AFRICAN HUMAN MOBILITY REVIEW

Violent xenophobic episodes in South Africa: 2008 and 2015

Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: What Must the African Union Do?

Violent Conflict and Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions

Development-Induced Displacement and Its Impacts on the Livelihoods of Poor Urban Households in Bahir Dar, North Western Ethiopia

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African Human Mobility Review

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Volume 1 Number 3   September – December, 2015- Special Issue

GUEST EDITOR'S NOTE

ARTICLES

GUEST EDITOR'S NOTE

Shimeles Bonsa Gulema[*]

The history of Africa since independence in the 1960s has been defined, to a large extent, by the quest for modernization, development, and democracy. These issues are fundamental to the continent and the failure to achieve them over the last sixty or so years, a reality in a number of African countries, has wrought havoc and destruction. For instance, nation and state building in Africa has been bedeviled by the failure to recognize and manage the continent's cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity, not to mention the fact that the very model of the nation-state was never African but colonial in origin. Post-colonial Africa's record on building the foundations of democracy, peace and security have, at best, been mixed with a significant number of countries finding themselves mired in cycles of dictatorship, war and violence.[1]

Nevertheless, this picture of crises does not belie the seriousness of Africa's commitment or struggle to dismantle the colonial inheritance of authoritarianism, underdevelopment and fragile nations and institutions. There is no better example than Africa's decades-old search for development to demonstrate the scale of the challenges, but also the depth of investment made to break the shackles of poverty and inequality and build nations-states that are modern, viable and inclusive. Since the 1960s, African governments made development their *raison d'etre*, followed different paradigms of development and embarked on massive projects ranging from building infrastructure to small-scale industrialization to providing basic social services. The ideology of developmentalism, which is now gaining momentum in some African countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, was in full swing. Successes were evident everywhere, but were often short-lived, not inclusive or did not address the root causes of poverty. Reforms

[1] Goran Hyden, *African Politics in Comparative Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

proposed by the World Bank and the IMF, notably the 1980s Structural Adjustment Programs[2] worsened the conditions.

Contemporary state developmentalism (otherwise referred to as the developmental state model), which privileges the delivery of development over or, even, at the expense of democracy and civil liberties, has registered impressive growth trajectories, like the arguably high double-digit growth in Ethiopia,[3] and subsequently generated a sense of optimism that Africa has finally found the key, a panacea, to a new world of African renaissance[4]. At the same time, however, the paradigm of the developmental state, like those that preceded it, has so far failed to fundamentally alter the dependent nature of Africa's national economies or transform the lives of millions of Africans. In the immediate, however, the human cost of this quest for development include the massive displacement, both in rural and urban Africa, of people who often are located at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. Dislocation is also caused by war and violence, which in large part is also a result of the lack of development.

The central reasons for Africa's development crisis are complex, evolving and subject to different interpretations. If existing unequal international division of labor, whose roots go back to the eras of slavery, colonialism and imperialism, constitutes the external origin of the African crisis, weak institutions and the predatory and authoritarian nature of the African state then represent the domestic part, although both are (and have always been) deeply intertwined. The consequences have been negative, catastrophic in

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[2] World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1981); Thandika Mkandawire and Adebayo Olukoshi, eds., *Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa* (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series, 1995).

[3] Reuters Africa, "Ethiopia's economy to grow 10.5 percent in 2015/16: World Bank," May 22, 2015 (http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN0O70LP20150522) ; Dereje Feyissa Dori, 'Ethiopia's African tiger' leaps towards middle income," *The Guardian*, October 22, 2014 (http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/oct/22/ethiopia-african-tiger-middle-income).

[4] Thabo Mbeki, "The African Renaissance, South Africa, and the World," a speech at the United Nations University, April, 9, 1998 (http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html).

many cases. Unmet social and political expectations, which have become the reason for disillusion and frustration with the vast majority of Africans remaining no better off than their parents, have also tested the very legitimacy of the African state and its mandate to govern. This tension of the state and state-society relations manifests itself in ways that range from the rise of insurgencies and disengagement from the state to the informalisation of economies and politics.

Migration, both internal and transnational, represent an exit strategy for poor Africans. It has now acquired a greater significance as large number of people, numbered in tens of millions, move across many countries and regions of the world. The migration of Africans to Europe and the Middle East which is now eclipsed by the unprecedented exodus of Syrians is only the latest in this saga of global human mobility. The twentieth century has in fact been called 'the age of migration,[5] a reference to the fact that there are more migrants in the world today than ever before – about 232 million international migrants in 2013.[6]

A major outcome of displacement and migration, twin processes linked by the dynamics of underdevelopment, poor governance, environmental crisis and conflict, is the state of being a refugee, a precarious condition especially when legal and political recognition and protection are not provided. Somali or South Sudanese refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia and those from the Horn of Africa in South Africa often find themselves in a state of limbo or suspension, simultaneously 'not being here (home) and not being there (host)', and often harassed by states and at times subjected to communal violence and xenophobia.

Needless to say this is an intractable challenge and the question is how to address it in an enduring and meaningful way. The unbounded optimism that attended Mbeki's declaration of African renaissance appears to survive the frustration that followed, albeit modestly. The fact that some of the world's fastest growing economies are in Africa is testimony to the huge promise and

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[5] Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration* 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[6] United Nations, *Trends in International Migrant Stoke: The 2013 Revision – Migrants by Age and Sex* (UN Database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock?Rev.2013?Age, 2013).

possibilities for change in the continent. Yet, change requires fundamental transformation in the organization of African politics and economies and the continent's relations with the world and its place in the global economy. Sustainable development and democratization, Africa's perennial pursuits, are once again at the heart of the solution.

The Papers

The *Special Issue* is a novel undertaking by the journal of *African Human Mobility Review*. It resulted from a discussion held between the editors in South Africa and myself in New York. The idea germinated in the wake of an unprecedented wave of attacks against African immigrants in South Africa, a development that was unusual, if not unique. What was striking then was the fact that it happened in the very country where the idea of African renaissance, which included ideals of solidarity and empathy among Africans, was declared. We felt that this dark episode demanded some explanation and hence our decision to initiate some deep conversation on the political economy of development, migration, displacement, and xenophobia.

The *Special Issue* is not as comprehensive and representative as one would expect. Nevertheless, it brings together studies on a range of issues, all tied to the general theme of the special issue and each demonstrating the interconnections between poverty and underdevelopment, conflict, displacement, migration and xenophobia. The first two papers deal with the theme of xenophobia, one discussing the specific episodes of 2008 and 2015 in South Africa and the other exploring ways to tackle the scourge, with the African Union being in the forefront. Simon Bekker's paper "Entitlement Demands and Entitlement Despair: Reflections on the Violent Xenophobic Episodes of 2015 and 2008" interrogates the validity of the term xenophobia in characterizing the violent collective behavior associated with South Africa's urban working class and underclass. For Bekker, the violence against fellow African immigrants was a result of unmet social and economic expectations instead of any entrenched xenophobic attitudes.

In her paper entitled "Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: What the African Union Do?," Romola Adeola, on the other hand, affirms the economic origins and continent-wide nature of xenophobia and makes a case for a lasting intervention by supranational institutions, principally the African Union.

After all, the AU's reason for existence or legitimation is the protection and furthering of human rights, unity, peace and security within and across member countries.

The remaining two papers deal specifically with issues of displacement, one caused by conditions of war and violence and the other by state-led development. "Violent Conflict and Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions, a paper by Nat J. Colleta, is a narrative of displacement, offering a critical discussion of its dynamics, roots, and its links with conflict and environmental crisis and those between what she calls political topography and ethnic demography. The paper draws attention to anti-immigrant sentiments, including the phenomenon of 'Afrophobia', which, the argument goes, operate in the context of economic hardship and ethnic political mobilization. The author ends the paper with a call for a new displacement paradigm, one that is proactive and transformative.

Getu Ambaye and Assefa Abelieneh's paper, "Development-Induced Displacement and Its Impacts on the Livelihoods of Poor Urban Households in Bahir Dar, North Western Ethiopia," presents a discussion of the human cost of development, which is displacement, in a country where development/developmentalism forms the legitimating ideology of the state. At the same time, the paper problematizes the issue by arguing that urban development in Bahir Dar, as in many other urban centers in the country, has engendered both benefits and deficits, represented, for instance, by the cutting of existing social ties on the one hand and the ownership of improved houses on the other respectively.

By Way of Conclusion

A deeper exploration of issues of displacement, xenophobia, conflict, and migration, as the four contributions have made, serves to underscore larger, often global, processes including globalization and transnationalism but also inequality within and between countries and regions. Likewise, there is a link between the crisis of the nation-state in Africa, owing in part to the rise of non-state and supra-state actors, and the unravelling that is now evident in many parts of the continent. In addition, the papers offer a critique of existing assumptions, interpretations and practices, as in the case of the term

xenophobia; call for a rethinking in a way that enables a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, and suggest measures to tackle existing challenges, including displacement and xenophobia, among others.

If these papers have gone some distance in this endeavor, we will then have every reason to say we have met our objectives. However, this contribution, modest as it is, couldn't claim to be exhaustive. It emphasizes, instead, the need for sustained research on the complex and evolving dynamic of human mobility in the continent.

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Violent xenophobic episodes in South Africa, 2008 and 2015

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Abstract

A comparison between the 2015 and 2008 violent xenophobic episodes in South Africa is made, identifying both similarities and differences. Since government and other commentators, in both 2015 and 2008, differ considerably in deciding whether these episodes ought to be considered as essentially xenophobic in character, a number of prominent interpretations employed by these commentators will be identified and discussed. The perpetrators mobilised during these events are drawn from the same pool as the protesters mobilised during current country-wide violent service delivery protests. Accordingly, this article concludes by suggesting that an insightful interpretation covering both categories of actors belonging to South Africa's urban working and under-class may be made. The violent collective behaviour that is becoming widespread country-wide stems, to a significant extent, not from their deep-seated xenophobic attitudes, but rather from the unfulfilled expectations of what they believe should be their just entitlements.

Keywords: South Africa, violent xenophobic events, service delivery protests, comparisons of series of events.

Introduction

Before the main theme of this article is identified, an anecdote that plays the role of preamble is recounted. It foregrounds a number of issues directly relevant to the main theme.

In June 2015, during a visit to Cameroon in West Africa, I was travelling south of Yaoundé, the capital city, with a doctoral student and his brother to visit the two men's parents. Since Cameroon is one of the countries confronted with the Boko Haram threat, there were several roadblocks in the rural

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forested region through which we were travelling. At each, I was requested, as a foreigner, to step out of the car and show my passport to the uniformed gendarme responsible for passing cars and their passengers. "You are a South African, *monsieur*?" asked one such gendarme and when I replied in the affirmative, he continued by telling me that he and his fellow security officers treated foreign visitors to Cameroon with courtesy. "Do you in South Africa do the same thing, for foreigners from Africa?" he then asked with perhaps a touch of scepticism. I had no ready and credible reply to this.

On the 18th of April 2015, Emmanuel Sithole, a cigarette and sweet hawker and Mozambique national living and working in Alexandra Township in Johannesburg, was attacked and stabbed in the heart by four young male residents. He later died after journalists rushed him to hospital. It is probable that the Cameroonian gendarme knew of South Africa's less than courteous treatment of foreigners through Emmanuel Sithole's sad story. A South African photojournalist's sequence of remarkable photographs of the build-up to the murder, some of which appeared on the front pages of South African newspapers, were also broadcast globally through social media. This deadly incident that took place during the series of closely-knit violent attacks on the persons and property of foreigners at that time, in the words of a South African journalist, gave "a face, a name, a life and a personality" to one of the targets of this violence, thus providing "humanising elements that have been absent in much of the (media's) coverage" (Harber 2015). They also led to criticisms by senior government members that wide-reaching broadcasting of such material damages South Africa's international reputation.

That South Africa's image as a safe refuge for African asylum-seekers and as a hospitable territory for economic migrants from the developing world has been further diminished in 2015 is common cause. This article will compare the 2015 series of closely-knit violent events to that of 2008 when a similar series took place. The comparison between what hereafter will be referred to as the 2015 and 2008 xenophobic episodes, will identify both similarities as well as differences. The focus of the comparison will be on the geography and chronology of the events, on both civilian perpetrators as well as civilian victims, and on government reaction to the continuing outbursts. In the second place, since government and other commentators, in both 2015 and 2008, differ considerably in deciding whether these episodes ought to be

considered as essentially xenophobic in character, a number of prominent interpretations employed by these commentators will be identified and discussed.

The perpetrators mobilised during these events are drawn from the same pool as the protesters mobilised during current country-wide violent service delivery protests. Accordingly, this article will conclude by suggesting that an insightful interpretation covering both categories of actors belonging to South Africa's urban working and under-class may be made. It will be argued that the violent collective behaviour that is becoming widespread country-wide stems, to a significant extent, not from their deep-seated xenophobic attitudes, but rather from the unfulfilled expectations of what they believe should be their just entitlements.

Conceptual Framework and Methodology

The rise of xenophobic attitudes in South Africa is not a new topic of research (Nyamjoh 2006). The 2008 series of violent events in urban South Africa shifted the research focus toward analyses of violent collective action and the various causes of such action. This in turn required a wider conceptual framework, in particular to include analyses of cross-border migration streams, state migration policies, and the attitudes and actions of the members of the South African Police Service (Hassim et al. 2008, HSRC 2008, Misago et al. 2009). It also required an approach to analyse violent collective action itself, leading to debates regarding the utility of relative deprivation and resource mobilization approaches (Bekker 2010). In the analysis below, particular attention is given to the approach employed by Donald Horowitz (2001) in which social psychological as well as sociological concepts are employed and the roles of both precipitating factors and of rumours are foregrounded.

The methodology employed during these analyses begins with a comparison between the 2015 and 2008 xenophobic episodes where each episode comprises a series of closely-knit violent events identified in the print media. The validity of such event data sets may be taken to be acceptable whilst acknowledging that missing data may be the most serious form of description bias (Earl et al. 2004). Subsequently, a comparison is drawn between primary stakeholders' interpretations of the causes and nature of these 2015 and 2008 episodes. These interpretations are identified both in

publications by members of the research community as well as in the print media. In the third place, a preliminary analysis of a recently constructed event data set of service delivery protests in South Africa (Powell n.d.) is made with the aim of revealing resemblances between this analysis and those undertaken earlier.

Outbursts in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, March and April 2015

On Monday the 30th of March, the 2015 violent xenophobic episode began in Isipingo, an industrial and residential area in the eThekwini metro south of Durban's CBD. The probable precipitating factor was the rumour that local businesses were hiring foreigners to replace local workers involved in industrial action and wage disputes. After a series of attacks on individuals in the area, some 240 displaced foreigners reported to the local police station and were subsequently moved to a tented transit camp.

This first outburst was followed by a series of others in the metro, particularly in the northern township of KwaMashu and in the inner city residential area of Verulam – more specifically, in its informal residential neighbourhoods – where foreigners' shops were looted and burnt down and foreigners themselves attacked. This onslaught continued for two weeks and included large crowds of locals marching on a number of occasions, with the ostensible purpose of driving migrants out of Durban. In response, local foreign migrants organised a demonstration in the metro's CBD during which clashes took place between the demonstrators and the South African police.

Temporary shelters to accommodate the displaced foreign nationals were established in Isipingo, Chatsworth and Greenwood Park (located in Durban North). "The municipality has supplied tents, electricity, showers, ablution facilities and primary health care in the form of mobile clinics where the displaced foreign nationals have been accommodated," an eThekwini spokesperson said (Sosibo 2015). With seven people killed at the height of the violence, it was reported that many foreign nationals still feared for their lives. The temporary shelters were replaced by four camps in the province – in Chatsworth, Phoenix, Isipingo Beach and Pietermaritzburg – which together accommodated about 5 000 people. The camps were situated on grounds that were not intended for habitation and, as a result, sanitation was a problem (Sosibo 2015).

Some two weeks after the commencement of these outbursts in KwaZulu-Natal, in anticipation of a similar wave in Gauteng, foreign shop owners in the CBD of Johannesburg closed their doors in a bid to protect their stock amid rumours circulating on social networks that attacks were imminent. This was three days before the murderous attack on Emmanuel Sithole in Alexandra Township.

The anticipated assaults soon materialised with foreign-owned businesses in the inner city areas of Jeppestown and Cleveland, and later in the East Rand, being attacked and looted. Simultaneously, as was the case earlier in Durban, locals blocked roads with rocks and burning tyres, purportedly to drive foreigners out of South Africa. The violence was reported to have claimed the lives of seven people, three of them South African. Simultaneously, camps for foreign nationals fleeing the violence were established close to the CBD and in Germiston on the East Rand.

The South African police were called upon, in both Durban and Johannesburg, to contain the violence. Much scepticism about police effectiveness and neutrality was expressed both in the media and by many on the ground (Sosibo et al. 2015, News24 2015). Eventually, during the third week of April, the South African National Defence Force was deployed to "volatile areas" to prevent attacks on foreigners, as stated by Defence Minister Mapisa-Nqakula. She was reported to have said that the army was intervening because an "emergency" had developed (BBC News, 2015). The first deployments were to Alexandra, the poor township north of Johannesburg where Emmanuel had been hawking his wares.

Build-Up and Immediate Outcomes of the 2015 Episode

Though numerous violent outbursts have taken place during the past seven years, these have not been as intense and as closely-knit as the two episodes during April 2015 and May 2008 that are compared here. However, seemingly isolated outbursts ought not to be seen as once-off and unrelated to earlier and later events as a local history of violence against strangers, mixed with social and mass media coverage of such recent violence elsewhere may become a potent combination. Such an event took place in Soweto, Johannesburg's largest township, in January 2015. What was described as a looting frenzy of foreign-owned shops in Soweto broke out and later spread to other townships in Gauteng. It left six dead and large

numbers of Bengalis, Pakistanis, Ethiopians and Somalis displaced (Sosibo et al. 2015).

Gauteng provincial politicians put these attacks down to economic reasons: "The recent attacks are because township entrepreneurs feel demoralised, frustrated, and they feel they cannot thrive as business owners in their own communities," Gauteng's economic development MEC said a week after the outbursts (Sosibo et al. 2015). National Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu added, "You cannot run away from the fact that there are underlying issues and that our people are being squeezed out by these foreign shop owners" (Sosibo et al. 2015). On Monday 16 March, some two weeks before the start of the outbursts in KwaZulu-Natal, a public announcement by the Zulu King called for foreigners to "take their bags and go" (Ndou 2015). While addressing the rural Pongolo community in isiZulu during a moral regeneration event, King Zwelithini was reported to have accused government of failing to protect locals from the "influx of foreign nationals". "Most government leaders do not want to speak out on this matter because they are scared of losing votes. As the king of the Zulu nation, I cannot tolerate a situation where we are being led by leaders with no views whatsoever" (Ndou 2015).

The dissemination of credible rumours, whether these reflect the precise statements of influential public figures or not, can prove to be a potent form of contagion (Horowitz 2001: 74f): once a violent event has taken place, violence may spread to another place where precipitants at the subsequent location are less significant than they were at the first. Violence does not occur in isolation; it derives intellectual impetus from events regarded as comparable elsewhere (Bekker 2010: 144). The interpretations at local community level made of Minister Zulu's statement in Gauteng and the Zulu King's speech among the predominantly isiZulu population of eThekwini are probably cases in point.

Two developments in the aftermath of the 2015 episode will be identified. They have been chosen since comparable outcomes did not take place after the 2008 episode. They have also been chosen since they may be seen as different sides of the same coin: from foreign African governments' points of view, the South African government's response to the 2015 episode has been visibly unapologetic. Conversely, the South African government condemned the Nigerian government for the withdrawal of its envoys and established a

special body to search out criminals (both foreign and South African) for extradition and prosecution.

First, there was a wide-ranging and deeply critical reaction to these events by a number of sub-Saharan African governments, some of which went as far as threatening reprisals through the deportation of South African nationals and their businesses from their territories. Political leaders from Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe publicly condemned the attacks, with both Malawi and Zimbabwe sending buses to repatriate citizens following the violence. Mozambiquan workers at South African gas companies downed tools in protest. Nigeria's acting high commissioner in South Africa and its consul-general were called home to brief the Nigerian Parliament about the welfare of Nigerian citizens in South Africa following what was called "the anti-immigrant violence" in Durban and Johannesburg (Visser 2015).

Second, one week after the termination of the 2015 episode, there was the establishment of a national government programme aimed at ridding "our country of illegal weapons, drug dens, prostitution rings and other illegal activities" (Hunter 2015). Named Operation Fiela-Reclaim and initially carried out by the South African National Defence Force, it was launched by a national inter-ministerial committee on migration. During its first week of operation, 265 suspects had been arrested and charged in relation to 150 cases of public violence around the country, according to Minister Radebe. Simultaneously, he announced that government was working hard to ensure that 1 507 documented foreign nationals awaiting repatriation would be sent home as soon as possible and stated: "We have thus far repatriated a total of 1 997 undocumented migrants from both KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng temporary shelters" (Hunter 2015).

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), as mentioned above, was first mobilized about a month after the 2015 episode began. It was subsequently requested to launch Operation Fiela. In 2008, during the violent xenophobic episode of that year, the SANDF was also called upon to intervene toward the end of the episode. However, no subsequent operation was launched. We now turn our attention to 2008.

Outbursts in Gauteng and the Western Cape, May and June 2008

During the second half of May 2008 (and continuing through the first week of June), a series of short violent outbursts took place in neighbourhoods of numerous South African cities and towns. The violence during these outbursts was committed by civilians and was inflicted on the property and the person of civilians. The perpetrators were largely young and middle-aged poor black South African men; the targets were largely the property and businesses of foreign African nationals as well as these civilians themselves; and the locations were predominantly urban informal settlements, townships and hostels. The series of outbursts began in Gauteng and, about a week after the first serious event, spread to other urban areas of the country, Cape Town and the Western Cape in particular. Initial state reaction was evasive, essentially denying the scope and seriousness of these events. Subsequently, as the series of events spread across the country, the state sought explanations in criminal and mob behaviour. This geographic spread of outbursts was accompanied by widespread coverage in the mass media – television, radio and newspapers – of these events and their possible causes. Since the reaction of many of the victims was flight from their residential areas, a number of temporary refugee camps were established (in Gauteng and Cape Town, in particular). During the aftermath of these outbursts, more than 20 000 refugees were accommodated in this way, numerous African foreign nationals were reported to have left the country, and government urged refugees in camps to return to the residential areas from which they had fled since these were said to have calmed down (Bekker et al. 2008; Bekker 2010).

In order to distinguish the violent events that took place during the first week from those that occurred subsequently in May and early June, news articles on the 2008 episode captured from the print media were filed under an event name (typically the locality where the outburst took place) and a standardized set of event data was assembled for each. These data included date, duration, type of settlement, nature of violence, reported precipitants and rumours and the nature of police intervention. In Tables 1-4 below, events have been classified in terms of the province in which they occurred, the date on which they took place, whether they were major or minor in intensity and whether they included violence against persons or solely against property. The first three tables depict events that took place in the

periods 10 to 20 May, 21 to 31 May, and during June 2008, respectively. The fourth table aggregates these results for the entire period.

As is clear from Table 1 (first phase), the majority of outbursts during the first phase took place in Gauteng. In addition, all major outbursts were situated in Gauteng and comprise more than a third of all events in that province. In fact, the most reported deaths during the three-phase period under scrutiny took place in this province during the first phase. Four events were reported to have had identifiable precipitants, Alexandra – a black township in Johannesburg – being the most detailed. Significantly more reports identified rumours that were claimed to have fuelled the violent outbursts. A minority of reports on these events indicated police presence and police intervention, most often detailed as attempts to disperse crowds. During the middle phase, comprising ten days (see Table 2), the print media reported a total of sixty-three events. Thirty-two of these events took place in the Western Cape, thirteen in KwaZulu-Natal, seven in Gauteng, and eleven in other provinces. From the media reports, it appears that xenophobic violence in this phase was not as violent as during the first phase. The majority of events were classified as minor events on property alone. Police intervention was reported in a number of cases, most often involving the arrest of perpetrators. These events appear to involve opportunistic behaviour more often than in the earlier phase since media coverage and rumours involving earlier events led many foreigners to depart from their residences and abandon their property. This anticipation of possible attacks created a context in which locals could vandalize and loot homes and shops belonging to those who had fled.

In the final phase (see Table 3), ten of the eleven reported events were minor with half involving assault on persons. This final phase – effectively comprising of the first half of the month of June – reflects a diminishment in the frequency of events in all four classes as well as a (late) diffusion to new provinces. This phase may be seen, at least in terms of print media coverage, as the petering out of the series of outbursts country-wide. In the aggregated data of outbursts in Table 4, it is worth noting that most major events took place in Gauteng during the first phase, and that most outbursts during the whole period under scrutiny were minor events involving vandalizing of property and looting rather than assault on persons.

Table 1 First Phase

	Major Involving Assault/Death	Major on Property Only	Minor Involving Assault/Death	Minor on Property Only	Total
FIRST PHASE					
Gauteng	14	4	11	21	50
Western Cape	0	0	0	2	2
Others	0	0	3	6	9
Total	14	4	14	29	61

Table 2 Middle Phase

	Major Involving Assault/Death	Major on Property Only	Minor Involving Assault/Death	Minor on Property Only	Total
MIDDLE PHASE					
Gauteng	2	1	1	3	7
Western Cape	2	4	4	22	32
KZN	2	0	4	7	13
Others	1	0	3	7	11
Total	7	5	12	39	63

Table 3 Final Phase

	Major Involving Assault/Death	Major on Property Only	Minor Involving Assault/Death	Minor on Property Only	Total
FINAL PHASE					
Gauteng	0	0	2	1	3
Western Cape	0	0	0	0	0
Others	1	0	3	4	8
Total	1	0	5	5	11

Table 4 Summary of All Events

	Major Involving Assault /Death	Major on Property Only	Minor Involving Assault/Death	Minor on Property Only	Total
	SUMMARY OF ALL EVENTS				
Gauteng	16	5	14	25	60
Western Cape	2	4	4	24	34
Others	4	0	13	24	41
Total	22	9	31	73	135

The 2008 and 2015 Episodes: Similarities and Differences

There are a number of striking similarities between the 2015 and 2008 series of violent events. To begin with the geography and chronology of the two episodes, the outbursts were principally confined to urban townships, inner city residential areas and informal settlements of South Africa's metros. It is worth noting that local perpetrators also employed the CBDs of Durban and Johannesburg in the 2015 episode. The location of these events are often at a substantial distance from one another, implying that communication regarding justifications for violent action by word-of mouth would have been well-nigh impossible. In both episodes, chronologically, outbursts began and, in large measure, spread rapidly within one metro for some ten days before shifting into a second metro. In both cases, after two to three weeks, the series of closely-knit outbursts petered out at approximately the same time, as the state decided to mobilize the South African Defence Force to deal with what they belatedly called an emergency.

The second striking set of similarities is found in the rapid diffusion of information across neighbourhoods of metros as well as between metros themselves. Rumour, justifications for violent actions, and shared belief in immunity from punishment were communicated within the mass media – newsprint, television and radio (in various languages) – as well as via social media. The latter probably played a more important role in 2015 than in 2008 since more residents were capable of using social media tools during this later episode (Worldwideworx n.d.). In both Cape Town in 2008 and

Johannesburg in 2015 (the second metros to be affected in each respective episode) foreigners who had been informed via such media of outbursts elsewhere anticipated attacks a day or two before they began. However, the impact of these outbursts in Cape Town, where most events were opportunistic since foreign residents and shop-owners had fled their homes and shops before the attacks began, differed from the impact in Johannesburg where events appear to have been as violent as in Durban.

Similarities regarding the content of information being diffused before as well as during the outbursts are also striking. Rumours form an essential part of the process leading up to an outburst, Horowitz (2001: 74-75) argues

> They mobilize ordinary people to do what they would not ordinarily do. They shift the balance in a crowd toward those proposing the most extreme action [… But] a rumour will not take hold unless there is a market for it [...] What is remarkable is not that an interested agitator starts a rumour but that the rumour is spread, believed, and acted upon.

In 2008, research identified "(s)hared rumours in different sites [...] regarding the 'stealing' of jobs and 'unfair' business competition," issues clearly identified during the 2015 episode in Durban as well as in Johannesburg (Bekker 2010: 139). It would appear that the frustrations of many urban dwellers regarding access to housing, municipal services, jobs and the like, access to what they as South Africans regard as their entitlements, have persisted and enabled rumours spread in 2008 to be, once again, believed in and acted upon in 2015.

Likewise, the widespread criticism of South Africa's state police during 2008 was repeated in 2015. Criticisms ranged from incompetence and lack of resources to tacit complicity in the violence. However, criticisms of this nature appear to be insufficient in explaining the widely reported perceptions of immunity from punishment and incrimination that perpetrators across urban South Africa revealed during both episodes. The claim of insufficient penetration of state police presence into the informal settlements, inner city neighbourhoods and townships of urban South Africa is at issue here. If policing is defined as "any organized activity, whether by the state or civil groups, that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace," and if security is considered from the point of

view of the resident "rather than from the governance perspective of the political authorities,", then the resident may be thought of as having a choice of police services, beyond that provided by the state police (Baker 2008: 22, 27). The difficulty arises when the state no longer has the capacity to bring non-state policing – such as vigilante groups, civics, traditional authorities, informal security groups and so on – under effective accountability while community or local political organizations endorse intolerance of outsiders and associated violence. This appears to have taken place during a number of outbursts in both 2008 and 2015. In short, the issue is not solely that of perceptions regarding state police but, probably more importantly, local residents' perceptions regarding the role and legitimacy of bodies such as vigilante groups, civics, traditional authorities and informal security groups, bodies that promise some form of communal order to local residents.

There are, however, clear differences that emerge from this analysis of the two episodes. The first difference regards the manipulation of xenophobic attitudes by influential public figures. The Zulu King's speech two weeks before the outbreak of the 2015 episode was publicly supported soon afterwards by the son of the South African President who was reported to have "come out in full support of King Goodwill Zwelithini's controversial call to deport foreigners from South Africa" (Khoza 2015). Earlier, after the January 2015 looting of foreign-owned shops in Soweto, the national Small Business Development Minister stated that foreign-business owners in South Africa's townships could not expect to co-exist peacefully with local business owners unless they shared their trade secrets. She was quoted as saying: "Foreigners need to understand that they are here as a courtesy and our priority is to the people of this country first and foremost" (Mail & Guardian 2015). Three weeks into the 2015 episode, in mid-April, both the Minister and the King called for an end to the outbursts, the King claiming that he had been misinterpreted.

In sharp contrast, before and during the 2008 episode, such manipulation 'from above' of xenophobic attitudes was absent. In the words of a South African political scientist,

> The country's leaders may bear indirect responsibility through policy failure and acts of commission, but I see no evidence that the marauding crowds are taking their cue from government immigration policy or from corrupt cops [...] We do not have the active anti-

xenophobic leadership we need, but at least […] we do not have leading politicians manipulating anti-foreigner sentiment as they have recently done, with calamitous consequences, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ivory Coast (Glazer 2008: 54).

A second major difference concerns what was earlier termed the two faces of the same coin: foreign sub-Saharan African governments' angry response to authorities' handling of the 2015 episode, on the one side, and the South African government's rejoinder by establishing a national 'operation' aimed at ridding the country of criminals and illegal immigrants, on the other. There were no such accusations and ripostes after the 2008 episode. Some reasons for this difference include the greater visibility, in 2015, of South Africa on the African continent. This visibility was not only in terms of trade, but also within the African Union where a South African is the African Union Commission Chair, as well as militarily through South African participation in peace missions. Simultaneously, however, the image of South Africa as a regional hegemon has shrunk: Nigeria has now been crowned as Africa's largest economy and it is generally known that President Zuma is struggling to maintain a positive reputation during his second term, in contradistinction to the robust and sometimes controversial image that former President Mbeki enjoyed on the African continent in 2008.

The third difference to be noted here is the change in the initial and subsequent metropolitan epicentres of the two episodes. In 2008, greater Cape Town proved to be particularly vulnerable after the series of outbursts in Gauteng. In 2015, in Cape Town, there were no visible outbursts classified as xenophobic. On the other hand, in the case of the predominantly Zulu-speaking metro of eThekwini and its later migration to Johannesburg, the series of events making up the 2015 episode may be put down, at least in part, to shared frustrations converted into group aggression, to the manipulation of anti-foreigner sentiment, as well as a less than effective state police reaction to looting in Soweto and neighbouring urban places. However, what did take place before and during 2015 in the Western Cape (as well as in Gauteng and Durban) were continued violent outbursts related to service delivery issues. These will be discussed in more detail below. The point to be made here is that, while disregarding the rumours and justifications for violent actions against foreigners that flooded the mass and social media in

2015, residents in the Cape Town metro mobilised often in a violent fashion, by venting their frustrations on municipal targets instead.

Prominent Interpretations of the 2015 and 2008 Episodes

Upon his return from an official international visit in June 2008, President Mbeki was clear in his interpretation of the 2008 events as well as in reprimanding how this episode was being reported:

> The dark days of May which have brought us here today were visited on our country by people who acted with criminal intent. What happened during these days was not inspired by a perverse nationalism […] resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiment of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia – and this I must also say – none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia (Hassim et al 2008: 4).

Government officials at the time also argued that much of the violence was well-coordinated and, accordingly, probably organised. The Minister for Intelligence Services was quoted as stating that "we cannot ignore […] that there were reportedly meetings held in hostels, that this prairie fire of hate seemed to move fast as if planned, and that there were printed pamphlets" (Bekker 2010: 132). This suspected underground organisation – an imagined third force – was never identified.

This official response to the 2008 episode – emphasising criminal rather than anti-foreigner intentions behind the violence – remained state orthodoxy throughout the next seven years. In addition, this orthodoxy stood firm despite fractures caused by various public statements from government officials and politicians at public events that proved difficult officially to place within a criminality framework. The statement by the Minister of Small Business Development and the speech by the Zulu King, as examples, are difficult to locate within such a framework.

In April 2015, Police Minister Nhleko said he found it hard to view the attacks as just xenophobia. He was reported to have said that "In a sense, what we are witnessing are afrophobic kinds of activities and attacks, resembling

elements of self-hate among Africans. The evidence shows the attacks are mainly against the Congolese, Zimbabweans, Malawians, Somalis and some South African nationals as well" (Gqirana 2015).

Strict orthodoxy appears to be returning: according to the joint ad-hoc committee set up to investigate the 2015 xenophobic attacks, police in Alexandra told the committee that they have no evidence suggesting that the violence between foreigners and locals in April was xenophobic. In a reprimand reminiscent of Mbeki's 2008 speech, committee chair Ruth Mbengu was reported to have said "it's not only wrong but extremely irresponsible of the media to incorrectly label the attacks on foreign nationals in April as xenophobic" (Eye Witness News 2015). As of September 2015, the committee had yet to table its final report.

Few commentators beyond the South African state endorse interpretations within such a criminality framework. Equally, few endorse a framework within which xenophobia emerges as the primary and dominant determinant for violent outbursts. A recent SAMP publication that distinguishes between xenophobia denialism, xenophobia minimalism and xenophobia realism and opts for the third interpretation is an exception (Crush & Ramachandran 2014). Rather, most commentators recognise the importance of xenophobic attitudes during the outbursts without placing this at the heart of the interpretation. There appears to be agreement among these commentators on the well-researched nature and breadth of xenophobic attitudes among South Africans (Adam & Moodley 2013) as well as on the deprivation – unemployment, poverty, inadequate shelter and basic services – facing South Africa's urban poor (Simkins 2011). Where disagreement surfaces is in the interpretation of the intentions underpinning the behaviour of members of this urban poor when that behaviour turns *violent* and targets persons and property in their neighbourhoods.

Two influential interpretations – both focusing on rational elements of behaviour – will be summarised. The first is the relative deprivation interpretation: poor black urban residents are experiencing competition regarding jobs, inadequate provision of housing and service delivery in their informal settlements, little effective government communication regarding these issues in their residential areas and corruption from government officials and the police. The relative deprivation they experience then comprises the frustrations they develop as a result of their expectations in

these regards not being realized. These sentiments that combine to generate shared generalised anger, are converted into violent aggression against those they perceive as competitors and as the immediate cause of their frustrations, partially since they appear to be better off than themselves. Their targets accordingly are the 'foreigner' and the 'stranger' in their neighbourhoods (HSRC 2008).

The second interpretation is that of resource mobilisation, where the focus shifts from attitudes and frustrations to the political economy in the immediate neighbourhoods of the urban poor. For instance, collective action before and during an outburst targeting foreigners and their property is considered to be a strategy employed to extract benefits. Local leaders who may lack institutional access to either the local economy or to the political process aim to acquire material and/ or political resources by mobilizing local residents. For example, such resources could comprise local trading and job opportunities, or access to municipal and local council positions. Such an interpretation focuses attention on local leadership institutions; on how violence is organised and why locals participate (Tarrow 1994, Misago et al. 2009).

In both interpretations, it is clear that while the violent targeting of foreigners becomes a destructive instrument used against innocent civilians, it is not necessarily the primary goal – aggression may well be redirected (toward the local municipality, as an example) and local leaders' attempts to extract benefits from those who control or own resources may be pursued by means other than attacking foreigners and their property.

The last alternative interpretation identified here shifts the analysis from rational to emotionally-suffused behaviour. Perpetrators, Horowitz (2001) argues, mix calculation with passion during their uninhibited violent behaviour. The insight that the discharge of aggression is a satisfying experience leads to the question of what violent xenophobic behaviour offers young urban South Africans who suffer deprivation and are keenly aware of unfulfilled promises of entitlement made in post-apartheid South Africa. At least in part, such behaviour, which often appears to offer pleasure to perpetrators, enables the reversal of humiliation. Horowitz (2001: 536) notes:

> [...] the violence that aims to thwart domination [...] is suffused with affect born of humiliation. Much of the pleasure

> that violence brings springs from the mastery that reverses dishonour [...]

In summary, interpretations of the 2015 and 2008 violent episodes range from an investigative spotlight illuminating the xenophobia of many South Africans to the state's insistence that the spotlight ought rather to be focused on criminal behaviour. In both cases, it is probably true that this terminology that refers in singular fashion to 'xenophobia' or to 'criminality' conceals as much as it reveals. Accordingly, it is fitting to remark here that the perpetrators mobilised during these events are drawn from the same pool as the protesters mobilised during the rising number of violent service delivery protests across the country. Both are members of South Africa's urban working and under-class.

Service Delivery Protests that Turn Violent

In order to broaden our events-based analysis of violent collective behaviour in urban South Africa, a profile of the growing number of violent service delivery protests in the country will be developed here. A research project named the Civic Protests Monitor (CPM) has such events-based data covering the eight year period from 2007 to 2014. Civic protest is defined as "referring to organised protest action within a local area which directly targets municipal government or targets municipal government as a proxy to express grievances against the state more widely" (Powell n.d.: 5). These protests, more generally known in the popular discourse as service delivery protests, generally involve urban residents from poor neighbourhoods of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan municipal areas. Three of the general trends over this period are highlighted in the CPM (Powell n.d.: 3):

- The number of protests in 2014 reached an all-time-high of 218. The previous maximum was 204 in 2009.
- In the three year period of 2012 – 2014, Gauteng experienced more protests than any other province. Since 2007, Gauteng's share of protests has been rising more rapidly than in other provinces. Cape Town was the most protest-prone municipality with 84 protests, followed by Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Between them these five metro municipalities accounted for half of all the protests recorded.

- The prevalence of violence associated with protests has continued to increase. The number of violent protests reached a record high in 2014. In 2007, just less than half the protests were associated with some violence. In 2014, almost 80% of protests involved violence on the part of the participants or the authorities.

Violent protests have been defined in this study "as those protests where some or all of the participants have engaged in actions that create a clear and imminent threat of, or actually result in, harm to persons or damage to property" and the research reveals that the number of violent protests has risen at a faster rate than the total number of protests. In 2007, the total number of violent protests was 44. Seven years later this number had increased more than fourfold to 181.

Five forms of violence are distinguished in the event data set: intimidation, personal attacks, arson, damage to property and looting. Intimidation was the most frequently cited form of violence (376 protests) associated with protest in the 2012 – 2014 period. Physical attacks on individuals were less prominent (315 protests). The destruction of property (including arson) was recorded more often than attacks on individuals (a combined total of 372 protests). Thus, two thirds of the types of violence recorded at protests went beyond "mere" intimidation and involved the destruction of property, assault, looting and even death (Powell n.d.: 9).

What emerges from these trends is a continuing series of violent events across urban South Africa during which residents mobilise and target municipal officials, local councillors and municipal property, in a phrase, elements of the local state. The demands made by protesters captured in the database comprise improved municipal services (such as housing, electricity and water), improved non-municipal services (such as education and policing) as well as demands for employment opportunities.

A relative deprivation interpretation of this rising number of violent events would root residents' frustration in the same structural conditions as in the case of violent xenophobic events. However, the aggression, as it shifts from generalised anger toward the identification of targets blamed for the causes of this frustration, is directed at elements of the local state rather than at foreigners and strangers and their property. In equal measure, a resource mobilisation interpretation would have it that local leaders, with the aim to

acquire material and political resources, exploit the frustrations of local residents by promoting violent action against the local state rather than against foreigners and strangers and their property.

Conclusion

A profile of South Africa's urban poor has been sketched that depicts them as both deprived and frustrated. One way to conceptualise their common state of mind is to attribute to them a shared generalised anger. This generalised anger may be seen through the lens of unfulfilled expectations: entitlement promises made by the African National Congress during the continuing struggle for transformation and liberation, promises made to the newly urbanised, to the urban poor and to those against whom apartheid discriminated. The frustrations that surface through the inability of many urban dwellers to realise or receive their fair share of entitlements – housing, municipal services, jobs and the like – are easily converted into aggression that is directed at those held responsible for these failures.

In the case of the recent xenophobic outbursts, this aggression appears to have been directed against those who, according to widespread rumours and widely broadcast elite discourse, appeared to be largely responsible for much of this failure. These small foreign groupings also appeared to be both isolated as well as unprotected. Aggression against superiors is converted into aggression against unranked groups in the immediate neighbourhood, with little fear of retribution.

In the case of violent service delivery protests, this aggression was directed against local municipal officials and councillors and, often, against their municipal offices and town halls. These local elites are often perceived to be significantly more privileged than most residents in their local community as well as incompetent, corrupt or both. Here too, local protesters have little fear of retribution, particularly after the Marikana wildcat strike that turned into a massacre with more than 40 miners killed by the South African police. This has given the police pause in the presence of protest incidents. In addition, the simultaneous emergence of a new political party – the Economic Freedom Fighters – that supports many service delivery protests adds a measure of legitimacy to such actions.

The generalised anger may also be seen through the lens of resource mobilisation where a focus on attitudes moves to a focus on the political economy of violence. In both cases, xenophobic as well as service delivery events, it is local leaders (both informal and formal) who are considered to be at the heart of the mobilization of perpetrators and protesters during the outbursts. They do this by playing to the frustrations of local residents with the aim of extracting benefits from those who control or own resources – be they local shopkeepers and artisans or officials and elected councillors. This shift identifies an overlap much debated recently by senior officials in the South African government between outburst, protest and criminal activity. The looting during outbursts and protests indicates that one dimension of this collective behaviour is undoubtedly criminal, probably significantly more of a petty rather than of a hardened and professional nature.

These two lenses focus our attention on a South African urban poor who reveal less of a deep hostility to the foreigner and stranger than a generalised shared sentiment of exclusion, sometimes approaching hopelessness regarding their current urban lives. The lenses also reveal an urban working and under-class that is frustrated by the failure over the past two decades of what they have been led to believe are their just entitlements. Simultaneously, as they become more aware of the growing inequalities between themselves and the new local as well as national elites, this frustration is converted either into aggression against those deemed to be responsible for their current state or into mobilisation in pursuit of some of these privileged entitlements.

Lastly, this analysis reveals a new form of agency that the South African urban poor are developing. This agency emerges from rational as well as emotional motives, from aggression against those seen to be responsible for limitations on entitlements as well as ways to convert long-standing humiliation into mastery through violent behaviour, particularly gratuitous violence. Moreover, over the past few years, access to new forms of social media has facilitated the broadening of this agency. The 2015 violent xenophobic episode has revealed that it is not only South African groupings that possess agency in the country: foreign African immigrants in both Durban and Johannesburg organised and expressed their anxiety and displeasure in public and the voices of foreign African governments after the episode were public and forceful in South Africa, on the African continent and

internationally. South Africa may well remain chiefly a limited access order (North *et al.* 2013) in which elites take most of the national decisions that affect South Africans' lives, but both the urban poor as well as foreign actors are demonstrating, through their agency, that these elites do not have it all their own way.

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Preventing Xenophobia in Africa: What Must the African Union Do?

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Abstract

The issue of xenophobia has, for many years, been one of the pressing challenges in Africa. While South Africa currently appears as a poster-child of this problem in Africa, the issue of xenophobia is not solely a South African problem. Traces of these attacks have long existed since the 1960s with countries such as Ghana and Nigeria raising agitations against each other and occasioning displacements of millions of people. Similar to the South African narrative, the agitations were borne out of a need to create an economic haven, the realisation of which was impeded by the influx of foreign populations. In recent years, the issue of xenophobia has equally resonated in the treatment of Somalis in Kenya following the attacks by the Somali-dominated insurgency group and in the treatment of Rwandan refugees in western districts of Uganda.

While the discourse on xenophobia has focused on the obligation of states to protect non-nationals within their territory, the roles of supranational institutions beyond the state are rarely discussed. Specifically, the role of the African Union as a continental institution saddled with the mandate of promoting human rights, fostering African unity, furthering development and ensuring peace and security on the continent is not often central to the discussion on durable solutions to the problem. This paper considers what relevant institutions within the African Union can do in addressing the issue of xenophobia in Africa.

*Keywords***:** migration, African regional institutions, mass expulsion, foreign population.

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Introduction

In recent years, the issue of xenophobia has become a paradoxical result of globalisation's ideal of free trade and global human rights commitments (Njamnjoh 2006: 1). While governments often pledge openly to ideals of common humanity and commit to fostering free movements of goods and services, national immigration laws speak differently in response to the local communities' insecurities about foreign population influx and the consequences of such influx on access to social security and welfare. In Europe, the treatment of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, as well as the constant writhe by Western European states over the Strasbourg court's immigration policy decisions, evince this paradox and demonstrate the distant reality between international commitment and national implementation.

In Africa, this paradox is equally evident. Colonially imposed borders have become testaments of identity since the independence of many African states. The narrative of the 'foreign-other' which was not an essential component of pre-colonial societal orderings (Arthur 2000: 19) has become a powerful rhetoric for determining access to social security and welfare. In immigration policies, social classifications and behavioural patterns, this narrative has resonated. While South Africa has emerged in recent years as the poster-child of the narrative of the 'foreign-other', it has not been alone in this identity crisis. Since the 1950s, occurrences in several African states have perpetuated this narrative. While much focus has been granted to the obligations of individual states in respecting human rights within its borders, little attention has been paid to the role of supranational institutions that can address the problem of xenophobia on the continent. It is within this gap that the argument of this paper is located. This paper considers what the African Union (AU) can do in addressing the issue of xenophobia in Africa. Before advancing a discourse on the role of the AU, it is significant to analyse the manifestations of xenophobia across several African countries in order to vindicat the need for an African-wide response at the level of the AU.

Manifestation of Xenophobia in Africa

Xenophobia is the perceived fear, hatred or dislike of a non-native or foreigner in a particular country (Centre for Human Rights 2009). The word 'xenophobia' derives from two Greek words *xénos*' and *phóbos* which translates into 'fear of a foreigner' (Bordeau 2010: 4). The United Nations

Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Rapporteur) defines xenophobia as 'a rejection of outsiders' (United Nations General Assembly 1994: para 29). According to the Rapporteur,

> [x]enophobia is currently fed by such theories and movements as "national preference", "ethnic cleansing", by exclusions and by a desire on the part of communities to turn inward and reserve society's benefits in order to share them with people of the same culture or the same level of development.

While the notion of xenophobia bears close links to concepts like racism and ethnic intolerance, its semantic distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is rooted in national identity, citizenship and a rejection of foreigners belonging to other borders, states or nations (Commission of the European Communities 1993: 14). Some manifestations of xenophobia include prejudices, attitudinal orientations, and behaviours against a foreigner (International Labour Organisation 2001: 2). Such prejudices, attitudinal orientations and behaviours can be triggered by political incitements, declining economic conditions or concerns relating to national security, particularly in the current era of terror attacks. While foreigners are generally affected, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are often the central targets in xenophobic situations. In Africa, some of the evident manifestations of xenophobia have been the expulsion of foreign nationals, threats of expulsion and, in other instances, violent attacks. These manifestations date as far back as the 1960s.

In November 1969, forty-nine days after becoming Ghana's Prime Minister, Kofi Busia introduced the Aliens Compliance Order (the Aliens Order) which sought to expel undocumented aliens. 'The Aliens Order required aliens who lacked work permit [to] get them within a period of two weeks or leave the country' (Gocking 2005: 156). Prior to this time, a general perception of foreigners as the cause of 'large-scale unemployment that had befallen Ghana' had begun to emerge in the country (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 176). Most of the foreign population were from other West African countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. In 1931, Nigerians constituted the majority of foreigners in Ghana. Their success in running businesses in Ghana led to an influx of other Nigerians to the country. Tensions began to rise in Ghana with the increasing entry of foreigners and the dire socio-economic conditions of Ghanaians. In response to increased pressure from

Ghanian citizens, certain measures were initiated including the Aliens Order and the Ghanaian Business Promotion (GBP). The GBP sought to reserve certain businesses for Ghanaians (Asamoah 2014: 187). According to Asamoah (2014: 187), '[t]o facilitate Ghanaian business promotion, aliens would be allowed to engage in certain economic activity only if they put in capital of determined amounts.' Oppong (2002: 26) notes that the Aliens Order 'led to the mass exodus of between 900,000 to 1,200,000 individuals from Ghana.' Ghanaians praised the order as a nationalistic initiative to ensure jobs for Ghanaians (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 176).

In 1972, Uganda expelled thousands of Asians from the country in the face of worsening economic conditions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015: 145). News reports (BBC 1972) confirm Hansen's (2000: 198) recount that 'all Asians from Britain, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia were told they had three months to leave Uganda.' Following the expulsions, the businesses owned by these foreigners were expropriated, however, the economic downturn of the country was not salvaged (Stokes 2009: 187).

In 1978, Gabon took a decision to expel all Beninese from the country (Henckaerts 1995: 16). The decision was premised on an alleged aspersion on President Bongo and the people of Gabon by President Kérékou of Benin in July 1978 (Gray 1998: 396). Fifteen months before this time, in May 1977, Kérékou had accused officials of Gabon of a foiled mercenary coup that sought to oust him from power and told African leaders that he would consider anyone who attended the regional summit in Libreville a traitor (Gray 1998: 396). In reaction, Gabon banned Beninese from coming into the country. Gray (1998: 396) notes that 'the person of Bongo and the image of the state were […] merged in the minds of many Gabonese citizens.' In July 1978, when President Kérékou restated his accusation before Bongo at the Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Sudan, President Bongo became enraged (Gray 1998: 396). In communication with the Chairman of the OAU, President Bongo stated that 'the anger of an entire people, which has been controlled for a whole year, literally exploded after the verbal vulgarities and insanities uttered at the OAU' (Gray 1998: 396). Subsequently, about 9 000 Beninese were expelled from the country (Henckaerts 1995: 16). According to Henckaerts, 'the sole factor of being a Benin national triggered the expulsion decisions without an examination of individual behaviour' (Henckaerts 1995: 17). Gray (1998: 397) notes that although the expulsion had implications on the economy and on the education system of Gabon, 'the

Gabonese state was able to avert more serious political unrest through an exercise in "citizenship promotion".'

Due to declining economic conditions in the early 1980s following a period of economic boom in the 1970s, Nigeria expelled over 2 million foreigners from the country in 1983 (Aremu 2013: 340). More than a million of these foreigners were from Ghana (Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139). In addition to the decline in economic conditions, another key reason given for the expulsion of foreigners from the country was the involvement of foreigners in crime in the country (Aremu 2013: 341). In 1985, another wave of expulsion was carried out in which 300 000 Ghanaians were expelled from the country (Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139-140). As with the first wave of expulsions, the worsening economic conditions constituted the basis for this expulsion (Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011: 139).

In response to the declining economic situation in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s, former President Bédié propagated the idea of *ivoirité* which sought to weave Ivoirian identity into political and economic access (Kimou 2013: 18-19; Wiafe-Amoako 2015: 82-83). The institutionalisation of Ivoirian identity fuelled resentments against foreigners and divided the Ivorian society. In 1999, between 8000 and 12000 nationals of Burkina Faso were expelled following tensions between Ivoirians and Burkinabe farmers (Human Rights Watch 2001: 4).

In 2004, an attempted coup against the President of Equatorial Guinea, allegedly led by a mercenary, spurred a clamp-down on foreigners in the country (Shirbon 2004). Foreigners from several African countries were detained, intimidated and some were expelled. Government officials raised suspicions against foreigners and Equatorial Guineans were called upon to be 'vigilant with foreigners, regardless of colour, because [their] target [...was] the wealth of Equatorial Guinea, the oil' (Roberts 2009: 192-193). An estimate of about 1 000 foreigners from other African countries, mostly from Cameroon, were expelled from the country (Human Rights Watch 2009: 81). Equatorial Guineans who did not belong to the law enforcement agency of the state were permitted to arbitrarily arrest those suspected to be illegal foreigners (Human Rights Watch 2009: 81). In 2007, the government banned other West African nationals from 'owning grocery stores' in the country, and such stores were either taken over by the government or closed (IRIN News 2008).

The rhetoric that citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo Kinshasa) were stealing natural resources that belonged to Angola was at the root of several recent mass expulsions of Congolese from Angola. In 2004, the Angolan government expelled an estimated 100 000 Congolese from Angola (Siegel 2009: 23). Over 160 000 Congolese were expelled between December 2008 and December 2009 (Adebajo 2011: 91). Perpetuating the rhetoric in question, the Angolan Foreign Minister stated that Angola 'will never give up its right to protect its natural resources and its right to repatriate citizens who are acting in a way which do not benefit the country' (Reliefweb 2009).

In 2009, the government of Congo Kinshasa expelled 50 000 Angolans in retaliative response to the mass expulsion of Congolese from Angola. This was done 'amid a rising wave of popular anger over the humiliating treatment of those expelled [by Angola]' (Human Rights Watch 2012: 11).

The history of the xenophobic violence in South Africa, although arguably rooted in the legacies of apartheid and the failure of the post-apartheid government in effectively accommodating foreigners (Hanekom and Webster 2009/2010: 105; Adam and Moodley 2013: 37), dates back to 2008 with the waves of attacks against foreigners seen in various locations across South Africa (Duponchel 2013: 5). The first known attack was on 11 May 2008 in the Alexandria settlement in Johannesburg. By the end of May, over 60 people had been killed and tens of thousands were displaced (Tafira 2011: 114; Hankela 2014: 75). In 2015, a new wave of attacks against foreigners were incited by the Zulu King and followed the death of a South African teenager at the hands of a Somali. The rhetoric that underscored the 2008 attacks – that foreigners were stealing jobs and committing crimes – resonated in the new wave of attacks (Mwakikagile 2008: 335) that resulted in the loss of properties owned by foreigners, the death of about 7 people and the displacement of thousands of foreigners (Essa 2015).

In 2009, Burundi expelled between 800 and 1 200 foreigners from the country (Jeune Afrique 2009). These foreigners were mostly from Rwanda and Congo Kinshasa, however others from Tanzania, Uganda and Senegal were equally affected. The expulsion was premised on the need to address crime in the state. A police representative argued that it was a routine exercise aimed at expelling irregular migrants who were largely responsible for crimes in the state (Jeune Afrique 2009).

In 2013, the government of Tanzania expelled close to 11 000 undocumented foreigners in an effort to rid the country of criminal elements (Ghosh 2013). Prior to the expulsion, the President of Tanzania had given a two-week ultimatum to undocumented foreigners to leave the country. The decision was informed on two grounds. First, on the complaint 'from villagers over acts of armed robbery, bus attacks and kidnaps attributed to illegal immigrants in the area [of Kagera]' (Naluyaga 2013) and, second, on the ground that undocumented foreigners 'overstretched government's ability to offer services to its people' (Naluyaga 2013). Of those expelled were 300 from Uganda, 4 100 from Burundi and 6 400 from Rwanda (Ghosh 2013).

With the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Kenya by the Somali al-Shabaab group, negative reactions against Somalis have arisen in the country (Harper 2010; Wambua-Soi 2012; Hatcher 2015). Following the 2013 Westgate attacks, Kenyan government authorities threatened to close down the Dadaab camp which housed about half a million Somali refugees. In 2014, approximately 4 000 Somalis were arrested in Operation *Usalama* Watch initiated by the government with the view to counter terrorism and address security concerns in the state (Boru-Halakhe 2014). Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake (2015) observe that '[i]n Kenya's attempts to address the threat of violent extremism, the Somali Kenyan community is often stigmatized.'

The Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) in many respects shares close ties with Congo Kinshasa. Aside from the name, the Congo River and language, the countries share ethnic and cultural bonds. However, this has not assuaged 'foreign-fears' premised a distinct border. In 2014, Congo Brazzaville initiated an operation dubbed Operation *Mbala ya bakolo*, literally translating to 'slap of the elders' (Amnesty International 2015: 9). The essence of this operation was to rid the country of criminal elements and, although it was regarded as a 'general operation' (Amnesty International, 2015, 14), over 50 000 citizens of the Democratic of Republic of Congo were expelled (Reuters 2015). While acknowledging the repatriations, a government spokesperson emphasised that 'the operation continues' as not all that should be repatriated has been found (Amnesty International 2015: 17).

In June 2015, suicide bomb attacks in N'Djamena by Boko Haram resulted in the death of 27 people and left approximately 100 others injured (Channels Television 2015). In response to these attacks, one of the measures implemented by the Chadian government was the expulsion of foreigners. In

the month of June, the Chadian military expelled 200 to 300 Cameroonians from the country in a 'clean up campaign against undocumented foreigners' (Ernest 2015). In July 2015, over 2 000 undocumented Nigerians were also expelled from Kousseri in Chad (Telegraph 2015).

In the case of Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Uganda and South Africa xenophobic reactions were spurred by economic considerations. In Chad and Kenya, xenophobic prejudices were informed by the war on terror. In Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, politics as well as economic considerations triggered xenophobic expulsions. In Tanzania, Burundi and Congo Brazzaville, xenophobic actions were largely spurred by the rhetoric that foreigners were committing crime. In Congo Kinshasa, the expulsion of Angolans was political. While various reasons underpin xenophobic reactions in these countries, a central theme which resonates is that the issue of xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in Africa. As a problem that is not country-specific, the role of the AU as an institution saddled with the mandate of fostering cohesion among African states and promoting peace and security, is imperative. In light of this fact, the next section considers the role that various institutions within the AU can play in addressing the issue of xenophobia.

The Role of the African Union

As the regional institution mandated to advance cooperation among African states and between Africa and the international community, the AU has the capacity to be a significant actor in addressing xenophobia. Under the AU Constitutive Act, the AU is mandated to promote human rights, sanctity of life, and peaceful co-existence and cooperation between African states, as well as position the continent at an advantage within the international community. In the past, the AU has, through norms and institutions, made significant strides in fostering these goals. The AU has taken significant initiatives in relation to peace and security, economic development, international cooperation, institutionalisation of democracy and promotion of human rights in Africa. In 2013, the African Union developed a policy agenda for the continent premised upon the need to build an integrated Africa and to rightly position Africa in global governance (Makinda et al 2016: 183). In the Solemn Declaration, AU member states committed to 'continue the global struggle against all forms of racism and discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerances' (African Union 2013: art H(i)). This commitment was further emphasised in the 2015 policy document created by the AU to foster this Solemn Declaration (African Union Commission 2015). However, while the

Solemn Declaration and the Policy Document iterate the need for states to combat xenophobia by ensuring that Africa takes in global governance, the roles of relevant institutions within the African Union in fostering this goal are not specifically mentioned. This paper discusses the roles which relevant institutions within the AU can perform in addressing the issue of xenophobia on the continent.

The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments

The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (the Assembly) is the highest political organ of the AU and is saddled with the mandate of advancing the goals of the AU. In line with the Constitutive Act, the Assembly is granted the responsibility of making policies and decisions, determining the AU's budget, establishing and directing other organs, appointing key authorities of the AU Commission (AUC) and the African Court of Justice, delegating its functions where appropriate and monitoring compliance with its decisions (Constitutive Act of the AU 2000: art 9). Significantly, the AU has adopted numerous treaties within the African human rights system. While still named the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1981, it adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter), which is still the main regional human rights instrument. In commemoration of the 50th year of African integration, the Assembly adopted the Solemn Declaration. The declaration served as a springboard for the development of the Agenda 2063 policy document, which highlights the aspirations of the African Union over the next 50 years from 2013. One of the aspirations emphasised in the policy document is the need to combat the issue of xenophobia. While the Assembly has taken steps in developing norms for the prevention of xenophobia, this paper argues that in view of its broad mandate, the Assembly can do much more. For example, one significant role it could play is to cooperate with key organs on the continent with exclusive mandates on human rights protection, peace and security by fostering compliance of Member States with their decisions. Such institutions include: the African Union Commission (AUC), African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In addition, the Assembly can adopt a common position

on xenophobic violence on the continent in which it should emphasise non-cooperation with states that fail to effectively address xenophobia.[7]

The African Union Commission

As the secretariat of the AU, the AUC is the nerve centre the AU. Headed by a Chairperson, the AUC has nine departments included among which is the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Within the DPA, the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division (HARDPA) is particularly relevant as the unit with a mandate over issues of migration. One significant role which the AUC can play is in facilitating regional dialogues on the issue of xenophobia. These dialogues should be aimed at raising awareness on the issue, promoting traditional African values such as *ubuntu*,[8] sharing practices on how the issue of xenophobia can be addressed and drawing the attention of states and relevant stakeholders to xenophobic hotspots, orientations and attitudes. The AUC should also develop advocacy pamphlets to foster regional sensitisation on African shared values of humanity and on the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In collaboration with the ACHPR, the HARDPA should develop a model for states to utilise in developing national policies on the issue of xenophobia. This model policy should highlight the ways through which xenophobia manifests, emphasise respect for human rights obligations and incorporate a rights-based approach to migration. Moreover, the HARDPA should disseminate information on xenophobic attacks through the use of news media and recommend urgent measures that states should adopt in addressing the issue in places around the continent where xenophobia arises.

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[7] The African Union Assembly has initiated common positions in the past in relation to issues such as climate change and child marriage. In 2009, it initiated a common position on non-cooperation with the International Criminal Court. *See Decision on the Meeting of African State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)*, adopted by the 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Sirte, Libya, Assembly/AU/Dec 245(XIII) (3 July 2009), rev. 1 (Tladi 2009: 57).

[8] The concept of Ubuntu embodies the idea that the humanness of a person is premised on that of others. According to Cornell and Van Marle, ubuntu embodies "the notion that one's humanness can be diminished by the violent actions of others, including the violent actions of the state" (Cornell and Van Marle 2005: 207).

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

Constituted in 1987, the ACHPR is the primary regional organ, the mandate of which is to promote and protect human rights in Africa. In 1996, the ACHPR decided on a communication against Zambia following the country's decision to expel illegal foreigners resulting in the exile of 517 West African nationals from the country (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme v Zambia 2000). In its decision, the ACHPR emphasised that 'mass deportation of the individuals in question here, including their arbitrary detention and deprivation of the right to have their cause heard, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter' (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme v Zambia 1996: para 31).

Following the xenophobic violence in South Africa, the ACHPR adopted a resolution against this violence (Resolution Condemning the Xenophobic Attacks in the Republic of South Africa 2015). In the May Resolution, the ACHPR requested that the South African government ensure that mechanisms are put in place to prevent xenophobia from reoccurring. The ACHPR further stressed the need for investigation and urged the state to respect its obligations under the African Charter.

As a pivotal institution in the promotion of human rights in Africa, the ACHPR has an essential role to play in addressing issue of xenophobia in Africa. This paper argues that one of the ways through which the ACHPR can bring an end to the issue of xenophobia is through standard-setting. The decisions, resolutions and comments of the ACHPR have, over time, become useful resources for civil society advocacy and for state action plans. The ACHPR can leverage on this fact in developing a report on a rights-based approach to immigration laws and policies in Africa.[9] In this study, the ACHPR should assess national laws and provide recommendations on how these laws could be aligned with international human rights standards. The ACHPR should also develop a General Comment on the issue of xenophobia. This General Comment can be made with reference to the provision of article 19 of the African Charter which emphasises the rights of 'all peoples' to 'enjoy the same respect and [...] have the same rights' (African Charter 1981: art 19). The ACHPR should also undertake promotional visits to states where

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[9] In 2014, the African Commission approved a study undertaken by one of its special mechanisms on the right to nationality. (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 2014).

xenophobic tendencies and attitudes are observed in order to sensitise authorities on viable measures to ensure that foreign nationals are adequately protected.

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council

As a platform through which various 'social and professional groups' (Constitutive Act of the AU 2000: art 22(1)) can engage in the activities of the AU (Viljoen 2012: 206-208), the ECOSOCC has the capacity to be a significant actor in addressing the issue of xenophobia in Africa. The ECOSOCC is designed as an 'advisory organ' of the AU (Constitutive Act of the AU 2000: art 22(1). In this position, the ECOSOCC is involved in realising the AU objectives, conducting studies required by AU institutions, making recommendations, promoting human rights and democracy, fostering popular participation and advancing collaboration between the AU and civil society organisations (Statute of the Economic Social and Cultural Council of the African Union 2004: art 7(1-8)). Considering its function, one of the roles that the ECOSOCC can perform in addressing the issue of xenophobia is to host sessional meetings in which relevant stakeholders, including states and the civil society, meaningfully engage in effective dialogue on combatting xenophobia nationally and regionally.

The Pan-African Parliament

Although initially created to foster economic integration on the continent, the PAP has assumed a broader function over time (PAP Protocol 2001; Dinokopila 2013: 303-304). The PAP Protocol which sets out the scope of PAP's competence emphasises that PAP developed from a need to 'provide a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots organizations to be more involved in discussions [on] challenges facing the Continent' (PAP Protocol 2001: preamble). Some of the functions of the PAP are to foster economic integration, promote human rights, democracy and good governance and serve as a focal point for engagement with regional economic communities (RECs) and their parliaments (Constitutive Act of the AU 2000: art 3). In view of its mandate, one of the roles which PAP can perform in addressing the issue of xenophobia is to engage with RECs on legislative, administrative and other measures that can be adopted in combatting xenophobia in states within the sub-regions. As these RECs, such as ECOWAS, EAC and SADC, have a strong presence in the AU, the PAP should engage them in actualising regional strategies for tackling the issue.

The African Peer Review Mechanism

As a 'peer pressure' platform that allows African leaders to assess their commitment to governance, democracy and development, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has a relevant role to perform in addressing xenophobia in Africa. The APRM is a voluntary self-assessment mechanism that is conducted under the aegis of the AU (Killander 2008: 41). Member states of the AU voluntarily accede to the process. The APRM is constituted by three institutions: the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government (APRF), the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP), the APRM Secretariat and the Country Review Mission Team (CRMT) (Africa Peer Review Mechanisms: Base Document 2003). While the CRMT conducts country visits and produces reports on the progress made by states in line with its commitments on governance, democracy and development, the PEP oversees the review process, considers recommendations of the CRMT and makes recommendations to the APRF. The APRF is the forum for political discussion in which states under review are urged to act in line with the recommendations gleaned from the review process.[10] While the CRMT and PEP are essential in addressing the xenophobia, this paper argues that the APRF is particularly significant as it serves as a platform for constructive dialoguing between heads of states and governments (Turianskyi, 2013).

The African Peace and Security Architecture

The APSA is the main institution responsible for the protection of peace and security on the continent and is mandated to manage and resolve conflicts. Within APSA, there are five main pillars, these are: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (Panel), the African Standby Force and the Special Fund (PSC Protocol 2002). Two of its pillars relevant to addressing the issue of xenophobia in Africa are the CEWS and the Panel. The CEWS is a system designed to prevent situations of conflict by flagging potential conflict hotspots. In relation to xenophobia, the CEWS should monitor xenophobic orientations that may degenerate into conflict if not given proper attention. The CEWS should give detailed reports of such situations to the PSC for

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[10] States are assessed on compliance with the values agreed upon in the New Partnership for Africa Development Declaration (NEPAD Declaration).

further actions. The significance of the Panel resonates from the motivation for its establishment (Jegede 2009: 416). Rooted in African traditions of deference to elders (Viljoen, 2012, 193), the Panel is required to give advice to the PSC and AUC on matters bothering on peace and security on the continent (PSC Protocol, 2002, art 11(3). An important role which the Panel can perform in addressing the issue of xenophobia is to advise the PSC and states on how xenophobic-related conflicts can be prevented.

Conclusion

The issue of xenophobia is a pressing challenge that cuts across human rights, governance, development and democracy in Africa. As it is not specific to one African state, an Africa-wide response is essential. Within this context, the role of the AU is primary. This paper elaborates on the role of seven institutions within the AU that are relevant to addressing the issue of xenophobia in Africa.

With regards to the Assembly, this paper argues that the Assembly can develop a common position on xenophobic violence on the continent, in which it should emphasise non-cooperation with states that fail to effectively address xenophobia. The Assembly should also cooperate with the decisions and recommendations from other AU institutions, such as the ACHPR, in respect to its own decisions and recommendations. With respect to the AUC, this paper argues that it can facilitate regional dialogues on the issue. This paper also argues that the AUC should develop advocacy pamphlets for regional sensitisation on the issue of xenophobia. In addition, the AUC should develop a model policy for states to utilise in developing national policies on the issue of xenophobia. With regards to the ACHPR, this paper argues that the ACHPR should develop a report on a rights-based approach to immigration laws and policies in Africa and also develop a General Comment on the issue of xenophobia. In relation to ECOSOCC this paper argues that ECOSOCC should host sessional meetings with relevant stakeholders for effective dialoguing on measures to combat xenophobia nationally and regionally. With respect to the PAP, this paper argues that the PAP should engage with RECs leveraging on their strong sub-regional presence in addressing the issue of xenophobia. With regards to APRM, this paper argues that while the CRMT and the PEP are important, the APRF is particularly important in light of its ability to exert 'influence' or 'peer pressure'. In relation to APSA, this paper argues that the PSC and CEWS have significant roles to perform, arguing that the CEWS should monitor xenophobic

orientations that may degenerate into conflicts if not given the needed attention. This paper argues that the Panel should advise the PSC and states on the prevention of xenophobic-related conflicts.

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Violent Conflict and Forced Displacement in the Horn of Africa: Government and Donor Policies and Programs in Search of Durable Solutions

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Abstract

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is currently engulfed in entangling and shifting cross border conflict, resulting in at least four major forced displacement situations. These conflicts emanate mainly from the Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea and involve large numbers of refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Globally, there are an estimated 54.7 million displaced persons. More than a quarter (27%) of the globally displaced, are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 8.7 million or over half (58%) of those in the HOA.

On the one hand, forced displacement in the Horn places additional stresses on already weak local and national institutions and marginalized, underserved host communities. Services are often perceived to only benefit the displaced as opposed to receptor communities leading to envy and local conflict. On the other hand, displaced persons also have skills and assets that could be harnessed and utilized to benefit the local economy in pursuit of durable solutions. The complex cultural, social, and political nature of the region is compounded by an ongoing set of development challenges, including: demographic shifts; imbalanced service provision; the threat of pandemic diseases; and increasing contestation over scarce natural resources, especially water and grazing areas.

This article examines the underlying drivers of violent conflict, the impact on both the displaced and the receptor host communities, and the effectiveness of

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government and donor policies and programs. The research methodology included a literature review, field-based participant observations, and a series of in-depth key informant and focal group interviews in HOA refugee camps, host communities and major cities.

The search for a new paradigm shift from care and maintenance to resilience and self-reliance is underway. Given the now "protracted" nature of the displacement, the old encampment humanitarian approaches of care and maintenance are now giving way to a rethink from a development perspective by governments and donors alike.

Finally, from a prevention perspective, stemming forced migration at its source by improving security, governance, and livelihood opportunities in countries of origin are key to managing the displacement challenge. Regional integrated area development can convert fragile border areas which now serve as shock absorbers for conflicts within these fragile states to prosperous change agents opening avenues of cross border trade and development.

***Keywords*:** conflict, displacement, Horn of Africa, integration and migration.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa (HOA) covers Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.[11] It is richly endowed in human, social and natural capital. However, the region is plagued by a complex history of weak governance, insecurity, recurrent drought, increasing environmental degradation, entrenched poverty and endemic violence.

The region is currently engulfed in entangled and shifting cross-border conflict resulting in at least four major forced displacement situations. These conflicts emanate mainly from Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, involving large numbers of refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Five countries host over sixty percent of refugees in Africa: Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and Chad. This does not include the growing number hosted in the South Sudan, where armed conflict is on the rise, or Djibouti, an important transit point to Yemen and the Middle East.

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[11] While Yemen is impacted by the HOA refugee crisis and discussed herein, it is not conventionally considered a part of the Arabian Peninsula. There are an estimated 280,000 Somali refugees in Yemen.

Globally, there are an estimated 54.7 million displaced persons, comprised of 38 million internally displaced and 16.7 million refugees in foreign countries. An estimated 14.9 million persons (11.4m IDPs and 3.5m refugees), or more than a quarter (27%) of the globally displaced, are in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 8.7 million or over half (58%) of whom are in the HOA (ODI/HPG and IDMC 2015; GPFD 2015). There are 1.9 million refugees in protracted situations with an average length approaching 20 years (Loesher and Milner 2011).

Stresses and Impacts on Host Communities

Forced displacement in the HOA places additional stresses on weak local and national institutions, as well as marginalised, underserved host communities. On the one hand, there are increasingly negative development impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability (CCSD 2014). In addition, such displacement can become a breeding ground for further conflict and political instability. On the other hand, displaced persons also have skills and assets that could be harnessed and utilised to the benefit of the local economy and the pursuit of durable solutions.

While there are increasing financial demands on host government budgets due to the influx of refugees and IDPs, humanitarian and development financing and technical assistance from the international community assists in addressing the needs of both the displaced and receptor communities.

Major Development Challenges

The complex cultural, social and political nature of the region is compounded by an on-going set of major development challenges including: demographic shifts; imbalanced service provision; growing threat of pandemic diseases; and increasing contestation over scarce natural resources, especially water and grazing areas.

Despite the recent attention brought to the growing challenges of forced displacement across Africa by the Kampala Convention in 2012 (GPFD and IDMC 2012), there is, as of yet, no single comprehensive critical analysis connecting the sources and drivers of displacement, refugee and host community dynamics, and the range and effectiveness of donor and host government policies and practices in the pursuit of durable solutions to the growing displacement crisis in the HOA (RMMS 2015). In seeking such

solutions, international agencies are facing a number of knowledge gaps. Several key questions immediately emerge. Are displaced persons or migrants in the HOA fleeing political oppression and violence, seeking economic opportunity and better lives, or some mix of drivers? Why do current policies and operational approaches of the international community and host governments often result in protracted displacement and dependence rather than integration and self-reliance? How can the hierarchy and sequencing of displacement drivers and context specific durable solutions be better understood?

Policy and Operational Challenges and Options

These fundamental issues pose a range of policy and operational challenges to the international community and host countries. They may be summarised in the following key concerns. Has the donor community failed to sufficiently understand and address the underlying structural causes of displacement? Has the academic community missed a vital and growing global research problem, thus being complicit in its relative benign neglect? What are the political, economic and social factors shaping conventional government and international policies of encampment and exclusion rather than integration and inclusion? How does the modality of displacement and migration (e.g., smuggling, trafficking, labour market opportunities, etc.) shape the design of solutions? Should one be looking beyond 'country and sub-regional' approaches and at 'intra-regional' integration possibilities? Is a differentiated approach to the forced displacement and migration challenges of the HOA needed? In short, what are the political economy forces, knowledge, capacity and financial gaps facing donors and host governments in addressing the multiple causes and durable solutions to forced displacement in the HOA?

In dealing with the above challenges, there is growing international recognition that development actors should engage earlier and adopt a longer-term approach, in collaboration with displacement affected governments, host communities and international humanitarian partners. In confronting conventional wisdom, Alexander Betts et al (2014) note that, "refugee communities engage in production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and the development of financial and capital markets. They have many of the core features of any other economic systems." Building on existing assets, it is important to shift the mind-set of donors, governments and NGOs from seeing the displaced as victims with needs to survivors with capabilities; from dependency to self-reliance and resiliency.

A paradigm shift is also required that balances and links the humanitarian protection of the displaced with the need to also address the social and economic development impacts on host receptor communities in a 'holistic' manner.

The options typically presented in seeking durable solutions to forced displacement are local integration, return and repatriation to the country of origin or resettlement in a third country. In the search for durable solutions, this paper examines the underlying drivers of violent conflict, examines the impact on both the displaced and the receptor host communities, and assesses the effectiveness of government and donor policies and programs.

Methodology

This paper is based upon a literature review, field-based participant observations and a series of in-depth key informant and focal group interviews in HOA camps, host communities and major cities. Over 50 individual interviews and 15 focal group discussions where held with a range of stakeholders including government officials, donor and non-governmental agency staff, host community leaders and displaced persons.

Three field visits were made to the HOA over the course of 12 months, ranging from one to three weeks on average. The field visits included the main HOA countries and most of the major refugee camps including Dolo Ado, Amami and Shire in Ethiopia; Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya; Ali Addeh in Djibouti; and Kiryandango in Uganda. Interviews were also undertaken in the urban centres of Kampala, Addis Ababa, Djibouti-Ville, Juba, Nairobi, Cape Town and Stellenbosch. Somalia was off bounds due to persistent security threats.

Sudan and South Sudan were visited during the author's earlier research on the demobilisation and reintegration of armed combatants within the Framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement under the auspices of the United Nations. Information was gathered during this work on all war-affected groups, including displaced persons. Recent events in South Africa, particularly affecting the relationship between Somali refugees and host communities in Durban, Johannesburg, and Cape Town, have necessitated the inclusion of South Africa as an impacted country in this work.

The Demography of Forced Displacement

In 2014-15 there were an estimated 49.3-54.7 million displaced persons globally (Boehler and Pecanha 2015). About 61% or 30.2 million were in a protracted state of displacement, meaning that they had been displaced from their communities of origin for at least three years[12].

In a region with an estimated 140 million inhabitants, the HOA currently contains over 2.2 million refugees and more than 6.5 million IDPs (NRC & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a). The bulk of the IDPs are distributed among four HOA countries: South Sudan (1.5 million), Somalia (1.1 million, and 370,000 in Mogadishu alone), Ethiopia (397,200) and Kenya (309,200) (NRC & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a).

Somalia is the largest HOA refugee originating country, with some 972,000 refugees. Ethiopia is the largest refugee hosting country in Africa with 682,761 refugees, while Kenya hosts the second largest number of refugees on the continent, with 589,994 refugees (55,519 in Nairobi alone) (RRMS 2015). Except for the recent crisis in South Sudan, most of the region's refugees and IDPs are currently in protracted displacement. Sudan is host to over 300,000 refugees from neighbouring countries, including 150,000 from South Sudan since December 2013. In 2014, a deepening conflict led to the displacement of about 557,000 new IDPs, including 430,000 new IDPs in Darfur and 86,000 in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a; UNOCHA 2015).

It would be an oversight to discuss forced displacement in the HOA without reference to Yemen. Although most literature does not consider Yemen to be a formal part of the HOA, it is now both a receiving point for refugees coming out of the HOA and, more recently, a departure point back in by those same refugees and others from Yemen, given the intense fighting there. It is noted that some 300,000 persons are now in the displacement mix in Yemen. With the recent Saudi intervention and no clear end of the fighting there in sight, it is hard to say how this will evolve or predict its eventual impact on the region. Saudi Arabia has recently deported some 150,000 Ethiopians.

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[12] IDMC reports that, "In 2014 there were people living in protracted displacement for ten years or more in nearly 90% of the 60 countries and territories monitored by the IDMC" (NRC & IDMC 2015).

In general, it is difficult to accurately determine the exact scale of displacement given that many displaced migrate into urban areas and are not in camps as such (IDMC 2015; NRC 2015 & IDMC 2015; UNHCR 2015a). Political uncertainty, violence, drought and governance failures have led to "cycles of displacement, return and subsequent displacement" for millions of refugees and IDPs in the HOA over the past 20 years (Majidi n.d.). In fact, a 'transitional phase' of voluntary return often occurs with male refugees taking 'look and see' visits to communities of origin to assess the security situation, check on their properties and relatives left behind and scope out work prospects. This also often leads to a temporary break up of families, as women and children are left in the camps, placing an additional burden on the women (Majidi n.d.).

Table 1 below summarises displacement in the HOA.

Country	Refugees originating from country*	IDPs	Refugees Hosted*	Percentage Women**	Percentage Children Under 18**
Djibouti	1,122	0	24,509*	48%	41%
Eritrea	354,474	10,000 (2013)	2930**	47.5%	56.5%
Ethiopia	124,952	397,200 (2014)	665,881 (Jan 2015)	49%	58%
Kenya	10,822	412,000 (Jan 2013)	569,772	51%	56%
Somalia	970,763 (Mar 2015)	1,107,000 (2014)	12,239 (Mar 2015)	50%	53%
South Sudan	638,402 (Mar 2015)	1,474,500 (Mar 2015)	257,673 (Mar 2015)	51%	61%
Sudan	703,567	3,100,000 (Jan 2015)	245,603	51%	39%
Uganda	11,069	29,800 (Jan 2012)	433,595 (28 Feb 2015)	51% (28 Feb 2015)	61% (28 Feb 2015)
Total***	2,815,171	6,530,500	2,167,844	-	-

*UNHCR has recently undertaken a revalidation of the refugee population in Djibouti and the preliminary findings of the exercise show that there are about 12,000 refugees in Djibouti.
** April 2015.

The Underlying Drivers of Conflict and Displacement

As indicated above, the causes and drivers of HOA displacement are complex and entangled**.** Resource or environmental scarcity, leading to violent contestation over scarce natural resources from land to water, is a dominant theme in the forced migration narrative in the HOA. Combined with a prolonged drought in the region, these factors lead pastoralists into closer and closer contact and competition with their sedentary agricultural neighbours, eventually resulting in their relocation into urban shantytowns such as Djibouti-Ville. The persistent poverty and weak institutional structures governing the allocation of scarce resources in these societies is a combustible formula for violence and conflict. An additional displacement driver in the HOA is flight from oppressive regimes, as is the case in Eritrea and Sudan today. The political economy of the region not only pits country against country in fragile, poorly marked and ungoverned borderlands (e.g. between South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya), but also ethnic and clan groups against one another as is predominant in Somalia.

Although the focus of this paper is on forced displacement due to violence and armed conflict, it should be acknowledged that a single cause such as armed conflict is rarely the only cause of forced displacement. It is also a region where pastoralism is the traditional mode of subsistence for a large portion of the population and natural and man made disasters have, in irregular intervals, affected populations and caused displacement. As noted earlier, there is often a complex set of circumstances, which drives displacement. For the HOA in particular, several key drivers of displacement can be identified as follows:

- **Shifting pastoralism.** Pastoralism is a tradition among many communities in the HOA. In Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya, large parts of the populations are pastoralists and even more are agro-pastoralists. Consequently, this means that they migrate according to seasonal patterns and climatic variations. Grazing grounds have been reduced and movement has become more government regulated with the new administrative boundaries and individual property rights. These changes have resulted in increased resource-based ethnic conflict.

- **Environmental degradation and food insecurity**. Effects of increasing environmental degradation including drought, floods,

diminishing pasture for cattle and competition for water, firewood and other livelihood resources, contribute to displacement. The increased competition for these scarce resources also contributes to armed conflict, for instance, between pastoralists and sedentary communities.[13]

• **Socio-ethnic conflict** is a prominent feature in the region and often leads to violence and displacement. Cattle rustling has displaced many communities in South Sudan, Northeast Uganda (Karamojo) and Northern Kenya (Turkana), while clan differences have led to support for various 'war-lords' in Somalia. For example, the Nuer, Dinka and Madi have come into conflict in South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia over farming and grazing rights.

• **Loss of livelihoods and weakened social fabric** in areas of origin have complemented insecurity as a main driver of migration and displacement. Assets are lost, livelihood opportunities are diminished, and the social networks and fabric of communities are weakened due to armed conflict and forced displacement.

• **Lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth**. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2013 youth comprised approximately one third of the world's current population. Estimates for 2014 suggest that 10-35 year olds comprise 40.5% of the global population. In discussing increasing youth urbanisation, Oyelaran-Oyeyika noted that, "there are more people under the age of 25 today than ever, totalling nearly three billion - or half of humankind – of which 1.3 billion between ages 12 and 24. Most live in urban areas" (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2014). A growing youth bulge in the HOA accounts for the bulk of the population in the region being under 25 years of age, contributing to increased competition for economic opportunities. Such labour market competition is a major driver of displacement, leading to migration of young people – the majority of

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[13] For an elaboration on the impact of climate change on human migration in Southern Africa see 'Cross-Border Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: a Protection Agenda' – A Draft for Consultation, April 8, 2015; and 'Disasters, Climate Change and Human Mobility in Southern Africa: Consultation on the Draft Protection Agenda'. The Nansen Initiative-Disaster Induced Cross-Border Displacement. June 4-5, 2015. Stellenbosch: South Africa.

whom are male – to more economically prosperous regions of Europe, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and South Africa.

• **Poor governance**. Corruption, inefficiencies and low technical and managerial capacity in government institutions limit the states' abilities to provide security, law, order, and basic services such as education and health. Lack of these services is a 'push-factor' for displacement not only in Somalia, but also in Eritrea, Sudan and South Sudan. A specific feature in several countries is the tension between the centre and peripheral regions due to inequitable division of power and wealth and governments' lack of respect for ethnic, religious and language differences.

• **Violent conflict**. Violent conflict in the region is closely related to poor governance, but also to the other 'drivers' identified above. Although it is possible to distinguish between the following types of armed conflict, it should also be noted that there are overlaps between them:

 o *War between states* (either directly, e.g. between Eritrea and Ethiopia, or through proxies, e.g. allegedly in the 'Three Areas' between South Sudan and Sudan)

 o *Civil war* (e.g. presently in South Sudan and at a lower scale in Sudan and Somalia)

 o *Ethnic based armed conflict* (e.g. South Central Somalia between 'war-lords', and the violent political crisis in South Sudan which takes on ethnic dimensions)

 o *International linked terrorism* (e.g. Al Shabab in Somalia and Kenya)

In sum, the drivers of displacement are a complex mix of political oppression, violence, food insecurity, economic opportunism and governance failures. While not using the terminology of mixed migration in this paper to capture these multiple drivers (including political asylum seekers, trafficked persons, economic migrants and refugees), it is often closely related to forced displacement due to violent conflict as such. Let us now examine some specific country cases.

The Interplay between the Political Topography and the Ethnic Demography

An underlying thread that weaves through the degrees of cooperation and conflict among and within the HOA countries is the interplay between the political topography and the cultural demography of the region emanating from a long colonial heritage. This interplay also shapes the degree of local integration as opposed to the other standard options of repatriation and resettlement for the displaced.

Ethiopia: A Tale of Two Displacements (Shire and Dollo Ado)

In Ethiopia the contrast between the two major refugee situations in the Northeast (Shire) and Southwest (Dollo Ado) of the country is truly a 'tale of two displacements'. Eritrean displaced are located in the Northwest and oriented toward resettlement and integration in third countries. The Somali are located in the Southwest and are focused on return, repatriation and reintegration to Somalia. During field visits and interviews in refugee camps and host communities in these two distinct areas, it was observed that the reception of Eritrean refugees and host community Eritrean Ethiopians' in the Northeast as compared to that of Somali refugees and Somali Ethiopian host communities in the Southwest, highlight the different drivers and impacts shaping social and economic integration, return or resettlement.

The Eritrean refugees in Shire are political and economic migrants fleeing forced military conscription and seeking economic opportunity, such as freedom from fear and want. They are generally receiving transitional assistance en-route to other countries of opportunity in Europe and the Middle East (e.g. Italy, the Nordic Countries and Israel). This is an understandable coping strategy serving as a bridge to possible resettlement, jobs, remittances and new citizen rights. It is basically a reaction to the political oppression and narrowing economic employment opportunities in Eritrea. The Eritrean refugees were mostly young males. In effect, displacement of an adult child abroad becomes an investment for the future for an Eritrean family remaining behind.

The Eritrean refugees seem to be more readily integrated, or at least accepted, in local host communities with similar Tigrinya cultural roots in Northwest Ethiopia. As reported in several interviews, this is evidenced by the increasing number of 'out of camp' refugees inter-marrying with ethnically related host community members and/or utilising host

communities as transitory way stations in their onward economic migration to Europe and other neighbouring countries. Thus, the remarkably high numbers of unaccompanied minors (under 18) and single youth-headed households are reported in field visits as about 40% in the Shire camps of Hitsats, Adi-Harush and Mai Aini population (reported by Regional UNHCR office to be roughly 67,520 in all three camps).

In reality, the cross border cultural affinity of Eritreans living on both sides provides a ready way station for those seeking to travel on to Europe through Sudan and Libya, as well as an opportunity for integration through marriage and work in the local hosting area. The cultural connectivity (extant bonding social capital) with ethnic groups on relatively fluid borders, enable many refugees (especially youth) to migrate to informal sector employment either in the host urban centres or abroad to North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Ironically, Eritrean interviewees complained as to why they were not receiving the media attention that Syrian refugees were getting, despite their plight. It was observed that donor governments tend to see their situation as a bilateral issue between Eritrea and Ethiopia. However more recently, boat sinking and loss of life in the Mediterranean, has featured prominently in the news and many of the refugees involved are Eritrean.

In contrast, the Somali refugees in Dollo Ado are primarily fleeing armed conflict, environmental scarcity and drought heightened food insecurity in their South Central Somalian region of origin. The complaints and demands mount in Dollo Ado camps, ranging from increased risk of malaria and the excessive pressures on basic services of health and education, to few recreational outlets for youth, no ambulance for emergency evacuation of pregnant women, insufficient feeding centres, shortage of firewood and no access to the national electric grid as an alternative energy source. Clearly this is an extremely poor and marginalised region of Ethiopia even without the additional burden of the Somali refugees on the local environment and economy.

On the one hand, it appears that environmental threats, primarily the cutting of trees for cooking (competition for scarce energy resources) and over grazing (livelihood contestation), are significant concerns of the Dollo Ado host community. On the other hand, the Somali refugees are also welcomed by the local Ethiopian Somali community. This is demonstrated in the labour and trade exchange between the hosting community and the camp refugees. It was reported that the refugees often provide day labour to the riverine

irrigated fields of the host community in exchange for cash and food to supplement their diet in a sharecropper arrangement. The host community values the market opportunities which refugees with cash present when buying local food and other basic needs.

Having noted the competition and cooperation between host communities and refugees above, refugees stated several times that life was better in the camps than in Somalia where there was "nothing to go back to", especially in terms of livelihood opportunities, security and basic services such as education. In fact, it was reported that cash remittances apparently are actually flowing in the opposite direction from the refugee camps to points in Somalia.[14]

In sum, the presence of refugees has had a mixed impact – some negative and some positive – on the local economies. While the local economies of the refugee hosting areas have been primed by refugee consumption and the spending of international and national agencies, the increased food and fuel prices and competition for firewood and water (i.e. market distortions) are negatively affecting the poorer members of the host communities. While, to some extent, members of the host communities are benefiting from basic services offered to refugees (e.g. health, education and water), there remains an enormous need to extend basic services in these very poor, underserved border areas of the host country.

Both areas (Shire and Dollo Ado) have enormous service delivery needs and a clear potential for growth and development provided that investments are made to create livelihoods opportunities for the refugees and host communities in a dual targeting approach. While in Gambela, the region of Ethiopia hosting South Sudanese refugees, it was reported that displacement

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[14] For two interesting studies on cash transfers and vouchers in Ethiopia see: Jean-Martin Bauer, Aschalew Feleke and Kedir Shemsu. 2013 'Markets and Cash Transfers in Ethiopia: Insights from an Initial Assessment'. Addis Ababa: The World Food Program. It appears that markets can respond to cash and voucher transfers, although a mix of in kind food and cash-vouchers is advocated in the transitional near term. Also see, 'Assessment of Financial Access in Hilloween and Kobe Refugee Camps in Dollo Ado Area of Southwest Ethiopia'. 2013 ICOS consulting PLC, funded by ILO. The latter study maps the informal and formal financial service providers in the refugee area of Dolo Ado as a prelude to enhancing access to micro credit, related to strengthening livelihood opportunities.

is mainly caused by internal conflict created by the government program of 'villagisation', which is tantamount to a tactical land grabbing mechanism.

The predominantly Somali refugee camp in Ali Addeh, Djibouti (about 14,000) is 'prima face' a semi-arid incubator of economic despair and social exclusion bordering Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. When interviewed, the camp youth requested skill training and credential verification to make them more attractive to the Middle East labour market. They typically migrate through the ports of Djibouti to Yemen, the Sinai and points beyond, assisted by an informal industry of middlemen traffickers, brokers and boatmen.

The cultural connectivity (extant bonding social capital) with ethnic groups on relatively fluid borders enables many refugees (especially youth) to migrate to informal sector employment either in the host urban centres and/or abroad to North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. They leave behind the old and very young in a humanitarian industry protected welfare environment for the most part devoid of economic opportunity and consumptive power, short of a few small businesses serving the camp population and the remittances sent back to the camps by 'overseas refugee workers'. It should be noted that with the growing conflict in Yemen, there has now been a growing reverse flow of Somalis back to Djibouti.

The refugee camps in Shire (about 67,520) and Ali Addeh (about 14,000) are 'de facto' reserve labour pools for the Middle East in particular. The Eritrean and Somali refugee camps may be 'protracted' wards of the UN, but the people, particularly youth, are highly mobile in search of more open labour market opportunities. In short, while the camps have become the outward symbol of the 'protection' industry, their inhabitants, particularly in Shire and Ali Addeh are on the move, relegating camps to 'transit points' for the young and able and UN subsidised social safety nets for the old, infirm and very young left behind (Humphris 2013; Meknonnen and Estfanos 2014).

Kenya: Refugee Camp or 'de facto' Free Trade Zone (Dadaab)?

Informal labour exchange and trade between displaced and host communities is a common phenomenon in the HOA as already noted above in the case of Dollo Ado, Ethiopia. Refugee camps, such as Dadaab in Kenya with a population of some 475,000 and Dollo Ado with over 205,000 refugees receiving remittances and wanting to supplement income and diet, represent market opportunities for surrounding host communities.

There is growing informal trade in goods and services beyond the refugee and host communities in Dadaab (Kenya) as Somali traders move goods from Dubai through the port of Kismayo (Somalia) back and forth to the camp and its surrounding environment, 'de facto' relegating the camp to a tax free economic investment and free trade zone. It is common knowledge among Kenyans that Dadaab refugee camp is the best place to buy imported tax-free cars, scooters and electronic goods, among other commodities. The Somali refugee trade links extend to Turkana camps (there is even a thriving Somali operated bus line between Turkana and Dadaab camps) spanning from the Northeast to the Southwest Kenya and into neighbouring county markets.

Does Economics Trump Ethnicity or Vice-versa?

Kenya

In Kenya, the *Kakuma* (Turkana) camp, of mainly South Sudanese mixed with Somali, there is an absence of cultural affinity with the hosting Turkana community. Tensions run high between the host community and the refugee camp, especially around grazing and water use in a resource scarce environment. This situation is unlike in Dollo Ado, where the cultural fit between the Ethiopian Somali host community and Somali refugees helps to mediate the economic contestation over scarce resources.

In addition to the contestation over scarce environment resources (water and firewood in particular), the cultural conflict between Turkana peoples and South Sudanese refugees does not encourage social cohesion between refugees and hosts. As reported in focal group interviews, the Turkana feel the Sudanese look down upon them. They find Sudanese refugee graveyards and dumps amusing as they handle death, burial and waste differently. They see their very way of life threatened, especially among their youth who come into contact with the refugees.

South Africa

In South Africa, while not normally considered in discussions and analysis of the causes and impacts of forced displacement due to armed conflict in the HOA, one cannot but mention the recent events resulting from HOA displacement, particularly involving Somali businessmen. The Cape Province, has had its own unique experience with displaced persons and host community conflict dynamics with Somali, Zimbabwean and other refugee populations. Violent xenophobic responses to refugees in South Africa due to

competition for scarce jobs, wage distortion and rent inflation in the local economy are well documented (Charman and Piper 2012). Recent surveys in South Africa reported that over 45% of the respondents felt that "foreigners should not be allowed to live in South Africa because they take jobs and benefits away from South Africans" while 40% think that there should be strict restrictions placed on foreigners seeking entry into the country and 24% felt foreigners should be completely prohibited entry (Maaure 2013).

South Africa once hosted the largest number of asylum seekers in the world. Akin to Uganda's generous policy and legal framework, under the post-apartheid refugee and migrant legal reforms, groups such as the Somalis are granted refugee status with freedom of movement, work permits and access to basic services.[15] While successful Somali entrepreneurs become symbols of envy and frustration among the South African poor in informal settlements, they remain relatively invisible to South African and migrant elites living in secure gated communities serviced by private security personnel that are now estimated to be double the size of South African's police force (Abdi 2013). More recently, the government has introduced a number of restrictive practices including closing down some refugee reception offices. Overall the number of asylum seekers has decreased.

In 2008, when similar xenophobic violence erupted against South African non-nationals resulting in some 62 deaths and 35,000 displaced persons, the then AIDs activist movement, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), shifted from advocating for HIV victims' rights to fighting for refugees' rights, spanning multiple human rights issues, activist networks and constituencies. This movement evolved into the Social Justice Coalition (SIC) in the Western Cape, a community based civil society organisation addressing a broader range of Human Rights issues. Then, even the terminology utilised by the state regarding refugees talked in terms of "temporary shelter" and not "refugee camps" per se. As Robins noted, "refugees were increasingly depicted by government as illegal, criminal, troublesome, ungrateful and undeserving" (Robins 2009).

In Durban, Gauteng and Cape Town, South Africa, both in 2008 and more recently in 2015, there have been violent attacks by South Africans of Zulu

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[15] The Refugee Act requires 180 days for the determination of status but, in fact, asylum seekers spend years waiting for a determination, finding it difficult to find stable work in the interim (PASSOP 2013).

decent on migrants from Somalia, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The Department of Home Affairs reports about 70,000 new asylum claims in 2013 from over 80 countries worldwide. Among these, some 9,000 are from Ethiopia and Somalia alone (Pugh 2014). The outward cry of local South Africans in the townships accusing African "foreigners" of taking their jobs in an environment of high youth unemployment, has led to violent attacks and calls for them to return to their home countries.

Somalis and others in informal settlements with limited access to the formal labour market, manage small stores (*spazas*). Their success becomes a symbol and target of South Africans they serve in these "no go zones" where crime, poverty and unemployment reign (Abdi 2013). Mistrust and resentment loom large as refugees are stigmatised as criminals and bearers of disease. Local politicians such as Zulu King Ghatilensi have used them as a political mobilising pawn. As Dr. Roni Amit from the University of Witwatersrand has recently noted, "the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in South Africa has adopted a much expanded assumption of illegality. The DHA often acts outside of the legal framework under the guise of security. Migration has been framed as a security issue" (Amit 2014).

The impact of forced displacement on the host or receptor communities is complex and manifold. Clearly the clash of cultures in Natal, South Africa and Turkana, Kenya discussed above can lead to violent conflict, but this is mostly a result and not a cause of violence emanating from the economic competition for scarce resources and the increasing class divisions among the poor themselves.

In South Africa, it may not be cultural or racial bias per se (although ethnicity has become a mobilising factor for recent violent attacks on Somali traders) but rather the pooling of resources and sale of goods and services at lower prices and subsequent local competition, that is resented by some fellow Africans in the South African townships in particular. The recent violence perpetrated by poor South Africans upon the successful Somali immigrant shop owners in marginalised townships and use of the term 'Afrophobia' as opposed to 'Xenophobia' in characterising events on the ground, are subtle but clear indicators that economics trumps ethnicity as the core motivator of violence.

Poor governance can also play a role. The weakening of the judiciary and dominance of the ANC Executive Committee has led to conditions in "Lindela"

or transit camps for deportees as tolerable and a weigh station as they are now being rounded up and reported in "Operation Fiela" following recent clashes. It has also been further argued that post-apartheid xenophobia is a result of the merging of the politics of resistance and emerging state or nationalistic politics in the attempt to define citizenship and a new South African identity formation (Neocosmos 2006).[16]Some neighbouring countries such as Malawi have initiated repatriation programs with some 3,200 Malawians having fled South Africa in the wake of the violence. However it is reported that, given the few economic opportunities in their home country, there is now a steady stream of Malawians returning to South Africa despite their fears and risks (Masina 2015).

The Impact of the Interplay between Economics and Ethnicity

Market Distortions

The dominant impact in all these HOA settings is the creation of market distortions particularly in prices, wages and rents. Host communities have seen the price of charcoal in Dollo Ado go up almost four-fold from 40 Bir to 150 Bir per bag and a sack of sugar from go up nearly three-fold from 300 Bir to 800 Bir. Refugees are willing to work for a margin of what local wages had been beforehand, thus perceived to be taking away rightful or entitled jobs from host locals. The competition for limited social services (especially health and education) also becomes a point of contention. Host community health centres become overcrowded and under served and schools suddenly have excessive enrolments with children often speaking a totally different language, thus challenging teachers and the systems to adjust.

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[16] Neocosmos (2006) notes that post-independence Africa may have been 'de-radicalised' but not 'democratised' with the advent of 'Africanisation', now called 'Affirmative Action.' This relationship has been further forged in State public-private partnerships of the more recent 'Black Economic Empowerment' movement, culminating in the post-apartheid process of 'national building'. This, in term, required 'national unity' which entailed a political process of common identity and legal rights, duties and benefits (access to credit, social services, etc.) embedded in social relationships that distinguished hosts or natives from strangers or foreigners. The establishment of Bantustans was merely a mechanism for social and labour control and provided a ready labour reserve, particularly for white capital formation such as mining. Also see M. Mamdani. 1996. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. London: James Currey.

Basic Service Overload

Refugees tend to attract additional social services such as health and education to previously underserved, marginalised border regions. However, the perception that services only benefit the displaced as in Turkana, becomes reason for envy and local conflict. Where governments such as Uganda's are attuned to this unintentional threat to local stability, they have been quick to enhance service provision to the local host community. Ensuring some degree of basic services balance and social cohesion between camps and host communities is a major challenge in this situation. This is particularly important where new cultural groups such as Dinka and Newar are coming into Madi and Acholi areas.

Environmental Degradation

Another major issue emerging in Dollo Ado, Kakuma and other refugee camp areas in the HOA is environmental degradation due to energy production, particularly wood-source fuels. This was also an obvious outcome in Turkana and Dadaab. In many cases, an equilibrium or accommodation short of integration has been achieved, where the incentives to return diminish in the face of continued and unpredictable insecurity of places of origin. [17]

Weakened Social Networks and Uneven Access to Information

Family and social networks have been weakened as a result of protracted displacement to a diversity of locations. This has resulted in poor information, particularly on conditions of return. It has been reported in one return survey of Somali refugees in Kenya, that "only an estimated 18% of refugees have contact with people in their area of origin" (IOM and UNHCR 2014).

The Volatile Mix of Economic Contestation and Ethnic Mobilisation

Violent conflict in the HOA countries and beyond (having effects even in South Africa) is a manifestation of social and economic grievances framed by exclusion and marginalisation associated with deep poverty, vulnerability,

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[17] While not discussed in depth here, providing mechanisms for dealing with trauma (particularly among unaccompanied minors) and dispute resolution between displaced and hosting communities are also important new development challenges.

constrained socio-economic mobility and contestation over scarce resources including jobs. This contestation manifests itself in violent ethnic mobilisation. Clearly economics trumps ethnicity as the deep structural cause of the violence. However, ethnicity is the major mobilising tool.

The need to be cognizant of inadvertently enabling market distortions in prices and wages of local goods and services, creating perceived if not real social service imbalances, hastening environmental degradation and growing ethnic conflict, are major displacement issues. While economic contestation is at the root of conflict between the displaced and hosts, ethnicity is more often than not a mobilising feature for the perpetration of violence. In sum, for most refugee and host community encounters, the degree of ethnic or cultural fit between the displaced population and the host community is a key variable in shaping the degree of receptivity and non-violent accommodation.

Government Legal and Policy Responses: Acts of Fear or Necessity?

The legal frameworks and policies of hosting countries regarding the displaced revolve around five main issues: (1) access to basic services; (2) the right to work; (3) the ease of mobility; (4) the ownership of property; and (5) a clear path to the choices of citizenship, return or resettlement. The degree to which host governments subscribe to international law and norms related to these issues is of critical importance to shaping durable solutions for the displaced.

Although governments are signatory to various conventions and acts effecting the HOA over the years (including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention, the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 2006 Refugee Act, the 2009 Kampala Convention, and the 2012 Uganda Refugee Regulations) they have not always been sufficiently translated into effective program implementation due often to a mix of political will and local capacity.

Uganda

On the one extremity, Uganda (now hosting over 350,000 displaced: 188,000 Congolese in the South and Midwest and 154,000 South Sudanese in Adjumani, Arua and Kiryandongo districts) has a progressive legal policy that provides gazette plots in settlements through which refugees can farm the

land and enter into lease contracts (UNHCR 2015a). This 'out of camp' approach has generally resulted in a vibrant trade and exchange between the hosting communities and the refugees, as discussed earlier.

The government and the UNHCR have been taking strategic steps to strengthen the resilience and self-reliance of the refugees and hosting areas since the 1999 Self Reliance Strategy (SRS) for Refugee Hosting Areas, continuing with the 2006 Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) and imbedding a refugee Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) in the National Development Plan II (2015-2020). These steps have culminated in the Refugee and Host Populations Empowerment (ReHope) program that aims to bridge humanitarian and development assistance in self-reliant and resilience strengthening actions (UNHCR 2015b). This innovative program and its limitations will be discussed further in an analysis of donor responses below.

In addition to providing user land rights to refugees, such programs are included in national development plans, as Uganda is now doing in the Northern Uganda Development Plan (NDP II). This ensures attention to the issue of displacement as well as budget to support the design and implementation of plans and programs.

Kenya

On the other extremity, despite developing a draft policy and Refugee Act in 2012, Kenya has made little progress in moving the policy beyond a draft stage and implementing of the Act itself. In effect, it has framed the displacement issue through a security lens. It has relied heavily on the conventional camp approach with large, tightly controlled encampments in Dadaab (estimated to house about 350,000 refugees) and Kakuma (housing an estimated 120,000 displaced). The Dadaab camp is effectively the third largest city in Kenya. Work permits and freedom of mobility are out of reach. Tensions between the camps and surrounding host communities are apparent with frequent incidents. One interviewee characterised the Kenyan camps as "open prisons." The security incidents at Westgate Mall and Garissa school referred to above led to "Operation Watch", a security sweep of urban areas throughout the country to round up Somali displaced and either return them to the camps or repatriate them to Somalia itself. In 2013, the Kenyan High Court ruled against such actions and a tripartite agreement establishing a legal framework for voluntary returns was signed between UNHCR, and the

Kenyan and Somali governments. This has placed Kenya in the international limelight and under the scrutiny of various human rights groups. Voluntary repatriation has been encouraged but there are few takers given the insecurity in areas of return in Somalia.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has traditionally sought a balance between managing tightly controlled camps on its borders with Somalia and acknowledging large historical Somali ghetto areas, especially in Addis. It maintains an encampment policy that requires refugees to obtain permits to leave the camps. However, in August 2010 the government introduced a new policy permitting Eritrean refugees to reside outside camps if self-sufficient or supported. With a more "open camp" policy toward the Eritrean situation, given the cultural fit between refugees and receptor communities, there are higher rates of inter-marriage and integration than usual. On the border areas, given the cultural consistency between Somali Ethiopians in the South, Eritrean Ethiopians in the Northeast and Sudanese Ethiopians in the Eastern Gambela region, there is thriving labour exchange and trade in goods and services between the camps and neighbouring communities. The Barbera corridor between Ethiopia and Somalia has become somewhat of a thriving trade route between the countries.

South Africa

South Africa's legal and policy framework has increasingly come into conflict with its quest for democratisation. The 'Aliens Control Act' of 1995 basically negated rights of immigrants, particularly the freedom to trade and work, treating them as illegal and criminal by confiscating their assets, harassing and deporting them. Following on the heals of the 1998 Refugee Act, the draft 'White Paper on International Migration' of 1999 used rising unemployment as a means of discouraging immigration and enforcing the Aliens Control Act. The only concession was to the mining sector when it became a bill in 2000.[18] It was reported in a recent round table discussion on Xenophobia in South

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[18] See the 1998 Human Rights Watch Report on 'Xenophobia in South Africa', documenting the Inkata movement and Buthelezi's inflammatory statement blaming crime, unemployment and spread of diseases on 'foreigners'. HRP was later critised for prioritising illegal aliens over the then 50 percent of South Africans living in poverty.

Africa that since the 2008 events there have been over 350 deaths and only a single prosecution of the perpetrators in Afrophobic related incidents (Amit et al. 2015). Clearly failures of the rule of law, particularly evidenced in the slow pace and backlog of the judiciary and the late actions of the South African police force, serve as a de facto signal of impunity for such criminal acts.

Djibouti

Despite hosting a large camp in Ali Addeeh on its southern border and growing displaced shantytown areas in Djiboutiville itself, Djibouti does not have an explicit refugee law or policy. The general displacement trend is to use Djibouti as more of a 'transit point" than a "final destination". Of course, given its limited availability of arable land job opportunities, one would expect this pattern. Interviewed youth in Ali Addeeh described a situation whereby the elderly and very young in the camp are supported by the generous safety net of the international community while the young and able migrate back and forth to Yemen and elsewhere to work and send back remittances to buttress consumption in the camps. Here, economic opportunity, conflict induced insecurity and climate change merge to form a constellation of interrelated factors driving 'mixed migration'.

Puntland, Somaliland and Somalia

Puntland adopted policy guidelines on IDPs in 2012, and Somaliland developed a draft policy framework in 2014. However, the implementation is slow and the jury is out on whether the capacity and resources will enable effectiveness. Somalia itself adopted a policy framework on displacement and an agency for refugees and IDPs in December 2014. The New Deal compact, supported by the international community in 2014, presents an opportunity to address the issue of durable solutions. However, it is hobbled by a weak state that is critical to implementation.

The "warehousing approach" to refugees, registering, feeding and protecting them, comes face to face with the desire to move and integrate elsewhere, be it in the hosting environment or beyond Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

The environmental and labour market limitations of Djibouti typically require moving beyond to the Gulf States. An interesting finding in Djibouti was the desire for youth looking to migrate for jobs to have access to better labour market information as well as some kind of skill certification. Here,

perhaps a stronger vocational counselling element might be introduced especially for youth in the camps.

International and Regional Policies and Programs

Donors exhibit a range of responses to the crisis situation in the HOA. On the one hand, UNHCR has moved considerably from a "camp management" approach to a more "open camp" approach as mentioned above, acknowledging that the care and maintenance in camps is neither a sustainable nor realistic solution given the numbers of displaced now already outside camps in peri-urban informal settlements or on the move through neighbouring host countries. The operative donor language is "building resilience and self-reliance" which translates into providing a basic safety net of transitional food, shelter and basic services while enabling skill enhancement for onward labour market migration and employment elsewhere.

As discussed above, in the Uganda case, these steps have culminated in UNHCR's flagship initiative- the Refugee and Host Populations Empowerment (ReHope) program that aims to bridge humanitarian and development assistance in self-reliance and resilience strengthening actions (UNHCR 2015b). Its focus is on integrated programming combining legal advice, service delivery, livelihood support and giving voice to refugees in the planning and programming process in a holistic manner. The approach differentiates between rural and urban livelihood support, combining access to land, technology and markets for the rural displaced with skill enhancement, entrepreneurship, business assistance and access to credit for urban livelihoods.[19]

This innovative and comprehensive approach acknowledges that the old "camp-based" approach of prolonged humanitarian assistance is not sustainable, especially under conditions of protracted displacement that have become the norm in the HOA. However, as mentioned earlier, the ReHope program does have limitations, most important being that the insufficient amount of land allocated limits farming to subsistence agriculture and prevents any real transformation through mechanised agriculture and agro-

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[19] Considering livelihood, FAO has been studying areas of origin, travel routes and hosting areas of settlement, intervening to improve water and heard management, providing market information and restocking as a means of prevention.

industry in these areas. A second gap is the need for improved community policing and access to justice, perhaps by financing mobile courts and trained local mediators. Finally, there remains the issue of balanced service delivery with regards to classroom and teacher disparities. Some even argue that there is a need to go beyond primary education provision and offer more scholarships to refugee children for secondary education in order to promote social mobility and break the vicious cycle of displacement.

UNHCR's support for scholarships for Eritrean displaced is an interesting twist and a relevant development intervention. Also in due to the large number of unaccompanied minors, the camps are forced to create "community kitchens" for feeding (estimated feeding of 1000 children per day) and unique walled shelter areas that fence in unaccompanied minors for joint supervision by so called "house mothers". In effect, in the words of the UNHCR regional director, "the UNHCR program here is creating communities not camps as such."

An interesting unspoken tension between host governments and the displaced is how to manage the subtle political balance between wanting refugees to be self-reliant, but not so progressive that they compete with and monopolise local community resources. Indeed there is always the lurking issue of moral hazard, as successful pilot integration schemes such as ReHope run the risk of attracting more refugees.

In cooperation with regional economic communities (particularly Inter Governmental Agency for Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (ECA)), the African Union (AU) has established the African Peace and Security Architecture (ASPA) to deal with prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In this context, it has set up a continental early warning system (CEWS) a standby security force (ASF), a panel of wise men and a Peace Fund (PF) to support humanitarian assistance, peace-making and peace building efforts in the region. These organisations have focused on mediation and conflict resolution for the most part, bringing parties together to establish peace and assisting enforcement through peacekeeping missions such as the African Union Assistance Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia.

The African Union Boarder Program (AUBP) has taken the additional step of developing cross-border services, such as health and customs control, to facilitate the movement of people, goods and services (economic exchanges).

The underlying theme is to strengthen the governance capacity of these here-to-fore ungoverned and relatively ungovernable border areas. IGAD has also sought to facilitate dialogue on transport and export in the extractive industry, technical assistance for regional environmental standards, skills development as well as conflict mediation. Its Migration Policy Framework is an effort to harmonise various regional migration policies, strengthen inter-governmental coordination, build capacity and enhance community involvement. There have also been efforts to collaborate on regional integration with the African Development Bank (AfDB) around infrastructure through the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund managed by IGAD.

The World Bank's Operational Policy 8.10 for Emergency Lending and 2.30 for Conflict and Development are the key policy instruments enabling a quick and relevant response to displacement situations. The main regional approach in the HOA thus far has been to restructure or amend existing projects. The primary example is the HOA Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP). This operates cross border and is being implemented in collaboration with IGAD. It seeks to strengthen IGAD's conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN)[20] with additional resources, equipment and training (World Bank 2014). On the analytical side, the World Bank conducted an initial study on the impact of the Dadaab refugee camp on the host community environment in Kenya (DRC 2010). A second similar study is underway for the impact of the Kakuma refugee camp in Northwest Kenya on the surrounding Turkana host community.

The World Bank's Third Northern Uganda Social Action Project (NUSAP III) currently under design will seek to address displacement challenges impacting refugee host areas. Other relevant instruments such as the Third Peace and Development Plan can be targeted to include refugee-affected areas, with particular concern for women and children. It is a planning and finance framework with a clear programming stream through NUSAP III and provides a framework for community monitoring results. It is innovative in that it includes community participatory appraisal processes, disaster or catastrophic risk insurance, micro credit and social accountability mechanisms. In addition, the World Bank is exploring extending the

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[20] CEWARN has an estimated annual budget of $1.5 million funded by member states, the USAID, GIZ and several Scandinavian countries in a joint financial arrangement (JFA) facility.

government assisted conditional cash transfer program to displaced through the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), shifting the emphasis from a dependency-producing provision of food toward increased self-reliance and return through livelihood and related skills development.

It is clear that issues of environmental degradation can be addressed by providing alternative energy and fuel sources, such as wind farms, solar power, natural gas and surface water conservation. The World Bank's Horn of Africa Study analyses the displacement issue within the larger development and reconstruction analysis of the HOA (World Bank 2014b; World Bank 2015b).

In addition to the above key international actors, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has recently approved a project in Southern Ethiopia to assist areas where Somali refugees are about to return. The Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils (DRC and NRC, respectively) have also been actively analysing Somalia context and piloting small recovery initiatives including provision of communal water points, skill enhancement and profiling needs assessment (Bryld and Kamau 2013).Finally, the European Commission has programs targeting both refugees and host communities with a security accent on access to justice, mobile courts and policing solutions.

The Search for a New Paradigm: From Care and Maintenance to Resilience and Self-Reliance

Given the now "protracted" nature of the displacement, the old encampment humanitarian policies of care and maintenance are now giving way to a rethink from a development perspective by governments and donors alike. Identifying the "development deficits" or gaps (such as security, livelihood, conflict resolution and human trafficking) between the displaced and the host communities is an essential first step. Targeting the most vulnerable among the displaced, integrating them into domestically provided social services rather than stand alone IDP programs and extending the local social safety net where feasible, are priorities. Enhancing "mental mobility" or a change in mind-set among the displaced is a necessary adjunct to social and economic access and mobility. The "dependency syndrome" engendered by old warehousing approaches is now being transformed.

As Betts et. al. (2014) have observed, refugee communities exhibit similar features of normal economic systems, that is, "they (refugee communities)

engage in production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and the development of financial and capital markets" (Betts et al 2014). What appears to be the determining factor in the success or failure of refugee self-initiatives in the economic sphere, is the openness of government policies regarding property rights or user rights, the right to work and the freedom of movement. As mentioned above, Uganda not only provides land for agriculture, but freedom of movement to trade between the camp in Kyrangwali settlement, Kampala, Arua, Gul, and even beyond Uganda to Tanzania and South Sudan. While not without its limitations, Uganda's approach provides a tipping point to influence neighbouring country's policies on displacement and migration.

To the extent that livelihood programs and some form of user or property rights complement a transitional safety net of basic service provision, at minimum, a limited opening for some form of "transitional integration" within local economies is possible. However, where refugees are seen as distorting the local economic wages, prices and rents and competing for meagre job opportunities with local communities, there has been pushback and resistance by hosting governments and communities' members. The degree and intensity of such local pushback is only moderated by the cultural and ethnic fit between the refugees and the receptor communities, as in the case of Eritreans in Northeast Ethiopia and earlier discussed Somali Ethiopians bordering Southwest Mandera triangle with Somalia and Kenya.

To further illustrate the ethnic reach across refugee hosting environments, one needs only to see the transport links established by Somali bus and minivan companies between Kakuma and Dadaab camps in Kenya. Again, ethnic and clan bonded social capital networks trump geopolitical borders. Of course the flow of remittances, especially through the Somali Hahwala system of informal banking, helps to fuel production and trade wherever Somali live and work.

The formula of refugee business success is rounded out by access to satellite information and communication technology (ICT) and Internet connectivity of mobile phones, along with financial access and networked social capital, human capital skills and host government policy space. Betts et al (2014) reported that over 66% of the displaced in Kyrangali settlement and 96% of those in Kampala have mobile phones.

Clearly, further investigation into a new paradigm that emphasises a more open public-private sector system of managing refugee flows is warranted. This is particularly evident when balanced against the risks of conventional methods that encourage conflict by painting the displaced into corners of insecurity and local competition. This brings one back to the trade-offs between the durable solutions of integration, resettlement and repatriation within the overall framework of open and closed camp mentality.

Addressing Borderland Push and Pull Factors

Addressing both push and pull factors in the camps and prospective areas of return in an integrated 'holistic' manner is key to achieving durable solutions. Here, the link or bridge between humanitarian and development approaches is critical. The push factors entail skill and self-reliance development of refugees while in the camps, while the pull factors are security, basic service access and property rights in the areas of return.

The UNHCR, partnered with World Bank, may wish to extend or shift its traditional safety net approach from a dependency-producing safety net (providing food, shelter and basic services), to a "transitional safety net", emphasising livelihood interventions, mitigating the dependency mind-set and, thus, preparing the displaced with skills for strengthening self-reliance and positioning for eventual economic reintegration upon return.

Despite the de facto cross-border trade (human and capital mobility) among the displacement affected countries in the HOA, there remains an enormous need for economic and social infrastructure addressing environmental degradation, physical infrastructure and job creation in both receipt and return areas. A Cross-border Regional Integrated Area Development approach would stimulate the development of the border areas in the three countries and facilitate regional trade, stability and return.

Merging stabilisation, security and development would provide the bridge linking humanitarian protection to building resilience and socio-economic development. It could be truly transformational, going beyond palliative transitional solutions or holding patterns for the extreme poor (refugees and IDPs) living in dire, uncertain conditions.

The location of the camps, mainly in marginalised border areas, may ironically be a silver lining. They have shined a "spot light" on the unequal development in receptor countries and here-to-fore marginalised border

areas. So much so that the camps may, in the long run, attract greater public investment and attendant state budgetary resources, particularly towards improving infrastructure and basic services, in areas that may otherwise may have continued to be neglected.

In the Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia border area called the Madera Triangle, a Cross-border Regional Integrated Area Development approach could address the refugee impact on host communities as well as the pull factors for refugees in a comprehensive manner, benefiting local communities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. It also fits into the decentralisation and federalism thrust of all three countries. The displacement situation in Dollop Ado provides a great opportunity for such a regional cross-border displacement project. For the refugees in Dollo Ado, return to their areas of origin in South Central region of Somalia is the only feasible long-term solution. Lack of security, poor access to basic services and limited livelihood opportunities, were identified in focus group interviews as the key constraints to their return.

While uncertain security is a concern, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Somali refugees have been willing to take risks and undertake itinerant farming, moving back and forth between refugee camps on one side of the border and farming and herding in communities of origin on the other side. As indicated above, studying and understanding these coping livelihood modalities would be critical to building on extant refugee capacity and ingenuity. Such a development intervention could address both push and pull factors necessary for a durable regional solution to the protracted displacement crisis.

Partnering for Peace

The AU supports inter-continental policy collaboration emanating from such forums and programs as the "Kampala Convention" and the "African Union Border Program" (AUBP). The objective of the AUBP is to promote regional coordination and cooperation, build capacity and enhance community involvement. Population movement is not a new phenomenon in the HOA. Displacement due to violence does not occur in isolation from these seasonal migratory and climatic cycles and trends. With reference to pastoralists in particular, there is a need for a regional approach to facilitate and protect pastoralist livelihoods.

Infrastructure, basic service access, training, capacity building and micro-finance are a key constellation of investments that, if done in an integrated area development manner in areas such as the Madera Triangle or the Turkana area bordering South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, could form the critical mass necessary to transform the economies of these marginalised areas. This would promote regional development and refugee integration and reintegration in a single stroke.[21] Of course, this integrated area development approach could benefit from increased donor coordination perhaps through the formation of a joint displacement and development secretariat, a shared action plan and a special multi-donor displacement fund.

Harmonisation of Country Policies and Programs

Such innovative institutional initiatives as discussed would have to be complemented by country policy and legal reforms that accent key elements: (i) some form or path of citizen rights short of outright citizenship (some form of legal recognition); (ii) property rights or long term land use rights; (iii) the freedom of movement; (iv) the right to work or work permits; (v) and skill verification.

The African Union Border Program (AUBP) is one example of bringing together various actors in a coordinated integrated regional development and conflict prevention management initiative. Another idea is to complement these efforts at coordination and local regional capacity building with development of special boarder area economic zones that can attract investment with favoured capital access and tax policies, along with infrastructure connectivity. In many ways, as presented earlier, the Dadaab refugee camp has actually evolved into a de facto "free trade zone". However, to enable such integrated cross border development to take place these areas, the displaced located in them need to be given voice and factored into national, regional and local planning and budgeting processes. In the case of Somalia, one might envisage this in contrast to conventional top down, state-centric development, as the state is being rebuilt or reconstructed from the periphery to the centre in a loosely constructed federal system.

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[21] There is a history of such successful integrated area development projects in the 1960s, such as the Camilla Project in Pakistan to the Mekong River Development Project in Southeast Asia.

Working together, the UNDP, WFP, FAO and UNHCR have a Somali initiative, "Drought PDNA Assessment", focusing on commercialisation of pastoralism, basic services and local capacity building. The overall program is multi-sector, focusing on livelihood development, community policing, food security through a mix of food and cash transfer to stimulate an agricultural supply response, alternative fuel sources, environmental protection and basic service delivery. Analytical work is also underway on water reservoir and irrigation development. The overarching aim is the normalisation of refugee life.

Bilateral donors such as Turkish International Cooperation Assistance (TICA) continue to provide humanitarian relief, while USAID and DFID are taking cash based and market oriented approaches. Here, the radical perspective of seeing Dadaab as an economic powerhouse in that region of Kenya, meshes nicely with treating it as a de facto free trade zone with well developed market reach into Kenya, Somalia and other countries.

From Shock Absorbers to Change Agents: Developing the Borderlands

As noted earlier, policies addressing forced displacement are based on a continuum in which the displaced are perceived as a threat or risk on the one hand, a burden somewhere in the middle, and an asset on the other end of the continuum. From a prevention perspective, in the end, there is little doubt that stemming forced migration at its source by improving security, governance and livelihood opportunities in countries of origin is key to preventing and managing the displacement challenge. As discussed above, regional integrated development can convert fragile border areas, which now serve as shock absorbers for conflicts within these fragile states, to prosperous and open avenues of cross border trade and development.

It is clear that policies in relatively authoritarian democratic regimes such as Kenya and South Africa can lead to extreme practices of State technocratic or managerial xenophobia and discrimination in programs that advocate rounding up refugees and deporting, incarcerating and/or returning them to camps such as 'Usalama Watch' and 'Operation Fiela'.[22] Here the concept of

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[22] Lebogang Seale's (2015) quotes ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe: "South Africa can't allow illegal migrants to roam around committing crime". In defense of 'Operation Fiela', Seale further quotes Mantashe: "You can't say the state must do nothing, must allow illegal immigrants, must allow undocumented people in society,

State Sovereignty comes face to face with the protection of human rights. Unfortunately the recent experience of "Afrophobia" in South Africa is not a question of individual rights but one of national politics. Guarding against this outcome would be necessary.

Next Steps: The Alignment of Durable Solutions

In summary, the alignment of durable solutions to address both push and pull factors in a decentralised integrated local area development approach encompasses the following main actions:

(a) Harmonising country policy and legal frameworks to ensure that there is consistent and regulated freedom of movement, ability to work and clear identity documentation or papers.

(b) Including refugees in national and local development plans, as Uganda is now doing in the Northern Uganda Development Plan (NUDP III), to not only grant attention to the issue of displacement but also budget to support the design and implementation of such plans and programs.

(c) Creating livelihood opportunities through combing skill development, agriculture and SME investments and employment generation.

(d) Mitigating environmental deterioration by addressing the need for alternative cooking fuel and employment through labour intensive reforestation.

(e) Strengthening social infrastructure and addressing imbalances in access through the provision of schools, health centres, safe water and sanitation facilities (UNICEF-Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development 2013).

(f) Promoting connectivity by enhancing basic transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure in underserved, marginalised border areas.

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it must leave unlicensed firearms in society… being dictated by NGOs on crime fighting strategies puts South Africa at risk of having a mini sate within a state."

(g) **Providing conflict management, mediation and conflict resolution capacity** through training community members and leaders.

(h) **Addressing the social psychological and basic needs of the most vulnerable**, particularly unaccompanied minors through specially targeted and customised programs.

(i) **Ensuring Donor and NGO coordination and financing** to provide a critical mass of technical and financial support in order to enable the capacitation of local authorities and close the gaps between policy and implementation in addressing the needs of the displaced.

Finally, as one Ethiopian Minister interviewed astutely observed, "we don't need another study, we need to mobilise resources for regional infrastructure and connectivity through social and economic development." This will require political will as well as economic resources.

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Development-Induced Displacement and Its Impacts on the Livelihoods of Poor Urban Households in Bahir Dar, North Western Ethiopia

Getu Ambaye * *and Assefa Abeliene* **

Abstract

This article attempts to explore urban relocation impacts on the livelihoods of poor households displaced by a development project in Bahir Dar city in northwestern Ethiopia. Qualitative methods were used to generate the necessary data. The findings identified that the urban relocation caused a variety of livelihood risks such as loss of home or shelter, lack of urban infrastructures such as road facilities, electricity, job opportunites, potable water services and cash compensation for rehousing, as well as landlessness and separation of small cohesive social groups (notably coffee members). Though IDPs are exposed to various livelihood challenges because of a lack of addressing environmental impact assessment recommendations, those who received housing land are partly happy with owning legally recognised urban land. Currently, IDPs are the owners of the land registered by the municipality. The study urges the need to assess and address the unmet needs of poor urban residents as well as the environmental impact of urban development projects.

Keywords: Displacement, Ethiopia, homelessness, landlessness and livelihoods.

Introduction

Displacement is broadly defined as the uprooting of people from their place of habitual residence (Cernea 2005). Population displacement has become a global problem, particularly since the end of the Cold War (Cernea 2009 Cernea & McDowell 2000). Cernea and McDowell (2000: 49), note that 'displaced populations have been part and parcel of modern history and often people are being displaced in the name of progress.' The literature

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review outlines the major causes of internal displacement into three typologies, namely development-induced displacement, conflict-induced-displacement and disaster-induced displacement (Tesfaye 2007; Getu 2005). There are also various terms that are used to describe a wide range of displaced populations, including 'refugees', 'development displacees', 'environment and disaster displacees', 'internally displaced people or persons' (IDPs), 'forced resettlers', 'internal refugees', 'environmental refugees', and 'climate refugees' (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center [IDMC] 2010).

This study is conducted among Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by urban development project, Bahir Dar Ethiopia. What is of primary importance in this study is the fact that development is the largest cause of global population displacement, a phenomenon commonly termed 'Development-Induced Displacement' (DID) in the literature (Hussain 2008; Cernea 2000). DID is the process that takes place when people are forced to leave their homes as a result of development projects such as the construction of dams, roads, airports, as well as urban clearance initiatives, mining, deforestation and the introduction of conservation reserves (Baviskar 2009; Mathur 2006). The magnitude of urban development-induced displacement in Ethiopia has been increasing (Birhanu 2006; Fitsum 2007; Gebre 2008; Nebiyou 2000). The recent urban development policy of Ethiopia is designed to address various urban challenges through infrastructural projects such as slum clearance initiatives and housing projects (Tebarek 2013).

The magnitude of population displacement by development projects in developing countries has increased particularly since the 1960s and 1970s (Dessaelgn 2003). 'Projects assisted by the World Bank in the majority of developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, account for an ever increasing number of displaced populations globally (Thomas 2002).The displaced people face a number of risks that damage their livelihood(McDowell,2002). Significant examples of such projects have been in Malaysia (the FELDA project), Sri Lanka (the accelerated Mahaweli project), Indonesia (the transmigration project), Colombia (Caquetá), and Brazil (Polonoreste) (Cernea & McDowell 2000,McDowell, 2002). Recent research by Cernea (2009: 290) indicates that in India alone during the period 1949-2000, development programs displaced over 6 million people; in China during a similar period (1950-2005), about 70 million people were displaced According to Cernea (2009: xxvi):

> […] every single year in the first decade of the twenty first century, development programs forcibly uproot and displace from their houses and fields cohort of populations conservatively estimated to total at least 15 million people, which is equivalent to between 150 and 200 million for the decade.

The main objective of this study is, therefore, to explore the livelihood impacts of the urban development-induced displacement that involved the transfer of poor squatter settlers from the inner city to the outlying parts of Bahir Dar city. This is done with the aim to conceptualise how urban development-induced displacement relates to vulnerability, livelihood assets (capital), livelihood activities/strategies, policies, and institutions/associations and processes that determine people's choices in shaping livelihoods and livelihood outcomes as the results of livelihood strategies (Scoones 1998). As a result, the effects of urban displacement on relocatees' livelihoods are assessed in terms of physical, natural and financial wellbeing, social solidarity and basic services, as well as, infrastructure assets, activities, processes and outcomes.

Generally, studies emphasise the inherent socio-economic risks of involuntary displacement (Shami 1993; Downing 1996). Case-by-case studies across the world indicate how the displaced population experiences risks (Pankhurst & Piguet 2009). In this regard, displacement research has made remarkable achievements in documenting the livelihood risks people encounter due to involuntary displacement. In his multiple studies, Cernea (2000; 2005; 2009) provides lists of the inherent livelihood risks faced by people forcibly displaced for various reasons. These risks include landlessness, homelessness, joblessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources and social disintegration (Cernea 2000). Analysis of livelihood risks related to displacement has resulted in the identification of supplementary risks. One of which is the loss of access to community services, ranging from clinics to educational facilities, that may result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among displaced people (Aptekar & Behailu 2009). Another identified risk is the violation of human rights (Andnet 2010); displacement from one's habitual residence and loss of property without fair compensation is considered a violation of human rights (Robinson 2003; Abebe 2009).

In Ethiopia, there are some evidences gathered from case studies on urban development-induced displacement particularly in Addis Ababa (Birhanu 2006; Dejene 2005; Feleke 2009; Fitsum 2007; Gebre 2008; Ashenafi 2001). The studies indicate that displaced poor households are exposed to various dimensions of livelihood risks. The process usually involves the transfer of poor residents from inner parts of cities and towns to peripheral areas, thereby inhibiting their access to basic social or public services (Birhanu 2006; Dejene 2005; Feleke 2009; Gebre 2008; Ashenafi 2001). The process of relocating people from the inner city to the outskirts is argued to disrupt business ties with customers, fragment informal and social networks and lead to a loss of neighborhood-based organisations (Tebarek 2013; Gebre 2008; Fitsum 2007). In addition, urban displacement results in the separation of work site from home site in female-headed households (Habtamu 2014; Etenesh 2007).

As reviewed above, urban development-induced displacement affects the various aspects of livelihood assets and activities of poor households (Habtamu 2014); some research focuses on the impacts on female-headed households (Tebarek 2013; Etenesh 2007); and some others consider the livelihood outcomes in terms of the coping and survival strategies of relocated residents in urban contexts (Ephrem 1998; Tesfu 2014; Dinku 2004). Most of the previous studies have been confined to Addis Ababa. With no prior study that attempts to investigate how urban relocation erodes a community`s access to all the elements needed for livelihood – physical, social and natural wellbeing and financial capital – this study attempts to explore the livelihood impacts of urban relocation with particular reference to Bahir Bar city located in northwestern Ethiopia.

Description of the Study Area

This particular study is conducted in Bahir Dar city, located in the northwestern parts of Ethiopia. The research has been conducted by a single urban development project in Bahir Dar city's Kotatina resettlement neighborhood. The Bahir Dar Hulegeb Stadium project is a relatively large-scale project covering 15.5 hectares of land that touches Keble 14, 15 and 17 which are sub district in Bahir Dar city (Bahir Dar City Service Office 2000). The construction of the stadium has resulted in the displacement of 352 heads of households. The displaced households were required to resettle in the outskirts of the city. Those displaced live in a new resettlement neighborhood popularly known as Kotatina *Sefer* or *Mender,* located in the

southwestern peripheral area of Bahir Dar city. The place name of *Kotatina* refers to the hill place and its surroundings that were identified and reserved by authorities for the settlements of IDPs in the outlying area of the city.

Methods of the Study

The study is based on qualitative methods that involved in-depth interviews with key informants, observations, two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (one with a male group and the other with a female group), and documentary assessments. One of the advantages of qualitative methods is the allowance for understanding participants' experiences within context (Creswell 2007). Understanding the experience of internal displacement, therefore, required the careful selection of key informants who were representative of displaced households or communities living in the Kotatina neighborhood. Key informants were contacted by co-investigators who attended public gathering places in the community, such as churches, mosques, and community-based associational meetings. Participants for interviews were informed of the purpose of the study through a written document and signed an agreement to participate in the study. Local leaders or executive committee members of informal Iddirs, Ikub and other informal associations, were selected as the key informants, along with two experts from Bahir Dar city municipalities. The selection criteria sought out individual heads of households displaced by the Bahir Dar Hulegeb Stadium project, and given plots of land as compensation for rebuilding their homes. Considering gender, six male and six female Iddir leaders, and two male Bahir Dar city municipality experts were identified and interviewed. Each interview was conducted using an interview guide, with questions followed by probes to elicit in depth information. The two FGDs were also conducted by using a FGD guide. In order to maintain anonymity when analysing, organising, and presenting the major themes that emerged from the in-depth interviews, key informants are noted as A1, A2, A3, and so on to A14.

The Results of the Study

Currently, the IDPs live in close proximity. Resettlement involved transferring urban poor residents from their squatter settlement to Kotatina, located on the periphery of Bahir Dar city. Internal displacement and resettlement as experienced by the IDPs, involved a relatively short physical distance from Kebele 15 to Kebele 14 of the city administration. Before the influx of IDPs, the Kotatina site, a stretch of land in the outlying area the city

administration, was possessed by people engaged in agricultural activities. Now, the new resettlement site is made to be part of Kebele 14 of the city administration.

The study explored the livelihood impacts of internal displacement, including the loss of home or shelter, concerns about the sustainability of life in the new resettlement neighborhood with no mainstream urban services such as roads, electricity and potable water, the inability to get cash compensation for rehousing and the separation from coffee members. The following subthemes outline and describe the controversial issues involved in livelihood risks such as a lack of cash compensation, basic housing services, job opportunities and transportation, as well as homelessness and social disintegration. Some of the positive aspects of urban development-induced displacement are also noted.

Physical Capital: Homelessness

One of the pressing problems or livelihood risks faced by individual households following the internal displacement was homelessness. The project planners and designers did not propose any cash compensation for displacement and resettlement. The study found that relocatees' financial capacity had also worsened due to extra housing expenses during the transitional period of relocation. On the one hand, participants considered their displacement and resettlement without compensation as a wrong doing committed against their rights. They raised their grievances to Municipal authorities. On the other hand, authorities and municipalities argued that, for IDPs who had been squatter settlers in the urban locality, the allocation of land should be viewed as compensation. An ad hoc committee comprising of community members was formed to work temporarily with the registration of household heads in order to identify which households were entitled to compensation. All informants openly reported compensation related issues, as well as how the lack of compensation was justified by concerned authorities.

The sudden dislocation was traumatic and stressful for the displaced people. According to informants, with no prior warning, all residents were given a two week deadline to leave their housing. The situation of homelessness, particularly during the transition period, compelled all displaced households to live in rented houses for two to four months. This information was

confirmed in both of the FGDs. One informant (A3) recalled his experiences, stating:

> I have passed through many challenges and problems since the date of my displacement in Kotatina. It was in February 2008 that all residents in Ketel Sefer were told to leave the place required by the government for the purpose of building a big stadium in Bahir Dar. Authorities passed orders suddenly to all of us to leave within a week time period by saying all of you go and 'Jefijifeh giba', literally to mean 'build your own temporarily family shelter using leafs or plastics in a places you are provided'. And, I was forced to stay in a temporary housing that I rented from local residents in Kebele 14. For that house, I was paying 300 Birr monthly.

> The other key informants from the Bahir Dar municipality argued that they share the inconvence that the IDPs suffer, however, the multiplier effect of the new project is greater than the IDPS suffering. They state that there is always some negative aspect when doing such projects and the main concern is to ensure that the benefits outweigh the negatives, in favour of majority of people's wellbeing. For this reason, the municipality tooks action at the expense of the IDPs. In order to minimise homelessness, the municipality gave such lands for the majority of the IDPs except some of them which there residence period in Kettle seffer is less than five years According to his explanation, why the criterion of restricting to five years for giving such land is some IDPs which are not well established residence in the area have not the right to cliam to have such lands for housing construction. Because of that they come in this site with in short period of time by expecting such land grant distribution through municipality. They confirmed, if they can construct such home in ketel sefer thus the municipality will supply such lands for them. So in order to minimize such abuse and to address the more victims the municipality distribute lands for whose residence in ketel sefer is great or equal to five years (Informant A14).

Lack of Access to Basic Services

Another livelihood-related risk that Kotiatina IDPs continue to face is a lack of access to basic housing services such as electricity, potable water and waste water management. Though authorities discussed this issue with a

group of IDPs and promised to work to develop infrastructure, nothing was done. As Informant A4 recounts:

> The place of Kotatina was devoid of any basic services and very detrimental for my life and housing especially during the first two years. There was no water, electricity and even road services which has been still the main problem. Being an IDP especially during the first two years of my displacement and resettlement was the worst experience ever I experienced before.

The existing services are very limited   to satisfy both at individual and at household Levl. Both FGDs and key informant respondents reported that a persisting lack of potable water requires them to buy daily drinking water. Individuals who still do not have access to basic housing services are compelled to pay money to other persons who are getting access to the basic services in their newly built homes. The study participants reported that they were made to resettle outside of the mainstream infrastructure that provides services for urban population of Bahir Dar city. Informant A1 describes the situation:

> I have experienced loss of housing that was accessible to the main road, direct electric services, and potable water supply. Still, the serious problem of me is payments for one electric bulb. I am paying 25 Ethiopian birr on a monthly basis that indirectly extended from another relocated person through negotiations and agreements. I am also suffering from regular or daily payments for buying potable water because of the shortage of water supply here in Kotatina. For instance, for one 'Jerika', which could contain ten liters of water, I am supposed to pay 40 cents through agreements and negotiation with local residents.

The two key informants from Bahir Dar municipality responded to this problem by noting that the problem of inadequate service delivery proves challenging .It is not only evident in Kotatina, but also in other new urban settelements. Thus, they argue, the solutions to service delivery problems hinge on the overall development process, and it requires time (Informants A13 and A14).

Lack of Access to Transportation

A lack of physical mobility within and beyond their locality is a common characteristic of the economic life of displaced people. Study participants

described distinct transportation problems, largely in connection with their livelihood strategies. According to the respondents (FGDs' and key informants), transportation is a major issue as residents strive to survive in the informal labor markets of the urban economy.

Internally displaced households or persons (IDPs) are obliged to commute between their home residences and places of work daily. In this regard, Gebre (2008) found that because of a lack of adequate transportation services, some lose site-related advantages of both formal and informal employment or major livelihood assets and activities, some lose home-sites, and others lose both. A common statement highlighted by Informants A3 and A6 is that 'everybody here strive to survive by smaller activities.' Comprising the poorer segment of the wider socio-economic spectrum of the society, the economic survival strategies of IDPs is largely constituted by the informal economy. Most IDPs are predominantly engaged in the informal labor markets such as Gullet-Gebeya, located near Kebele 4, 14, 15, and 16, and comprising of informal and small-trade activities such as, hired day workers, construction workers and sellers of handicrafts, local drinks (such as Arkie and Tella), bread, tea and local coffee.

In securing income, daily travel from Kotatina to market places located in the inner parts of the city in Kebele 4 and Kebele 16 is necessary. As Informant A6 stated, 'if somebody comes into Kotatina resettlement site early in the morning, every individual of both women and men of a household member are seen coming out from their home and travel for searching for informal activities on a daily basis.' Or as Informant A4 put it, 'if somebody comes to Kotatina neighborhood in a day time; most houses are getting closed due to their engagement in daily informal works far from the place of their residences.' Individuals return from daily informal work at dusk to sleep and have no time for doing anything else. In other words, because their economic activities are far from their homes, IDPs do not undertake working and housing activities simultaneously, as was common practice before their displacement. Another impediment to reliable transportation noted by residents, are the muddy areas located between Kotatina and mainstream urban transport services, because of which, the neighborhood is cut off from taxi services.

Financial Capital: Compensation Issues

The redeeming effect of cash compensation was not considered during the relocation process. One of the most common subthemes that emerged from the research is the absence of compensation related to displacement. Informants describes the process leading to their sudden eviction from Ketel Sefer and relocation to Kotatina, noting that a few weeks before their immediate eviction, authorities called a sudden meeting for a discussion with the community. An ad hoc committee drawn from community members was formed to work temporarily with the registration of household heads, and identify households entitled to compensation.

One of the complex problems of poor urban residents internally displaced by development projects is related to the legal statuses of their land and housing. The project planners and designers did not propose any cash compensation for displacement and resettlement except allocating 105 meter square plot of land for individuals in Kotatina as compensation. As previously noted, some participants considered their displacement and resettlement without compensation as a wrongdoing committed against their rights and raised their grievances to municipal authorities. One key informant said, 'I bought the land from the local inhabitants though the municipality didn't give me legal document.' However, some IDPs who had been squatter settlers in the urban locality viewed the allocation of land as compensation. All of the informants openly reported about the compensation related issues, particularly the justification of the lack of compensation by municipal authorities. Informant A3 describes the responses provided by the authorities concerned in the following way:

> The concerned authorities justified that the compensation is offered in forms of land. Your previous land was possessed not through the municipality system. Thus you don't have legal grounds to complain against the action of this development project. The project is built for the benefits of all people including you. They warned us not to raise the issues of cash compensation, that [we] may be at risk of losing the plots of land provided for housing reconstruction.

The municipality key informants, A13 and A14, outlined this procedure of urban development. Stating that somebody who has a home through the municipality and has a site conformation letter and structural maps of the house that are signed and approved by the municipal authority, has the right

to claim both land and finance for the construction of the home. However, somebody that has their own home but does not have an accreditation letter and structural maps of the house (including additional structures that border the house), does not have the right to claim finance for construction but may only be granted the land for building the house

In defiance of this municipal protocol, a number of internally displaced households obtained their former housing land through informal arrangements. One informant noted that the formal means of obtaining urban land was unthinkable for poor urban settlers and, as such, informal land transactions constituted the most viable economic alternative. Most participants admitted that their settlement was considered to be illegal. Informant A8's personal account exemplifies this type of illegal acquisition of housing land through informal arrangements:

> I came to Bahir Dar area in 1983. I bought the land of Ketel Sefer in the same year, 1983, informally from the local farming inhabitant and built a home and lived there until I was displaced in 2008.

Despite such informal transactions, money spent for the land and previous housing was overlooked by authorities and relocation was implemented without any compensation given to the poor households. Participants reported that the absence of any compensation for their displacement was a critical problem. In addition to being traumatic and stressful, the absence of any compensation left heavy burdens on poor residents in rebuilding their new home place, as expressed by both FGDs. Key informant participants openly expressed their grievances against being displaced without compensation, as detail by Informant A3:

> I didn't get any compensation for all properties I lost. Initially, authorities promised to give us compensation for the costs of the displacement and resettlement processes. Later, that was not materialised. The situation exposed me to extra and unexpected expense. For instance, I paid 713 Ethiopian birr for the plot of land to get the master planning paper done. Besides, for the first two months in the immediate aftermath of the eviction, I paid 100 Ethiopian birr for the rented house. A lot [of] expenses to buy 'enchet' (wood), tin for reconstruction of the home. I was also made to buy water for drinking and for construction purposes. Thus displacement makes me to expend much money, to construct my house,

and weakened my financial capacity and makes the day to day lives difficult.

Natural Capital: Landlessness

In this particular study, not all displaced households received housing land. The displacement and resettlement scenarios resulted in a crisis of housing land issues for some groups of IDPs. Although the registration of all displaced households was conducted, approximately 65 displaced households were not given plots of land for housing .The land was given based on their lengths of residency in Ketel Sefer.Their residency lenthen less than five years remain without giving such land for building their house.. The issue of landlessness is very complex to understand among IDPs, especially in relation to households that did not receive land. Similarly, Asmamaw (2011) confirms that the displacement and resettlement of squatter settlers further aggravates the risks of homelessness. Although the authorities conducted their registrations, individuals reported that they remained landless:

> Mine is a very unique case... I have faced the worst experience of being IDP especially of being homelessness. I [had] been living for 25years in my Ketel Sefer residence. And I had my own house. As opposed to other IDPs, I have remained landless for the reason that I couldn't know. Currently, I am living in a rented small room shelter for which I am paying 70 Ethiopian birr monthly In relation to landlessness, the size of the land is important. Participants expressed their grievances regarding the size of the housing land allocated for displaced households in Kotatina resettlement sites. The size of plot of land is estimated to be 105m^2, which is much smaller than the plots of urban residences in Bahir Dar city and other similar nearby cities. This reduced size of housing land curtailed the home-based services and other related activities of households. As Informant A11 reported, 'we share a single toilet for three to four households. Lack of maintenance makes it unclean. We could not make a private toilet due to the compactness of the land. (Informant A11).

Based on observations, the landlessness and lack of sufficient space has resulted in IDPs currently living in crowded and, therefore unsafe, conditions in the new resettlement neighborhood.

Human Capital: Lack of Educational and Health Services

Similar to the above mentioned impacts on the other aspects of livelihood capital, the displacement also negatively affected what will be termed 'human capital', referring to those infrastructures such as education and health services that ensure individual wellbeing and development. Because of Kotatina's newness, the transport, water, electric and telecommunication infrastructures were not in place before relocation began. As a result, the school, health post, health center and hygiene related developments are by far the most inadequate when compared to the other infrastructural developments observed in the neighborhood. It is noted that as a result inadequate educational facilities, some of the school-age children in Kotatina remained in their houses rather than attending kindergarten or primary schools.

Similar infrastructural failures related to health and hygiene have resulted in the emergence and outbreak of malaria. There is no health service center accessible to the Kotatina neighborhood and, as such, ill residents must take two to three taxes to reach the nearest health center. The situation is described by Informant A8 as follows:

> I have four children's all of them reach at school age but only the two have got the opportunity to attend school and the remaining are around their home because of one of them can't walk long journey to reach the school and one of the children as is guarding the house during day time when both of us-mother and father are not around homestead in order to win the house livelihood. As I mentioned, we [husband and wife] regularly come back home at the day fall and are engaged to accomplish the remaining housing activities. One day when the smallest kid was ill due to malaria, we were not around our home and nobody was calling us about the situation and the child remained at home until we [came] back to our home. At that day, we were frustrated by the moment. After a lot of ups and downs, we were able to take him to one of the far-off health center and saved our child.

Most significantly, Informant A8 explained that this type of problem is common to most relocated residents of Kotatina as they suffer from a lack of access to adequate health services and facilities.

Social Capital: Social Disintegration

As briefly mentioned above, relocation caused changes in the social ties of IDPs. The disintegration of previous and long-lasting networks of

relationships was evident following the geographical separation of neighbors caused by the relocation. Housing-based ties were not considered by concerned authorities in the process of household identification, registration and the provision of small plots of land. Informant A12 describes how internal displacement affected his social ties:

> The displacement affected only parts of our social life in terms of the disintegration of groups of persons who attended the coffee ceremony together. My close persons of the coffee groups are now disintegrated. Some live in the right corner of the new locality and the remaining is living in the left corner of the locality. It is rarely we are in contact with such coffee members. Now, I have established a new coffee group here in the new place of residence.

Informants described the way in which each head of household was made to resettle in a new place of residence, in a method that disregarded social ties based on geographical proximity. From the registered individual or households, most were identified as eligible to receive plots of housing land. Without consideration given to geographical or residential proximity, IDPs drew lots to have the opportunity to choose a parcel or their share of the plots identified for resettlement in Kotatina. This haphazardly designed land provision led to the dispersion of pre-displacement neighbourly groups. Informant A7 notes:

> Right! "ke dero gorebetoch gar terarekenal" literally my long lasting and old neighbours are separated and I have lesser contact and relationships with them in Ketel Sefer. [We] are now made [to] resettle in very separate places of residences.

Positive Aspects of Urban Development: Displacement in Context

Study participants were asked their views about the positive aspects of being displaced and resettled into their new neighborhood. The interviews identified some of the positive aspects of internal displacement and resettlement. One such aspect is that IDPs are now the legal owners of the land registered by the municipality. As such, though they are exposed to the various infrastructural problems noted above, they are partly happy with their ownership of urban land. Informant A3 expresses this sentiment, stating:

> Thanks to God after a lot of ups and downs, now my housing facilities are better than other IDPs in Kotatina. Now I could be able to get legal land for my housing though built of wood and mud. During our life in Ketele Sefer, we were repeatedly asked by governments to leave the public land.

Another positive aspect of internal displacement and resettlement is that the pre-existing informal, traditional and self-help associations have remained intact following relocation. Traditional voluntary associations broaden the system of social relations among urban inhabitants. Similarly, self-help associations such as *Iddir*, *Ikub*, and *Senbet-Maheber* are seen to establish stable patterns of relationships between individual members of the association. Currently, the communities of IDPs are actively engaged in multiple forms of informal associations. According to informants, most of the informal associations were established prior to their displacement and, as such, the IDPs have had the experience of participating in informal associations such as *Iddr* and *Ikub* in both their old and new neighborhoods. Informant A6 states:

> One of the strengths, I realised, is that attempts have been made by authorities to resettle all displaced communities in one locality that would help us protect the disruptions of the existing associations and relationships. This really helped us to maintain our long lasted Iddir and Ikub associations. For instance, I was and still am the cashier of the Iddir since the last ten years even before the displacement of residents from neighborhood in the year 2008.

Discussion

The development-induced displacement resulted in a number of undesirable consequences for the poor urban households. Though some livelihood risks

play a more primary role in impoverishing poor urban residents, all of the risks may be understood as interconnected. One of the observable features of livelihood risks related to displacement is that the intensity of the individual elements or variables of livelihood risks vary at times (Cernea 2000; Cernea 2005). Data across FGDs indicated that one of the most common livelihood risks faced by individual head of households was the complete destruction or loss of their shelter temporarily without the offer of compensation packages. The situation during the transition period compelled each head of household to stay in rented houses as a survival strategy that varied in length from two to six months. This reality sits in stark contrast to the document reviewed from feasibility studies conducted by the municipality authority that assured that the stadium project would have significant positive socio economic impacts for the overall development of Bahir Dar city and its residents; including the poor, women, men, youth, tourists, merchants, etc... In addition to loss of homes, the relocation process also entailed the complete loss of access to basic public services. Lack of infrastructure for basic services such as electricity, potable water and waste management, as well as educational and health services, are still critical problems in Kotatina. Cernea (2000; 2005) notes that patterns of livelihood risks spurred by internal displacement vary across affected communities and between groups. In the case of Kotatina, the FGDs in particular indicated that women, children and the elderly are more vulnerable to the livelihood risks faced by the project-affected community.

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, researchers seem to take for granted that development-induced displacement leads to the disintegration of social networks in the form of family separation or neighborhood disintegration. The interview data as well as the FGDs reveals the prevalence and significance of social networks, with consideration being given to the disruption of pre-displacement networks of individual persons and the formation of new networks post-displacement. Parts of social networks of IDPs are changed, such as coffee groups that are formed based on the geographic proximity of neighbors. The change and continuity of networks of IDPs were also understood by referring to the retention of existing social networks. As proved by the respondents, the displacement initiative did not consider residents' livelihood contexts and denied them agency over their rights to live and their opinions on local development. As such, it is seen that the development project resulted in a number of undesirable consequences

for the IDPs. However, after significant struggle (which still greatly affects the daily existence of the IDPs), some IDPs have been successful in overcoming some of these undesirable consequences by developing strategies to recover their lives to their pre-displacement states.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As it has been presented so far, urban development-induced displacement in Kotatina resulted in numerous consequences on the livelihoods of poor urban residents. As is indicated by most of the literature, the findings of this investigation have shown that development-induced displacement results in further impoverishments and deteriorations to the livelihoods of residents, particularly vulnerable groups such as women, children and the poor. The implementation of the stadium project also failed to account for the loss of main assets of the IDPs, particularly the land and physical assets that would be important in generating other assets. Though some IDPs received land compensation, it was perceived as inadequate compensation for the extensive loss as a result of the implementation of the project. The relocation also created a financial burden on IDPs by adding a number of additional expenses that were not manageable for poor households. In addition, lack of market services and accessibility also hampered IDPs income generating activities and options for self-employment.

Urban development-induced relocation partly resulted in the disintegration and loosening of IDPs social ties. Additionally, it was found that lack of transportation and adequate education and health care facilities near residents neighborhoods, pose considerable risks to personal wellbeing and development. Furthermore, women were found to be more affected by the undesirable consequences of relocation that men.

Despite these livelihood risks spurred by urban development-induced relocation, some displaced people seemed positive that households were able to secure small plot of housing land which is legally recognised by the municipality of the city administration. The stadium project is also argued to be important for the future development of Bahir Dar city and, as it was argued by municipal authority side key informants and a noted in the project feasibility study, constructing an international multi-purpose stadium in Bahir Dar city has the potential for direct and indirect positive future impacts for all residents in the city. However, this argument fails to acknowledge that

the environmental and social impact assessment was made for nominal rather real measures taken based on such recommendations.

Recommendations

The study suggests that knowledge of the multifaceted problems and livelihood risks faced by IDPs is important to consider in the implementation of development programs. Thus, the relocation process should be implemented, not only with project feasibility studies that show promising benefits for the overall urban development and most citizens in the city, but also with environmental and social impacts studies that consider the negative impacts of development-induced displacement on the physical, financial, natural, human and social capital of low-income households. Based on such studies, municipalities should take the necessary measures for each negative impact based on the environmental management plan which is designed in the environmental impacts assessment process.

The study also suggests that understanding the positive aspects of internal displacement is an important avenue for needs- or problems-based development approaches and interventions, including rehabilitative measures and actions. There is a need to understand the interest and consent of individuals and communities experiencing development-induced internal displacement and resettlement. Currently, the relocated communities in Kotatina are demanding that the concerned authorities provide access to the same basic infrastructures available in the mainstream urban society of Bahir Dar city. Based on this case study, the study advises that urban development plans need to more closely consider the implications of relocation on the lives and livelihood opportunities of poor households.

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