ethos of Islam as conceived in the Qur'an and elaborated in the Sunnah of the Prophet. Although these are the two primary sources of Islamic ethics, one more source should also be taken into account: the practice of the Prophet's Companions. They were trained by the Prophet himself, and their lives as individuals and as a society are the best embodiment of Islamic values, after the example of the Prophet. Further, the life and the practice of the second and third generation leaders *(a'immah)* of Islam are the next best model of Islamic values and norms. They are almost free from alien ideas and values that affected Islamic society in succeeding generations. This is testified to by the Prophet himself as well as by history. He said: "The best generation is mine, next comes the generation that will follow, and then the generation that will come after."[1] It goes without saying that the life of the Companions or of the *(a'immah)* of the next two generations does not constitute an independent source beside the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is taken only as an authentic expression of the ideals set forth in them. The life of the peoples in succeeding generations does not enjoy this status, because it bears the influence, in varying degrees, of alien ideas and practices.

To define the Islamic ethos as presented in the Qur'an, the Sunnah, the life of the Companions, and their righteous Successors is the first task of Islamic ethics. The view of the good life *(al ḥayāt al ṭayyibah)* for which Islam stands has to be set forth in detail. It has to spell out the various components of that life, the traits and characteristics, motives and attitudes, feelings and emotions, actions and reactions, relations and associations that constitute it. It has to determine the place of human necessities and material conditions in the realization of that life. It has to define the priorities: What goods are higher and what are lower; what is the ultimate end of life, and how are various goods related to that end? It has to study the relation between knowledge, action, and feeling; between personal attainments and social concerns; between devotion to God and commitment to humanity. It has to determine the place of aesthetic values in life, the pleasures of the body,

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[1]The hadith with little difference in words has been reported by many Companions and recorded by many scholars of hadīth: al Bukhārī, *Saḥīḥ*, Shahādat 9, faḍā'il asḥāb al Nabī 1, and other chapters; al Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, fitan 45, manāqib 56; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, ahkām 27; Ahmad, *Musnad*, Vol. I, 378; Vol. 2, 228; Vol. 4, 267; Vol. 5, 350.

and material goods. It has to show the value of individual work and collective action. In all these things, it has to be viewed in the context of normal life, as well as in extraordinary and stress situations.

Another aspect of the Islamic ethos comes to light when we discuss such questions as what is right and what is meritorious, and, opposingly, what is wrong and what is punishable by God? What is the place of motive and intention in this regard? What are the degrees of obligation, and what are the personal and collective duties? How do the circumstances of the individual and society affect the degree of obligation?

I have talked about good, right, and virtue; similar things can be said about evil and vice. Islamic ethics has to discuss both of these aspects.

The second task before Islamic ethics is to discuss the general terms used in Islamic morals, such as good, bad, right, wrong, meritorious, non-meritorious, responsibility, and obligation. The task has to determine and explain what these terms, or the terms used in Islamic sources communicating these ideas, mean. What are their degrees or levels, and how are they determined? What part is played in their knowledge by reason, intuition, and revelation as incorporated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah? It has to inquire into the ways the language of the Qur'an and the Sunnah expresses or suggests the degree of good and right, evil and wrong. It has to determine what act and practice of the Prophet is the Sunnah to be followed, and what is a personal habit or preference; or what incidental actions and practices are not meant to be followed. The Qur'an and the Sunnah recognize the convention ('urf) of the society and accord it a normative value if it belongs to a particular aspect of life. Islamic *fiqh* regards it as one of its secondary sources, and it is also to be noted by Islamic ethics. Some Sufis have claimed that mystical intuition (kashf), or inspiration, is also a source of ethical knowledge. Others have denied that, and a third group has taken a position in between the two. Some of these problems are the subject of meta-ethics, and others are the concern of moral epistemology.

The third task of Islamic ethics is to discuss how Islamic ethics is related to and influenced by Islamic faith. In Islam, God and the Hereafter are not merely postulates of morality as Kant had thought; they determine very much the meaning and content of ethical concepts and values. The distinction between the right and the meritorious, the role of motive, the concept of good and its levels, the nature and scope of virtue — all these notions are influenced by the Islamic idea of God, the life Hereafter, prophecy, and revelation. Modern ethics has tried to disengage ethics from metaphysics. But it has failed to see that to deny or not to affirm these realities is also a kind of metaphysical position. Islamic ethics has to point out the different ways in which Islamic faith affects moral life and concepts.

An important issue that falls into this category is the possibility of human

freedom and responsibility in the context of Divine omnipotence and predestination. Islamic ethics has to show that the freedom of man, to the extent he is held responsible for his acts, is not contravened by the omnipotence and predestination of God as presented in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Another issue that falls into this category is whether the norms of rationality, goodness, and justice, applicable to man, are equally applicable to God, or is it that they only partly apply to Him? On the answer to this question rests the theological problem of Divine justice and evil.

The fourth and last task of Islamic ethics is to pronounce judgements on problems that face Islamic society and to say what is right or wrong. To cope with this problem, Islamic ethics will have to define its own dynamics. It will have to specify the values that are permanent and unchangeable, and those whose operational norms may change. To the second category belong, in my view, such values as justice and equality whose scope or level of application may vary according to conditions.[2] If the first of these four tasks has been thoroughly accomplished·this last one would not be difficult to perform.

These are, in my view, the tasks that Islamic ethics is to accomplish. I will now review various streams of writings mentioned earlier and point out what contribution they can make to Islamic ethics.

Philosophical Works

The ethics that Abū Naṣr Fārābī (d. 329/950), Abū 'Alī Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Naṣīr al Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1273) and Jalāl al Dīn Dawwānī (d. 908/1502) have elaborated do not touch upon the last three problems I have mentioned. They are only concerned with the first problem, or, rather, with just a part of it, for it discusses the problem of good and leaves out the problem of right. Greek ethics was essentially an ethics of good, and as these writers adopted that ethics they brought no change in its character. Its central question remained as it was, namely, an investigation into the ultimate good or good in itself. The answer that Greek ethics gave to this question was happiness, which Muslim philosophers translated in Arabic and Persian as *sa'ādah*. In the way this concept was originally elaborated, a very comprehensive idea of the good was presented. It included knowledge; moral virtue, individual as well as social; health and the pleasures of the body; material goods; and even the goods of fortune, such as noble birth. Everything found a place

in this ideal. This, perhaps, was the reason why it appealed so much to Muslim philosophers.

However, a distinction was made between knowledge, which in its real sense was theoretical or philosophical, and moral virtue. Greek idealism identified the real essence of man with *nous* or theoretical reason, which alone was to survive the death of the body when it finally perished, never to be revived again. Thus, pure knowledge or contemplation of reality came to be regarded as the ultimate perfection of man and the highest good, while moral virtue or righteous conduct was regarded as the proximate perfection and a lower good.

Muslim philosophers upheld this distinction. Some of them, like Fārābī, even considered that nothing was good in itself except knowledge, and made every other good subservient to it.[3] Never was it asked whether this concept was consistent with the Islamic ideal of life. Even Imām Ghazālī, who followed in their footsteps, did not raise that question.[4]

Greek ethics analyzed moral or practical perfection in terms of virtues of the faculties of the soul: the rational, the irascive, and the appetitive. The virtue of the rational was wisdom; the virtue of the irascive was courage; the virtue of the appetitive was temperance; and the virtue of the entire soul was justice. Muslim philosophers followed this division and tried to categorize all the virtues of life under these four heads.

One of the glaring defects of this scheme was that religious virtues of Islam, such as faith, trust, love, and worship, could not be accommodated in it. So they were either ignored or were placed where they did not belong. Worship, for instance, was put by Miskawayh under justice,[5] where it was obviously a misfit.

The real reason why the Greek scheme of virtue could not express the entire gamut of Islamic virtues lay deeper in its concept of man. According to it, man was only a rational and a moral being. Religion was not a part of his essence, and hence religious virtues could not be treated as a separate class. Muslim philosophers were not able to discern that fact. The only person who realized it was Shāh Walī Allāh (d. 1176/1762). Consequently, he discarded the Greek scheme of virtue and worked out a different scheme.

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[3] Al Fārābī, *Al Madīnah al-Fādilah*, ed. Dr. N. Nadir (Beirut: 1956), p. 85; *al Risālah fi al 'Aql*, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut, n.d.) pp. 31-32. See also my book, *The Moral Philosophy of al-Fārābī* (Aligarh, India, 1965), pp. 25-27.

[4] Al Ghazālī, *Mīzān al 'Amal*, ed. Sulayman Dunya, (Cairo: Dār al Ma'ārif, 1964), pp. 217-221, 195-196. See also my book: *Sufism and Sharia*, (Leicester: UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1981), pp. 82-83.

[5] Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al Akhlāq*, (Beirut: Maktabah al-Hayāt, n.d.), p. 196. See also my book, *The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawaih*, (Aligarh, India: Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1964), p. 109.

In place of wisdom (*hikmah*), courage (*shajā'ah*), temperance (*'iffah*) and justice (*'adālah*), he proposed the virtues of purity (*tahārāh*), reverential submission (*ikhbāt*), magnanimity (*samāhah*), and justice (*'adālah*). The merit of this scheme is not the point of discussion here. What I want to underline is the fact that Shāh Walī Allāh realized that justice would not be done to the religious dimension of Islamic life unless its independence was recognized and religious virtues were given a place equal to other virtues.[6]

Theological Works

Theologians did not enter into normative questions of Islamic ethics. They discussed the source of ethical knowledge, the basis of moral obligation and the meaning of ethical terms. Besides these epistemological and meta-ethical questions, they also discussed the questions of human freedom and responsibility, and Divine justice. They took different positions on these questions. The determinists, for instance, upheld the absoluteness of Divine power, denied the reality of human freedom and responsibility, and did not try to justify Divine justice.

Another group of theologians, the Mu'tazilite free-willers, asserted that man has power and freedom to choose and act, and that this limits the omnipotence of God. Without acceding it, one can justify neither human responsibility nor Divine justice. They said that although a category of things, such as prayer, fasting, and sacrifice, is known to be good only through revelation, other goods are known through reason. This includes things that are pleasant or useful, as well as those that are morally good. We know through our reason that truthfulness, justice, and generosity are good; and lying, injustice, and miserliness are evil. Further, things are good in themselves; revelation does not make them so—it only confirms an ethical fact. They also said that moral obligation is rational; we know before any revelation may come that it is our duty to tell the truth, keep our promise, and shun lying and injustice. The pronouncements of reason, they said, are binding not only on man but also on God. He must reward the righteous and punish the wicked. This is what they called Divine justice.

Ash'arite theologians opposed the Mu'tazilah on all these counts, but they also did not side with the determinists. They tried to work out a *via media* between absolute determinism and the self-sufficiency of human will. This was their doctrine *kasb* or acquisition. But the way they stated the doc-

[6]Shāh Walī Allāh, *Hujjat Allāh al Bālighah*, (Delhi: Kutub Khānā Rashīdīyah, n.d.), Vol. I, pp. 53-55; Vol. II, pp. 67-69, 81-87. See also my paper, "Shāh Walī Allāh's Philosophy of the Islamic Sharī'ah," (Karachi: Hamadard Islamicus, Vol. X, No. 4, 1987), pp. 25-33.

trine appeared to many theologians of the *Ahl al Sunnah* to be a kind of qualified determinism. I am referring here to such theologians as Ibn Hammām[7] (d. 861/1475) of the Māturīdī school and Ibn Taymīyah[8] (d. 728/1327) among the Salafīs. These theologians admitted with the Muʻtazilah that to justify human responsibility and Divine justice one must affirm the efficacy of human will, and, to that extent, restrict Divine activity. This does not mean, however, compromising Divine omnipotence, for the limitation on the activity of God, they said, is not placed by anyone else, but by God Himself. It is he who limits the exercise of His unlimited power and allows man to act, and gives man the will and the power for the purpose.

On the question of ethical knowledge, the Ash ʻarites were of the opinion that revelation is the only way to know the good and the right. They did not accord any role to reason except in knowing what is pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmful. Nothing is obligatory, they said, unless revelation commands it. Reason is not the basis of obligation. Some like Abū al Maʻ ālī al Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) and al Shahristānī (d. 548/1153) even went to the extent that when we say "X is good" or "Y is a duty," it simply means that "X is approved by the Revelation" or "Y is commanded by the *Shar*ʻ[9] These words mean nothing else. It follows from this position that nothing can be said to be obligatory on God, and that His actions are not the subject of ethical judgment.

The Māturīdīs and the Salafī Ibn Taymīyah did not take this position. Agreeing partly with the Muʻtazilah, they said that reason does reveal things that are good, bad, right, or wrong in the ethical sense. But there is a limit to it; there are things that are known to be good and bad only through Revelation. They held a similar view about the basis of obligation. Part of obligations is both rational and revelatory; others are only revelatory. However, no one will be punished by God on his defaults unless he is first warned by a Revelation[10]. As to the question whether anything is obligatory on God, Ibn Taymīyah said that both the Qurʼan and the Hadith affirm it, but only in the sense that God has imposed it on Himself, not in the sense that someone else has obliged Him.[11] The Qurʼan, for instance, says that "He (i.e.,

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[7]Ibn Hammām, *al Musāyarah* with the commentary, *al Musāmarah* by Kamal b. Al-Sharif, (Bulaq: al Matbaʻah al-Kubrah al-Amīriyah, 1316 A.H.), pp. 100 H.

[8]Ibn Taymīyah, *Majmūʻ Fatāwā Shaykh al Islām* ed. ʻAbd al Rahmān b. Qāsim and his son Muhammad, (Riyadh: 1398 A.H.) Vol. 8: 117.

[9]Abū al Maʻālī al Juwaynī, *Kitāb al Irshād*, ed. Dr. M. Yūsuf Mūsa and ʻAlī ʻAbd al Munʻim, (Cairo: Maktabah al Khanjī, 1950), p. 258; ʻAbd al Karīm al Shahristānī, *Nihāyat al-Iqdām*, ed. A. Guillaume, (Oxford, 1934), p. 370.

[10]Majmūʻ Fatāwā Ibn Taymīyah, *Majmū Fatāwā Shaykh al Islām*, op. cit. Vol. 8, pp. 435-436.

[11]Ibn Taymīyah, *Kitāb al Tawassul wa al Wasīlah*, (Cairo: Matbaʻ al-Manār, 1327 A.H.), pp. 65-66.

God) has imposed mercy on Himself" (6:12).

Ibn Taymīyah has also pointed out that if something is right or wrong for human beings, it is not necessarily so for God. The proposition that rational judgments are true for every rational being, including God, is not true.[12] Some rules, such as speaking the truth and keeping promises, are true for men as well as God. But some things, such as causing death, pain or suffering to creatures, that are wrong for man are not wrong for God.

I have given here only an idea of the various positions that the theologians have taken on ethical questions. No one should get the impression that the positions are as simple as I have presented. There are many variations, and the literature on the subject is very rich and deserves to be thoroughly studied.

Jurisprudential Writings

Works on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence *(usūl al fiqh)* or on the structure and the objectives of the Islamic Sharī'ah have discussed some normative questions and touched on the knowledge of the Sharī'ah rules and the basis of their obligation. I will leave these epistemological and meta-legal questions, since the views expressed on these subjects are nothing different from what we have reviewed under theological ethics. I will only refer to a few normative issues.

Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) in *al Mustasfā*;, Ibn 'Abd al Salām (d. 660/1262) in *Qawā'id al Ahkām fī Masālih al Anām* and Abū Ishāq al Shātibī (d. 790/1388) in *al Muwāfaqāt*, to mention a few leading scholars, have raised the question: what is the end or the object of the Sharī'ah?[13] Al Shātibī, who has studied the works of the earlier two writers and discusses the issue at length, gives the following answer:

> "The rules of the *shar'* have been designed to produce goods *(masālih)* and remove evils, *(mafāsid)* and these are certainly their ends and objects."[14] And "the *masālih* are those which promote the preservation and fulfillment of human life, and the realization

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[12]Ibn Taymīyah, *Minhāj al Sunnah*, (Beirut: Dār al Kutub al Islāmiyah, n.d.), Vol. I, p. 124.

[13]Al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustasfā*, (Cairo: al Halabī, reprint from Amīriyah, ed. 1322 A.H.), Vol. I, pp. 284-314. Ibn 'Abd al Salām, *Qawā'id al Ahkām fī Masālih al ānām*, (Beirut: Dār al Jīl, 1400/1980), Vol. I. Abū Ishāq al Shātibī, *al Muwāfaqāt fī Usūl al Sharī'ah*, ed. 'Abdullāh al Darrāz (Cairo, n.d.), particularly Volume II.

[14]Abū Ishāq al Shātibī, *al Muwāfaqāt*, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 195.

of all that the human nature, animal and rational demands, till one is happy in every respect."[15]

This is an extremely important statement. It underlines very clearly that the purpose of the Sharī'ah is to secure the all-round fulfillment of man — fulfillment of his body and his soul, his intellect and feeling, his moral being and religious being, his aesthetic tastes and sensitivities, his individual personality and society. It shows that when a scholar of the Sharī'ah, freeing himself or herself from all alien influences, reflects on its structure and its objectives, he or she comes to the conclusion that the Sharī'ah aims at a comprehensive and balanced well-being of man.

This, of course, does not mean that all the constituents of this well-being or happiness are equally valuable. Some are, to be sure, more valuable than others, but it is very important to note that everything has a value in itself and is not merely a means or condition for another. Shāṭibī has discussed the priorities of the Sharī'ah. The subject is so intricate that I cannot state it in a few words. However, one thing is clear: Islam does not single out one element of personality, be it knowledge, feeling, action, morality, or religious devotion — in short, any good of the body or the soul — and say that it is the highest and the ultimate good, and everything else is subservient to it. Shāṭibī did not begin with idealistic metaphysics, or a doctrine of the soul, or a theory of knowledge as the philosophers did; consequently, he did not extol contemplation over action or knowledge over virtue; nor did he downgrade the goods of the body or frown upon its pleasures. All that he wanted, he pleaded, was that one should pursue the objective of the Sharī'ah, duly minding the priorities it stands for. If this is done with a view to please God, it is *'ibādah*[16], worshipful service to God, which is the object of man's creation according to the Qur'an.[17]

In these works on the principles of jurisprudence and the philosophy of the Sharī'ah there are other points also worthy of note. There is an elaborate discussion in them on the levels of obligation and the factors, individual and social, that may upgrade or downgrade the obligation of individual acts. There is also a discussion on motive and its affect on judgments regarding actions and the recompense thereupon, here or hereafter. A thorough study of these works is necessary to accomplish the fourth task set before Islamic ethics.

[15]Ibid, Vol. I, p. 25.
[16]Ibid, Vol, II, pp. 168-169.
[17]al-Qur'an, 51:56.

Sufi Writings

It is easy to review philosophical, theological or jurisprudential writings, for there are many common ideas in them. This is not so with Sufi writings. However, at the risk of being charged with simplism, I will say that these writings may be divided into three categories:

One category of writings extolls the ecstatic experience of union with God as the highest goal of human endeavor, ironically calling it *tawḥīd*, and urges that the whole life be geared to that end. This is the view of Shaykh 'Abdullāh al-Anṣārī al-Harawī[18] (d. 481/1049).

The second category of writings asserts that it is not ecstatic union but, rather, the realization in knowledge that reality is one is the highest goal. There are different interpretations of this truth, one offered by Ghazālī[19], the other by Ibn 'Arabī[20] (d. 638/1240).

The third category of writings say, that the ecstatic experience of union with God is only a stage in the spiritual pursuit *(sulūk)* of the mystic. It has to be transcended, and the final and unbridgeable difference between God and the world or man has been realized. That realization is the final end of the Sufi pursuit. The most clear and forceful exponent of this view is Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī[21] (d. 1034/1627). He claims that without treading the Sufi path and going through these experiences, one cannot attain the Qur'anic goal of servanthood *(ubūdīyah)*, where the will of man merges into the will of God; that is, where one wills nothing but the will of God.

In order to realize their goal, Sufis prescribe a discipline of life; a method of purification of the soul; and a way of worship, devotion and contemplation, which are partly based on the teachings of the Prophet, and partly developed in the light of experience. These two components of the Sufi Way *(ṭarīqah)* vary in their relative strength from group to group and individual to individual. Accordingly, exercises in asceticism, renunciation, devotion, contemplation and ecstasy vary in rigor.

There is a reorientation of the values and norms of life in the light of the goal that the Sufis set before themselves and the *ṭarīqah* they practice.

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[18]'Abdullāh al Anṣārī al Harawī, *Manāzil al Sā'irīn*, with commentary by Iskandarāni, p. 227.

[19]See my paper, "The Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Development of Ghazālī's View of Reality," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, 1982, pp. 32-36.

[20]See Abū al 'Alā al 'Af īf ī, *al Tasawwuf: Al Thawrah al Rūḥiyah fī al Islām* (Beirut: Dar al Sha'b, n.d.), pp. 175-184. See his large work, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhiyid Din Ibnul 'Arabī* (Cambridge: 1936), reprint Ashraf, Lahore.

[21]See my *Sufism and Sharī'ah: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī's Effort to Reform Sufism* (Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), pp. 37.

How close or how removed this orientation is from the Prophetic model is a point of study. It is difficult to make a general statement. It may be noted, however, that in this process the Sufis have, at times, deepened our understanding of Islamic virtues, both religious and moral; and they have, at times, diverged from the original understanding, even transformed it.

Political and Economic Writings

In the political works of scholars like al Mawardī (d. 450/1058) and Ibn Jamā 'ah[22] (d. 819/1416) or the economic writings of jurists like Qaḍī Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/799) and Abū 'Ubayd[23] (d. 224/838), there are discussions that help us to understand Islamic concepts of political and economic justice. Scholars of the last few decades have uncovered and presented a lot of material on the subject. In the light of this and of the other many relevant ideas they have discussed, the Islamic view on the subject should not be difficult to formulate.

I have tried in this paper to define the concept and the issues of the prospective Islamic ethics. I have also tried to give an idea of the work that has been done on the subject by our scholars in various fields. I am sure that if the scholars of our time take up the challenge, they would get great help and inspiration from the writings of our predecessors in developing an Islamic ethics.

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[22]Abū al Hasan 'Alī b. Muḥammad al Mawardī's work *al Aḥkām al Sulṭānīyah* has been published many times. Muḥammad b. al Husayn b. Muammad Khalaf b. al Farrā' Abū Ya'lā (d. 380/990) also has a book with the same title. The name of Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. 'Abd al 'Azīz Ibn Jam'ah's book is *Taḥrīr al Aḥkām fī Tadbīr ahl al Islām.*

[23]Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf's work is entitled, *Kitāb al Kharāj*. It has been published many times; its translations in various languages have also appeared. Abū'Ubayd al Qāsim b. Sulṭān's work is entitled *Kitāb al Amwāl*; the edition that is before me is of Maktabah al Tijārīyah al Kubrā, Cairo, 1353 A.H.