

# The Islamists' Responses to Modernity and Their Notion of Active Da'wa

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## ABSTRACT

*This research examines the the impact of modernity that has been reshaping Muslims' lives in Muslim societies. It particularly examines various impacts of modernity such as colonialism, secularism, liberalism, and Westernization that led Islamist to worry about the decreasing role that Islam was playing in society and in the state. Their worry about the absence of Islam in the public sphere led the Islamists to become the front line da'wa group, intensively countering the impact of modernisation in the Islamic world. This research employs qualitative approach combining observation and texts review. Reviewing the relevant texts and observation to the contemporary da'wa movements and individuals are conducted within both fieldwork and desk work. As the result, I argue that the Islamists are the most 'active' Islamic da'wa movement in the modern societies including in Indonesia. Activism is their core da'wa characteristics that routinely calls on Muslims to respond to the impact of Western power. Their da'wa, therefore, is an activist ideology. This research contributes to the contemporary da'wa discourses and movements in the Muslim world.*

*Keywords: Da'wa, Islam, Modernization, Muslims, Western.*

## ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini mengkaji dampak modernitas yang telah 'membentuk ulang' kehidupan umat Islam ditengah masyarakat Muslim. Penelitian ini, secara khusus meneliti berbagai dampak modernitas seperti kolonialisme, sekularisme, liberalisme, dan westernisasi yang membuat kaum Islamis khawatir tentang menurunnya peran yang dimainkan Islam ditengah masyarakat dan negara. Kekhawatiran mereka tentang absennya Islam di ruang publik membuat kaum Islamis menjadi kelompok garis depan dalam melakukan da'wa, yang secara intensif melakukan counter terhadap dampak modernisasi di dunia Islam.

Penelitian ini diuji melalui pendekatan kualitatif yang menggabungkan observasi dengan ulasan terhadap teks-teks tertulis yang relevan. Melakukan kajian teks dan pengamatan langsung terhadap gerakan da'wa kontemporer dan individu dilakukan dengan cara fieldwork (kerja lapangan) dan desk work (kerja kepastakaan). Sebagai hasil dari penelitian ini, saya berpendapat bahwa kaum Islamis adalah gerakan da'wa Islam yang paling 'aktif' dalam masyarakat Muslim modern termasuk di Indonesia. Aktivisme adalah karakteristik utama da'wa mereka yang secara rutin menyerukan umat Islam untuk merespons dampak dari kekuatan atau hegemoni Barat. Da'wa mereka, oleh karena itu, adalah memiliki ideologi aktivis. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada wacana dan gerakan da'wa kontemporer di dunia Muslim.

Kata Kunci: Da'wa, Islam, Modernisasi, Muslim, Barat.

## INTRODUCTION

Modernisation that have been taking place in Muslim countries since the nineteenth century and earlier have changed the relationship between Islam and the state. The reformulation of laws as a consequence of modernisation, and the adoption of a largely Westernised legal system, has had a profound impact on Islamic courts and the position of the *ulama*. Modern, Western-influenced, 'secular' law has occupied a more dominant position in these states, often replacing the role of Islamic law with respect to matters of regulation and punishment.

The limiting of the role of such *shari'ah* related institutions in the colonial and now the postcolonial public sphere, and the restriction of Islamic authority in modern nation-states is perhaps the main way in which so-called 'Islamists' – who struggle through various political means to re-Islamise the public sphere - have encountered 'the downfall of the hegemony of the symbolic Muslim system'.<sup>1</sup> While many Islamists accommodated themselves to the idea of the nation-state, at least in the sense that it became the focus of their projects of Islamisation, secular Western ideologies, from atheism to consumer capitalism, have been seen as the key factor in undermining the normative Muslim systems of authority in the modern world. Such key factors have been responded by the Islamists through their *da'wa* movements.

This article outlines Islamism in Indonesian contexts that influenced by Islamism in the Middle East, and highlighting particular gaps in the existing literature with regard to the *Tarbiyah* movement. Previous literatures on this *da'wa* movement mostly studied the *Tarbiyah* movement in association with the increasingly formal and very public *dakwah* managed by

the Prosperous and Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS). My research maintained that this movement are also shaped by their members in middle and lower levels of the movement which have strong roots in informal networks (different with politics) that mainly emphasise the personal impact of a more private *da'wa* and embodied religious training in strengthening their individual piety and sense of belonging amongst its members. It is worth in my opinion, to study this movement through both their individual *da'wa* and their public *da'wa*, and also to provide a clear perspective on their position to modernity and how they respond through their *da'wa* movements.

This article explains the significance of active *da'wa* within the Islamists in the modern period. This article begins by explaining the impact of modernity to the Muslim world, followed by examining the Islamists' response to the impact of globalised modernity, and then exploring the Islamist notion of active *da'wa*.

#### THE IMPACT OF MODERNITY TO MUSLIM SOCIETY

From the sixteenth century through to the nineteenth, European society gradually acquired and expanded its cultural, economic, and political supremacy. This growth was marked by the rise of the natural sciences, new technology which enabled industrial capitalism and new forms of communication (such as the printing press), as well as a new political stability. The structural transformations that Europe witnessed in these areas is often collectively known as 'modernity'.<sup>2</sup>

The modern period was also the period during which Muslim supremacy declined as European economic and political strength increased. Thus the European conquest of Muslim lands also occurred in this period, with Britain, France, and the Netherlands having conquered and colonised numerous Muslim countries by the end of eighteenth century.<sup>3</sup> One by one, the Ottoman caliphate's territories were occupied, and the caliphate itself – which was the only remaining symbol of Muslim political supremacy – started to decline, with its final collapse occurring in 1924. The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate – 'the sick man of Europe' - was widely taken as the key symbol of Muslim political stagnation.

European colonisation pushed Muslims into an intense encounter with modernity. Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation of Egypt in 1799 not only brought French troops armed with guns, but also modern science, ad-

ministration, and technology. Later, Egypt was colonised by the British, who built modern hospitals, schools, and scientific laboratories. Egypt's Muslim leaders and religious scholars were amazed by these European modern scientific developments, and these encounters made them realise how much Islamic countries had declined compared to European (non-Muslim) countries. Within this period, then, Muslims came to acknowledge the superiority of European society and the end of their own supremacy. They felt that the Europeans had left them too far behind in the fields of modern education, economics, politics, and military power, and this loss of power produced a deep psychological impact on Muslims.

Realising their 'backwardness', many Muslim leaders adopted modernity, particularly within the arena of politics. They built freedom movements which aspired to indigenous modern nation-states, often leaving the idea of the caliphate and other traditional Islamic political systems behind. Nation-state building began after World War I, and during this period, Muslim elites in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia endeavoured to establish modern political and social systems. These modernisation programmes transformed the structures of political systems in Muslim societies, with Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, becoming the first Muslim country to reject the Islamic caliphate and become a modern, secular state. For Attaturk, to develop the state required Turkey to become westernised and Islam largely privatised, and such thinking led to similar modifications soon following in other Muslim states.

This 'modernisation' agenda challenged many Muslims' convictions, particularly those who disagreed with the marginalisation of Islamic systems. In the face of such challenges, many Muslims felt it necessary to defend Islam and to object to the adoption of secular concepts such as rationalism, parliamentary institutions, and the replacement of Islamic law with European law. Many regarded this reform as being incompatible with Islamic principles requiring Muslims to use *shari'ah* as the central source of Muslim social life, and saw it as removing Islam from Muslims' public lives.

As a result, heated debate emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries among Muslims, concerning how best to respond to modernity. Many scholars including Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy (2004), and Kurzman (2002) have come up with different but related

typologies to classify Muslim responses to modernity.<sup>4</sup> There are three basic types of Muslim response to modernity as suggested by these scholars – the traditionalist; the modernist (and to some extent related to secularist position); and the Islamist. As Rippin (2005) points out, typologies are theoretical categories that can help to identify tendencies, but social realities can rarely be fitted neatly into one position or another. In this article, I will examine only the most relevant typology to this topic; the Islamists.

### ISLAMISTS' RESPONSES TO MODERNITY

The absence of Islamic values in public spheres, Islamic states, and Muslim rulers are the main concerns of the Islamists. As a result of the impact of modernisation and secularisation brought by colonialism, the role of traditional *ulama* and religious scholars in conducting *da'wa* had changed in the modern period. With the developments of new media, the printing press and information technologies, Muslims became exposed to new religious discourses from *ulama* old and new, as well as modernists and Islamists. Modernists and Islamists challenged and criticised the traditionalists' approach to *da'wa* through their *dakwah* movements. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the state. In the twentieth century, Islamist movements came to represent ideological opposition to the influence of other Western 'isms', such as liberalism, Zionism, and secularism.<sup>5</sup> For them, the "cultural imperialism" and the increasing global hegemony of Western culture, economic and politics have shifted Islamic values of Muslims.

In responding to the impact of modernity, the Islamists rejected the ideas of both traditionalists and modernists or secularists.<sup>6</sup> The Islamists is characterised by its key ideology that 'Islam(ism) is the solution' (*Al-Islamu huwa al-hall*). In this regard, Islam is not only seen as a religion, but also as a political ideology. It is should reformulate all aspects of society, including politics, economics, social life, the law, and so forth,<sup>7</sup> with Islamists emphasising the absolute character of the source of authority of Islam; Quran and Sunna.

In contrast with traditionalists, modernists and secularists, Islamists tend to accept changes in a 'controlled' fashion.<sup>8</sup> They accept more restricted changes than modernists, and use the two authoritative sources

of the Quran and the Sunna to accept or legitimate changes in the modern era. Islamists have often responded to modernisation in a complex fashion by rejecting Westernisation but rooting certain aspects of modernity in the 'pure' Islam of the Quran and Sunna. Thus, Islamists have 'indigenised and Islamised' many concepts and structures from Western political sciences, including ideology, revolution, organisation, democracy, and political parties.<sup>9</sup>

Islamists use political actions to attempt to re-create a 'true' and 'pure' Islamic society utilising *shari'ah* (Islamic law) to govern the state as well as public life. Most Islamists have sought to establish political parties and have participated in democratic procedures such as general elections whilst trying to show that Islam represents the best form of 'democracy'.<sup>10</sup> Islamists have claimed that *shura* (consultation), as mentioned in the Qur'an and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, is a principle of democracy in Islam, but have accepted democracy per se in order to support their goal of establishing an Islamic society.

The Islamists ideology was in many ways inspired and influenced by pre-modern revivalist figures like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787 CE). As revivalists, such figures attributed the political decline of Muslims to the increasing heterodoxy of the everyday practice of Islam. Revivalists believe that if Muslims return to 'pure' Islam as found in the Qur'an and Sunna, they will be able to restore the 'glory' of the past. Hence, the ideology of Islamism is related to revivalism and related complex and criss-crossing orientations in terms of a basic emphasis on seeking to purify and revitalize Islam.<sup>11</sup>

Islamists are also to some extent influenced and inspired by the reformist ideas of Egyptian scholars such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897 CE), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905 CE), and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935 CE) who are considered amongst the most influential modernist figures.<sup>12</sup> However, Islamism's reformist ideas have a complex relationship to such modernist figures. The modernists' reformist ideas generally attempted to reinterpret Islam in such a way so as to support modernity, while the Islamists came to focus more on Islamising modernity. Richard Mitchell, writing of the first mass Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which was founded in 1920s Egypt, explains: "the Islamist movements aimed at a total reform of the political, economic, and social life of the country".<sup>13</sup> Thus a general characteristic of Islamism is the belief

that Islamic teachings should encompass all aspects of life, from the private to the public domain.

Scholars such as Rippin (2005), Roy (2004) and Nasr (1996) consider Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) to be amongst the earliest Islamist ideologues. They are founding fathers and intellectuals of Islamist *dakwah* movements, namely the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (established in 1928) and the Jamaat-i Islami (JI) in Pakistan (established in 1941). Their *da'wa* emphasises the promotion of Islamic teachings and the provision of information on Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims.<sup>14</sup> Through these *dakwah* organisations, the afore-mentioned Islamist figures advocated a more 'authentic' Islamic framework for Muslim society. Also, whilst Mawdudi and al-Banna believed that the use of persuasion and gradual changes was best suited for achieving Islamic goals, Qutb believed in the need for more radical change.

These three Islamists figures had a significant impact on Muslims worldwide, especially young educated Muslims in urban areas with secular educational backgrounds.<sup>15</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood attracted Muslims in the Middle East especially, and some of their branches became prominent parties in the Sudan, Palestine and Tunisia. By contrast, the JI became more prevalent among South Asian Muslims, and their immigrant and diaspora communities in Pakistan, India, East Africa, the UK, and the Caribbean.<sup>16</sup> However, the Muslim Brotherhood also attracted Muslims in Indonesia, and became the inspiration for an Islamist *dakwah* party, whilst the influence of the JI is not prevalent among Indonesian Muslims. Indeed, movements in the Middle East such as the Muslim Brotherhood or *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, have had a strong global influence on Islamist movements worldwide, including in Indonesia. This movement influenced the Tarbiyah movement conceptually and ideologically (Machmudi, 2016; Permata, 2013). The Tarbiyah movement designed their *da'wa* programs/activities and goals based on the gradual Islamisation of the MB (individual-family-society and state).

#### THE ISLAMIST NOTION OF 'ACTIVE' *DA'WA*

As the modernisation brought a shift in Islamic worlds in terms of culture, social life, economics, and politics, including the marginalisation of the *shari'ah* court, the *ulama's* role in society, and traditional Islamic

schools, the Islamists *da'wa* have been very active especially in countering Western culture, politics, and economics.<sup>17</sup> They regarded western culture, economics, and politics as reflecting 'Western' values, which are characterised as 'atheistic', secular, and anti-religion.<sup>18</sup> Islamist *da'wa* movements see Islam as a comprehensive and active ideology whose role is not only to transform their selves but also their society (especially politics, cultures and economics).

These movements, thus propagate *da'wa* messages, not only focusing on private *da'wa* or seeking to Islamise individuals, but also focusing on public *da'wa* with the aim of Islamising the society and the state.<sup>19</sup> The focus of *da'wa*, for them, should go beyond the level of the individual, and be instrumental in creating an Islamic society, either through establishing Islamic political parties or producing impacts on the social and spiritual aspects of society through some other media or 'counter public'.<sup>20</sup> In transforming their societies, these movements developed a variety of *da'wa* models, including religious edification, religious education or training, and Islamic charity or social activity, building educational centres, religious places, and social and public services such as hospitals and clinics to support their *da'wa* agenda. They also travelled to many countries around the world to promote their *da'wa* ideology and, as a result, transnational *da'wa* activities and *da'wa* organisations have been established in many parts of the Muslim world.<sup>21</sup> These organisations have adopted various new forms of *da'wa*, with new aims based on their religious interpretations, their responses to public issues, and their involvement in social and political activities.

The core message of their *da'wa* is that Islam should be strongly present not only in the private sphere, but in the public sphere as well. For the modern Islamists, then, it is not enough simply to be a good Muslim just in the personal or private sphere; Muslims also need to actively shape the society or state they live in by seeking to make it more Islamic. Thus, Islamist movements focus on both disciplining the self for improving individual piety and controlling public piety.<sup>22</sup> For the Islamists, strengthening individual piety is a Muslim obligation which aims to reject Western or modernisation influences to their religious values.

In my previous study (2019), I explained that 'Individual piety' means the commitment to perform obligatory rituals such as the five-times-daily-prayers, reciting the Qur'an, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving

alms, and dressing and behaving in an 'Islamic' way. While 'public piety' means particular behaviour or practice performed in the public sphere that comes to have political significance. The concept of public piety also implies that there may be attempts at the regulation and standardisation of practices that are regarded by particular constituencies as appropriately 'pious'.

Key Islamist figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abul A'la Mawdudi have greatly influenced contemporary Islamist *da'wa* movements by strengthening their focus on locating Islamic identity within the public sphere and critiquing modernity. They also exemplify more 'gradualist' (al-Banna and Mawdudi) and more 'radical'/'revolutionary' (Qutb) forms of Islamism. Al-Banna, the founder of the MB, was deeply concerned about the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic beliefs and practices of Egyptian Muslims, perceiving Western culture and thought to have had a significant influence on Muslims in Egypt. He regarded this influence as a cause of the moral and political decline of Muslims, and created a new model of *da'wa* that called on Muslims to perform Islamic teachings in their daily life to address this, ranging from issues regarding domestic affairs to public matters.

For al-Banna, Islam needed to provide the key guidance for Muslim societies, and his influence is clear in the MB's political views that Islam: 1) is a comprehensive, self-evolving system providing the ultimate path to life; 2) emanates from, and is based on, two fundamental sources – the Qur'an and the Sunna; and 3) is applicable at all times and places.<sup>23</sup> However, although he, like other Islamists, promoted the establishment of a better Islamic state, he did not propose violence as a means for achieving this *da'wa* goal. Like al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb (born in 1906 in Asyut-Egypt), also criticised modern cultures and thoughts.<sup>24</sup> These criticisms are mostly presented in his books, *al-Adala al-Ijtima'iyya fi al-Islam* (Social Justice in Islam) which was written in 1949 and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) which was first published in 1964. The first book explains that the separation of religion and politics is a characteristic of Western societies and thus would be inappropriate for Islamic societies. The second book deals with the key concept of *jahiliyya* (ignorance). According to Qutb, although current Muslim societies proclaim themselves to be Muslim, they do not practice worship (*ibadah*), and they erroneously believe in sovereignty (*hakimiyya*) other than God. For Qutb, Muslims in these societies are also living in

*jahiliyya*.<sup>25</sup>

According to Qutb, any society that is not Muslim is an instance of *jahiliyya*, and everything outside Islam must also be included in the category of *Jahiliyya* as it is derived from the spirit of barbarism and is contrary to Islamic teachings.<sup>26</sup> For Qutb, although contemporary Muslim governments remain, they can be categorised as ‘infidel’ governments when they do not implement *shari’ah*. Muslim rulers, as they existed in the history of Islam are, therefore, not enough for Qutb and his followers: Muslim rulers must have a commitment to implementing *shari’ah* and Islamic values in their countries. A Muslim society, according to Qutb, must apply Islam across the board, letting it guide their faith, worship, legislation, social organisations and modes of behaviour.

As a result of these views, Qutb, unlike al-Banna, stated that Muslims are allowed to fight against such ‘infidel’ governments. Qutb therefore promoted a new model of *da’wa* that emphasised the need for activism and political *jihad* in order to turn Islam into a global power.<sup>27</sup> This shows Qutb’s goal of making Islam the basis of a state – an orientation that demands a total human submission to God.<sup>28</sup> Qutb thus rejected democracy, rationalism and secularism, and held that Islam needed to be purified from Western influences. Soage (2009: 189) highlights that Qutb’s perception on “the corrupt parliamentary democracy of pre-revolutionary Egypt has led him to turn to Islam as the solution of all problems”.<sup>29</sup> For instance, he rejected the Western banking system, which he considered to be contrary to Islamic law. He also criticised Western behaviour, in particular that associated with a concern for material goods.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, he rejected Western ideas about separating religious from secular matters, and the West’s adherence to rationalism. He thus refused to reconcile Islamic teachings with European outlooks, viewing Islam as a comprehensive ideology that regulates all aspects of human life.<sup>31</sup>

Giles Kepel (2005), who studied Islamic radical movements in Egypt, found that many contemporary radical Islamist activists are influenced by Qutb’s ideas and, like Kepel, Rippin (2005) classified Qutb and other Muslims who oppose their governments as ‘radical’ Islamists. Qutb was also considered to be responsible for the shift in the outlook of at least some of the MB’s members from holding moderate views under al-Banna’s leadership to becoming a radical splinter movement. His concept of *Jahiliyya* marks an obvious fission in the MB’s ideology, as al-Banna never accused

the Egyptian regime of his day of being non-Islamic.<sup>32</sup>

Appealing to such an understanding of sovereignty, Mawdudi argued that political sovereignty also belongs to God alone. If there are human agents that seek to constitute the sovereignty of God through implementing the political system of Islam in a state, they will never succeed because of the limitations of their power.<sup>33</sup> A democratic caliphate, for Mawdudi, means that the government is the only institution that is responsible for establishing *shari'ah*. The Islamic caliphate is certainly not a 'theocratic' system. It is the antithesis of monarchy, and fundamentally different from the Western democratic system, which is based on the sovereignty of the people, whereas the caliphate system is tied to the sovereignty of God.

Mawdudi was another key Islamist figure. He was regarded as an Islamist because of his beliefs about God's unique sovereignty, the universal application and implementation of *shari'ah*, and the need for a democratic caliphate.<sup>34</sup> According to Mawdudi, sovereignty over any aspect of life is only for God, since God is the creator and the ruler of the universe.<sup>35</sup> He criticised the concept of democracy because he believed that it mislead people about the true concept of sovereignty.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, governments that are elected by people should consider their position as being *amanah* (in trust) from God. Therefore, they have to implement God's commands – *shari'ah* – in the state and in all Muslim society.

The ideas of criticising 'Western' modernity and emphasising Islamic identity are most attractive to urban, lower middle class Muslims,<sup>37</sup> who believe that modernisation programmes in Muslim countries cannot succeed in transforming these societies into prosperous ones. For them, religious authenticity is the key for this transformation, and this is one of the central factors that generates their interest in the 'alternative' to the state system offered by Islamists. Their *da'wa*, as an activist ideology, therefore represents a new or reinvented approach.

As an Islamist movement, the Tarbiyah Movement that established officially in early 1980s in Indonesia has had an impact on the development of contemporary *da'wa* movements in the country, attracting large numbers of young Muslims. The Tarbiyah movement in this country have similar concerns and ideologies regarding the Islamisation of society and the public sphere with other contemporary Islamist movements worldwide. They are very active in conducting their *da'wa* agenda and promoting their *da'wa* messages online. They actively attend the weekly *Liqo* (reli-

gious training) sessions in their closest neighborhood and other *da'wa* activities.<sup>38</sup> They also use social media platforms for spreading their *da'wa* perspectives online. As been highlighted by Mandaville (2007) and Eickelman and Anderson (2003), this is not surprising, given that the Islamists have been the quickest in using almost all forms of modern technology, including the printing press, social media, and the internet. They conduct *da'wa* in public sphere that is more active and powerful form of *da'wa*, especially nowadays through the use of modern technology; social media and internet, such as Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.

## CONCLUSION

The debate concerning Islam and modernity indicates that there is a range of ways in which Muslims have dealt with modernity. They differ in approaches regarding the extent to which modernity and its transformations should be accommodated. Most Muslims realise that Islam has been declining – in politics, economics, the military, and sciences – and for the Islamists, this decline has been caused by Muslims breaking with Islamic values, identities and traditions. They view most Muslims as failing to practice the 'true' Islam revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and contend that the best way to solve this problem is to return to living by the Qur'an and Sunna.

Islamist *da'wa* movements have played an important role in responding to the absence of Islam from public life that colonialism and secularism led to in Muslim countries. The Islamist *da'wa* ideology concerning the strengthening of Islamic identity and the piety of Muslims, together with the creation of a more Islamic form of society, have attracted young people from the urban lower and middle classes. These young urban Muslims perceive this ideology as representing a revision of Islam that is more responsive to the modern period, and that provides a 'better modernity' – one that is more Islamic, religious, spiritual, just and humane.

Islamist *da'wa* groups are regarded as the most prominent adherents of *da'wa* in modern period. I found that both private *da'wa* (which concerns the Islamisation of the self to create pious individuals) and public *da'wa* (which concerns the Islamisation of society to create a pious society), have different meanings and orientations for contemporary Islamist movements. This finding contributes to the current scholarship and fu-

ture study on Islamist *da'wa* movements regarding that modern Islamists having a stronger commitment to *da'wa* than was the case historically, believe it necessary to be especially active (and even sometimes aggressive) in preaching and Islamising both the private and public domains, not only within individual level but also within society and state level. Their focus on public *da'wa* has resulted in large part from the disappointment that Islamists have confronted regarding the relative absence of *shari'ah* (together with the lack of religious values) within the public sphere in the modern period. Modern Islamists strongly believe in the need for Muslims to be active in Islamising the public sphere and the state.

#### ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Francois Burgat, *Face to Face with Political Islam*. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003).
- <sup>2</sup> Ira M Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- <sup>3</sup> Andrew Rippin, *Muslims; Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*. (London: Routledge, 2005).
- <sup>4</sup> Scholars such as Wiktorowicz (2006), Rippin (2005), Roy (2004), and Kurzman (2002) have come up with different but related typologies such as tradisionalists, modernists, secularists, Islamists and so on and so forth to classify Muslim responses to modernity
- <sup>5</sup> Christoph Schuck, A Conceptual Framework of Sunni Islamism. *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 2013, 14: 4, pp.485-506.
- <sup>6</sup> For further explanation and examples of modernist and traditionalist tendency and ideology, including their emergence and its roots, see Charles Kurzman, 2002 on modernist movements and Twediana Budi Hapsari 2018 on The history of contemporary Indonesian Muslim Groups and Muslim Media, *Jurnal Afkaruna*, vol. 14, no.1, 104-108.
- <sup>7</sup> Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
- <sup>8</sup> Andrew Rippin, 183 & 192.
- <sup>9</sup> Olivier Roy, 447.
- <sup>10</sup> Sayyed Vali R Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- <sup>11</sup> See. Wiktorowicz 2004 and Meijer 2009.
- <sup>12</sup> These figures have a key position in between modernism and revivalism/ Islamism. Al-Afghani, for instance, through his idea of pan-Islamism, attempted to unite Islam politically against the power of Europe, while Rida became a key figure in early Salafism (see. Rippin, 2005).
- <sup>13</sup> Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

- 14 Peter G Mandaville, 2007. *Global Political Islam*, (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 15 Roy, 2004.
- 16 On JI in Britain, see Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, 2012. Muslims in Britain; Questioning Islamic and National Identity. *Indonesian Journal of Muslim Societies*, Vol. 2, No. 2. see also. Mandaville, 283.
- 17 Mandaville, 2007.
- 18 Roy, 2004.
- 19 Ai Fatimah Nur Fuad, Da'wa and Politics; Lived Experiences of the Female Islamists in Indonesia. *Contemporary Islam*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-019-00442-x>.
- 20 Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
- 21 Mandaville, 283.
- 22 Fuad, 2019.
- 23 Mitchell, 1993.
- 24 Qutb is well known as one of the leading figures of the MB. He became a member of this MB in 1951, then head of its department for spreading Islam (*Qism nashr al-da'wa*) in 1952, and an editor of the weekly newspaper *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* in 1954 (Zollner, 2009).
- 25 Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam*, (London: Saqi, 2005).
- 26 Kepel, 47.
- 27 Barbara Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood; Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology*, (New York: Routledge, 2009).
- 28 Khatib, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb*. (New York: Routledge, 2006).
- 29 Ana Belen Soage, Islamism and Modernity: the Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb. *Journal of Totalitarian movement and Political Religions*, 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2, 189-203. See also, Hilmy, 2010 for detail explanation on Islamism and Democracy.
- 30 Robert Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity; the Search for Islamic Authenticity*. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
- 31 See Khatib, 2006; Moussalli, 1992; Shepard, 1992.
- 32 Kepel, 2005.
- 33 The agents are called 'caliphates', which means that they are not sovereigns in-themselves. Such agents are the representatives of the real sovereignty. The agents or systems they construct are under the sovereignty of God, who is the owner of the sovereignty both *de jure* and *de facto*.
- 34 Nasr, 1996.
- 35 Mawdudi elaborated his idea of sovereignty in his book, *First Principle of Islamic State*, published in 1960. Sovereignty is that which *de jure* belongs to Allah, and *de facto* is manifested in the working of all parts of the universe. Mawdudi refers to some verses of al-Qur'an (7:3, 12:40, 5:44) in which it is insisted that the acceptance of the *de jure* sovereignty of God is the meaning of Islam, while denying such sovereignty is *kufr* (unbelief). In other words,

there is no space for any other sovereignty in the world, particularly in a state. The sovereignty can be defined as the source of power and law and, for Mawdudi, such a source is only found in God. Although people elect government representatives, sovereignty does not come from people.

<sup>36</sup> Sayyid Abu A'la Mawdudi, *First Principle of Islamic State.*, (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1960).

<sup>37</sup> See. Burgat, 2003; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996.

<sup>38</sup> Fuad, 2019.

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